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INTRODUCTION
One of the most effective, and most mysterious, tools of modern theoretical physics is a
mathematical method including what is here called “field theory.” The success of this procedure
in unraveling the “zoology” of fundamental particles and their behavior is a marvel. The
philosophical context of this marvel is the source of endless academic controversy. The core of
the method is a blend of mathematics and description created by “physicist-philosophers,” from
Maxwell and Helmholtz to Einstein and Schrödinger. The mystery is expressed in comments of
two giants in physics, Nobelists Eugene Wigner and Paul Dirac. Wigner, in a famous 1959
lecture “The Unreasonable effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences,” put it this
way: “it is difficult to avoid the impression that a miracle confronts us here...1,” and Dirac, in a
1963 Scientific American wrote:
It seems to be one of the fundamental features of nature that fundamental physical
laws are described in terms of a mathematical theory of great beauty and
power...You may wonder: Why is nature constructed along these lines? One can
only answer that our present knowledge seems to show that knowledge is so
constructed. We simply have to accept it.2
This book tries to unravel the mystery, or at least chronicle it. It is about the discoverers, or
more accurately, the inventors of such procedures, or “agendas.” It is constructed from the
words of the “founders” and their contemporaries and of modern historians and philosophers.
This is also about the times of these people, social climates which allegedly nurtured them, and
that they allegedly transformed. The particular “allegations” considered center on the role of
“philosophy” in the development of their “physics.”
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In 1962 the great chemist Linus Pauling told a Soviet philosopher: "I have been studying
science forty years already...and I cannot recall a single instance when philosophy exercised any
influence on the work of any scientist."3 Similar sentiments have dominated the insiders' view of
philosophy and science for most of the twentieth century. This work attempts to initiate doubt of
such propositions by showing them untrue of the work of the founders, at least in theoretical
physics. Those founders, James Clerk Maxwell of Scotland and Hermann von Helmholtz of
Prussia, were products of educational systems steeped in the Romanticism and metaphysics of
the early nineteenth century, and they overtly advocated revisions of such philosophical agendas.
Their scientific work was laced with a new kind of blend of mathematics and analogy,
particularly concerning those kinds of motion we call heat and those kinds of "fields" we call
light. Several distinctive features of their theoretical approach seem to have been ignored by
their successors, particularly those whom philosopher Nancy Cartwright calls
“fundamentalists.”4 These are folks who take the theories of physics literally rather than
metaphorically. In the words of Werner Heisenberg:
“Instead of asking: How can one in the known mathematical scheme
express a given experimental situation? the other question was put: Is it true,
perhaps, that only such experimental situations can arise in nature as can be
expressed in the mathematical formalism? The assumption that this was actually
true led to limitations in the use of those concepts that had been the basis of
classical physics since Newton.5
The allegedly ignored features of those “mathematical schemes” include Maxwell and
Helmholtz’ original constructions as analogies, and the arguably inevitable result of this, internal
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contradictions and paradoxes.
Before disappearing, the paradoxes resulting from these opposing analogies, heat and light,
resonated in the scientific, industrial, philosophical, and academic "revolutions" of the late
nineteenth century, and provide a clue to the divergence in the twentieth of the successors,
Einstein in physics and the "logical positivists" in philosophy. We will invoke the sentiment of a
distinguished predecessor, Mary Hesse:
The discussion has, however, enabled us to compose some variations on a
theme: namely, the historical, heuristic, and logical importance for physics of
ideas and assumptions commonly called metaphysical. A society which is
uninterested in metaphysics will have no theoretical science.6
This reinsertion of metaphysics into physics will require the telling of several stories--of
several characters--of several places--located mostly in the last half of the nineteenth century.
Since many of the events and ideas are unfamiliar to most people more than a century later, it
might help to have a brief overview as a guide.
The central theme is an idea--or rather a bunch of ideas--or, even better, a family of attitudes
or agendas. They appear under many names: Field theory, mixed-mathematics, metaphors,
heuristics, and so on. They are attitudes mainly towards mathematics, physics, and philosophy,
but shed some light (and some shadow) on art, religion, business, and politics as well. The
exemplar metaphors are Maxwell’s “theories” of heat and its measure, temperature, and light and
its measure, color. The peculiar property of these metaphors is the emergence of an internal
contradiction or paradox in fundamentalist interpretation. Not only do these two metaphors
contradict each other, in that one asserts a continuum (plenum) of space filling “fields” and the
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other an aggregate of colliding particles, but each has its own ambiguity of fields and particles
within.
Ideas, attitudes, and agendas are not (usually) "things," but states of mind, hence we should
meet the minds of which these are states. These are primarily of two people, James Clerk
Maxwell and Hermann von Helmholtz. These two have pairs of intellectual "offspring" in
Ludwig Boltzmann and J. Willard Gibbs. This pair again begets another pair, Erwin
Schrödinger and Albert Einstein. The rest of the many characters in these stories relate to the
two principal families in various ways.
People who have ideas, attitudes, and agendas are located in a context. There is here a
context of places–many of them universities. In fact, the whole tale may be more of university
agendas, or fashions, of the nineteenth century than of individuals. In any case, keep your eye
on universities in Cambridge and Edinburgh (Maxwell), Berlin and Heidelberg (Helmholtz), and
the many interacting sites, Tübingen, Königsberg, Göttingen, Vienna, and Graz .
There is also the context of time--or the times. For symmetry, the main events here are
bracketed between the Great Exposition of 1851 and the Columbian Exposition of 1893, with the
Franco-Prussian war of 1870 marking the middle. Wider markers might be more memorable,
say the Revolutions of 1848 and the Einstein papers of 1905. Scientifically, it is tempting to
concentrate on the near-century between 1819, when Oersted first showed that magnetism was
generated by electric currents, and 1915, when Einstein and de Haas showed that these currents
represented the flow of a material substance.
Another context is the arenas in which these stories take place--arenas populated by people
who do not share the ideas of the heroes--who are indifferent, or even in opposition to their
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attitudes. In this story, support and opposition are seen in universities (but mainly the technical
schools), in science (but mainly engineering) and in opposing research agendas. The main battles
to watch out for are the "school-wars" (over agendas), the "atom-wars" (over theory), and the
"Romantic-Realist" wars (over truth), and the "practical men" competing for status with our
principals.
All of this would be a bit sprawling without some plan or structure, so the stories have a
geometry. As in a ladder, there are two parallel supports. Odd-numbered chapters focus on
Maxwell, England and their offshoots, and even-numbered chapters on Helmholtz, Prussia and
their offshoots. This makes for a nice, if unusual symmetry: Boltzmann of Austria develops
from the Maxwell side, Gibbs of Yale from the Helmholtz side. Einstein follows Helmholtz,
though maybe he descends more from Maxwell and Boltzmann. Schrödinger brings up the rear
(in the epilogue).
There are other dualistic themes (the rungs of the ladder?)--theories of heat vs. theories of
light, for instance. As is the way with such labels, the themes serve to introduce a complicated
mix that generally does not resolve itself into simple winners and losers, right-wingers and leftwingers, and so on. But, to paraphrase the text, "to find out the way things are, you've got to find
out how they got that way."

5

CHAPTER 1

It is a major contemporary struggle to assess the role of "background" in the emergence of a
new paradigm of science. To engage in this struggle , we begin with James Clerk Maxwell, one
of the authors of a method of physics called “field theory,” although this name came well after
his time. We will present continuities between Maxwell's collegiate musings and his mature
science; These continuities support an argument for an “evolution” of scientific ideas from a
prior discourse. These ideas were novel, or “paradigm shifting,” at the time as they rearranged
already existing competing paradigmatic agendas--particularly those of his teachers, Forbes the
physicist and Hamilton the philosopher. On the other hand, we will find a gulf between Maxwell
and his predecessors deep enough to support a claim of new,"incommensurable," notions;
suggesting that Maxwell's agenda, particularly his mathematization of Faraday's fields, can be
considered "revolutionary." Rather than try to resolve these conflicting claims of historical
reason by theory , we will try to reconstruct Maxwell's world-view from a mix of contemporary
and retrospective accounts. The play of subsequent history willL resolve issues of debt and
legacy

We choose to begin in 1851, as Maxwell then entered a "culture," Victorian England,
carrying from Scotland a very intensive scientific, cultural, and personal momentum acquired in
his youth in Edinburgh. Prior to his arrival battling professors at Maxwell’s first college,
Edinburgh University, professors James Forbes and William Hamilton enhanced this
momentum. As to his preparation in science he had studied two topics in particular: theories of
heat and its behavior – to conduct through matter to produce temperature changes, and theories
of light and its behavior - to bend and twist in conducting through matter to produce polarization
6

and, most significantly, color. What he found missing from these theories was a coherent
connection between heat and light, particularly a connection between the mathematical recipes
that seemed to “govern” their respective behavior behavior. He would become famous for
providing this connection through the notion of “field.”

MAXWELL COMES TO ENGLAND

The young James Clerk Maxwell arrived in England from Scotland in 1851 in order to
pursue scientific studies at Cambridge. He had already flourished at Edinburgh University, but
he wanted to study at the center of the scientific ferment that was then seemingly sweeping
Europe. To many, "science" was one of the engines driving the new techno-industrial progress.
The very English word "scientist" had been only recently coined by William Whewell of
Cambridge--with whom James intended to study. Popular science lectures by the ingenious
Michael Faraday and his charismatic predecessor, Humphrey Davy, had persuaded the London
elite that more improvements than gas-lights, the telegraph, and laughing gas, were just around
the corner. In the influential "Edinburgh Review" Lord Henry Brougham preached the cultural,
intellectual, and moral virtues of understanding the new world.

At the same time, the visible negative effects of the technological revolution were becoming
worrisome. Edinburgh was so besooted by smoke that it was known as "Auld Reekie," and an
English Royal commission had recently exposed the horrendous working conditions of the
midlands children (rehashed in Engel's notorious "Conditions of the Working Class in
England"). The population of London was dropping (from 128,000 in 1851 to only 27,000 in
1901) as the city shifted from residential to commercial.1 There had been riots in the streets by
7

working-class "Chartists," who wanted political reform, and the Thames was still more-or-less
an open sewer, receiving tons of human waste and garbage washed by the rain from holding-pits
throughout town. Cholera was a frequent visitor.2
In 1851 the great public event that celebrated the benefits of technology to the new England
was the "Great Exhibition," with its Crystal Palace and many industrial exhibits, and this
spectacle drew the close attention of the world's intelligentsia, especially from those nations
recently industrialized or those about to be. For young Maxwell, a cultured man as well as a
technical one, there were other enlightening distractions to be sure. For reading, Dickens'
"David Copperfield" was still the best-selling romance. Poetry was perhaps even more touching,
Tennyson having succeeded Wordsworth as poet Laureate. Tennyson was of special interest to
Maxwell (though he preferred the older poetry of Wordsworth) as a fashionable patron of
a Cambridge literary society, the legendary "Apostles,"--technically the "Cambridge
Conversazione Society"3. According to a contemporary diarist 4 :
Tennyson was then struggling with a reconciliation of scientific knowledge

and spiritual insight, as in his recent (1849) prologue to "In Memoriam":

We have but faith: we cannot know,

For knowledge is of things we see;

And yet we trust it comes from thee.

A beam in darkness: let it grow
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Let knowledge grow from more to more,

But more of reverence in us dwell;

That mind and soul, according well,

May make one music as before,
But vaster...5

Maxwell, a future elder in the Kirk of Scotland and teacher in the "socialist" working man's
institute (run by another Apostle, Tennyson protege F.D. Maurice), would not express such faith
so openly in his poetry, but would do so in his life's work.

The recent deaths of Wordsworth and the artist J.M.W. Turner signaled, in retrospect, the end
of an era of Romanticism not only in England but in all of Europe. In the new generation,
Tennyson's artist friends were the avant-garde "pre-Raphaelites," exotic, but abstract colorists of
mystic visions. Aesthetically, Maxwell preferred Turner’s more traditional "romantic"
pastorales and thematic evocations. Since the days of Napoleon, arts, letters and science had
been dominated by rebellious emotionalism, as in Turner's misty waterscapes or in
Wordsworth’s and Coleridge's academic defense of nostalgic classicism. Turner and Coleridge
had popularized German Romanticism through essays--especially on Goethe and his scientificpoetic agenda in color theory and in botany. Scientists Humphrey Davy and Michael Faraday
had heardof these "romantic" doctrines--microcosms within macrocosms and holistic
9

examination of the significant minute actions of nature--and relayed them to the English elite
through lectures at the popular "Royal Institution." Especially holistic was Faraday's union of
magnetism, motion, and electricity into a metaphorical manifestation of natural symmetry
hidden behind turbulent phenomena. This would be Maxwell’s starting point.

In politics, the passionate storms of the continent, the "revolutions of 1848" in Paris, Rome,
Vienna, Berlin, Munich, Prague, Venice, and elsewhere had, save the few ominous riots in
London, spared England and faded away everywhere else. Stability seemed in order, and the
Great Exhibition may have marked the end of a romantic political era as well .

Asa Briggs describes some gathering clouds:
Yet, although the Exhibition was an outstanding success and the pride which it
generated was real and lasting, the year 1851 itself was dominated by contrasts
and frustration. There was economic prosperity and commercial mastery, but
there was also political uncertainty and ministerial instability. At the beginning
of the year it was generally expected--and hoped--that Lord John Russell's Whig
administration, which had been in power since 1847 but was known to be weak
and tending to decline still further, would remain in office throughout a season of
carnival. The ministry did not survive peacefully even until the opening of the
Exhibition on the first day of May. It faced a crisis in February...[and finally
broke up] in 1852.6
This Great Exhibition (technically the third industrial trade show sponsored by the Society of
Arts, under the presidency of Prince Consort Albert) was titled the "International Exhibition of
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London" and was the first such show to invite exhibits from all nations. France, Prussia,
Switzerland, Belgium, Poland, Holland, Russia, Italy, Portugal, and Spain had all previously
held "national" exhibitions following the first of such, the Society of Arts' London Exhibition of
1756. The number of eager commercial exhibitors had grown to thousands (from 540 at the 3rd
Paris Exhibition in 1802 to 3040 at the 1814 Berlin Exhibition ), but this first international
7

extravaganza, with its 13,937 exhibitors, 193,168 pound budget, and 20 acre exhibition hall, the
"Crystal Palace," would dwarf them all. New York and Dublin in 1853, Melbourne and Munich
in 1854, and Paris in 1855 would try to outdo this record (e.g. 20,839 exhibitions at Paris), but
would not quite outshine London's "first" in attendance (London's six million to Paris' five).
London won too in memorable engineering with the Crystal Palace. (Vienna's showpiece, the
giant wheel in the Prater didn't come until 1873 and the Eiffel Tower came to Paris only in
1889). Even more significant than these specific accomplishments was the general impact of the
Exhibition on England's and the world's sense of the new age in "science," "industry," and "the
arts." Young Maxwell was himself destined to become a symbol of the new era--at the same
time he would plant the theoretical seeds for an even more profound, though less visible,
transformation of ideas in the worlds of physics and philosophy.

The Exhibition's sentiment intended by Prince Albert was the glorification of progress--the
industrial revolution in manufacturing and the associated spread of the virtues of the fine arts
through accurate and cheap replication. It had been first proposed by art patron Henry Cole,
arguing:
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Of high art in this country there is abundance, of mechanical industry and
invention an unparalleled profusion. The thing still remaining to be done is to
effect the combination of the two, to wed high art with mechanical skill.8

To this end exhibitors would feature ceramics from Dresden, tapestries from the Jacquard
looms in France, and tableware from the rolling mills of Krupp of Prussia. Queen Victoria and
the Archbishop of Canterbury opened the show in May, and the millions filed past the American
marvels--a nude Greek slave on a rotating pedestal (a "triumph of technological voyeurism over
Victorian prudery" ), mass produced Colt rifles, ladies "bloomers," Singer's sewing Machine,
9

Morse's telegraph and Goodyear's "Rubber Room" (with products of the new vulcanization
process, including false teeth).

France showed Daguerre's camera amidst the porcelain, tapestries and perfume, Belgium a
miner's safety lamp among the lace. The German states displayed Siemen's insulated wire,
which was soon to be used in the transatlantic cable, by the side of their Dresden china.

Exotic items had arrived from all over the world. The Bey of Tunis sent
rosewater and `two scissors used in the red cap manufacture.' There were fine
swords from Toledo, black lace from Barcelona, Dutch diamonds, Havana
cigars...10

Krupp's ominous 4,300 pound cast steel ingot (embarrassing Sheffield's pride 2,400
pounder) was, it is said, overshadowed (following the queen's murmur) by his shining cannon.
That was to be found amidst a display of shields bearing the logo of his sponsoring state--not
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"Prussia," but "Deutsches Zollverein," or the German customs union 11, an organization perhaps
more portentous than the cannon it sponsored.

The young Maxwell was probably reserved. Though he was an eager young scientist,
perhaps his dour Scots Calvinism turned an outing into a chore. Lewis Campbell, Maxwell's
friend and biographer, wrote:

The `viewing' of the Crystal palace...was made less exciting... by the constant
habit of viewing all manufacturers...Maxwell disclaims all `fanaticism' on the
subject, and his father writes that while a fortnight would be required to see it
properly, a good deal of it must be already familiar to them both.12
Another eyewitness report again represents the sense of visitors of witnessing the birth of a
new technological epoch. This was an American visitor, David W. Bartlett, who published a
rather breathless tourist account, "What I Saw in London," in 1856:

The view of these thousands in that wondrous interior was splendid beyond
description. The elite of the world was there--the flower of England!...There was
the Duke of Wellington--it was his eighty-second birthday...There was the
venerable Archbishop of Canterbury; Paxton, the designer of the beautiful
structure... there were beautiful women too, from England, and France, and
Russia, and America !

...A grand aisle or transept ran from east to west through the entire
building...In this grand aisle the masterpieces were placed, both of industry and
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art. The British department consisted of the entire western half of the building,
with the exception of a place for the machinery of all nations. In the grand
aisle...there were some fine specimens of art--models of bridges--telescopes-lighthouses, and docks...There was a fine collection of cottons, wools, seeds,
native arms, and artillery from the British East Indies...

In the department of machinery there were cotton-mills in full operation;
printing presses striking off impressions of newspapers; and all kinds of curious
machines requiring steam motive power...

...[Brazilian] costumes, tapestry, screens, and carpets ...[Swiss] embroidery,
watches, linens...[French] mirrors, sofas, libraries...

The extreme eastern portion of the Palace was given up to the United States,
and over it the eagle kept watch with careful eye. The finest--aye, and the last-object we gazed at was "the Greek Slave," the masterpiece of Hiram Powers...The
reaping machine at first did not attract much attention, but after its merits were
known, a crowd always surrounded it...The collection of agricultural implements
was good; there were excellent specimens of our raw produce; fine
daguerreotypes; an ingenious bridge by Remington; and other things of real
value...

And now that the Exhibition is closed, we may remark that during this summer
of 1851,...Europe (and especially England) cannot have failed to learn that--it is
not wise to laugh too soon. America, in May, was the laughingstock of Europe;
14

the journals of Paris and London went into convulsions of merriment at our
expense; Punch jeered, and the Times thundered forth its sarcasm; and the
people laughed. Then even the Times gave us the first position, in the Crystal
Palace, and out of it; Mr. Punch's wit was suddenly in our favor; and this time,
America laughed. We had triumphed on the water and on the land. Our yacht
shot past all her competitors [in the first of what became the America's Cup race],
and our reaping machines became the wonder of England.13

If young Maxwell was impressed by these modern marvels, he must have also been impressed
at the extreme hostility to the whole affair by some of the most notable intellects in England,
particularly scientists. Much of the opposition came from his own Scotland, itself in the throes of
rapid industrialization.

But why should there be hostility to the Exhibition? There was a profit of 186,000 pounds
(831 from checking umbrellas ), enough to fund a museum in Kensington, the relocation of the
14

Crystal Palace, and "1851 Exhibition Scholarships" for science students at Cambridge

a

---------------

(a) The scholarship was perhaps the greatest legacy of the Exhibition, for both Ernest
Rutherford and P.A.M. Dirac, the two most important scientists of the twentieth century, were
supported by this fund.

---------------
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Nonetheless there was indeed hostility, such that the ceramics expert William Burton
apologized in the 1910 Encyclopedia Britannica (the famous 11th, or "Scholars'," edition):

The London International Exhibition of 1851 is generally supposed to indicate a
low-water mark of art as applied to industry; it should rather be regarded as
marking the period when many of the old handicrafts had been extinguished by
the use of mechanical applications and the growth of the factory system, and
when the delight of men in these current developments was so great that they
were regarded as triumphs in themselves...15

A closer observer, the contentious mathematician-inventor Charles Babbage, seized on the
publicity to repeat his oft-heard complaints of "the decline of science in England" (particularly
shown by government bungling of support for his computing machine, the "Analytical Engine").
Babbage's first blast in 1830 was succinctly summarized in The Quarterly Review by a more
"scientific" scientist, David Brewster:

Bribed by foreign gold, or flattered by foreign courtesy, her artisans have quitted
her service--her machinery has been exported to distant markets--the inventions
of her philosophers, slighted at home, have been eagerly introduced abroad--her
scientific institutions have been discouraged and even abolished--the articles
which she supplied to other states have been gradually manufactured by
themselves...and the abolition of the Board of Longitude, the only scientific board
in the kingdom, at last proclaimed that...England had renounced by Act of
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Parliament her patronage even of the sciences most intimately connected with her
naval greatness.16
To Maxwell, Brewster was an admired fellow scot (once secretary to the Royal Society in
Edinburgh) and a fellow Scots churchman. He was the only non-Anglican in a group of
"Gentlemen of Science," the British Association for the Advancement of Science, a group that
received considerable elite patronage, contrary to the contemporary complaints of neglect.17 Still
the Brewster-Babbage "declinarian" complaint was widespread by 1851. Of course, the good
efforts of the Society of Arts, and indeed Albert's patronage, might have been thought to remedy
this complaint, but Babbage's response to the Great Exhibition was to intensify his accusations.
The objections came even as the project was planned. George Airy, the Royal Astronomer,
predicted the collapse of the 300,000 window Crystal Palace , and other notables had more
18

ideological objections:

He [Prince Albert] had to work for its realization against an extraordinary
outburst of angry expostulations. Every stage in his project was combated. In the
house of Peers, Lord Brougham denied the right of the crown to hold the
exhibition in Hyde Park; in the Commons, Colonel Sibthorp prophesied that
England would be overrun with foreign rogues and revolutionists, who would
subvert the morals of the people, filch their trade secrets from them, and destroy
their faith and loyalty towards their religion and their sovereign.

b

Prince

Albert was president of the exhibition commission, and every post brought him
abusive letters, accusing him, as a foreigner, of being intent upon the corruption
of England. 19
17

---------------

(b) The prophetic Colonel was also trying to protect a stand of elm trees in Hyde park, which
were subsequently housed in a ninety-foot transept of the Crystal palace. 20

---------------

Further, other Scots had a dim view of the "progress" here celebrated, especially the popular
Romantic poet-historian Thomas Carlyle. A former undergraduate in mathematics, he was
currently arousing citizens with his heroic reconstruction of Oliver Cromwell, his theories of
cyclical history driven by "great men" (borrowing liberally from the German theologian
Herder ), and his loathing of the lazy Jamaican "Negroes" in the colonies.22 Carlyle viewed the
21

present age as the end of an era--a darkness before a new "springtime of organic rebirth."23
According to scholar Gorman Beauchamp, among many others, Carlyle distilled the epithets that
condemned the Industrial Revolution:

Carlyle in `Signs of the Times' [1827] voiced his famous complaint about his
countrymen: `Men are grown mechanical in head and heart, as well as in hand.'
This essay became the locus classicus of the technophobic reaction to
industrialism, the term itself coined by Carlyle in Sartor Resartus `Were we
required to characterize this age of ours by any single epithet,' he wrote,`we
should be tempted to call it...the Mechanical Age. It is the Age of Machinery, in
every outward and inward sense of the word...' 24
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So to Carlyle the exhibition was a vulgar celebration of the wrongs of industrial society,25
though he himself would prosper in it, becoming Lord Rector of Edinburgh University in 1866
and getting the Prussian Order of Merit from Bismarck himself in 1874.26

The objection by the cantankerous old Lord Brougham should have been most interesting to
Maxwell, for Brougham was another hero, of sorts, from Edinburgh. He had achieved a
reputation of being a man who combined a capacity for Science (F.R.S., 1803), Arts (over 80
articles in the first 20 numbers of the Edinburgh Review), Education (founder of the Society for
Diffusion of Useful Knowledge," 1827) 27 and politics (Lord Chancellor of England under King
William IV, 1830-1834). His reputation as a Whig politician was such that "his portrait was in
c

every shop window" and "a piece of plate was presented to him, paid for by a penny
subscription of peasants and mechanics."28 and "a piece of plate was presented to him, paid for
by a penny subscription of peasants and mechanics."

C

---------------

(c He was particularly popular for the defense of the unhappy Queen Caroline's successful
attempt to avoid being deposed by Parliament on the accession of her estranged husband, George
IV, in 1820

---------------

The plaints of Brougham, Babbage, and Airy represent the glimmerings of the notion that
there was a mid-century social strain, not only between the "scientists" and the state, but among
the scientists themselves. Earlier, for example, Brougham had influentially opposed the
19

researches into the nature of light by the polymath Thomas Young, studies that in retrospect
seem to signal a radical break with the Newton-inspired "French Tradition" of corpuscular
radiation. Young, somewhat clumsy at the mathematical sophistications of the French School,
had adduced the microscopic wavelengths of vibrations of an elusive "ether" directly from
reconsidering Newton's great experiments. Then

he [Brougham] attacked Young with all the cheap weapons of the
successful lawyer...and though Young replied in a pamphlet written with equal
skill and greater politeness such was the mentality of the `polite' world that the
wave theory might have suffered sterility and oblivion had not sounder critics
revived it in France.
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The Frenchman August Fresnel had arrived at a similar optical heresy by a different, more
mathematically deductive route, and thus faced opposition by his countrymen--"Newtonians" all-as well as Young. The technical differences in their models were irresolvable. 30

The issues of scientific contention here were varied, including problems of method
(particularly the proper relation of mathematics to experimentation or demonstration), problems
of reality (was the "unseen universe" behind observable phenomena "atomic" or continuous?),
and problems of social relevance (the relation of "science"--or "natural philosophy"--to arts and
artisans, commerce and government). Young Maxwell had to see the Exhibition as a moment of
exposure of these problems of the intellectual to the affected and disaffected citizen . He had as
well decisions to make to chart his career on one side or the other, or between the sides of an
English "battle of the books"-- almost a tradition since the days of Swift and Newton. But had
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the decisions been made already, forged from an immersion in these problems well before, at the
Edinburgh Academy, the Royal Society of Edinburgh and Edinburgh University, Maxwell's preCambridge arenas of intellectual battle?

SCIENCE AT EDINBURGH: FORBES

Later, in 1871 , Maxwell would again move from Scotland to Cambridge--this time to stage
his own "revival of Physical Science" (this the estimation of his long-time friend, collaborator,
and rival, William Thomson). But what brought him there the first time? Mostly it was the
maneuvering of his doting father (his mother had died when he was young), who studied
carefully the routes to success and particularly the important contacts:

Have you called on Profs. Sedgwick at Trin. and Stokes at embroke?...Sedgwick
is also a great Don in his line, and if you were entered in Geology would be a
most valuable acquaintance ..31.
Maxwell's father was a dramatic character, an impulsive, usually unsuccessful businessman
who delighted in the romantic adventures of his highland ancestors. He had sent James to the
"progressive" Edinburgh Academy (founded by, among others, the international specialist of
derring-do, Sir Walter Scott--who himself was president of the Royal Society of Edinburgh from
1820-1833 ) 32 . As he was lately precocious in his studies--philosophy, poetry, mathematics-James' father took him to meetings of the Royal Society of Edinburgh. There a mathematical
contribution brought him to the attention of the formidable Professor James Forbes of the
University of Edinburgh, and Maxwell subsequently became his protégé. Or perhaps half
Forbes' protégé, for at that time there was a professorial battle-royal on between Forbes, the
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scientist, and William Hamilton, the philosopher. Maxwell became Hamilton's protégé too.
Later, in England, when Maxwell would study with Whewell, he would spend much time
meticulously comparing Whewell's philosophy to Hamilton's (to the detriment of the former.)
Inasmuch as it can be said that the revolutionary scientific ideas and attitudes of Maxwell had
some origin in his education, it is the ideological contrast between Hamilton and Forbes that
most prefigures Maxwell's infamous scientific dualisms.

In his science of “fields” and “molecules,” Maxwell would propound many apparent
contradictions that reflect these undergraduate tensions .Those contrasts leap out at the modern
science student on first discovering that one of Maxwell's immortal theories, that of electricity,
magnetism, and light, seems to hold that the unseen universe that supports light is continuous,
like a fluid or flowing solid (roughly the "luminiferous ether" of Young-Fresnel fame). Yet in
Maxwell's "other" revolution, the theory of heated gases, the unseen universe that supports heat
is molecular, thus discontinuous, like a collection of invisible grains of sand (roughly the
"atoms" of Dalton fame). Perhaps the contrast isn't as peculiar to a generation that has no prior
commitment to the unification of the forces and forms of basic nature; but in Victorian England,
and the rest of the world, such contradictions were problematic, not only as possible fact but
ALSO as possible philosophical truth. Is the universe a continuous plenum, or is it structured by
“atoms” flitting about in empty space. This basic question generated complex philosophical and
moral disputation.

Generations of Victorians were introduced to the wonders and morals of science through
successive editions of Mary Somerville's "On the Connexions of the Physical Sciences," first
published in 1834, and already into its seventh, 1846 edition by Maxwell's time. Mary had
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achieved fame for interpreting the formidable mathematical work of Laplace, the "Mechanique
Celeste," to the English for Brougham's Society for the Diffusion of Knowledge. Laplace said
that she was the only woman who understood his works. 33 Although written for ladies only,
"...to make the laws by which the material world is governed more familiar to my
countrywomen...,"34 the "Connexions" was by far the most readable and authoritative science
primer around, and can best represent what was common amidst the convolutions of the
Victorian debates on science..d

---------------

(d) Later generations could keep up with the astronomical sciences through the work of Agnes
Mary Clerke and her four editions of Astronomical History, several works on Astrophysics--and
a popular study on Homer--honored finally in 1903 by the Royal Astronomical Society.35

--------------

The theme implied by the title, the unity of physical phenomena, was dominant in the
nineteenth century scientific agenda--particularly the quest for the unification of heat and light.
In Somerville's words:

The progress of modern science, especially with the past few years, has been
remarkable for a tendency to simplify the laws of nature, and to unite detached
branches by general principles. In some cases identity has been proved where
there appeared to be nothing in common, as in the electric and magnetic
influences; in others, as that of light and heat, such analogies have been pointed
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out as to justify this expectation that they will ultimately be referred to the same
agent...36
For Somerville, “analogies” were arbitrarily rough conceptualizations of phenomena that
alluded to “truth,” but did not touch precisely upon it, through arbitrarily rough
conceptualizations,. Given Maxwell's own faith in analogies , it is initially surprising to find him
later speaking harshly of Mary Somerville. In his great "Treatise on Electricity and Magnetism"
(1873) he commented:

The most important step in establishing a relation between electric and magnetic
phenomena and those of light must be the discovery of some instance in which
the one set of phenomena is affected by another. In the search for such
phenomena we must be guided by any knowledge we may have already obtained
with respect to the mathematical or geometrical form of the quantities we wish to
compare. Thus, if we endeavour, as Mrs. Somerville did, to magnetize a needle
by means of light, we must remember that the distinction between magnetic north
and south is a mere matter of direction...Hence we must not expect that if we
make light fall on one end of a needle, that end will become a pole of a certain
name, for the two poles do not differ as light does from darkness.37
But here Maxwell wasn't criticizing Mary's notion of "analogy." Rather, he criticized her
particularly naive misuse of optical-magnetic concepts. In fact, Maxwell continued Somerville’s
conceptual play by adding a detail, “polarization.”
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We might expect a better result if we caused circularly-polarized light to fall on
he needle...The analogy, however, is faulty even here...38
These analogies tried to relate concepts from two different areas of science, light and
magnetism, in order to illustrate the underlying unity of nature and the laws that govern it.
Such was Mary Somerville’s suggestion that the methods of science might involve
imprecise “analogies,” rather than literal relations of “facts.” And such, then, is what scientists
were supposed to worry about when young James went up from Edinburgh Academy to
Edinburgh University. Especially problematic were dualities in theories of light waves or
particles. At the University, Maxwell met his two mentors, Forbes and Hamilton--each with a
strong message on these issues for the young.

Just what was in Forbes' "side" of Maxwell's education? In two successive school years at
Edinburgh (1847-1849), Forbes delivered 228 hours of lectures and 11 hours of exams on
Natural Philosophy. 39 Peter Guthrie Tait, a close friend of Maxwell's--and later a major
influence in spreading the scientific "revolution" through textbooks--attended the first series with
James. Ironically, years later, in 1860, Tait would be chosen over Maxwell to succeed Forbes at

Edinburgh.e Tait, "among other noteworthy accomplishments, had worked out the dynamics
of flight of the golf ball." 40

---------------

(e) Even later, (1922) the Tait Chair in Natural Philosophy was established, to be occupied by
such Nobel Prizewinners as Charles Darwin (grandson of the great Darwin) and theorist Max
Born.
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---------------

Forbes' major topics in the first year were 62 hours on "mechanics" ("statics" and
"dynamics"), 37 hours on Astronomy, and 11 hours on heat and steam engines. In the second
year Astronomy was dropped in favor of 21 hours of Optics. Forbes only taught Electricity or
Magnetism every 4 or 5 years, and Maxwell and Tait missed those years. In his third year,
Maxwell took special tutorial sessions, and assisted Forbes in research.41

In mechanics Maxwell and Tait studied the grand Newtonian system of deducing effects (the
successive locations and speeds of inert "masses") from causes of change-in-motion, "forces"
acting on the masses. Forbes would specify a particular size of mass and a formula (recipe) for
the variation, as the mass moved, of some force. In the most examined example, "gravity," the
force was assumed to decrease as the square of the increasing ascension of the mass. Why, a
student might ask? Because Newton found it so, Forbes might answer. Without reference to the
source or cause of this force, the students could formally (mathematically) extract recipes for
calculating the exact location and motion of the affected mass. This calculation required
combining recipes for the affecting force and Newton's recipes for the "laws" of the "mechanics"
of moving objects, much sophisticated by Mary Somerville`s admirer, Laplace. Dull stuff this,
except for the challenge of puzzle-solving and perhaps a competition among students for the
fastest or cleverest answer. Such competitions were championed by Forbes' hero, Whewell, as
exercises for training and testing of the mind, and in 1856 the Universities of Oxford and
Cambridge started administering puzzling public "school-leaving" exams to stimulate precise
f

education in the nation. Cambridge's own "Tripos," the senior terminal exams also became
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more competitive, more problem-oriented, and more mathematical under the guidance of
Whewell.

---------------

(f) These were the ancestors of the modern "A" (advanced) and "O" (ordinary) level exams
notorious throughout the former empire.

---------------

In Maxwell's study, just before the reforms, there was more to mechanics than problemsolving--there was morality, theology, and considerable controversy bound up in justifying the
relevance of these problems to the "real world." However, these issues were the heart of
Hamilton's lectures, not Forbes'.

Forbes assumed that not all (or even most) of student learning came from lectures. He
expected "the labour of private study and ardent self exercise."42 The texts are formidable even
today: Whewell on Mechanics and Airy on Optics, for instance. The difficulty stems from the
presumption that the reader can use the formulas of algebra and calculus as a replacement for
prose in "discussing" or "describing" the heart of the matter. This style was called "Mixed
Mathematics," and was then controversial, for the two "sciences" of mathematics and of natural
philosophy were populated by "purists" of mutual suspicion. After all, mathematics was
"known" by purely mental acts, while the "natural world" was "known" by the senses, and the
relation between thinking and sensing was (and is) irrevocably tangled in fierce philosophical
politics. Mixed Mathematics seemed to ignore the philosophical niceties and ambiguities and
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simply assume that the specific example-problems in Whewell or Airy made the combination of
thinking and sensing patently useful. Forbes' attitude was typical of the scientific "pragmatists":

Any doubt as to the propriety of viewing Mixed Mathematics as belonging to a
Natural Philosophy Class is at the moment peculiarly untenable. For the whole
progress of General Physics is happily so fast leading to a subjection to
Mathematical Laws of that department of Science, that in no very long time,
Magnetism, Electricity and Light may be expected to be as fully the object of
dynamical reasoning as Gravitation is at the present moment. 42

This idea of mathematics-as-descriptive-language became the heart of Maxwell's legacy, now
known as "mathematical physics." In 1881 he described it thus:

I was aware that there was supposed to be a difference between Faraday's way of
conceiving phenomena and that of the mathematician, so that neither he nor they
were satisfied with each other's language. I had also the conviction that this
discrepancy did not arise from either party being wrong...As I proceeded with the
study of Faraday, I perceived that his method of conceiving the phenomena was
also a mathematical one, though not exhibited in the conventional form of
mathematical symbols. I also found that these methods were capable of being
expressed in the ordinary mathematical forms...
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Faraday's methods resembled those in which we begin with the whole and
arrive at the parts by analysis, while the ordinary mathematical methods were
founded on the principle of beginning with the parts and building up the whole by
synthesis. 44

It was William Whewell himself who attempted to untangle the philosophical mess, not only
establishing “Mixed Mathematics” at Cambridge as the basis of Natural Philosophy (and the
Tripos), but publishing several monumental defenses of this hybrid philosophy, notably "The
Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences," 1840. On the significance of "analogies," he wrote:

Since the first [1837] edition was written, the analogies between light and heat
have been further extended...By passing polarized heat through various
thicknesses of mica, Prof. Forbes has attempted to calculate the length of an
undulation for heat.

These analogies cannot fail to produce a strong disposition

to believe that light and heat, essences so closely connected that they can hardly
be separated...are propagated by the same machinery...
Yet such a theory has not yet by any means received full confirmation. It
depends upon the analogy and the connexion of the Theory of Light (wherein
more maxima of heat are expected than Prof. Forbes has yet discovered). 45

Since Maxwell went on from Forbes at Edinburgh to Whewell at Cambridge, and on to
bring "Magnetism, Electricity, and Light" together in "dynamical reasoning" in the 1860's, it
would seem that Forbes and Whewell represent enough "sources" in Maxwell's education to
satisfy most intellectual historians. However, it is the contrast between his theories of light and
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of heat that most illustrate the peculiar agenda of mixed mathematics, so we should look at
Forbes's instruction in heat, especially since Maxwell missed his courses in electricity and
magnetism.

There is considerable prescience in Forbes' lectures on "heat," for this was his own
celebrated research area. Forbes held the prestigious Rumford Medal of the Royal Society-awarded in 1848 for his significant experiments on the "polarization of heat" by tourmaline
crystals or stacks of mica plates.46 This small part of his research "strengthened his belief in the
identity of thermal and luminous radiation." 47 Yet another Scot, Sir David Brewster (principal of
the University of Edinburgh in the 1820's, organizer of the Edinburgh Philosophical Journal and
the British Association for the Advancement of Science, ex-clergyman, and the celebrated
inventor of the kaleidoscope ), had, with Brougham, established the phenomena of polarization
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of visible light by crystals, though he, like Brougham, was hostile to the "ether undulation"
theories of Young or Fresnel.

His chief objection to the undulatory theory of light was that he could
not think the Creator guilty of so clumsy a contrivance as the filling of space with
ether in order to produce light.
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Forbes directly extended Brewster's research into the invisible heat "rays" now identified as,
in fact, "infra-red" light. Since this matter is at the heart of the agenda, perhaps Mary Somerville
can clear up the status of heat-light research, and Forbes' role in it:
Sir William Herschel, who employed a prism of flint glass, found that point [of
the greatest heat of the solar spectrum of colors] to be a little beyond the red
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extremity of the spectrum ["infra red"]; but according to M. Seebeck, it is found
to be upon the yellow, upon the orange,...accordingly as the prism consists of
water, sulphuric acid,...

(Seebeck, a student of the German poet-scientist Goethe, will reappear later in this argument). In
a similar work 49 ...M. Melloni employed a thermomultiplier...it is a very elegant application of
M. Seebeck's discovery of thermoelectricity”..

M. Melloni and M. Berard proved that the heat which accompanies the sun's
light is capable of being polarized; but their attempts totally failed with heat
observed from terrestrial, and especially non-luminous, sources...M. Melloni
lately rescued the subject, and endeavoured to effect the polarisation of heat by
tourmaline, as is in the case of light [by Brewster of Edinburgh]...Professor
Forbes of Edinburgh...came to the same conclusion.
It appears from the various experiments of M. Melloni and Professor Forbes,
that all the calorific rays emanating from the sun and terrestrial sources are
equally capable of being polarised by reflection and refraction...

It appears also from Professor Forbes's experiments, that the undulations of
heat are probably longer than the undulations of light...50

The Scots, as we mentioned, were not as enthusiastic about an undulatory theory of heat and
light as Mary might have thought, but she pre-empts argument in her summary:
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All substances may be considered to radiate calorific rays, whatever their

temperature

may be...51

...the probability of light and heat being modifications of the same principle is
not diminished by the calorific rays being unseen, for the conditions of visibility
or invisibility may only depend upon the construction of the eye...the chemical
rays beyond the violet end of the spectrum ["ultra-violet"] may be too rapid...and
the calorific rays beyond the other end of the spectrum may not be sufficiently
rapid...52

Forbes did much more to establish himself as a world-class heat expert, looking for heat in
moonlight (and failing), and contemplating the heat in volcanoes.53 He expanded his interests in
heat from mineralogy to geology, trekking to Norway and Switzerland in search of glaciers
moving according to his theory of glacial motion through melting. When not able to get away
from Edinburgh, he tested the soil around for its temperature at different depths (1846), and
developed a less-famous mathematical law of the conduction of heat in soil and in Iron. While
this minor discovery (that the thermal conductivity of Iron varies with temperature) scarcely
appears in recent histories, it was a critical point in theory at the time, figuring in the
mathematical theories of heat of the Frenchman Joseph Fourier. The impression of this work on
Maxwell may well have been crucial, for later Maxwell would look at the Mixed Mathematics
associated with heat conduction, attributing the method to Joseph Fourier, not to Forbes,54 as a
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guide to his philosophy of method--his method of "analogies"--which will dominate the theses of
this book.

Finally, in considering Forbes' legacy, we must note that none of these subjects in heat did
Maxwell take up in work as "research assistant" to Forbes. Rather, their joint work was in light-particularly in color, color mixing, and physiology of color (color-blindness and such). As this
subject forms a bridge to Maxwell's German "counterpart," Hermann von Helmholtz, we will
defer the problem of color until later.

By now some scholars will be waving their quills, for there appears to be emerging some sort
of "Edinburgh School" of precursors to Victorian Physics. Brougham, Forbes, Brewster,
Maxwell, and Tait are only some of the Edinburgh-trained natural philosophers that shared a
concern for light, heat, and Mixed Mathematics. They were major players; the Royal Society of
London honored many of their contributions with such awards as the Rumford Medal, the Royal
Medal, and the Copley Medal. Brewster, for instance, got the 1815 Copley Medal, 1818
Rumford Medal, and an 1830 Royal Medal "for discoveries related to the polarization of light."
After his 1838 Rumford Medal for "experiments on the polarization of heat [sic]," Forbes got an
1843 Royal Medal for "the Law of Extinction of the Solar Rays in passing through the
Atmosphere." Whewell, their Cambridge "philosopher" had an 1837 Royal Medal for
"Researches concerning the Theory of Tides," and even the competing Frenchman, AugustinJean Fresnel was awarded the 1824 Rumford Medal for "Development of the Undulatory
Theory, as applied to the Phenomena of Polarized Light..."55
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The inclusion of Fresnel (and not Thomas Young, The "English" inventor of the undulatory
theory) for Royal Society Honors was not a new recognition of the science of their former
enemy. Indeed, recall that the complaint of Babbage, echoed by Brougham, Forbes, Airy, and
others, was that the French had eclipsed England altogether in Science. In another "international
episode," a priority fight had been waged over who had "discovered" the planet Neptune--The
English amateur Adams or the French professional U. J. Le Verrier.56 The Royal Society's 1846
Copley Medal went to Le Verrier for "Investigations relative to the Disturbances of Uranus, by
which he proved the existence and predicted the Place of the New Planet (Neptune)."57

This episode too reflects on the education of the young Maxwell, for it is said that this
"discovery" was a dramatic issue before one of the meetings of the Royal Society of Edinburgh
he had attended with his father and his friend Forbes.58 Further, with the acquisition of
mechanics from Forbes, and later problem-solving skills at Cambridge, he too would dabble in
predictive astronomy. Specifically, Maxwell would use the classical methods of the French
(Laplace, Le Verrier, and Poisson) to study the influence of pieces of Saturn's Rings on each
other's orbit.59 The upshot of this work was to prove that Saturn's rings could not be solid. Inner
and outer pieces would have to orbit at different periods--according to Newtonian Mechanics-and thus a solid ring would be pulled apart by "tidal forces." This was an auspicious analogy-and Maxwell was fond of analogies-- the statistical scatter of moonlets of different speed all
independently orbiting Saturn and resulting in a single--or double--"whole" ring was reprised in
Maxwell's later dynamical theories of heat, colliding molecules replacing colliding ringparticles. For a "whole" gas can be modeled as a statistical scatter of chaotic "molecules," each
independently traveling according to the rules of Newtonian Mechanics. This latter picture is a
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snapshot of Maxwell's "other" great scientific innovation, next to his electromagnetic theory of
light. In the first approximation, it will be the philosophical and methodological conflicts
between these two "analogies"--heat and light--that will make a case for a characteristic situation
in philosophy we will tag as "Maxwell vs. Maxwell." If the conflicts prove to be essential to
Mixed Mathematics itself, then we might make a case for "Einstein vs. Einstein," for he too
innovated in theories of heat and light in 1905 in his epochal (and Nobel winning) analogy
(“heuristic” in his terms”) of light as discrete light-darts (“lichtstrahlung”) produced by heating
objects, while Max Planck and Wilhelm Wien had previously produced the same heat-light
mathematical recipes from an analogy of light to continuous “aether vibrations.” Again the
quills, for it is well-known that our current Mixed Mathematical foundations of physics, the so
called "Quantum Mechanics" and its successor Field Theories, are fraught with formal paradoxes
(or at least the analogies to the theories--"models"--are anomalous). What makes controversy
are the claims by many that these new novelties of the twentieth century (1925-1927 to be exact)
are "revolutionary," and separate our times from those quaint Victorian days of scientific
naivete. To suggest that this "Second Scientific Revolution" began with Maxwell or before, not
with either Einstein or Heisenberg, runs counter to more recent historical convention. To to
suggest that the structure of this revolution, or "transformation," is historically explicable is one
of the objectives of this study.

PHILOSOPHY AT EDINBURGH: HAMILTON

There was another "side" to Maxwell's Edinburgh education though, a somewhat more
reflective and philosophical background that is, on the surface, counter to the Whewellian
technical virtuosity of Forbes and friends. The alleged architect of this agenda was the
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celebrated Scots philosopher, Sir William Hamilton. In his late fifties, he was formidably
distinguished, and paralyzed on his right side, when Maxwell first attended his lectures in Logic
and Natural Philosophy. Hamilton taught a system of philosophy that specifically rejected
mathematics as a tool for studying nature. For this he was notorious, and the Victorian world
wondered what might happen if Sir William Hamilton ever met face-to-face with the other Sir
William Hamilton, a mathematician. The irony stems from there being two celebrated
Hamiltons--one from Edinburgh and the other from Dublin. They did indeed meet, but more of
this later. This “other” Sir William, always called "William Rowan Hamilton" to distinguish
him from his Scots counterpart, would strongly influence Maxwell's later work, but we must set
him aside for the moment.

Sir William Hamilton of Edinburgh was a committed Kantian. This allegiance to a German
philosopher was not unusual in Victorian Great Britian. Indeed the late poet laureate
Wordsworth had quite a reputation for grounding English Romantic Poetry in German
"Idealism," and headed a major fashion in translating Schiller into awful English verse--a
preoccupation of, among others, the astronomers Herschel and the Irish William Rowan
Hamilton. What was unusual was the Scot Hamilton's attempt to ground English "metaphysics,"
particularly theology, in Kant, the arguably reluctant founder of German Idealism of Schiller,
Hegel and the other notorious champions of "Will," "Spirit," and introspection. This habit led
Hamilton's competitor in theoretical morals, Whewell, into an opposing "justification" of rational
ethics, and led Maxwell to compare carefully the systems, siding with Hamilton.

In Hamilton's teaching, the human mind was active in shaping its contents--"to think is to
condition," he intoned. This meant that the object of attention--the "thing" of scientific
60
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investigation or the "deed" of moral discourse--already contained features inscribed there by the
act of imagination itself. From this "Kantian" base, much flowed of significance to a young
scientist-poet-moralist like Maxwell. For example, that controversial ether, the alleged unseen
medium whose quivers and strains were light itself, could be considered either itself a "thing," a
product of the imagination, or, more likely, a scheme or schema in Kantian terms) of a thing
(light). As stuff itself, as the Dubliners argued, it suffered from a terrible philosophical flaw--it
could not itself be seen (again in Kant’s terms, the thing-in-itself (“ding an sich”) could not be
either observed or imagined.. Hamilton's system required that the possible be the imaginable
and the imaginable possible. Thus such un-seeable stuff was, like infinite space or absolute
truth, not legitimately represented in imagination. So that idea was spurious. So far, there would
seem to be sympathy for his fellow Edinburgh ether skeptics, like Brewster. However, Hamilton
went much further, for the traditionalists had their own unseen universe, a variation on Newton's
original account of light as "fits" of some "most subtle spirit," emanated from glowing objects
much like "particles." Newton himself was characteristically vague on the precise composition
of light, so all the many sides in the controversy claimed legitimate descent. Wrongly, thought
Hamilton, and their attempts at writing mathematical equations of vibrations or attractions of this
stuff were doomed. Why? Mathematical objects (and logical objects--propositions) were not in
the world, but in ideas. We would never encounter the square root of minus four oranges, let
alone thirty lumens of light. We would encounter orangeness, or illumination, and our intellect
would "condition" these encounters so that they would be represented in imagination according
to rules. The rules were inherent. Each event, for instance, required elements of four aspects
("causes" according to an old mis-translation of Aristotle, or "categories" according to the new
metaphysics of Kant). Bad, vague, ill-formed ideas resulted from incomplete or mis37

categorization. There were rules of thinking, so thoughts could be examined to see if they were
in conformity. The idea of ether, infinity, the origin of things, or other meta-physical notions
were just that--metaphysical--and should not be treated as objects of empirical inquiry.

There was more, much more to Hamilton's philosophy--and many more convoluted relations
with his competitors--but the impact of these arguments on Maxwell is already emerging. Mixed
mathematics cannot itself describe anything, yet the world of the scientist acts as if it did. The
moral inductions of, say, the Reverend Paley (edited by Brougham) which adduced evidence of
God's plan from the obvious "design" of the universe, were thus logically futile. Yet, as there
were scientific laws, there were by analogy moral laws. These, to Maxwell and Hamilton, must
be justified not by appeal to experience and experiment, but to prior metaphysical,
"transcendental" reasoning.

Maxwell, like most of his Victorian colleagues, was a serious churchgoer, and respected the
academic parsing of theological professionals and amateurs that had dominated English letters
since the Reformation. Thus he saw in Hamilton's teaching a guide out of the philosophical
muddles that this discourse had produced. While he did not pursue a "Kantian" theology, as did
Whewell and the other Hamilton, he did take it as read that a similar "reformation" was required
in Natural Philosophy, and so the confusing successes of the experiments and Mixed
Mathematics of Forbes needed rethinking.

From this position, we argue that Maxwell's peculiarity as a scientist was to be his
preoccupation with "Epistemology," the study of knowledge itself. Epistemology in this era
meant specifically the examination of "objects" of thought and the "conditions" under which
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those objects were represented. Admittedly this would be a tedious business then, as it is still.
Maxwell would get much ridicule--his school friends called him "Dafty".61 His successors in
this business, Helmholtz, Boltzmann, Gibbs, and Einstein still get considerable ridicule and
condescension for their pre-occupation with Epistemology. However, fortunately for Maxwell,
the Cambridge of the 1850's, under Whewell's prodding, permitted such speculation, as long as it
didn't interfere with the serious business of competitive problem-solving.

This business of epistemology was also the major bone of contention of Forbes and
Hamilton. Hamilton, called by some the "contemner of Mathematics," wanted education at
Edinburgh to focus on his kind of consideration of the products of imagination, particularly in
the classic mode of the traditional "Liberal Arts." Greek and Latin were prerequisites for the
autopsy of great or fundamental ideas as they were recorded in those languages. The theme of
the classroom should be discourse and self-examination, and the student's voice had authenticity
not to be repressed. Forbes, of course, saw the babble of uninformed students as worthless, and
demanded expert lectures and student competition at his ideal academy. He wanted the kind of
reform in Edinburgh University that Whewell had pulled off at Cambridge in 1830.62
Eventually, Forbes won--he was promoted to Principal of the United College of St. Andrews,
and established a "modern" system there, while Edinburgh lost its last champion of tradition
when Hamilton died in 1854.

What of all this rubbed off on Maxwell? He went to Cambridge (originally to Peterhouse
College, then to Trinity) with a formidable agenda, including to study "metaphysics--Kant's
Kritik of Pure Reason in German, read with a determination to make it agree with Sir W.
Hamilton."63 By his friend Lewis Campbell's account, Maxwell and his schoolmates were quite
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taken with Hamilton, and Maxwell had done two years of the lectures (Logic and Metaphysics).
Skeptically, Cambell hints at his opinion of how Kant, Hamilton, and Maxwell could reconcile
the austerity of logic and the passion of sensations: "his [Maxwell's] mystical tendency was
soothed by the distinction between Knowledge and Belief."64

Maxwell had even written an extensive paper for Hamilton, outlining his own scientific
philosophy. He included a curious defense of "the vacuum" or the "void," that un-Kantian arena
of the planetary motions that was demanded to be filled (or banished) by millennia of ethertheorists. Maxwell wrote: "Since there is a vacuum, motion is possible,"65 and ended the work
with a Latin version of the part of Lucretius' "On the Nature of Things (De Rerum Natura)" that
defended the void as necessary for motion.

Maxwell's choice of Lucretius was here a bit polemical in a time where Hamilton's beloved
classics were a language for contemporary debate. In college classics there were two moral
teams, the proto-Christian Stoics and the dissolute Epicureans. Maxwell chose to cite an
Epicurean doctrine (represented to the Latins by the political poet Lucretius) abhorred by the
law-and-order Stoics--the "void." This ancient "space" was the stage upon which the Epicureans
imagined that "atoms" bounced around--under their own power--as if they had a "soul." These
atoms were the supposed "seeds of all thing, living and inert," and the overall authority, or law,
of their collective fates was no other than "chance" or "accident." The similarity to the
Maxwell’s later molecular theory of heat was uncanny.

To carry this theme deeper and using the most subtle elaborations of modern logic,
mathematics and physics, Classicist Michael White, among others, has proposed a useful
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mathematico-logical conflict dividing Epicurean "atomism" and prior Aristotelian "continuity".
Pointing to a role for mathematics, White located the split in applying "geometrical" and
"deductive" reasoning to Aristotle, and "analogical" and "inductive" reasoning for Epicureans:

From the evidence we possess, it seems unlikely that many Epicureans would
have been impressed by arguments that their doctrine of partes minimae [atoms]
undermine geometrical science...[but] my point...here is to suggest than when
Epicurus...invokes the analogy...between perceptible minima and theoretical
minima, this analogy has a certain dialectical force...Of course, as a piece of
analogical reasoning, the analogy from the sensible to the conceptual is not a
valid deductive argument and will, by contemporary lights, have relatively little
suasive force. However, there is some evidence that, from the perspective of
Epicurean "canonic" (epistemology, logic, and theory of science), analogy
occupied a central place in human knowledge.66
Classicist Elizabeth Asmis also sees in Epicurus and Lucretius a precursor to unusually modern
scientific description.67 It is not likely that young Maxwell or old Hamilton saw such radically
novel opportunities for new connections between analogy and mathematics, for the requisite
insights into the subtleties of geometry (for instance) were yet a dozen years in the future. Still,
the themata of these arguments--analogies, dialectic, discreteness and atomicity, and even
geometry would dominate the philosophical subtext of Maxwell's mature theories.

Maxwell actually preferred Cicero to Lucretius. He claimed to read him almost every
morning after his daily exercise. Cicero somewhat straddled the Epicurean/Stoic fence and could
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be cited to defend any idea. So why did Maxwell choose the Epicurean for this essay in
philosophy? The choice of the atheist, Lucretius, in defense of the anti-ether doctrine of the
void would have upset the English and Irish moralist-scientists (like the Irish Hamilton), and
perhaps have puzzled the skeptical but pious Scots (like Forbes and Brewster). In this instance,
however, it would delight old Hamilton, for his admiration of the comparable anti-material
doctrine of space in Kant was considerable. He drew his own opposition to ether theories from
this source, and his "contempt" for mathematics reflected his suspicion of the recipes for the
unseen proposed by the Forbseans. Ironically, in adult life, Maxwell would become notorious for
defending a theory of ether in electricity, and the opposing theory of atoms in heat. Perhaps the
ether may need to play a role in mixed mathematics, but not as a material substance, but more as
a mental "metaphor"--a guide to analogical thinking. As Maxwell put it in 1873,

...if we admit this medium [ether] as an hypothesis, I think... that we ought to
endeavour to construct a mental representation of all the details of its action...68

Or, as Einstein put it in 1934,

The ether thus became a kind of matter whose only function was to act as a
substratum for electrical fields which were by their vary nature not further
analyzable. The picture was, then, as follows: space is filled by the ether, in
which the material corpuscles or atoms of ponderable matter swim around; the
atomic structure of the latter had been securely established [by Maxwell's
successors] by the turn of the century.69
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Returning to Maxwell’s student paper on "void," we find hints of an excuse to work for
Hamilton's rival, Forbes, master of heat:

Now the only thing which can be directly perceived by the senses is Force,
to which may be reduced heat, light, electricity, sound, and all the things that can
be perceived by sense.70
To those not steeped in Kant, this is a rather obscure comment, but captures the attention of
specialists because it reflects a controversial historical and philosophical argument. The
historian L. Pearce Williams has argued that an important intellectual source of Victorian
science has been overlooked--the contributions of a hitherto little-known eighteenth century
Jesuit, Roger Boscovich.71 It seems that Boscovich's doctrine of the priority of immaterial
"point-atoms" as sources of force and action over dubious metaphysical "substance" had
currency in the nineteenth century. The doctrine along with arguments by Kant was considered
by chemist Humphrey Davy (of the Royal Institution) and absorbed by Michael Faraday. Since
Maxwell's theories of Electricity and Magnetism are a direct successor to Faraday's, we suspect
that there is a built-in anti-materialism in them. Here, in his undergraduate papers, we find
Maxwell defending precisely the Boscovich-Kant-Hamilton philosophy that Williams
identified. Confusing matters a bit, later in his career Maxwell would occasionally defend
materialism, as in his 1872 textbook on heat:

Even to this day those who are not practically familiar with the free [thermal]
motion of large masses though they all admit the truth of dynamical principles yet
feel little repugnance in accepting the theory known as Boscovich's--that
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substances are composed of a system of points, which are mere centres of force,
attracting or repelling each other. It is probable that many qualities of bodies
might be explained on this supposition, but no arrangement of centres of force,
however complicated, could account for the fact that a body requires a certain
force to produce in it a certain change of motion, which fact we express by saying
that the body has a certain measurable mass. No part of this mass can be due to
the existence of the supposed centres of force.
I therefore recommend to the student that he impress his mond with the idea of
mass by a few experiments...He should also read Faraday's essay on Mental
Inertia, which will impress him with the proper metaphorical use of the phrase to
express, not laziness, but habitude.72

This may or may not be a philosophical shift from his student days. This is an important
question, for the consequence of Maxwell's genius, Victorian theory of electromagnetism and
light, is supposed to include a materialist commitment to luminiferous aether (or "ether" to the
Continent). Maxwell himself would contribute to the popularity of this unseen substance, thus,
when the aether was swept away by Einstein a "revolution" against Maxwellian science was
proclaimed. Yet we will argue (following his own claim 73 ) that Einstein did not invalidate
Maxwell's philosophy of ether, he refined it. Perhaps Maxwell’s later "materialism" is not as far
from his student essay as it first seems.

To interpret Maxwell's occasional lapse into presenting models (e.g. molecules) as "real,"
obscures the fact that his philosophical basis for scientific causality was "metaphysical." Even
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in the relatively "conservative" text cited above, Maxwell allows for successful explanation by a
“centres-of-force” model that needs not be taken literally. Should we then have to take his
aether and molecules literally? The above text concludes with a description:

We have thus been led by our study of visible things to a theory that they are
made up of a finite number of parts or molecules...The molecules of the same
substance are all exactly alike...There is not a regular gradation in the mass of
molecules from that of hydrogen...but they all fall into a limited number of
classes or species...74

Except for the intrusion of the word "theory," this certainly sounds like a materialist doctrine.
Maxwell goes on to reject a Darwin-like "evolutionary" variation in the properties of molecular
species, since they are obviously "immutable." He concludes with a rather "metaphysical"
foundation indeed:

But if we suppose the molecules to be made at all, or if we suppose them
to consist of something previously made, why should we expect any irregularity
to exist among them? If they are, as we believe, the only material things which
still remain in the precise condition in which they first began to exist, why should
we not rather look for some indication of that spirit of order, our scientific
confidence in which is never shaken by the the difficulty which we experience in
tracing it in the complex arrangements of visible things, and of which our moral
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estimation is shown in all our attempts to think and speak the truth, and to
ascertain the exact principles of distributive justice.75

As with many of Maxwell's mature arguments, the ambiguous sympathy for taking his
models literally leads many to attribute a materialist "mechanical philosophy" to him.
Nonetheless there are already clues here to an opposite assumption, a sympathy for
antimaterialism of the Kantian type. That sympathy will become glaring as we reconstruct the
context of the researches in heat and light, and will be made quite explicit by Maxwell's coconspirator, Helmholtz.

In any case, the youthful remark that it is "Force" that is observable, not "stuff," justifies
empirical studies of the all of the senses, and Forbes, Maxwell, and Helmholtz would be looking
carefully at the sense of sight--color vision--especially at Thomas Young's neglected theory of
color vision by three primary color receptors in the eye. By this roundabout argument,
Maxwell's theory of should be open to "experiment," as vision was an "impression made on the
different parts of the retina by three kinds of light."76

There is yet one more clue to Maxwell's legacy from Hamilton. We wonder why we have
not yet seen a remark on this question of "mixed-mathematics," why Hamilton was considered a
"contemner" of mathematics, or what Maxwell thought of this. The clue lies in a remark by
Cambell concerning Maxwell's studies (with Hamilton) in Logic:

Boole's attempt to give its logical forms a mathematical expression [1847] had a
naturally strong attraction for Clerk Maxwell.77
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The drama hidden in this remark arises from the retrospective assessment of this then obscure
Irish mathematician. George Boole had entered a quarrel between his friend, logician Augustus
de Morgan, and the Irish Sir William Rowan Hamilton over the relationship of mathematics to
logic.78 Boole and de Morgan argued that they were, in effect, the same mental acts. Hamilton,
a follower of Kant and his Romantic successors, Hegel and Schelling, thought thinking (logic)
employed higher facilities (judgment) than mere arithmetic. Boole, for his side, produced a
proposed arithmetic of logic, which grew up into the symbolic logics that so dominated
philosophical studies of mathematics at the turn-of-the century. Maxwell would indirectly get
into that fight through his advocacy of Helmholtz's abstract geometrical ideas, which threw a
scare into those who thought mathematical geometry was supported by absolute truth. The
squabble thus touches our story in the guise of academic squabbles over the logic of geometry,
particularly at Göttingen, where the mathematicians Felix Klein and David Hilbert fended off a
challenge from the amateur "Boolean" logicians, Gottfried Frege and Bertrand Russell.7 9 The
stakes were the same as in Maxwell's day--what did mathematics and geometry have to do with
thinking and logic? In particular, what should be the role of mathematics in experimental
science. The Irish Hamilton, the mathematician; the Scots Hamilton, the philosopher; the Irish
Boole, the logician; the Scots Forbes, the experimenter, were all at odds when Maxwell learned
of them at school. Mixed mathematics was, then, a very arguable mixture indeed, and the battles
between the Whewell-Forbes position and the Hamilton position have necessary ties to the
obscure metaphysical battles of the Kantians and their successors.

Was there among this complex of Maxwell's studies some glimmer as to how to reconcile the
demands of philosophical logic and of applied mathematics? Logic seemed to stem from the
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abstract background of ideas, and experience from the foreground of the senses. Could some
kind of "mixed mathematics" combine them better than Boole's? Could it apply to the dispute
between voids and ethers? Maxwell had his work cut out for him at Cambridge.

THE HISTORY OF HEAT BEFORE MAXWELL

We have noted Forbes' interest in volcanoes, glaciers, and the heat of the earth at different
depths. The significance of these studies has to do with Maxwell's later inclusion of Joseph
Fourier in his list of predecessors. It was Fourier's study of heat that directly generated Forbes'
research. While Fourier's fame will rest on his mathematics (or mixed mathematics), his physics
generated considerable opportunities to experimentalists like Forbes. For instance, as adjuncts to
his studies of heat, Fourier produced three papers, in 1811, 1820, and 1824, on terrestrial heat to
show the applicability of his emerging general "Law of Heat." Historian John Herivel cites one
example:

For the particular case of Iron, he also calculates the approximate heat which
passes in the course of half a year from the atmosphere to the interior of the earth
over a given area of one square metre, and finds that it would be equivalent to that
which would melt about 2856 kilograms of ice or a column of ice having a base
area of one square meter and a height of 3.1 meters...
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It is easy to see that the (daily) variations (in temperature) are practically
insensible at a depth of 60 metres. As for the earth itself, whose interior
conductivity is much less than Iron, the variations would penetrate to much
smaller depths both for the annual and the diurnal variations,...and this is found to
be the case...as Fourier puts it: `If these facts had not been known they would
have been deduced as simple and obvious consequences of the general equations
which we have put forward.' 80

That last comment by Fourier neatly encapsulates the philosophy of science attributable to the
heroes of this work--Maxwell, Helmholtz, Boltzmann, Gibbs, and Einstein. The sentiment is
most often attributed to Einstein, as setting forth the priority of mathematical truths to
experimental results. Here we have ample precedent to Forbes’ study of the earth's heat and its
relation to glaciers and volcanoes, as well as the conductivity of Iron--for which we recall he was
noted. Stephen Brush explains:

By [Fourier's] own account it was the problem of terrestrial temperatures that led
him to develop his theory, and one of its first applications was the derivation of a
simple formula relating the time required for a homogeneous sphere to cool from
a specified initial temperature, the present temperature gradient at the surface, and
the conductivity and heat capacity of the substance. The temperature gradient
(rate of change of the average temperature as one goes down into the earth) was a
frequent measured quantity at this time, since it could be used to measure the
central temperature by extrapolation, and Fourier could give rough estimates of
the other parameters in his equation. The result was such a long period of time
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for the cooling of the earth (about 200 million years) that Fourier did not even
bother to write it down explicitly.81
This apparent transmission of concern for the age of the earth from Fourier’s France to the
England of Lyell, Darwin, and Whewell leads us somewhat away from Maxwell's stake in the
issue, though Maxwell's friend William Thomson--later Lord Kelvin--became notorious for his
inclusion in his 1884 Baltimore Lectures of an attack on geological evolution based on the
inadequate cooling time of the earth. Maxwell, who was well prepared to take up geological
issues, took another tack at Cambridge.

This other tack of Maxwell's concerned more philosophical roots of physics, but it illustrated
itself in the examples of heat and light. In Forbes' day the question of "what is heat" was a
major casuas belli of European science. Newton had "started" the trouble (as usual) by
speculating that heat was an effect of the vibration of a "most subtle spirit," our friend, the ether:

Query 8. Do not all fix'd bodies, when heated beyond a certain degree, emit
light and shine; and is not this Emission perform'd by the vibrating motions of
their parts? And do not all bodies...emit Light as often as those parts are
sufficiently agitated; whether that agitation be made by Heat, or by Friction, or
Percussion, or Putrefaction...As for instance; Sea-Water in a raging Storm;...the
Back of a Cat, or Neck of a Horse, obliquely struck or rubbed in a dark place;
Wood, Flesh and Fish while they putrefy;...Stacks of moist Hay or Corn growing
hot by fermentation; Glow-worms and the Eyes of some Animals...82
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This connection of heat and light was partially at odds with the alchemical agenda of
representing the traditional elements, Air, Earth, Fire, and Water by some fundamental "essence"
of matter--this "essence" being sometimes itself material, sometimes immaterial. The German
"Iatrochemists" of the eighteenth century had fixed on "the matter of fire" to be something called
"phlogiston" conferring weight ("gravity") or anti-weight ("levity") on chemicals possessing
different degrees of heat. Championed by Georg Stahl 83, the many experiments to isolate
phlogiston in the eighteenth century became predecessors to the reconsideration of the "true"
elemental composition of (hot) substances. This all led to a digression from the inquiry about
heat to an inquiry about elements ("Chemistry"), capped by a "revolution" of sorts in
nomenclature led by the French Chemist Lavoisier and his wife Marie. Ceremonially "burning"
the books by Stahl, Lavoisier and his "Anti-Phlogiston League" created a new description of the
elements, about 80, including the new constituents of air and water g he claimed as his own
discovery. 84 Included in Lavoisier's elements was a new “Lumier and a "Caloric"

----------------

(g) The English dissenting pastor, Joseph Priestley, also deserves some priority for the
discovery of the composition of air and water, as does the eccentric scion of the house of
Devonshire, Henry Cavendish (whose papers Maxwell edited when first head of the "Cavendish"
Laboratory at Cambridge).

--------------

("Chaleur"), which became a target for a great investigation by the generation of Frenchmen who
dubbed Lavoisier the "father of chemistry,"to be twinned with the great Newton, the "father of
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physics". Lavoisier himself was executed by the Terror for tax-farming, and his wealthy
widow, Jeanette, married an American adventurer, Benjamin Thompson,Count Rumford.

85

As Rumford was already famous for "disproving" Lavoisier's theory of material Caloric, this
domestic coincidence accidently symbolizes the coming shift from materialist theories of heatas-substance to anti-materialist theories of heat-as-motion, the very battlefield of Forbes and
Maxwell. The marriage, blessed by Napoleon, was unhappy. In a fit of high irony, Jeanette
ruined Rumford's prize roses by pouring hot water on them, perhaps striking a blow for her late
husband's caloric. History does record that Benjamin Thompson, Count Rumford did upset the
Lavoisier agenda with his notions that heat was not elemental at all, but instead a qualitative
result of motion or friction. He reported this idea while directing the Bavarian Army, noting that
infinite amounts of heat spewed forth from brass as it was being bored for cannon. Thus, he
presumed, the heat was not "in" the brass in the form of caloric, but "created" in inexhaustible
amounts by the friction of boring.

Rumford was sort of ignored by the more "professional" scientists, as he advanced many
dubious "new ideas," often conflicting. One, for example, was his successful "war on poverty"
in Bavaria, where he arrested all the poor and fed them on heated, watered soup. (Water and
heat, you see, were supposed to be the nourishing components of food). He also improved on
gall-wort for invisible ink, helpful in spying on his Boston friends for general Gage in the
American Revolution. He also led an English Regiment--of American Exiles--in an invasion of
the revolting colonies, but, alas, arrived just after Cornwallis' surrender--though he went on to
ravage Long Island a bit before the war formally ended.
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Given these examples of the work of Count (of the then dubious Holy Roman Empire)
Rumford, one might think the lack of splash of his theory of heat-as-motion is justified by a
tacky reputation. Far from it, for two of his sincere inventions of socially useful science caught
on--the "Rumford Stove" and the "Royal Institution." The former, a result of his researches in
heat and cooking for his poorhouse project in Bavaria (and his obsession with coffee pots), was
celebrated throughout England as a technological wonder. The latter , a private "museum" to be
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dedicated to the teaching of useful scientific arts to working-class artisans, survived from 1800
to the present to be a respectable, even prestigious, research center and science performing
center. Its stars, particularly the chemist Humphrey Davy (whose lectures the poet, Coleridge,
attended "for the metaphors") and his assistant Michael Faraday, became "professional"
innovators in science (hence presumably exceptions to the post-Napoleonic war "decline of
science in England"). Coleridge himself gave unsuccessful lectures at the "R.I." on German
Romanticism of Schelling.87 Faraday in particular would give Maxwell the notion of "field" that
he would combine with Fourier's mathematics to produce his version of mixed mathematics.

Finally, another legacy from Benjamin Thompson, Count Rumford, is his donation of funds
to the Royal Society and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences for two Rumford Medals"
for research in heat, awarded to (among others) himself (1800), Davy (1816), Brewster (1816),
Fresnel (for light, not heat, 1824), Forbes (1838), and Faraday (1846).

The celebrations were of later contributions to physics, but what of Rumford's original ideas
about heat? They didn't, at first, displace the Caloric dogma of Lavoisier, at least not where
science was flourishing in the first half of the nineteenth century, France. Napoleon had left a
school reform, jeweled by the prestigious Ecole Polytechnique, whose professors and students
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would direct the French apotheosis of Newton. Fourier, for example, was there as an assistant to
the famous physicist Lagrange before he was chosen to go to Egypt with Napoleon's army of
scientists and mathematicians. Pierre Simon de Laplace, the "French Newton," there led an
array of academicians, often called the "Society of Arceuil" after their informal meeting place.88
He had collaborated with the lamented Lavoisier in some researches in heat,89 so was not likely
to discourage the hunt for the elusive caloric. A former Polytechnic student, Nicolas Leonard
Sadi Carnot, carried the caloric idea to immortal fame in his 1824 "Reflections on the Motive
Power of Fire," a theory of the efficiency of Steam Engines. Since this work earns him paternity
as "the Father of Thermodynamics," the theoretical notions of heat therein survived long the
commitment to caloric, or the specific practical application to steam engines--note the actual
title: "Reflexions sur la puissance motrice de feu et sur les machines propres a developper cette
puissance."90 His father, Sadi, had been engineer in Paris both for revolutionary and Napoleonic
regimes, and he had developed theories of the loss of efficiency when water splashed on noncurved blades of waterwheels. It was a short hop to Nicolas' ideas on heat engines running on
caloric rather than water.91

Other Polytechnicians crop up occasionally, like Biot and Poisson, but our focus here is on
Maxwell's and Forbes' version of Joseph Fourier. Fourier, after his stint as secretary to the
Institut d'Egypte, had become a bureaucrat (Bureau of Statistics) while puttering in the science
business. He is better known today as a mathematician. His researches in heat in the early
1800's alienated him from the Academicians--Laplace and Biot particularly hated him. He was
blocked from the Academy by Louis XVIII, presumably as having been favored by Napoleon,

54

when "suddenly" in 1817 he was admitted into the Academy with the support of Laplace
himself. Caloric was still an element, but Fourier's formulas had to be admired. Herivel notes:

The familiar expression for the heat flux in solid bodies...was probably taken for
granted once the opposition of Biot and Poisson had been stilled by the presumed
defection of Laplace to the enemy camp. 92

Now this looks confusing. Did the French think that Fourier's theory of heat was wrong, but
his formulas were right? Did Forbes think that too? That is precisely the point--Fourier's
"famous formula" did not depend on any particular idea of what heat "was," be it phlogiston,
caloric, motion, or whatever. Hear Fourier himself, around 1810:

As to the general principle about which M. Biot talks which consists in the fact
that the molecules of bodies which are immediately adjacent to each other act on
each other [through "atmospheres" of caloric?] for transmission of heat, I do not
understand why one would wish to set it up as a new truth. It has seemed
inconceivable to me that the action in question could be entrusted solely to
surfaces in contact...I can assure you that I have often employed these
considerations in my researches. But I have recognized very clearly that it was
not necessary [to employ them] for founding the theory of heat.93
To reiterate, whatever these formula of Fourier's are, they are not derived from a
consideration of the nature of things, nonetheless they are the basis from which phenomena can
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be deduced and predicted. Maybe Laplace relented because he remembered the great Newton
pulling such a stunt. His "Law" of Gravitation worked, but as to the "cause" of gravity, he
"feigned no hypotheses." Now we have Fourier's "Law of Heat" and again no hypothesis
feigning. Laplace and Biot had a competing "law," but in theirs the flow of heat was caused by
temperature difference, where in Fourier's law heat was forced by a temperature "gradient" (a
rate, per length, of temperature drop). Fourier won, and Forbes proved it, a suitable achievement
for the Rumford Medal.

Following this excursion, as Maxwell might have in Edinburgh, a suspicion must have
arisen. If Newton and Fourier didn't get their "Laws" from considering experiments and
investigations into the nature of things, where did they get them? The standard answer--"they
were geniuses, it can't be explained"--worked (and still works) for most undergraduates, but not
for Hamilton, so not for Maxwell. You see, this question had bothered physicist-philosophers
since Newton, and at least one of them, Kant, thought of an answer. Since Kant was German,
and we are supposedly in Victorian England at the moment, this clue will have to wait--though it
is here irresistible to cite the German who posterity says resolved the heat problem in the 1850's-Rudolph Clausius. The famous title of an 1857 paper says it all: "On the Kind of Motions we
Call Heat" ("Uber die Art der Bewegung welche wir Warme nennen"). Motion, not stuff. It
would appear that the Kant-Boscovitch influence in electricity via Faraday and Davy could be
repeated in heat via Maxwell and Clausius.

THE PROBLEMS OF LIGHT AND COLOR
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Having found out what Maxwell learned about heat, we should turn to his education in light,
for it was these two subjects that Maxwell was to revolutionize in a way that produced the
confusing "Maxwell vs. Maxwell" ambiguity on what kinds of substances or forces that should
be the foundation of physics.

In considering Forbes' teaching on "light," we should not place too much emphasis on the
then controversial subject of the nature of light "itself." The undulatory theories of Young or
Fresnel met considerable skepticism in the "Scottish School" at the time, but concerted research
was not generally directed to clarifying this issue. Rather, it was the way light, whatever it was,
behaved that occupied the experimenter's time. Brewster's zeal for polarization was matched by
Forbes' concern for color and color vision, and it was in these areas that Forbes took on young
Maxwell as a prize "research assistant." The particular issues of study were in the question of
the composition of colored light (perhaps as mixtures of three "primary" colors) and the question
of how the eye perceives colors (e.g., a parallel suggestion of three color receptors in the eye).
This research would "spread" from Forbes and Maxwell in England to Helmholtz in Germany,
and ultimately to the early twentieth century musings of Erwin Schrödinger.

The history of the problem of color is perhaps more revealing of the nature of nineteenth
century physics and ideology than that of the problem of light. It "begins," as usual, with
Newton and his neglected classic "Opticks." The bulk of the work deals with his famous prism
experiments in "decomposing" sunlight into its "elements"--seven primary colors: Red, Orange,
Yellow, Green, Blue, Indigo, and Violet (the source of the universal student mnemonic "ROY.
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G. BIV"). Newton separated and remixed these colors from sunbeams in his rooms at
Cambridge, but (with one exception) withheld publication of such "optical alchemy" until 1704,
when his most formidable critic, Robert Hooke, died. What's to criticize? Enough to fill
libraries of the history of science, but here we focus on those points problematic in the studies of
Maxwell and Helmholtz. One problem was the seven color theory. Why seven? Why not six,
as Goethe later argued, or three, according to Young--though credit for this is usually given to
Helmholtz ? They couldn't count the colors, as their experiments showed a continuous wash of a
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"rainbow" ("spectrum") of all colors "primary" and "mixed." The trick eluding the
experimenters was to try to "purify" some colors and then mix them to see if the other colors
could be "compounds." To everybody's confusion, painters had been doing that for years, but
the mixture of colored paint was thought to be a chemical process different from the mixture of
pure "color" (recall Lavoisier thought light to be a chemical element itself). Even the painters
had their problems. In 1882, Van Gogh wrote:

We of course agree perfectly about black in nature. Absolute black does not
really exist. But, like white, it is present in almost every colour, and forms the
endless variety of grays...
There are but three fundamental colours--red, yellow and blue; `composites'
are orange, green, and purple...And to have a clear notion of this is worth more
than seventy different colours of paint,--since with these three principal colours
and black and white, one can make more than seventy tones and varieties. 95
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Here the problem of black and white as colors, mixtures, or the absence of colors reflected
not only the Impressionist`s creed (with which Van Gogh occasionally flirted), but arguments
about Newton's most hostile critic, Goethe. Newton may not have been too convincing in his
presentation of a seven-color theory, as he attributed his "proof" not to observation but to a kind
of "mathematics"--a theory of harmony. Since there were seven notes in a full musical scale-do, re, mi, fa, sol, la, ti, do--there were seven "spaces" between, and a harmony of notes, like a
harmony of color, was "proportioned" by those seven spaces:

Let GM [a line drawn on a spectrum] be divided [after the manner of a musical
chord] and conceive [various intervals] to be in proportion to one another, as the
Numbers, 1, 8/9, 5/6, 3/4, 2/3, 3/5, 9/16, 1/2, and so to represent the Chords of
the Key, and of a Tone, a third Minor, a fourth, a fifth, a sixth Major, a seventh
and an eighth above the Key: And the intervals...will be the Spaces which the
several Colours (red, orange, yellow, green, blue, indigo, violet) take up. 96

This idea of visible harmony had spawned admiring applications, including an "Ocular"
harpsichord. This instrument was popularized to seventeenth century "enlightenment"
philosophers through the popular "letters to a German Princess" of one of Catherine the Great's
hired geniuses, Leonhard Euler:

These colours [seven, though Newton's Indigo is missing from the blue end, and
"Purple" is added as "extreme red"] may be compared with the notes of an octave,
because the relations of colours, as well as those of sound, may be expressed by
numbers. There is even the appearance, that by straining the violet a little more,
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you may come round to a new purple, just as in raising from sound to sound, on
going beyond B you come round to c, which is the octave above C...
On this principle it was that Father Castel, in France,
contrived a species of music of colours. He constructed a harpsichord, of which
every key displayed a substance of a certain colour; and he pretended that this
harpsichord, if skillfully touched, would present a most agreeable spectacle to the
eye. He gave it the name of the Ocular Harpsichord, and you must undoubtedly
have heard it talked of. For my part, painting rather seems to be that to the eye
which music is to the ear; and I greatly doubt whether the representation of
several shreds of cloth of different colours could be very agreeable.97
Coincidentally, this musical arithmetic appealed to the French Newtonian the Marquis de
Condorcet, who annotated an edition of Euler's "Letters" before his unfortunate execution in the
reign of Terror (in the same batch with the "Newton of Chemistry," Lavoisier).98 David
Brewster, the Scot we met at the beginning of this chapter, included the ocular harpsichord in his
Treatise on the Kaleidoscope, and later described it in his 1833 edition of Euler's Letters.
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This is an appealing use of a classical "Pythagorean" analogy, combining harmony, colors, and
numerical ratios--just the kind of "applied mathematics" favored by the Romantics, but it was
not typical of Newton's writings and not taught by Forbes. For one thing, the "magic number" of
seven colors had been amended. Mary Somerville wrote:

In addition to the seven colours of the Newtonian spectrum, Sir John Herschel
has discovered a set of very dark red rays beyond the red extremity of the
spectrum which can only be seen when the eye is defended from the glare of the
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other colours by a dark blue cobalt glass. He has also found that beyond the
extreme violet there are visible rays of a lavender gray colour...100 h
,

---------------

(h) She ought to have mentioned the invisible “ultra-violet” radiations discovered by the
German romantic scientist Johann Ritter, as it influenced his patron Oersted, who influenced
Faraday, who, of course, gave us Maxwell. This will be but one link between Maxwell’s world
and the shadowy romanticism known to Goethe and Schelling (and opposed byRitter, and
Oersted) as “Naturphilosophie.”

---------------

Given such a constitution of light, the phenomenon of color vision becomes a physiological
question--how is the "mind's eye" stimulated to represent things in color. Forbes and Maxwell
developed many experiments to produce color illusions, and Maxwell went on to develop
devices such as a "color top" of three colors which, when spinning created the illusion of
others. He thought this might center his career. In 1855, after college, he wrote:
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I have no intention of doing a Newton or any elegant mathematics. I have a few
thoughts on top-spinning and sensation generally, and a kind of dim outline of
Cambridge palavers, tending to shadow forth the influence of mathematical
training on opinion and speculation. 102
Maxwell's interest in color vision did persist through his life. He developed a "Color-box"
by which he could test various kinds of people for color blindness, and "discovered" the
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"Maxwell Spot," a structure on the retina responsible for a distortion in color perception.103 In
1861 he exhibited one of the first color photographs to the Royal Institution i

---------------

(i) This involved a bit of luck, for the filtered red light he used didn't register on the film--but
some leaked ultra-violet made up for it.104

---------------

This appears like "practical science" as will Helmholtz's research in the same subject,
complete with the invention of medical diagnostic equipment. Maxwell started these
experiments in college, and intended them to benefit society (e.g., in studying color blindness).
Were this all he had done in his career, he would be listed among the host of experimental
scientists--mostly forgotten--who sprang from the "Scottish School" (more particularly, from
Forbes' teaching). It must be emphasized that Maxwell's famous "theory of light" and his not-sofamous "theory of color" are two essentially unrelated subjects. While Newton's theories of light
and color were distinctly connected, one could (and both Maxwell and Goethe did) separate the
two as arenas of research. Goethe's own theories of color as a psychological reaction to mixtures
of dark and light were not unknown to Maxwell, or other intellectuals of this post-romantic
period in England. The aforementioned artist J.M.W. Turner had exhibited in his collection
(now at the Tate Gallery) impressive paintings on the subject, including one specifically titled
"color theory," and had written essays in defense of Goethe.
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The teachings of Forbes represent obvious foundations for Maxwell's future inquiries into
heat, light, and color. The teachings of Hamilton represent foundations for the philosophical
justifications of these inquiries. The opposition of the two ways of thinking will "explain" the
apparent ambiguities in Maxwell's later thinking, and his struggle to reconcile them would lay a
foundation for a substantially new kind of scientific thought. The Hamilton-Kant branch of this
mix suggests such a radical departure from "normal science" (hinted at in the "opinion and
speculation" part of the 1855 comment above). Our pursuit of this thread will take us to German
science--to Maxwell's German "parallel," Helmholtz, and to Newton's German "parallel,"
Goethe.
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CHAPTER 2

In roughly the same time as Maxwell, but in a distant culture, Hermann von Helmholtz also
acquired an education in science and philosophy. This education, both at home from his erudite
father and at Prussia's elite schools, conveyed a very complex agenda for natural philosophy. As
he began as a doctor, Helmholtz' subsequent career as a physicist-philosopher is less obviously
prefigured in his education than was Maxwell's, but a detailed look at the philosophical context
of pre-revolutionary Prussia supports Helmholtz' debt to past intellectuals. This debt is
compounded in the dialectics of German Romanticism--the religious arguments of Herder,
philosophic ideals of Hegel, and the actual scientific agendas that Helmholtz learned should
guide his recent adventures in research--from physiology to physics--exemplified by his
development of that most crucial concept, "energy."

HELMHOLTZ AT KÖNIGSBERG

In 1851 the 30 year old professor of Physiology at Königsberg, Hermann von Helmholtz,
recently arrived from Berlin, went off on a tour of seven German physiological institutes.1 He
was not in a position to view the historical symmetries between his technical vacation and that of
Maxwell's in the same year, or the philosophical geometry of his and Maxwell's relocation.
While Maxwell viewed the German cannons of Krupp, Helmholtz viewed the German
laboratories. While Maxwell was crossing the path of England's patron of science, Prince
Albert, Helmholtz was crossing the path of a future patron of equal political significance, that of
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Prussia's new Foreign Service Officer, Otto von Bismarck.a
--------------(a) Who modestly noted: "the stream of time flows inexorably along. By plunging my hand into
it, I am merely doing my duty. I do not expect thereby to change its course."2
--------------Bismarck's Germany and Albert's England would be the separate customers for our founders'
new philosophy, and each would yield to a different kind of salesmanship. As for the relocation
parallel, the distance Helmholtz moved from Berlin to Königsberg, was far greater than
Maxwell's move from Edinburgh to London. Königsberg is 397 miles N. E. of Berlin, in what
was called "East Prussia"--now Lithuania--the stomping grounds of the renaissance Teutonic
Knights and the legendary Ambassador-Priest-Astronomer Nicolas Copernicus. The intellectual
shift represented by Helmholtz' 1849 move away from Berlin seemed away from the center of
things, not, as for Maxwell, towards the eye of an intellectual storm. But the intellectual parallel
was there, if for no other reason that Königsberg was the birthplace and stage for that hero of
Scots idealism, Immanuel Kant.
In Königsberg Kant's tomb was a public monument, attached to the ancient cathedral where
Frederick I crowned himself King of Prussia in 1701--and William I would do the same in 1861.
Elsewhere in the town reminders of philosophy were abundant.b

Kant was considered the

--------------(b) Even some of the bridges across the Pregel to the island Kneiphof would enter posterity (of a
sorts) as the site of the mathematical conundrum of "the Seven Bridges of Königsberg" (can one
cross all seven bridges without recrossing any?). In 1735 Leonhard Euler produced proofs
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concerning this and similar “mapping” puzzles, leading to Arthur Caley’s 1859 initiation of the
field of mathematical topology. Maxwell dabbled in related puzzles in his 1870 paper “On Hills
and Dales,” remembered as a founding document, along with those by Caley and Marston Morse
(1925), of a topological area called Ostometry, or the Theory of Surface Networks.2 a

--------------founder of the philosophy of science by all of our principals. The outstanding issue for
Maxwell, Hamilton,Whewell, Helmholtz, and the others was whether to adhere strictly to the
Kantian precepts (such as rejection of materialism and the priority of imagination to experience),
to modify them, or to replace them. The rehabilitation of this sage would become, at least
implicitly, the task of Helmholtz, among other Germans dubbed the “back-to-Kant movement.”
In 1851, however, the chief intellectual attraction of Königsberg was Helmholtz himself-already known among scholars of physiology for his identification of nerve cells in the ganglia
and for his (originally rejected) paper on some kind of life-force, "Kraft," that swirled eternally
in mechanical, as well as physiological, moving systems. The former discovery exemplified the
"practical" side of Helmholtz' fame, for he is remembered in some circles as a pioneer
physiologist. The latter invention brought him to the attention of the world of physicistphilosophers, for this "Kraft" is what we now call "Energy" and Helmholtz is thus credited,
along with Julius Mayer and James Prescott Joule, for creating the profound "physical law" of
conservation of energy. This "abstract" side of Helmholtz' fame is illustrated in popular lectures
on "the conservation of force (Kraft)" that he himself gave in Karlsruhe in 1862:
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The natural sciences, partly in consequence of their practical applications, and
partly from their intellectual influences on the last four centuries, have so
profoundly, and with such increasing rapidity, transformed all the relations of the
life of civilised nations; they have given these nations such increase of riches, of
enjoyment of life, of the preservation of health, of means of industrial and social
intercourse, and even such increase of political power, that every educated man
who tries to understand the forces at work in the world in which he is living, even
if he does not wish to enter upon the study of a special science, must have some
interest in that peculiar kind of mental labour, which works and acts in the
sciences in question.3

Turning from science in general to his own concept of natural force ("energy"), Helmholtz
demonstrated the interrelations of heat, mechanical motions, magnetism, electrical currents,
chemical transformations, and the growth of vegetable and animal life. Beyond utility,

You see how, starting from considerations based on the immediate practical
interests of technical work, we have been led up to a universal natural law [of
conservation of force], which...rules and embraces all natural processes; which is
no longer restricted to the practical objects of human utility, but expresses a
perfectly general and particularly characteristic property of all natural forces...4

Such investigations had propelled Helmholtz from the position of army doctor to Professor,
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and the hopes of the Prussian bureaucracy which promoted him were vindicated by his invention
of a valuable medical instrument, the "Ophthalmoscope."c
--------------(c) Independently invented earlier by, of all people, Babbage--at least according to the
Edinburgh based "Chambers Biographical Dictionary".5
--------------While the practical work of Helmholtz paid the bills, the philosophical work changed the
world, and it is important to assess both kinds of "science" against his own learning of these
subjects. As Helmholtz began as a medical student, we might look at what he learned at the
Friedrich Wilhelm Institute of Medicine, University of Berlin, and his new post as professor of
physiology at Königsberg. We might start the latter education with a Lutheran preacher of what
we call "Romanticism," Johann Gottfried von Herder.
Herder's work especially impressed itself on Königsbergers, as he studied there, and had
known the great Kant. His influence on Goethe and the Jena philosopher-poets Hegel, Fichte,
Schelling, Schlegel, and Schiller spread Europe-wide. Off the Continent, for example, both
Hamiltons and the astronomers Herschel and Airy were fond of translating Schiller, if not the
father of German Romanticism, at least an uncle. Herder's poetic visions, especially of human
history, were not merely recreational escapes from physiological studies such as Helmholtz',
they were part of them. Herder as well as Helmholtz had studied his anatomy lessons from
books by swiss-born Göttingen poet-professor Albrecht von Haller (d. 1877). Herder's
knowledge of the humanity he "organicized" into history came from such "scientific" evidence.
For instance, a single ominous example from Herder’s celebrated "Reflections on The
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Philosophy of the History of Mankind" (1784-1791) suggests a mind-body connection very
intriguing to our heroes:

Corrosive poisons can so change the skin, that a man may plunge his hand into
melted lead, and rigorous cold, as well as anger and other passions of the mind
also contribute to deaden the feeling*
*

Haller's Physiology, Vol. V. p. 16.6

For Herder, the principles of life were a struggle between external factors ("climate") and
internal generative power--a "vital principle acting in the way of nutrition and propagation"--and
this internal "organic" power "has the prototype of its appearance in itself."7 Thus arises the
"kernel"--the seed, gene, or archetype from which the form and development of the individual
may be deduced. This form can be both mathematical and artistic:

Amid the innumerable varieties of the human figure, certain forms and
proportions not only reoccur, but pertain exclusively to each other. With
artists this is an acknowledged fact...they placed this proportion, or symmetry as
they termed it, not

merely in the length and breadth of the limbs, but also in

their harmonic adjustments to the spirit of the whole.8

This harmony and proportion will reappear in much of this story--in the theories of color of
Newton, Goethe, Helmholtz, and Maxwell, for example--and it is well to be reminded of the
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religious basis for much of it. The university at Königsberg was founded as a "purely Lutheran"
school in 15449, and Herder was the first Lutheran preacher in Weimar.10 d He gave theological
sanction to science:

"Humanity is the end of human Nature; and, with this end, God has put

--------------(d) Many of our characters were not only church-goers, but church officers (Forbes was a
"Scottish Episcopalian"11, Maxwell a church elder, Brewster a preacher, Hiram Powers a
Swedenborgian12, etc.).
--------------their own Fate into the hands of mankind."13
To the students of Herder, religion, science, and poetry were of a piece. We shall see some
influence of such poetry, especially Coleridge’s, on English science, and we might envision a
German strain of that connection in Schlegel, oft-called “the Coleridge of Germany.” Schlegel,
the son of a Lutheran pastor began his poetic quest in the 1790's while a student, first of
philology, then of law, at Göttingen, then Leipzig. He joined the company of other authors of
German Romanticism, Friedrich Schiller and Friedrich von Hardenberg (later published as
“Novalis”), and rose to prominence through critical reviews (especially of Goethe) and pithy
aphorisms, “Fragments,” in which he constructed a theory of the new wave of poetics for which
he constructed the adjective romantisch.14 He saw connections between “poetry and “science
(although we shall see he had a somewhat different view of “science” than his less romantic
colleagues). Amidst his “Critical Fragments” we find:

115. The whole history of modern poetry is a running commentary on the
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following brief philosophical text: all art should become science and all science
art; poetry and philosophy should be made one.”15

And from the “Athenaeum Fragments”:

365. Mathematics is, as it were, sensual logic. It relates to philosophy as the
material arts, music and sculpture, relate to poetry.16

He is, as were most romantics, especially fond of the details of Kant’s complex philosophy of
knowledge and his rejection of the “reality” of the external material world. Poetry, the work of
inner “genius,” was to Schlegel a prelude to perception of a world of forces and activities, not of
“things”
Thus it might be said that the ophthalmoscope and the physiological study that it represented
loosely connects Helmholtz with a Protestant Romantic tradition. So does the place,
Königsberg, and even the method of "discovery" or "invention" in science. Helmholtz allegedly
invented the gadget while trying to demonstrate to his class that the supposed light from a cat's
eye was merely a reflection.17 Philosophically, there was a vast difference between experiments
of discovery and experiments of demonstration--an ideological difference that embroiled both
Helmholtz and Maxwell in their later years as laboratory directors.

There was much

more than the tradition of his college to imbue Helmholtz with the spirit of German
Romanticism. The legends of Kant, the romantic theory of Schlegel, and the preachings of
Herder are just small pieces of what was taught to every German schoolboy about the founders
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of the new German philosophy. The legends started with Kant at Königsberg, then Herder and
Goethe's teachings at Jena, followed by Hegel and his school. "Hegel and his school" included
poets, like Schiller; philosophers, like Fichte; and scientists, like Schelling. All of these had an
influence on Helmholtz. Not just indirectly--as schoolbook exemplars--but directly through
their specific theories of science, knowledge, and truth.e
--------------(e) Even more directly, we will find Helmholtz’ father to be a practicing Romantic, eager to see
his son’s career vindicate the precepts of his own aborted theological career.
--------------While their respective roots in Kantian philosophy are sufficient to link Helmholtz and
Maxwell for this argument, even more common ground can be suggested. For example, Manfred
Kuehn has argued that Kant's philosophy itself was partially rooted in the "common sense" and
"inborn aptitude" arguments of Scottish predecessors: Reid, Oswald, and Beattie.18 Though
skeptical of this explicit genealogy of Kant's ideas, philosopher Gary Hatfield accords to this
argument a basis for uniting the German Kantians and the English Victorians:

Kuehn's establishment of Scottish influence in Germany--including
reviews of books published in English and their subsequent translation--can serve
as a reminder to scholars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of the
danger of "national histories" that ignore the international character of the
community of natural and moral philosophers during the Enlightenment.19
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Like Maxwell, Helmholtz was to become a physicist-philosopher, and his work too would
center on mixed-mathematics. As Maxwell's color research accorded him secondary fame as an
experimenter, Helmholtz's legendary physiology would mark him down in history as at least an
interesting experimenter. More dramatically, Helmholtz's more celebrated agenda was the same
as Maxwell's-- "mathematical physics." Even the particular subjects Helmholtz would illustrate
with his (and Maxwell's) methods were the same: heat, light, and electricity. Thus, Maxwell in
Cambridge and Helmholtz in Königsberg in 1851 present us with parallels sufficient to expect
their agendas to be interwoven, as they were.

ROMANTIC SCIENCE: GOETHE

In order to understand the possible direct influence of German Romanticism on "actual"
physics, via Maxwell or Helmholtz, we must look more carefully at the academic locus of this
movement--Jena in the early 1800's. It's sage, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe was, by all accounts
the originating genius--transforming Kant's dry technical autopsy of the possibilities of thought
into a comprehensive description of the individual human experience. His early pot-boiler "The
Sorrows of Young Werther" had so successfully articulated what the German youth thought they
were thinking and feeling (about life, love, and place) that a rash of teen-age suicides-"Wertherfever"-- were laid at his door. His evocation of the internal struggles of Dr.
Faustus to find free choice amid the conflicting claims of authorities became and remains the urpoetry of European intellectuals (Einstein, for instance, paid extra fees at college for a tutor in
Goethe's poetry). However, what concerns us here is Goethe's claim to be a "research" scientist
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as well, doing elaborate experiments in both physiology and optics. In his old age he wrote:

As for what I have done as a poet, I take no pride in it whatever.
Excellent poets have lived at the same time; more excellent poets have lived
before me, and will come after me. But that in my century I am the only man
who knows the truth in the difficult science of color--of that I say, I am not a little
proud.20

His physiological bias reflected his philosophy--there should be in any complex situation a
"kernel"--an archetypal element that contained prefigurations of all diverse forms. For example,
amid the diverse multitude of bones of the ear, each specially shaped for a special purpose, there
should be one "ur-bone"f that recapitulated all the other shapes and functions. Goethe actually
--------------(f) The prefix “ur-“ arose from the name of the ancient Sumerian city of “Ur” from which all
civilization was assumed to have originated.
--------------discovered the bone, now called the intermaxillary, though few today see anything universal or
special in its shape or function. Similarly in botanical literature, Goethe sought the "Ur-Pflanze"
(ur-plant) that would be the Kernel for all plant-life.
In the case of Optics, Goethe took it on himself to rail at the errors of Newton, both in method
and philosophy. It seemed evident from Kant that knowledge generated by sensation was a
property of the mind, not the world, so that the "knowledge of "color" was an internal
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("psychological") reaction to light, not a property of light "itself":

Indeed, strictly speaking, it is useless to attempt to express the nature of a
thing abstractly. Effects we can perceive, and a complete history of those effects
would, in fact, sufficiently define the nature of the thing itself. We should try in
vain to describe a man's character, but let his acts be collected and an idea of the
character will be presented to us.
The colours are acts of light; its active and passive modifications: thus
considered we may expect from them some explanation respecting light itself.21

So, how did the sensation of light (or dark) work? “ The retina, after being acted upon by light or
darkness, is found to be in two different states which are entirely opposed to each other."22
Here was the central Romantic dogma, a duel of "opposites," an essential struggle within
everything, be it Young Werther's ambitions, Dr. Faustus's inquiries, or the human eye's struggle
with contrasts. While committed to inherent contrasts, the Romantics were not "dualists"--those
believers in the independent authority of metaphysical opposites (light-dark, good-evil, etc.).
Such a doctrine would have been "oriental"--a Persian Zoroastrian belief condemned by
the ancient Greek philosophers (except perhaps the hated Epicureans)--or an anti-Christian
"Manicheanism"--condemned by numerous ancient church councils. The opposites could not be
independent, they must be united. Even the ancient "founder" of logic, the Greek Parmenides,
condemned those who would treat light and dark as if "Neither had aught to do with the other." 23
What, then, would unite the fundamental "opposites?" Perhaps the struggle itself? The
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will? A mutual interdependence? A natural harmony or balance of nature? Such were the
problems of the metaphysical agenda that Goethe set forth, and that were taken up by his
admirers at the University of Jena--Schiller, Schelling, and the rest--and by their English
admirers, Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Carlyle, and by an American fan, Emerson.
For Goethe, the unification of opposites would be demonstrated in the instance of color
vision by testing. The eye when exposed to an unbalance--a bright light, for example--would
"recoil" and seek "rest" (or "activity" in the case of over-darkness) to restore the balance. Colors
arose in the struggle:
Light and darkness, brightness and obscurity, or if a more general
expression is preferred, light and its absence, are necessary to the production of
colour, Next to the light, a colour appears which we call yellow; another appears
next to the darkness, which we call blue. When these, in their purest state, are so
mixed that they are exactly equal, they produce a third color called green.24

This goes on, producing orange on the bright side and violet on the dark side--which mix to
pure red. Thus we wind up with exactly six colors--three pairs--not Newton's seven. Goethe
even arranged these colors at the vertices of a six-pointed star to illustrate the symmetry that
united the colors and added a diagram of "complements" that was considerable help in color
mixing. Complementary colors of the "mind's eye," were thus not independent of other mental
acts. As Van Gogh later put it (not unmindful of his sources),
"Romance and romanticism are not of our time, and painters must have
imagination and sentiment. Luckily realism and naturalism are not free from
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it"25):
But now, if summer is the opposition of blues against an element of
orange, in the gold bronze of the corn, one could paint a picture which expressed
the mood of the seasons in each of the contrasts of the complementary colors (red
and green, blue and orange, yellow and violet, white and black).26

(Mark Roskill, the editor of the letters, notes "Vincent had been studying at this date [Summer,
1884] the account of Delacroix's colour theory by Charles Blanc."27 Delacroix was a central
source of French romantic painting, and himself a most influential interpreter of Goethe.)
Goethe's "method" of discovering the innate laws of mind that dictate these "necessary
conditions of vision" suggests a kind of "science" that became a

doctrine --

"Naturphilosophie"– through his followers, notably Schellin and Seebeck. . The demonstrations
of optical conflict were a doorway to more universal laws of nature. Goethe argues

The investigator of nature cannot be required to be a philosopher, but it is
expected that he should so far have attained the habit of philosophizing, as to
distinguish himself essentially from the world, in order to associate himself with
it again in a higher sense. He should form to himself a method in accordance
with observation, but he should take heed not to reduce observations to mere
notions, to substitute words for this notion, and to use and deal with these words
as if they were things.28
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The role of mathematics in this "science" is to be secondary at best:

It may be expected that the investigator of nature...should be a
mathematician...
The author can boast of no attainments of this kind, and on this account
confines himself to departments of science which are independent of geometry;
departments which in modern times have been opened up far and wide.
It will be universally allowed that mathematics...has, in one point of
view been of the greatest use in the physical sciences, but that, by a false
application of its methods, it has, in many respects, been prejudicial to
them...
...A great mathematician [Newton] was possessed with an entirely false
notion on the physical origin of the colours; yet, owing to his great
authority as a geometer, the mistakes which he committed as an experimentalist
long became sanctioned in the eyes of a world ever fettered in prejudices.29

In this there is not only a call for a "non-mathematical" (qualitative) experimental science, but a
call for a "National effort":

In general it were to be wished that the Germans, who render such good
service to science, while they adopt all that is good from other nations, could by
degree accustom themselves to work in concert...The conduct of our neighbors
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the French is, in this respect, worthy of imitation.30

This was written in 1810, when Napoleon was revising the French school system, with the
enormously influential Ecole Polytechnique at its pinnacle. The Prussians in the post - 1815
reconstruction did indeed emulate the French. The Germans were inspired to create a school
system that virtually wiped out illiteracy by the last quarter of the century.31 A new university in
Berlin would cap it, and thus the call of Goethe was "heard" by Germany. Science, as in the
French school system, was to crown the nation's intellect - -but not the "science" of the
Newton-worshipping French, rather the "science" of Goethe. This was deliberately made so by
the explorer-writer Alexander von Humboldt and his brother, the Minister of education – both
unabashed Romantics.
We wonder how much Maxwell, a future color-theorist himself, knew of Goethe's "research."
Certainly for him as well as Helmholtz there pre-existed an "alternative" scientific account of
light, and, as we shall see, electricity and magnetism. We would expect Maxwell to be skeptical
of this German anti-Newtonian, as indeed he was. Hamilton's "Scottish Philosophy" had little
use for the Romantics' opposites and duals. Nonetheless we do find Maxwell's recommendation
to his father to read Humboldt's Travels and Polar Regions.32 So Maxwell knew something of a
"science" in Romanticism , and even adressed “scientific” themes to his fellow poets in his
Cambridge “apostles” club. More on that later. In Helmholtz's case Goethe and his studies were
required reading and, thanks to von Humboldt, immensely popular reading at that.
Goethe's call for a "German" science required inquiry into the "appearances" of the natural
world, parsed into an inherent natural struggle of opposites:
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True observers of nature...will agree that all which presents itself as
appearance, all that we meet with as phenomenon, must either indicate an original
division which is capable of union, or an original unity which admits of division,
and that phenomenon will present itself accordingly.33

There is, however, a "higher" principle of unification "above" this "division," as in magnetic
experiments where the division into separate magnetic poles is countered by a tendency to
"union" in the attractive powers of the mysterious magnetic forces.33 There is a united dualism in
electricity too, as

For us it [electricity] is a nothing, a zero, a mere point, which, however,
dwells in all apparent existences, and... whence, on the slightest stimulus [as in
frictional rubbing of resin on glass], a double appearance presents itself...So that
when we employ the terms or formulae polarity, plus and minus, for north and
south, for glass and resin, we do so justifiably and in conformity with nature.35

"Polarity" exists as well for the opposites light and darkness (though Goethe is careful here
not to commit unconstrained dualism, and often reminds the reader that "darkness" is the
absence of light – there is only one Kernel of color). Color is a "higher" level of phenomena, for
it relates to other human senses, notably aesthetics. Moreover, there are related analogies to
explore:
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Before we proceed to the moral associations of colour, and the aesthetic
influences arising from them, we have here to say a few words on its relation to
melody. That a certain relation exists between the two, has been always felt; this
is proved by the frequent comparison we meet with, sometimes as passing
allusions, sometimes as circumstantial parallels. The error which writers
[Newton] have fallen into in trying to establish this analogy we would thus
define:
Colour and sound do not admit of being directly compared together in
any way, but both are referable to a higher formula, both are derivable, although
each for itself, from this higher law.36

This "higher law" of polarity can not be directly stated, for language is symbolical and never
expresses things explicitly. However, by using all forms of symbols, the higher law can be
witnessed operating behind the phenomena – this is how an analogy or "heuristic" works. This
argument leads naturally to the question that most concerned Maxwell and Helmholtz: How
should the laws of nature be found, and how should they be expressed?
Our physicist-philosophers seemed to follow Goethe, at least in the sense that the laws of
science required analogies, not direct description of innate essences. Because of that they had to
struggle with the question of discovery: are the laws are "discovered" by experiment, or
"invented" by the inherent powers of the mind? The latter position, the "idealist" one, was, as
we shall see, the notion of choice for our heroes.
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If that was the case, then there is some value in examining more to what extent the
"background" of Romanticism colored the science of young Maxwell and young Helmholtz.
Legend has it that this would be futile, for, after all, it is the Scot and the Prussian who are said
to have led the Victorian-Bismarckian escape from futile Romanticism.

ROMANTIC SCIENCE: VON HUMBOLDT

Trying to determine Helmholtz' intellectual beginnings is a bit more difficult than in the case
of Maxwell. To organize this a bit it is helpful to look forwar d- -to Helmholtz' eventual
domination of the agenda at Berlin University (similar to Maxwell's at Cambridge--in fact, the
organizers of Cambridge's Cavendish Laboratory sought Helmholtz as director before
Maxwell).37 From Berlin in the 1880's, we can look either forward to the succession of Walther
Nernst and his "third Law of Thermodynamics," one possible ending to this saga, or, better, back
through Helmholtz to the founder of Berlin (now Humboldt) University: Karl Wilhelm von
Humboldt. This will get a bit confusing, as we have met two famous von Humboldts, this time
brothers, Karl Wilhelm and Alexander, Helmholtz' patron. Karl was a philologist and poet of
the turn-of-the-century, educated at Göttingen and Jena, and good friend of Schiller. His career
was that of civil servant and scholar – one of the erudite romantics the Prussian King, Friedrich
William III, loved to have hanging around his royal court. As scholar-poet, Karl
extended the romantic theory of unification of polarities into a theory of "duals" in language
formation, and through this developed almost a "science" of identifying national "character"
(volkgeist) by the technical peculiarities of language. He was the first, for instance, to introduce
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the Basque language into European studies.38 Such notions would not normally occupy our
interest save that they became a sort of "national policy," influencing generations of German
youth. This institutionalization of philosophy came about because Karl was Friedrich William's
Minister of Education and was in charge of revising the Prussian educational systems of the
"reform period" during and after the Napoleonic Wars. He reorganized Prussia's secondary
education system, creating model "humanities high schools" (Humanistisches Gymnasiums).39
Latin, Greek and the Classics became the national curriculum, and, by examination, prerequisites
for the civil service.

To the following century, these moral teachings evolved into the

"reactionary establishment" that required drastic modernization. Helmholtz himself would serve
on reform commissions to escalate science and mathematics to a par with humanities.
In 1809, after Napoleon had deprived Prussia of her famous university at Halle by
incorporating it into his new state of Westphalia, Karl von Humboldt organized a new
University of Berlin. The university's agenda, popularized by Humboldt's friends, Hegel,
Schleiermacher, Fichte, and his more famous brother Alexander, was to exhibit the organic
unity behind the diverse departments of knowledge. This agenda was certainly appropriate for
the later greats that worked there, including the scientists Van t'Hoff, Helmholtz, Koch, DuBoisReymond, and Fischer, and the influential intellectual historian, Treitschke. Those who argue a
mid-century revolution against Romanticism (say towards entrepreneurism) evoke other
ideologies, such as those of historians von Ranke and Mommsen, heroes of "positivism," and the
"scientific method." But for Helmholtz, Berlin's embattled Naturphilosophie seems a more
characteristic scientific outgrowth of his Romantic background, and he would struggle with
this proto-science, not always rejecting its more Kantian sentiments.
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Romanticism was the official ideology of the pre-1848 humanities, but not often of the
academic sciences. Christa Jungnickel and Russell McCormmach have recently chronicled the
institutional struggle against such "nature philosophy". They find that In 1821 a second drain on
Berlin resources for physics arose when Leopold von Henning, a student of Hegel, took up
Goethe's theory of colors. After studying the theory and with Goethe's support, Henning began
to give public lectures on it at the university.

The government supported his experiments...by giving him funds for
optical instruments and by promoting him to professor...In 1831, he reported to
Goethe that on the average he had been getting forty serious students for each
course...He also reported that there had been no lack of `malicious obstacles' from
`several sides' against the lectures, perhaps raised by the `stubborn mathematical
Newtonians'...
In 1826 [Berlin schoolteacher Ernst] Fischer answered this outbreak of
bad physics and Hegelian muscle-flexing in the Berlin ministry of culture with a
new edition of his 1805 textbook...40

Helmholtz would take up color theory at Berlin, and would join in the skepticism about this
“Naturphilosophie,” but this may mislead us as to his own philosophy of nature. After all,
Goethe himself could get frustrated by his zealous adherents:

Even Goethe struggled against the injury to German physics and to
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German science in general that...nature philosophy had done. Praising E.F.F.
Chladni's Acoustics, Goethe wrote to Frederich Schiller that Chladni
`belongs...among the blessed who don't have the faintest notion that there is such
a thing as nature philosophy.41

Though rejected by the authority of German Romanticism, this acoustician Chladni provides
yet another link between a philosophy of holistic analogies and Maxwell-Helmholtz agenda, for
it was he who provided a key metaphor for the development of the notion of space-filling
"fields." Specifically, Chladni was noted for making the "geometry" of sound visible by
producing patterns of sand or dust on metal plates vibrating at different pitches. Following this,
Faraday and others made the "geometry" of magnetism visible by producing patterns of scattered
iron filings on plates of paper near magnetic devices. The specific sound-magnetism analogy
would contribute heavily to the mathematical details of the Maxwell-Helmholtz field theory.42
However, at this point in our story, 1851, Helmholtz is at Königsberg, not yet a Berlin
superstar. He was aware of the encroachment of mathematics into physics via analogies,
especially through a new kind of academic strategy introduced to Königsberg in 1834 by Franz
Neumann; the "mathematical physics" seminar.43 Did he also know of the Humboldt plan? As
it happened, virtually everyone in Europe did (including Maxwell) - -not necessarily through the
popularity of Karl, but through the immensely popular travelogue-natural science books of
brother Alexander. The first two volumes of The Cosmos: Outline of a Description of the
Physical World were first published in 1845 - 47, and by the time the series of five was finished
in 1862, "The Cosmos, next to the Bible, [was] the most widely read work of his day."44 It is
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hard today to understand the influence of Alexander von Humboldt. By the end of his century,
the celebrated Agnes Mary Clerke complained of his difficult style and his vague ideas,
substituting, as she said, the "indefinite for the infinite."45 Maybe that was because Humboldt's
contributions to Naturphilosophie were in many ways too parallel to Goethe's, and thus
discredited by the English technical revolution, Berlin scientific skepticism, and French
Positivism. In some ways Humboldt went further in adherence to both an "organic"
(interdependent) universe and in a "method of analogy" to indirectly arouse understanding of the
whole. He championed the central role of a "vital force" in nature that animated and connected
all things, living and inert, and was famous for traveling the world in search of revealing
specifics. In an early (1793) work on Botanical and Physiological analogies ("Aphorismi" in his
Latin):

We call that matter inert, brute, and inanimate, the particles of which
are combined according to the laws of chemical affinity. On the other hand, we
call those bodies animate and organic, which, although constantly manifesting a
tendency to assume new forms, are restrained by some internal force from
relinquishing that originally assigned them. That internal force, which dissolves
the bonds of chemical affinity, and prevents the elements of bodies from freely
uniting, we call vital. Accordingly, the most certain criterion of death is
putrescence, by which the first parts, or stamina of things, resume their pristine
state, and obey the laws of affinity.46
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Perhaps this kind of philosophizing, central as it is to the technical metaphysics of the
scholars, was overlooked by his fan s– in favor of the exotic adventures and sights:

The south Pass southward of the Wind-River Mountains. Swelling of the
ground in the Great Basin. Long disputed existence of Lake Timpanogos. Coastchain, Maritime Alps, Sierra Nevada of California. Volcanic eruptions...47

(This is a small excerpt from the table of contents of "Views of Nature," an 1850 work
undoubtedly on Helmholtz's summer reading list of 1851). While the readers toured exotic sites
(in their Biedermeier armchairs, for this was the name of the stodgy nineteenth century
furniture– and of the "Victorian" age in Germany), the author snuck in scientific principles.
Humboldt observed the botany, geology, and culture wherever he traveled, and made
measurements of all sorts. Of interest to us (because they interested Forbes and Fourier) were
the measurements of temperatures at different altitudes, and especially those near volcanoes.
These measurements began in earnest on his early and famous voyage of discovery to South
America in 1796. He had signed up as assistant botanist on a French expedition to
circumnavigate the globe, and when that fell through, he went to join Napoleon (and Fourier) in
Egypt. Somehow his travel arrangements got fouled up, and he wound up in Madrid, so grabbed
an exploration to South America instead. Besides his experiments in heat and his astronomical
observations (a transit of Venus for instance), he measured the strength of magnetic fields
wherever he went, returning to Paris via Mexico and the United States. This led him to a theory
of "magnetic storms," and he hatched a plan for an international scientific body to make
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scientific measurements, a

Magnetischeverein that was to be a prototype for future trans-

national cooperation. This particular scheme was taken up by (among others) Carl Friedrich
Gauss and his associate Wilhelm Weber at Göttingen, and would become of considerable
interest to Maxwell and Helmholtz. In his "Treatise on Electricity and Magnetism," Maxwell's
fascinating descriptions of terrestrial magnetism and storms and their possible relation to the sun
and moon cite Gauss, not Humboldt as the pioneer in this field48, but Maxwell certainly knew of
the pre-Magnetischeverein history of the investigation.g
--------------(g)

For those looking to Humboldt for some more socially useful agenda for nineteenth

century science, the same trip yielded a study of the fertilizing properties of guano, "the
introduction of which into Europe was mainly due to his writings."49
--------------Through this kind of work, as well as his early allegiance to the "Weimar coterie" (he had
studied at Jena after attending Göttingen and Freiberg, and contributed to Schiller's new
periodical Die Hern50), Humboldt and his brother, then a poet and protege of Schiller, became
favorites at the court of Friedrich William III, and of Friedrich William IV on his accession in
1840. Alexander, in fact, declined the Education Ministry lately occupied so effectively by Karl,
but served loyally in diplomatic posts despite his preference for Paris to Berlin or Potsdam. He
eventually alienated the (allegedly) liberal King Friedrich William IV by refusing to attend the
"revolutionary" Frankfurt parliament in 1848, but this was more of a tactical than a philosophical
gesture.51
Helmholtz certainly knew, then, of the legacy of Goethe and Humboldt, and he acknowledged
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as much in his encyclopedic reports on Physiological Optics of the 1860's. One reference to
Humboldt cited some of Alexander's earliest researches into the effect of electricity on nerves.
The Italian Galvani had popularized experiments on tweaking frog legs by
electric discharge in the 1790's. This led to the "discovery" of current electricity and the
"battery" by Volta, currents and magnetism by Oersted, induction by Faraday, and to Maxwel lFaraday fields, as well as Helmholtz' early pioneering work on the physiology of nerves.
However, it is not electrical research that concerned Helmholtz in the "Optics," it was the
physiology of sight.
Helmholtz cited Maxwell copiously in his "Optics" for his researches on color theory and, of
course, cited Goethe as well. Comments on the latter comments indicated some skepticism on
Helmholtz' part. Later he would recall

The old-fashioned idea was...Aristotle's opinion, that colour is a mixture
of white and black...And in very recent times GOETHE has tried to uphold it
again...
The experiments which GOETHE uses to support his theory of colour are
accurately observed and vividly described...But NEWTON's assumption that
white light was composed of light of many colours seemed so absurd to
GOETHE, because he looked at it from his artistic standpoint which compelled
him to seek all beauty and truth in direct terms of sensory perceptions...
The great sensation produced in Germany by GOETHE's Farbenlehre was
partly due to the fact that most people, not being accustomed to the accuracy of
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scientific investigations, are naturally disposed to follow a clear, artistic
presentation of the subject...Moreover, HEGEL's natural philosophy used
GOETHE's theory of colour for its purposes. Like GOETHE, HEGEL wanted to
see in natural phenomena the direct expression of certain ideas or of certain steps
of logical thought. This is the explanation of his affinity with GOETHE and of
his chief opposition to theoretical physics.52

Not only did Helmholtz know a lot about Romantic science, he had an opinion as to what
parts were plausible and what were not. From the above speech, delivered late in Helmholtz's
life, we can detect some lingering sympathy for the "early" Romantic, Goethe, and some
hostility for his "successor," Hegel. As we shall see, this attitude went way back in Helmholtz's
life, to a time when he had a bitter struggle with his father about these problems of science and
philosophy.

HELMHOLTZ'S ENERGY AND PHYSIOLOGY

Helmholtz's attitude towards Romanticism, particularly towards the "scientific" biologicalorganic agendas of Goethe and Humboldt was not merely the casual interest of a student of
humanities Gymnasium of Potsdam. For him, the question of life-forces was both a professional
concern and a personal point of friction with his father.
Father Helmholtz, Ferdinand Julius, was a frustrated theologian, turned poor schoolmaster by
circumstance. He had left the Theological program at Humboldt's new Berlin Universityto fight
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Napoleon, and on his return found the University too "hyper-orthodox" for his conscience.53
Taking up the more practical profession of classical languages (the new German school system
required such manpower for the center of its curriculum) he patriotically served his nation, while
confining his preaching to his home and classroom. Hermann memorialized him obliquely in a
commencement address many years later:

the older among us can remember the men of that period, who had been
the foremost volunteers in our army, who were always ready to plunge into a
metaphysical discussion, who were well read in the works of Germany's great
poets, who burned with wrath at the name of the First Napoleon, and glowed with
pride and inspiration in relating the deeds of the war of liberation.54

The patriotism stuck--Hermann served the army loyally in both the Revolution of 1848 and
the Franco Prussian-War of 1870-71--but the metaphysics seemed harder to reconcile. He started
out in the right direction, hoping to study philosophy--encouraged, no doubt, by his father's
lifelong friend Johann Gottlieb Fichte. This Fichte was the son of the illustrious first Rector of
Berlin University, champion of the Romantic agenda.

Young Hermann entered the Royal

Friedrich-Wilhelm Institute for Medicine and Surgery in Berlin, to which he would return as
professor forty years later, in 1838, and fell under the tutelage of the great physiologist Johannes
Müller. Attending between forty and fifty lectures a week, studying piano, Goethe and Byron in
his spare time55, Helmholtz found himself caught up in precisely the research agenda that his
father had hoped--the problem of the "vital forces."
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Following the lead of Goethe, a certain

...Ernst Heinrich Weber had demanded that vital phenomena should be
explained in terms of physical processes. Johannes Müller endeavoured in all his
physiological work to clear the way for inductive methods of investigation, and to
push deductive reasoning and metaphysical conceptions more and more into the
background. But he could not emancipate himself from the notion of a separate,
individual, vital force, distinct from the chemical and physical forces within the
organism...This is only abolished by death; the forces which it restrained are then
set free, and produce corruption and putrefaction; the vital force has
vanished...Müller did not attempt to disguise the inconsistency of his position,
and as a result the four gifted young investigators, Brücke, du Bois-Reymond,
Helmholtz, and Virchow, were all striving to develop a logical and unified
physiology according to the principles of exact investigation. Each sought to
abolish the notion of vital force from...physiology.56

The Goethe-Humboldt programme seemed to have turned anti-metaphysica l– much to the
dismay of Helmholtz' father. According to Königsberger:

The more the young man's thoughts...took him away from metaphysical
speculation, the stronger and for some time the more irreconcilable became the
conflict with the wholly speculative philosophy of his father.57
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Müller was a reluctant revolutionary, but the chemist Justus Liebig (another "father of
chemistry" from whom we will hear much later) enthusiastically led the battle against vitalism.
Helmholtz joined up. Following his promising thesis for Müller, a microscopic discovery of the
nerve fiber-ganglion connection, he took up a specific Liebig project--fermentation.
Fermentation, particularly in wine-making by yeast, was seen as a kind of metabolism,
perhaps more genteel than putrefaction, and Liebig's claim that the actions of yeasts were not
vital forces, but simple chemistry, seemed open to experiment. Helmholtz tried:

The main objective of this paper, published in Müller's Archiv in
1843...was to support Liebig in his attack on vitalism by proving that there can be
no such thing as spontaneous generation. Helmholtz found, however,
that...fermentation and putrefaction are not the result of chemical action, as
supposed by Liebig [involving oxygen]. He showed (and the clear precise
wording of his results is of especial interest in view of the great discoveries of
Pasteur at a later time) that putrefaction can occur independently of life, but that it
offers a fertile soil for the...nutrition of living germs, and is modified...by them...
These observations, which Helmholtz was unable to pursue from the
inadequacy of the means at his command, seemed actually to give fresh support to
vitalism, and his experiments were accordingly regarded with suspicion...58

Helmholtz may well have benefitted from the ambiguity of his anti-vitalism, for he
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desperately wanted to get out of his eight year commitment to the army, the price for his fiveyears in medical school. He was at this time (1847-1848) a Hussar-Surgeon in Potsdam, and had
no facilities for research. To get a waiver of service, he needed an appointment to a non-military
civil service post and the bureaucratic intervention of someone of high position.

That someone

was to be Alexander von Humboldt himself, who pulled strings to get Helmholtz "transferred"
to the Berlin Academy of Arts as lecturer in Anatomy-for-artists and as an assistant in the
anatomical museum of the University of Berlin (1848-1849). This took some clout indeed, for
this was a time of revolution, when the army was the only major loyal resource of a
beleaguered king. Helmholtz may have treated a few battle casualties himself during the Berlin
uprising, but there was actually little battle involved--the army had mistaken an order to leave to
protect the king for an order to leave the city altogether. Even so, the revolution continued for
several years, and the army was a crucial tool in the strategies of negotiating constitutions for
both Prussia and a Greater German Confederation. For Humboldt to be able to fiddle with
military appointments in such times speaks to his extraordinary relation with the Prussian court.
For him to promote the career of Helmholtz in the face of an attack on vitalism is even more
unusual, and for him to do this despite his further skepticism over Helmholtz' "other project," the
now immortal "Conservation of Energy" paper, is extraordinary. We should now look more
closely at this development.
Helmholtz' theory of energy concerns our argument not because it represents some
discovery of a hidden universe of "real" forces, but because it represents, in a reluctant way, a
crude version of Maxwell's method of analogies. Specifically, the argument put forth by
Helmholtz does not, in essence, proceed from observations– like that of Dr. Julius Meyer who, a
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few years earlier, had noted that blood seemed redder in the tropics, hence surmised a relation
between body heat, oxidation in the blood, metabolism, and bio-activity. The argument of
Helmholtz also did not arise from careful measurements – like those of James Prescott Joule,
who had carefully measured the rise in temperature of fluids heated by mechanical agitation.
The center of Helmholtz's claim was mathematical - -and mathematical in a way that seemed
foreign to his empirical colleagues: "Humboldt was quite mystified, and refused to send your
note to Paris." 59
Du Bois-Reymond (the physiologist Emile, not his brother, mathematician Paul) wrote the
above, and it typifies the reaction to Helmholtz' methods. The great publisher of important
scientific papers, Poggendorff, rejected the manuscript for publication in his Poggendorff's
Annals on the grounds that it contained too much mathematics and too little experiment57 (as he
had also rejected Meyer). Eventually, however, it was the method of argument that prevailed, not
so much the phenomenon. According to Helmholtz, the "conversion" of Müller, Humboldt, and
of Franz Neumann at the Berlin University were accomplished by 1850:

After a severe struggle, I have converted a bold mathematician, who gets
somewhat confused over non-mathematical logic, and himself is a lecturer on
mechanics, to the doctrine of conservation of energy, so that it is now official
doctrine in the University. Neumann is rather difficult to get at; he is
hypochondriacal, shy, but a thinker of the first order.60

But what is this thing called energy about which Mayer, Helmholtz, and Joule compete? The
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best answer to such a question is assigned by legend to Heinrich Hertz, a later student of
Helmholtz who extended the methods to Maxwell's equations and "discovered" radio waves.
The story is that Hertz responded to the question "but what are radio waves?" by quipping "they
are terms in Maxwell's Equations." Likewise, "energies" are terms in Helmholtz's equations. It
is through Helmholtz's and Maxwell's methods that someone like Hertz is enabled to frame an
inquiry into laboratory matters in terms of such abstracta, and it is our argument that these
methods are related, and derive directly from suggestions by Kant, albeit refracted through
German Romanticism. Still, before we are even sure what is to be "conserved," and what it
means to be "conserved," Helmholtz himself should introduce his "doctrine":

The principal contents of the present memoir show it to be addressed to
physicists chiefly, and I have therefore thought it judicious to lay down its
fundamental principles purely in the form of a physical premise, and, independent
of metaphysical considerations, to develop the consequences of these principles,
and to submit them to a comparison with what experience has established...

(Note already that the role of the laboratory is to provide a demonstration ground for the
applicability of physical principle, not for the initial discovery of it)

The deduction of the propositions contained in the memoir may be
based on either of two maxims; either on the maxim that it is not possible by any
combination whatever of natural bodies to derive an unlimited amount of
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mechanical force, or on the assumption that all actions in nature can ultimately be
referred to attractive or repulsive forces, the intensity of which depends solely on
the distances between the points at which the forces are exerted. That both these
propositions are identical is shown at the commencement of the memoire itself. 62

It is important to note that Helmholtz begins by asserting that his "propositions" (laws) can be
"based" on "maxims," not empirical investigations. The initial manipulation of these maxims
will be by the "non-mathematical logic" that Neumann had so much trouble with, while the
"propositions" will be manipulated with the (French-style) mathematics that Poggendorff didn't
like. The specific relation of Kant's arguments to Helmholtz will occupy much of Helmholtz'
later teaching.
Much of the controversy centered of charges and defenses of “materialism,” a view that
banished vitalizing capacities from “brute” matter. Kant opposed it. In chapter one we
mentioned L. Pearce Williams' proposal to seek not only Kantian, but Boscovichian influences
on Maxwell's possible anti-materialism. In 1758 and 1763, Roger Joseph Boscovich, a
Dalmatian Jesuit and member of both the Royal Society and the French Academy, wrote (in
Latin):

...matter is unchangeable, and consists of points that are perfectly simple,
indivisible, and of no extent. & separated from one another; that each of these
points has a property of inertia, & in addition a mutual active force depending on
the distance in such a way that, if the distance is given, both the magnitude and
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the direction of this force are given; but if the distance altered, so also is the
force altered...64

Boscovich goes on in this "non-material" theory of moving forces to calculate recipes for
motions of objects in collisions, precisely the theme of Helmholtz' memoire. It is not accurate to
say that Boscovich preceded Helmholtz in the invention of the modern theory of conservation of
energy, though he came close. It is more accurate to say that Helmholtz was joining a
mechanical agenda that had been in progress since Newton.
While from Helmholtz' introductory paragraph, we still have little idea of "energy," we have
a better idea of methodological doctrine. How, for instance, do we "prove" two maxims to be
identical? Presumably by showing that what follows from one always follows from the other.
This is a method that will require a great deal of confidence in the "universality" of some
particular exemplar. With a slight stretch, we can expect Helmholtz' mature scientific methods
to be kinds of "proof by mathematical analogy." We will hear more on this from Maxwell and
Helmholtz in the 1860's, but more can be anticipated also from this memoire.
Another striking preliminary is in his maxim beginning "it is not possible that..." This
introduces "prohibitory" statement, a "ban," a "no-no." From whatever follows that phrase, how
can one derive a positive statement (like "thirty percent of the energy in this interaction is lost as
heat") from a negative one (like "it is impossible that this interaction can continue forever")?
This again involves both the mathematical and non-mathematical "logics" that Helmholtz here
substituted for "metaphysics."
Having been alerted in the first paragraph to the philosophical issues that will dominate
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physics for the following century, we are now curious to see how some of these develop:

The problem of the sciences just alluded to is, in the first place, to seek the
laws by which the particular processes of nature may be referred to, and deduced
from, general rules. These rules--for example, the law of reflection and refraction
of light .. .– are evidently nothing more than general ideas by which the various
phenomena which belong to them are connected together.

(Even Whewell got excited about this sentence--how are phenomena "connected together" and
how do they "belong" to "general ideas" and what is a "general" idea, anyway?)

The finding out of these is the office of the experimental portions of our
science. The theoretic portion seeks, on the contrary, to evoke the unknown
causes of the processes from the visible actions which they present; it seeks to
comprehend these processes according to the laws of causality. We are justified,
and indeed impelled in this proceeding, by the conviction that every change in
nat ure must have a sufficient cause...
The final aim of the theoretic natural sciences is therefore to discover the
ultimate and unchanging causes of natural phenomena. Whether all the processes
of nature be actually referable as such, or whether nature is capable of being
completely comprehended, or whether changes occur which are not subject to the
laws of necessary causation, but spring from spontaneity or freedom, this is not
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the place to decide...

(Indeed the"place to decide" had been the post-Kantian agenda of the Hegelians and their
detractors.)

To speak more particularly, the phenomena of nature are to be referred
back to motions of material particles possessing unchangeable moving forces,
which are dependent on conditions of space alone. Motion is the alteration of the
conditions of space...

(This "materialism" might run into some trouble with the English ether, and whatever that last
sentence meant is better left alone for now.)
Her [theoretical natural science] vocation will be ended as soon as the
reduction of natural phenomena to simple forces is complete, and the proof given
that this is the only reduction of which the phenomena are capable.65

By adding "reduction" of phenomena to "material forces" in one of the most influential
documents of the late nineteenth century, Helmholtz had here given support to those later
historians who considered the Victorian era the premier age of scientific "mechanism" and
"materialism." There did grow, primarily in France, social and moral doctrines like Comte's
"Positivism" committed to the same agenda in the "human sciences" as the "physical sciences."
This reinforced the unfortunate impression that this Helmholtzian (- Maxwellian - Hertzian)
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"revolution" put science in league with philosophical and economic forces as the cause of the
"mechanistic - materialist age." As to how economic forces arise in this context, consider the
possibility that scientific knowledge may be profitable. Helmholtz again seemed to condone this
– his brother and his son both became very successful engineers (despite Hermann's father's
objections). The age of science seemed to spring forth from this "discovery of energy."
But there are good reasons not to jump to such historical conclusions from the occurrence of
a few buzz-words or suggestive notions in Helmholtz's preface. Among other reasons, this
particular work only became famous after Maxwell and Helmholtz staged their "later"
revolutions in electrodynamics and heat. At the time of its appearance in this story, the
Exhibition year of 1851, it was obscure, suspicious, and extremely opaque, and caused scarcely a
stir, despite Helmholtz's rather optimistic thought that it had become "doctrine" at Berlin.

PHYSIOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

Despite his rather confusing pamphlet (privately published as it was unacceptable to either
Poggendorff's or Müller's journals), Helmholtz finally got a real academic appointment-to Königsberg, where he was when we met him at the beginning of this chapter. Several
significant events were still to come before the year of our opening, 1851. Helmholtz married,
had a child,

completed two major pieces or research (experiments on the propagation of nerve

impulses and the ophthalmoscope), and launched his first tour of European capitals, introducing
himself to the larger scientific world (he missed Liebig in Leipzig as the latter had gone to
London to see the Exhibition).
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The Ophthalmoscope was the beginning of his work in optics--and color theory--that put him
on a parallel track with Maxwell, though in retrospect these studies seem like sidelights to more
important matters. Tactically, though, something as concrete as an oculist's device made more
sense to the patrons of science than some abstract mathematical speculations. Helmholtz
wrote:

The construction of the ophthalmoscope was a turning-point in my
position in the eyes of the world. From that moment I found favor with the
authorities and colleagues, and was left free to follow the promptings of my
scientific curiosity.65

The research on the propagation of nerve impulses was closer to this curiosity, for it dealt
directly with the philosophical problems that his father thought should be his work. In 1850 he
reported to the Berlin Academy of Science that he had cleverly measured the time between the
excitation (electric discharge) of a nerve in a frog's leg and the time the muscular reaction set in
– a time of .0014 to .0020 seconds for an electrical impulse to travel 50-60 millimeters .g
--------------(g) This makes the "speed of thought" to be around sixty miles per hour.
--------------A copy of the report went to Humboldt in Paris. There was quite a reaction. Humboldt was
"mystified."

Müller didn't believe one could measure times that small. Helmholtz' father was

dismayed.
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The dismay of the latter grew out of the Romantic's sense of the unity of reality and
thought--of necessity requiring that the bodily expression coincide with the thought. A lag
between the conception and the act, a gap between the Will and the Action was
unacceptable to the Hegelians (to whom every action was a manifestation of immediate
symmetry). Helmholtz's father wrote:

As regards your work, the results appeared to me surprising, since I regard
the idea and its bodily expression not as successive, but as simultaneous, a
single living act, that only becomes bodily and mental on reflection...66

Hermann replied:

Our thought is not so rapid as we usually believe...With great attention,
when the will is ready to act at the instant it receives the message, the message is
only delayed about one tenth of a second. 67

With this kind of reaction, Helmholtz decided to take his case to a larger audience, and
invented a popular lecture to publicize his work. He devised an "electric telegraph analogy for
popular consumption"68 and, in view of the telegraphy rage throughout Europe, became a
celebrity-scientist. It was successful. Humboldt and Müller "converted," and somehow
Helmholtz made his experiments compatible with Romanticism. By 1852 his father could write:
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It almost seems to me that this mathematical empirical method of
investigation, when once it develops into a definite art, and no longer depends on
individual genius, may inaugurate a new...way to philosophy...and thus establish
the ego-doctrine of Fichte as the only possible mode of philosophical thought.69

Remember, Helmholtz's father was a frustrated theologian and good friend of the Fichtes'.
Moreover, he was committed, both in his theological studies and in his school-teaching,
of carrying out a revolutionary doctrine. This doctrine was more than the "traditional"
Romanticism of von Humboldt's school-system, it was to father Helmholtz a radical
modification by Fichte and

his colleague Schelling of the received doctrine of Kant himself.

We can briefly suggest that the elder Helmholtz thought that the new "science" was supposed
to make more room for theology. In particular, the theory of "coincidence of thought and deed"
reflected seriously on the state-approved Lutheran doctrine of the role of free-will in duty. The
question was whether good, moral, and pious thoughts, intentions, and prayers were sufficient to
gain "grace," or whether good deeds were also required. If good thoughts were good deeds, then
civic responsibility in itself, without piety, was not virtue. On the other hand, to the
conservatives (like von Humboldt), good deeds like army service and paying taxes should be
automatic evidence of good intentions--thus theologically sanctioned, if not required.
So, to some, Fichte's loosening of the automatic function of willing (voluntary) thought
required some rethinking of the notion of compulsory duty. Helmholtz's father thought this a
reasonable task for a school-teacher. Then Hermann reported that the whole premise of the
struggle was "scientifically" out of whack. There was a time gap between thought and act. The
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connection between good deeds and good thoughts now required rethinking, and father
Helmholtz seems to have done that rethinking between his letters of 1850 and 1852. At least
Helmholtz didn't change his mind about the Fichtean legitimacy.
This kind of thing--a struggle between father and son--permeates the Helmholtz
correspondence in the early years. It is too simplistic to account for Helmholtz's revolutionary
science by some Oedipal struggle with dad, but there was always a defensive tone to young
Helmholtz's rejection of Romanticism. Of more significance to this story is the
philosophy Helmholtz put in place of the immediacies of the Romantics. He opted for (or
invented) not a new "materialistic" philosophy, like the "positivists," but an older, traditional,
Kantianism.
Which came first, the philosophy or the physiology, is a controversial question.
Conductor-Historian Leon Botstein, in considering the impact of a later physiological work,
Helmholtz' 1862 "On the sensations of Tone", uncovers considerable evidence for influence on
both the "practical" and "aesthetic" agendas of Brahms' Europe:
The impact of Helmholtz' book was extraordinary. It had a direct
influence on the design of instruments, primarily the piano, especially through the
relationship between Helmholtz and C.F. Theodore Steinway. Helmholtz seemed
to solve the problem of how to build a stable instrument that could be tuned,
remain reasonably in tune, and possess a rich resonating sound. Steinway's
famous duplex scale patent of the 1870's owes its origin to Helmholtz.70

In contrast:
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But Helmholtz drifted, despite his disclaimers, into the realm of aesthetics
and the evolutionary history of musical systems...

Helmholtz realized that art extended beyond nature. Two arenas were required to
understand fully the links between art and nature: the psychology of perception and the
philosophy of knowledge (epistemology), and philosophical psychology.71 While in this tract on
sound, Helmholtz did not accept the Naturphilosopher's (and his father's) sense of the implicit,
immediate unity of aesthetic and intellectual harmony, he did display the feature of
Kantian-Romanticism that were the hallmarks of the Maxwell-Helmholtz revolution: a method
of analogies.
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CHAPTER 3

In his years at Cambridge, Maxwell grappled with the complex of philosophy, culture, and
science which had been igniting academic controversies as far afield as America. Scientists were
into everything; spiritualism, art, politics, and poetry and Maxwell plunged into these subjects,
particularly through collegiate philosophy and literature clubs. To his literary friends, the
"Apostles" he announced his intention of creating a new kind of philosophical physics, and to his
scientific friends he constructed a model of what he had in mind; a method of mathematical
analogy articulating "Faraday's lines of Force." Lurking behind these early ideas was a struggle
to reconcile the metaphysical problems here illustrated by two most famous of his elders, the
Irish astronomer Sir William Rowan Hamilton and the Scots Kantian philosopher, Sir William
Hamilton. Superficially the conflict seemed to be between the burgeoning anti-metaphysical
logic of the experimenting scientist and the fading romanticism of the old "natural
philosophers."

MAXWELL'S READING

Maxwell studied at Cambridge for six years (1850-56), and, besides visiting the Great
Exhibition, developed the remarkable scientific-philosophical agenda that served him so well.
His father had hoped that young James would make a practical man of himself--somehow. On
hearing that James was visiting Birmingham, a legendary manufacturing center, his father wrote:
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View, if you can, armourers, gunmaking, and gunproving--sword-making and
proving--papier mache and japanning--silver plating by cementation and
rolling--electrotype, Elkington's Works--Brazier's Works,...--turning teapot bodies
in white metal, etc.--buttons, steel pins, needles,...--engine making--tools ...1

This is hardly the milieu of a Victorian aristocrat, and James had more bookish matters in
mind. His college plan--written to his friend, Lewis Campbell in 1850--included studies in
"Algebra, Classics, Mathematics" and:

3. Natural Philosophy--Simple mechanics problems to produce that kind of
solving problems which Prof. Forbes has taught me to despise.
4. Metaphysics--Kant's Kritik of Pure Reason in German, read with a
determination to make it agree with Sir W. Hamilton.2

He did that and a good deal more--picking up strands of ideas that would blend into the
tapestry of his physics. A few examples:

[I am] taking up Mill's Logic...and finding them [Mill and Berkeley] by no
means the last word on the relation of sense to knowledge3
Comte has good ideas about method, but no notion of what is meant by a
person...4
I have been working my way into the views of heavy German writers
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[including Hegel]. It takes a long time to reduce to order all the notions one gets
from these men.5
[to his father] read Humboldt's `Travels and Polar Regions' 6
Routh is writing a book about Newton in conjunction with Brougham 7
[I've] read Chaucer, Bacon, Pope, Berkeley, Goldsmith, Cowper, Burns, Carlyle,
Ruskin, Kingsley, Maurice ...8

Note the predominance of "Romantics" in these lists (e.g. Hegel, Carlyle, Kingsley, von
Humboldt) and the skepticism toward the "positivists," especially Comte, the inventor of
"positivism," "sociology" and the French wave of anti-romanticism that would dominate the
borders of Maxwell and Helmholtz's intellectual territory.
There was, of course, time for science--even the perennial habit of young
physicists--cat-tossing:

There is a tradition in Trinity that when I was there I discovered a method
of throwing a cat so as not to light on its feet, and that I used to throw cats out of
windows.9

This was not some kind of heartlessness (Maxwell was extremely fond of dogs--he owned
several--usually terriers named Toby I, Toby II, etc.) but a long tradition of student physics.
According to the "law of conservation of angular momentum" a freely falling object cannot
change its "spin." So how do cats always land on their feet? Generations of students have
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theorized about this, and generations have tossed cats to see if it is so. Maxwell found "the
proper method was to let the cat drop on a table or bed from about two inches."
Maxwell not only read, he wrote. His poetry was never considered very good as much of it
was humorous verse, but occasionally he would become quite serious. Note the sentiments from
an 1853 poem called "Reflections from Various Surfaces":

By the hollow mountain-side
Questions strange I shout for ever,
While the echoes far and wide
Seem to mock my vain endeavour;
Still I shout, for though they never
Cast my borrowed voice aside,
Words from empty words they were -Words of Truth from words of Pride.10

There is in this a sense that Maxwell was engaged in a serious inquiry of his own--both in
science and religion. Indeed he was, and he seemed frustrated by the failure of the divergent
received knowledge to unify into a sensible guide. He was struck by the similar frustrations of a
former Cambridge student, the late Laureate Wordsworth.
Wordsworth was perhaps Maxwell's favorite poet. He recommended to his girl back home
(who was, alas, a first cousin, and they could not marry) that she "read Wordsworth's Prelude till
sleepy."11 This work was an autobiographical poem, subtitled "Growth of a Poet's Mind," and
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clearly reflected many of Maxwell's own sentiments. Wordsworth wrote about Cambridge of
1787:

And from my pillow, looking forth by light
Of moon or favoring stars, I could behold
The antechapel where the statue stood
Of Newton with his prism and silent face,
The marble index of a mind forever
Voyaging through strange seas of Thought, alone.
...Yet from the first crude days
Of setting time in this untried abode,
I was disturbed at times by prudent thoughts,
Wishing to hope without a hope, some fears
About my future worldly maintenance
And, more than all, a strangeness in the mind,
A feeling that I was not for that hour,
Nor for that place.12
It is likely that Maxwell knew of the intense interest Wordsworth had in science, fostered by
Maxwell's later hero of mathematics, the Irish Sir William Rowan Hamilton. This very poem,
among many, was evidently sculpted and resculpted in extensive correspondence between
Wordsworth and Hamilton.13
The other poet who surfaces constantly in this study (inevitably linked to Wordsworth) is
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another Cambridge voyager, Samuel Taylor Coleridge. He is credited here and elsewhere as
almost single-handedly joining the early German Romantic agenda and the English scientific
paradigm that spawned both of our philosopher-scientists, Helmholtz and Maxwell. The
following selections from Trevor Levere's 1977 biographical study of Coleridge provides the
details of the connexions:

Coleridge loathed the passive mechanistic philosophies born of the
eighteenth century, associating them with atheism, determinism, anarchy, and
tyranny, and charging them with every contemporary offence against taste,
character, religion, and politics. For him, the French Revolution, the Terror, and
Napoleon were all consequences of the so-called Enlightenment...
Coleridge's understanding of the principles of science is...fundamental
to his philosophy...his philosophy of nature was especially significant because it
opened the way to a verification of principles applicable to the life of man and the
life of the mind. The verification came from natural science, in many branches of
which Coleridge was well informed.14

While he may not have learned much "science" at Cambridge in the 1790's, his subsequent
education justifies his presence here:

Coleridge's greatest inspiration to the study of science and his constant
exemplar of scientific genius was his sometime friend and contemporary,
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Humphrey Davy. Coleridge at one time considered Davy as second only to
Wordsworth as the greatest man of the age.15

Coleridge himself comments on science in correspondence with his first guide to science, the
Bristol chemist Thomas Beddoes:

I should not think of devoting less than twenty years to an Epic Poem. Ten
to collect materials and warm my mind with universal science. I would be a
tolerable Mathematician, I would thoroughly know Mechanics, Hydrostatics,
Optics, and Astronomy, Botany, Metallurgy, Fossilism, Chemistry, Geology,
Anatomy, Medicine--then the mind of man--then the minds of men--in all Travels,
Voyages, and Histories.16

Perhaps this plan was too grandiose for 1797, but Coleridge did go to Göttingen in 1798 to study
German, Anatomy, and Physiology from Kant's most admired physiologist, Blumenbach. He
didn't make it to Schiller's Jena, but did return to England to study Naturphilosophie and to take
notes at Davy's lectures:

Later he came to perceive that Naturphilosophie led to pantheism, and so
he had to reject it. But he remained sympathetic to the attempt at reconciliation
[of philosophy and theology].
He was also happy to adopt the genetic form of the theories of
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Naturphilosophie, which viewed nature as the always evolving product of rational
and living developments. In addition, nature for Coleridge and the
Naturphilosophen alike was unified--everything was related to everything else.
Science was correspondingly comprehensive.17
An example, a unification program of chemistry, was celebrated in an 1818 essay, where
Coleridge wrote of the "charm" of chemistry that

It is the sense of a principle of connection given by the mind, and
sanctioned by the correspondency of nature. Hence the strong hold which in all
ages chemistry has had on the imagination. If in SHAKESPEARE we find nature
idealized into poetry, through the creative power of a profound yet observant
meditation, so through the meditative observation of a DAVY, a WOLLASTON
or a HATCHETT;
By some connatural force, powerful as greatest distance to unite with secret amity
things of like kind, we find poetry, as it were substantiated and realized in nature:
yea, nature itself disclosed to us, GEMINAM istam naturam, quae fit et facit, et
creat at creatur, as at once the poet and the poem!18

In the same essay, “The Friend,” of 1818, Coleridge remarks specifically on the emerging antimaterialist theory of electricity:

Compare the interval with the progress made within less than a century, after the
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discovery of the phænomena that led immediately to a THEORY of electricity. That
here as in many other instances, the theory was supported by insecure hypotheses;
that by one theorist two heterogeneous fluids are assumed, the vitreous and the
resinous; by another, a plus and minus of the same fluid; that a third considers it a
mere modification of light; while a fourth composes the electrical aura of oxygen,
hydrogen, and caloric: this does but place the truth we have been evolving in a
stronger and clearer light. For abstract from all these suppositions, or rather
imaginations, that which is common to, and involved in them all; and we shall
have neither notional fluid or fluids, nor chemical compounds, nor elementary
matter,--but the idea of two--opposite--forces, tending to rest by equilibrium.
These are the sole factors of the calculus, alike in all the theories. These give the
law, and in it the method, both of arranging the phænomena and of substantiating
appearances into facts of science; with a success proportionate to the clearness or
confusedness of the insight into the law. For this reason, we anticipate the greatest
improvements in the method, the nearest approaches to a system of electricity
from these philosophers, who have presented the law most purely, and the
correlative idea as an idea: those, namely, who, since the year 1798, in the true
spirit of experimental dynamics, rejecting the imagination of any material
substrate, simple or compound, contemplate in the phænomena of electricity the
operation of a law which reigns through all nature, the law of POLARITY, or the
manifestation of one power by opposite forces ...
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Levere does not intend, nor do we, to simply ally the romantics and scientists against the
materialists and engineers, for the attitudes overlapped as we have seen, for instance, with
Whewell:

The line dividing experiment from speculation was important for every
scientist, but there was clearly no unanimity in England or Germany about where
the line should be drawn or how it should be interpreted. Scientists did not fit into
a clean dichotomy of respectable scientists on one hand and Romantic ones on the
other.19

Thus Levere constructs a web of interactions with the philosopher-scientists that dominate this
account of the background to Helmholtz and Maxwell, connecting Coleridge and Davy with the
Unitarian chemist Joseph Priestley and with Newton himself, and with more obscure
Romantics: a Hungarian mathematician called Mako, the "Yugoslav" atomist Joseph
Boscovich, and the Naturphilosophs Ritter, Oken, and Oersted, among others to which we will
return.
Considering others on Maxwell's schedule of readings, of Carlyle and von Humboldt we
have already heard. Perhaps a word about Comte is in order, for twentieth century apologists
for science in the Romantic era view him as the spokesman for the new, Progressive scientific
Revolution. He certainly sounded like a Forbsean:

The most important and most precise laws of thermal phenomena are
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discovered; but the author (Fourier) has not once inquired into the intimate nature
of heat itself, nor has he mentioned, except to point out its uselessness, the
vigorous controversy between partisans of heat as a material substance and those
who make it consist in the vibrations of a universal aether.
....
All phenomena are subject to invariable natural laws. The exact discovery
of these laws and their reduction to the least possible number constitute the goal
of all our efforts; for we regard the search after what are called causes, whether
first or final, as absolutely inaccessible and unmeaning20

Maxwell apparently agreed with the first remark about Fourier's indifference to the matter of
heat, but rejected Comte's second point. Comte argues that metaphysical speculation,
introspection, and the like are not tools for physical science, or the "social science" he was
inventing. He sneers at an "illusion of discovering the laws of human mind by contemplating it
in itself."21 It is not that ideas and theories are not important in science, indeed facts require
theory. But theory requires facts, so a vicious circle arises. Comte "broke" the circle by
employing history to have theories emerge "spontaneously" from a past "theological," speculative
era.22 When in time the last of the ideas, scientific laws, pop up we will

sum them up in a single body of homogeneous doctrine...the final
triumph...will take place spontaneously, and will re-establish order in society...the
revolutionary crisis which harasses civilized people will then be at an end.23
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This certainly was a call for progress through anti-Kantian, materialist science, and this from a
student of the École Polytechnique as well (he was expelled in 1816). The followers of Comte
"dominated" French progressivism during the lives of Helmholtz and Maxwell, particularly the
historians Renan and Taine, and the notables of the Académie des Sciences, and it remains to be
seen whether, as positivists now claim, the modern scientific agenda fell victim to this "French
disease."
While many English progressives were indeed intrigued, ultimately Positivism caused the
scientific agendas of France and England to diverge. In a recent electronic forum, The
VICTORIA bulletin board, Professor Patrick Leary remarked

The enthusiasm that people like Mill, Lewes, and others felt for Comte's
emphasis on empirical and scientific analysis as a basis for belief began to wane
in the 1840s as Comte became more insistent on slavish devotion (and frequent
infusions of cash) from his admirers. The most profound disillusionment came,
however, in the early 1850's, when he elevated his radical materialism into a
dogmatic and hierarchical "Religion of Humanity" with all the trimmings
(priesthood, hymns, sacraments, etc.) that called for a repellent police-state utopia
of which Comte himself would be the semi-divine dictator. Friedrich Harrison
and a few others persisted as Positivist disciples for the rest of the century, but
most intellectuals who had found inspiration in Comte's early work had jumped
ship long ago.24
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Maxwell is certainly to be numbered among these, dismayed not only by the recent turn to
megalomania, but the whole program of the rejection of metaphysics. Another message to the
same bulletin board cites a poet, Mortimer Collins (1827), on the offending sentiment:

Life and the universe show spontaneity;
Down with the ridiculous notions of Deity!
Churches and creeds are lost in the mists;
Truth must be sought with the Positivists.25

ANALOGIES

Major clues to Maxwell's revolution come from his activities in his first years at Cambridge.
His later residence as first Cavendish Professor of Experimental Physics and founding director of
the legendary Cavendish Laboratory is a more celebrated accomplishment, but occurred well
after his establishment of the research potential of mixed mathematics. His youthful tenure,
marked by contributions to the Apostles club, his early research on Saturn's Rings, and his work
for F. D. Maurice's Christian Socialist movement, should clarify the strands of romanticism and
pragmatism which underlie his novel "method of analogies" that constitutes the philosophical
dimension of this argument.
Several papers that Maxwell read to the Apostles survive, and reveal a very deliberate agenda
of combining the Forbsean and Hamiltonian outlooks that he brought from Edinburgh. This club
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is itself legendary in history, having been a select organization of the brightest literati of
Cambridge--the new Laureate Longfellow, for instance, had been an early member. In 1869,
Tennyson would lead former Apostles in founding a "Metaphysical Society - to include scientists
T.H. Huxley and Joseph Tyndall and amateur scientist (and son-in-law to the Queen) The Duke
of Argyll26." This particular intersection of "philosophy" and "science" was not the legacy of
Maxwell and Helmholtz, and we will hear of later tension between these prominent
metaphysicians and Maxwell himself. His metaphysics took quite a different path.
Maxwell's essays often centered on questions of morality, partially reflecting controversy over
a new curriculum in "Moral Science" recently begun at Cambridge.a Morals and metaphysics too
--------------(a) Anti-scientists, like Carlyle, were skeptical of the practical turn of this Whewellian
endeavor. It was for the new course in "Political Economy" that he invented the immortal
description "the dismal science."27
--------------discussion of the "purpose" of nature as revealed in it's design (the metaphor of Rev. Paley).
Maxwell took up such questions as spirituality and the "unseen universe.” He was intrigued by
recent "experiments" of psychics claiming to move tables through spiritual powers--so called
"table-turning".

On the first question, God and morality, Maxwell said much, but it is

generally conscripted into the conventional Victorian pieties that become a young collegian
among poets--a Calvinist respect to a distant author of the rules of right living. Later, when a
church elder, he found support in scripture, but usually kept such sentiments quiet. His letters to
his wife are laden with scriptural passages exhorting the Love of God over earthly passion, but
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not even to his many minister friends did he cite biblical authority to his more scientific
philosophy.b
--------------(b) Kingsley, an author familiar to Maxwell, had a similar code with his wife, barely concealing
an almost erotic tone within clever verse-citing28, but to attribute such crypticism to Maxwell
would be to conjure up a rather un-Scottish Victorian sensuality.
--------------Maxwell saw morality more in the abstract realm. He was aware of the scandalousness of the
other Apostles’ fascination with contemporary art and literature, but for him the earnest quest for
culture tended more toward the respectable. In art he seemed unaware of the shocking themes
emerging in mid-century salons. At this date, Tennyson's friends, the pre-Raphaelites, led by
Dante Gabriel Rossetti, had not yet become infamous, but the Apostles' interests had been piqued
by their forerunners. In a study of another painter of that circle, Edward Burne-Jones, Joseph
Kestner writes:

Women in Victorian painting constitute a range of figures typifying the
social conscience, sentimentality, and anxiety of the period. Such images include
the woman as guardian of hearth and home (Millais, The Order of Release, 1746,
1853), woman as suffering worker (Redgrave, The Sempstress,1844), and woman
as fallen victim (Hunt, The awakening conscience, 1853). As the century
advanced, these images could become more specialized, as in the presentation of
the nun or the enchantress...[e.g., by Collins or Millais]...If some of these images
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represent concern for the condition of women, others embody fears that were
expressed socially, for example, in the Contagious Diseases Acts of the 1860's or
the exclusion of women from higher education.29

Kestner continues by quoting Graham Hough's 1961 work, The Last Romantics:

Any full treatment of the culture of the period would have to explain the
lavish and eccentric display of erotic symbolism that made its appearance on both
sides of the Channel after the middle of the century--the obsession with various
illicit alliances between love, pain, and death; the femme fatale or the vampire;
homosexuality, male and female; hermaphroditism, and all the rest of it.30

Maxwell would have none of this titillation. His artistic haunts were not galleries, but more
respectable museums. Kestner quotes Helene Roberts on that venue:

The Royal Academy accepted few paintings that threatened the precarious
logic of laissez-faire of the carefully cultivated myth that dominance was the
natural right of the male.31

In another collegiate activity, Maxwell's respectable socio-religious conscious exhibits itself
clearly in his joining Maurice's project for a Working Man's College. Maxwell actually taught
night courses for this College even after he finished at Cambridge32, but Maurice's subsequent
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reputation as a proto-Socialist cannot be reasonably carried over to James' very conservative
politics. On the other hand, Maurice's advocacy of German Romanticism, particularly the
Naturphilosophie of Schelling, seems to have had a literary source comfortable to
Maxwell--Samuel Taylor Coleridge.33
On the second question--psychics--we must be a little more careful, for the question of the
connection between a spiritual world and this one was a serious one, particularly to alleged
experts on natural phenomena. Two of Maxwell's best friends, William Thomson (later Lord
Kelvin) and Peter Guthrie Tait went on to become champions of scientific "evidence" for psychic
phenomenon. Tait, along with Balfour Stewart, authored a very popular book --"The Unseen
Universe"34-- linking vibrations of the invisible aether with transmission of thought and force
along with light. Kelvin and Stewart became presidents of the Society for Psychical Research,
dedicated to sift the "evidence" for spiritualism, and numbering among its members many of the
elite Cambridge scientists of the turn-of-the-century (and, from 1884, Americans Nicholas
Murray Butler of Columbia and William James of Harvard35). Brian Wynne, among other
modern scholars, has made much of this spiritualist movement as a characteristic "political"
grouping of elite Victorians trying to preserve Cambridge (and science) from the bourgeois
"professionalizers,"36 of which the most notorious until recently had been Joseph Tyndall37. Thus
Maxwell's position on hidden powers could be a clue to both his scientific and social biases.
The question of psychics first came to Maxwell's attention through the widely publicized
"debunking" experiments of Michael Faraday--that very hero of electrical science who
"discovered" electromagnetism. It seems that the distinguished President of the Royal Institution
had unintentionally endowed some scientific legitimacy on psychokinetics. As Maxwell wrote to
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the Rev. C. R. Taylor (1853):

In the Athenaeum of the 2d there is Faraday's account of his experiments
in table-turning, proving mechanically that the table is moved by the unconscious
pressure of the people wishing it to move, and proving beside that table-turning
may be honest. The consequence has been that letters are being written to Faraday
boastfully demanding explanations of this, that, and the other thing, as if Faraday
had made a proclamation of Omniscience. Such is the fate of men who make real
experiments in the popular occult sciences...our anti-scientific men here triumph
over Faraday.38

Faraday himself tried to remain skeptical. In his comprehensive "Experimental Researches"
of 1859 he argued:

You hear, at the present day, that some persons can place their fingers on a
table, and then elevating their hands, the table will rise and follow them...The
assertion finds acceptance in every rank of society and among classes that are
esteemed to be educated. Now, what can this imply but that society, generally
speaking, is not only ignorant as respects the education of the judgment, but is
also ignorant of its ignorance.39

Apparently the assumption of Faraday's sympathy to the table-turners arose from an earlier
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tolerance of a champion of Newtonian-Mesmeric "subtle fluids; one Baron von Reichenbach.

The od-force or odyl dreamed up by von Reichenbach was treated with
immense respect by metaphysicians and scientists [around 1845]; despite the
failure of sensitives to see under laboratory conditions the od-force streaming
from the poles of magnets... The more acute of the scientists realised that von
Reichenbach was wading out into the muddy reaches of pseudo-science, but even
a scientific genius like Faraday was impressed enough to look into animal
magnetism. Faraday did not treat it with the scorn he later reserved for
spiritualism; he thought that magnetism had a great effect on the day to day
business of living, and took von Reichenbach seriously enough to oppose him on
a specific issue. (Von Reichenbach maintained that men sleep better with the head
to the north, Faraday that body was 'dio-magnetic,' and was more comfortable
east-west).40

Maxwell's skepticism recurred in his Apostle's club lectures--occult phenomena may be
legitimate, but if so must be subject to the same kind of rigorous scientific experiments as other
"unseen" forces--like Faraday's electromagnetism. What is behind this particular issue is the role
in phenomena for the aether, Newton's "most subtle spirit" that had carried forces of heat, light,
and healing since the pre-revolutionary successes of Anton Mesmer and his followers.41 That's
another long story, and since Maxwell was fairly skeptical of the subject, it is better to turn to the
specific method of Faraday that made his psychic research, at least, palatable to James.
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Clearly the notion of the transmission of psychic forces over a distance via aether is
analogous to electrical coils (with interrupted currents) transmitting physical forces to magnets at
a distance. The latter was Faraday's "discovery" in the 1820's.42 The key term in this description
is "analogous," for Faraday himself made no use of mathematical methods or the like in
conjuring up his notion of electromagnetic action. He couldn't--he was self-taught, mostly from
the popular demonstrations at the Royal Institution by its great orator Humphrey Davy (from
whom Coleridge "increased his stock of metaphors").43 Faraday's experimental "discovery" was
no such thing--his "experiment" was a demonstration--a demonstration of a principal he had
arrived at through a method of analogy. The particular analogy was one of "symmetry"
generalizing Hans Christian Oersted's 1819 notice of the "connexion" of moving electricity and
magnets.44 This provides a more concrete example of the "Romanticism" inherited from Faraday,
for everyone was well aware of Oersted's affinity for Goethe, Fichte, and Schelling. Maxwell
later attributed to him the motive of seeking an even sharper analogy than among electricity,
magnetism, and motion--the origin of the "field":

Conjectures of various kinds had been made as to the relation between
magnetism and electricity, but the laws of these phenomena...remained entirely
unknown till the Hans Christian Oersted, at a private lecture to a few advanced
students at Copenhagen, observed that a wire connecting the ends of a voltaic
battery affected a magnet in its vicinity...
... Oersted endeavoured to ascertain the effect of a wire heated by an
electric current. He discovered, however, that the current itself, and not the heat
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of the wire, was the cause of the action...
It appears therefore that in the space surrounding a wire transmitting an
electric current a magnet is acted on by forces dependent on the position of the
wire and on the strength of the current. The space in which those forces act may
therefore be considered as a magnetic field...45

Faraday had constructed a "model" of three factors: magnetism, electricity, and motion. Any
observed pair of the trio would produce the third member. This could be "demonstrated" by, for
instance, combining electricity and magnetism, via a current surrounding a magnet, to get
motion. This was Faraday’s “invention” of the “motor.” The American Joseph Henry
demonstrated the same analogy, but got little notice at the time.46 Or, one could combine motion
and magnetism to get electricity, as in Faraday's "dynamo," and so on.
Maxwell was more concerned with Faraday's method than with his results. On a small scale,
Maxwell would later discuss at great length with Faraday an extension of his analogies,
particularly the precursor to the "field," the "lines of force" that "connected" the distant objects
being acted upon, to gravity. He wrote to Faraday in 1857:

The lines of Force from the Sun spread out from him, and when they come
near a planet curve out from it, so that every planet diverts a number depending on
its mass...
Now conceive every one of these lines...to have a pushing force instead
of a pulling one, and the sun and the planet will be pushed together with a
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force...proportional to the product of the masses and the inverse square of the
distance.47

The suggestion that gravity was a push rather than a pull, though originally conjectured by
Newton himself48, was rather too bold for Faraday. He replied:

The idea that we may possibly have to connect repulsion with the lines of
gravitational force (which is going far beyond anything my mind would venture
on at present, except in private cogitation), shows how far we may have to depart
from the view I oppose [action-at-a-distance]"49

Now it is not the phenomena of gravity ("in itself") that is really at issue here, it is this
"method of analogy" and, particularly, Maxwell's notion of setting it to Fourier's mathematics.
In the original letter, Maxwell continued:

I have now surely tried to show you why I do not think gravitation a
dangerous subject to apply your method to, and it may be possible to throw light
on it also by the embodiment of the same ideas, which are expressed
mathematically in the functions of Laplace and of Sir W. R. Hamilton [of Dublin,
not Edinburgh]."50

In fact, it was Maxwell's formidable mathematization of "his" method that originally captured
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Faraday's attention. Earlier (in 1857) Faraday had written: "I was at first frightened when I saw
such mathematical force made to bear upon the subject [of electricity and magnetism]."51 And
the"professionalizer" Tyndall concurred: "I never doubted the possibility of giving Faraday's
notion a mathematical form."52
The inclusion of gravitational theory with electromagnetism via Faraday-Maxwell-Hamilton's
methods never did work out. In fact, it was in an advanced form the great chimera of Einstein's
career, and eludes present physicists to the point of now being considered a wild-goose chase.
But the original correspondence was prompted by Maxwell's success in at least getting Faraday's
electricity-magnetism-motion mandala into mathematical form, the legendary "Maxwell's
Equations."
Before getting into the heart of the matter, which obviously engaged Tyndall and Faraday in
1857, we should return to this method question, assigned here to Maxwell's student days of
1850-54. One of his Apostle's club essays posed the central question: "Are there Real Analogies
in Nature." No! says Maxwell, analogies are "in the mind":

That analogies appear to exist is plain in the face of things, for all parables,
fables, similes, metaphors, tropes, and figures of speech are analogies, material or
revealed, artificial or concealed. The question is entirely of their reality!...
If...we start from the study of the laws of thought...then these apparent
analogies become merely repetitions by reflection of certain necessary modes of
action to which our minds are subject...Now, as in a scientific point of view the
relation is the most important thing to know...54
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Kant, Hamilton, and for that matter Whewell, couldn't put it better, though they tried. It
appears that Maxwell asserted that he could "study the laws of thought" via Kant or some
modification, and adduce "necessary relations" within or between analogies. This should result
in a mathematical model of the internal relations, harmonious and dialectical, among the
phenomena of motion, electricity, and magnetism. He not only asserted it, he went out and did it
(in about ten years), and Maxwell's "relations" dominated the study of heat as well as light for the
next century and beyond.

ENGLISH ROMANTICISM: THE OTHER HAMILTON

So there were no "real analogies in nature." Who thought there were? Was it that there were,
in the audience of Apostles, some literati to whom Maxwell's remarks were shocking? Or was
Maxwell just polishing off a "scientist's" view of the current fashions in literary theory?
The problem here is one of Romanticism again--this time "English Romanticism" of the sort
practiced by Wordsworth, the club's idol, and his didactic friend Samuel Taylor Coleridge.
Specifically, we must ask if these "analogies in nature" are the flesh of the Romantic's world,
and, if so, if Maxwell is attacking such ideas of nature. Such a view would suggest a split
between the scientist's and the poet's world-view, something that Maxwell does not seem to
endorse (given his fondness for Wordsworth). More interestingly, we could surmise that
Romanticism in the 1850's wasn't what it once was in its prime, and that poetics and didactic
science were drifting closer together. In that case, Maxwell's remarks seem like the
announcement of a new synthesis of experience, thought, and substance.
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To clarify this latter view, we need not study Maxwell, but his audience. They were
Cambridge Victorians, not officially Romantics at all. The formal phase of "English
Romanticism," insofar as such eras have exact time spans, "ended" in 1832. According to the
standard practice, codified in the Norton Anthology of English Literature:

The Reform Bill, after three decades of political stagnation and repression,
inaugurated the Victorian Era of cautious readjustment of political power to
conform to the economic and social realities of a new industrial age.55

This dubiously progressive (First) Reform Bill of 1832, cleaning up election practices, and
the repeal of the "Corn Laws" in 1846, are generally regarded as the stirrings of the new
industrial age in political terms. The Reform was more symbolic than real, only slightly
repairing Parliamentary election franchise abuse. Likewise, the repeal was more a political signal
than an actual moment of economic realism. But, to poets, the symbolism was important and
these events indicated a new agenda. Not a total rejection of Romantic principles, but a
"readjustment." This, it seems, is what Maxwell was setting about to do in science.
The analogies in nature were both poetic conceits and scientific facts, at least among those
took an organic view of the synthesis of emotional and physical sensations. Wordsworth and
Coleridge did just that with their "Lyrical Ballads" published anonymously in 1798. And so too
did Schiller and Goethe, and the English were forever claiming the Jena masters as their own
inspiration. There were, as we have been uncovering, direct connections between the founders
of Romanticism and the founders of Victorian physics, and the Maxwell's debt to Wordsworth
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and Coleridge is as strong (and ambiguous) as Helmholtz's to Schiller and Schelling.
At the beginning, analogies were not the issue, for emotions, not ideas, were being revived.
Wordsworth, in a later preface to the Lyrical Ballads wrote that the new poetry was not "a mirror
of nature," but "the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings."56 But somehow, as for the
scientist, emotions had to connect with sensible nature. Following the Norton definitions:

Coleridge regarded poetry as the product of the poets' imagination,
which--by a process that Coleridge called "a dim analogue" of God's own creative
activity--assimilates the materials of sense into an organic entity that does not
imitate the created world, but constitutes an equivalent creation of its own.57

And, further, the poet rejected the old-style materialism where the human mind is not active in
determining events:

Romantic poets habitually imbue the landscape with human life, passion,
and expressiveness. In part such descriptions represent the poetic equivalent of
the current metaphysical concept of nature, which had developed in deliberate
revolt against the world views of Descartes and other scientific philosophers of
the 17th and 18th centuries, who had posited as the ultimate reality a mechanical
world consisting of physical particles in motion.58

Maxwell clearly was not rejecting, but adjusting, Wordsworth and Coleridge. Being a Scot at
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Cambridge, he had other Romantic heroes to defend as well--his illustrious countrymen. There
was the founder of Maxwell's grade-school, Sir Walter Scott, whose death in 1832 was perhaps a
better mark of the end of Romanticism than the Reform Bill. Then there was the poet, Robert
Burns, who wrote like Maxwell talked, in dialect, and was admired for it, not ridiculed, as was
young Maxwell.
It is then plausible to surmise that Maxwell's "analogies in Nature" speech was indeed an
announcement of a modified Romanticism that would result in new physics. We might make it
more certain by looking at the details of such a reform program in science and philosophy. For
convenience and coincidence, we can then turn to the letters of, of all people, the Irish Sir
William Rowan Hamilton. Maxwell never met this Hamilton, but was greatly influenced by his
work. But that influence is known to be mathematical, not philosophical, so we cannot argue
that Hamilton's romanticism is Maxwell's. But it is very much like it--or rather, it seems
half-way between the full-blown emotionalism of the early Romantics and the sober version
tempered with Scots pragmatism. Hamilton is especially revealing in this regard because, as a
poet as well as a mathematician, he was in direct touch with both Coleridge and Wordsworth,
and much of their correspondence survives.
Posterity ignores the Romanticism and poetry of this Hamilton, much to the detriment of all.
His scientific fame was secure. He was a close friend of the de Morgan and Boole of Maxwell's
curiosity (his correspondence with de Morgan fills half of a volume in the three-volume memoire
by Graves). He invented mathematico-physical methods that would transform the later work of
Helmholtz and Maxwell. He was a long-time mathematician-astronomer at the University of
Dublin, president of the Royal Irish Academy, and a rare corresponding member of the academy
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of St. Petersburg, Russia. Thus he knew personally the same academic luminaries whom
Maxwell admired (and took them to church when they visited Dublin). He was born in Dublin,
but Tait, Maxwell's friend at Edinburgh, wanted him treated as a fellow Scot. Tait wrote in the
Eleventh Brittanica:

Hamilton,...[a] Scottish mathematician, was born in Dublin [in 1805]. His
father...and his uncle...migrated from Scotland in youth. A branch of the Scottish
family to which they belonged had settled in the north of Ireland in the time of
James I., and this fact seems to have given rise to the common impression that
Hamilton was an Irishman.59

Tait had apparently done that before, for Graves wrote (back in 1882):

It has been necessary to insist with some detail upon these [genealogical]
facts, because Professor Tait of Edinburgh, in his Article upon `Hamilton'
published in the North British Review for September, 1866, lays claim to his
mathematical chief and friend as virtually a countryman of his own, asserting that
`his grandfather came over from Scotland to Dublin with two young sons ...' This
assertion my investigations have disproved. 60
Tait went ahead anyway in the article in the Eleventh, and misspelled Graves' name as well
(`Greaves'). Hamilton always spoke well of Tait, though.
Sir William Rowan Hamilton's vast reputation as a mathematician was enhanced by his
134

opposition to the other Sir William Hamilton, thus distracting us momentarily to their common
ground in Kant. The two Hamiltons did meet--on a trip to Edinburgh hosted by Forbes, and the
report of their meeting is legendary:

It should not, perhaps be left unrecorded that Hamilton met on this occasion his
distinguished namesake Sir William Hamilton of Edinburgh, known to all the
world as a great thinker, learned in philosophy, and a reformer in logic, but a
contemner of mathematics...
...The approximation only showed that the Scottish Philosopher and the
Irish Mathematician were not in harmony, that the former looked down on the
latter, as the first, it might be, of his sort, but of a sort not the first, while the latter
on leaving, good humouredly said to his companion...`Well, you see we did not
fight.' They had, however, a common object of admiration in one who was both
philosopher and mathematician, the great Leibnitz, and the host lent to his guest a
book containing a Latin poem by Leibnitz...61

Much later (1864), The Irish (mathematical) Hamilton remembers his duelist as follows:

Well, I retain all my old respect for Sir William Hamilton, of Edinburgh,
as a gentlemen, and also as one of the most learned metaphysicians of modern
times...
But I conceive my old mathematical crony and correspondent Professor De
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Morgan, to have proved--in the Athenaeum, a few years ago--that Sir William
Hamilton had never attained to a correct understanding of the First Proposition of
the First Book of Euclid; although he used to lecture thereon, for the purpose (I
believe) among others of illustrating his thesis...that "mathematics are, as is
universally confessed, the easiest of all sciences." (The italics are his own). This
seems to me unpardonable, in him. I am most willing to learn from, but how can
I trust a teacher, who ventured to pronounce on the intellectual tendencies and
position of a science, in which he was ignorant of his own ignorance of the first
rudiments.62

There yet more scientific relevance to this "other (Irish) Hamilton." He was a player in the
great undulatory theory debate too, taking a side opposite the "Scottish Skepticism" of Brewster,
Forbes, and Brougham. An historic meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of
Science in Manchester, June 1842, brought together a most distinguished group of natural
philosophers, including Whewell, Brewster, the celebrated astronomer Herschel, and the
venerable John Dalton--Manchester's pride and "inventor" of the chemical atom.

On a subsequent day a grand debate arose over the question whether the
Undulatory Theory of Light was to be regarded as having failed, or as having been
established. The discussion was started by Sir David Brewster...Sir David
rejoiced in impugning explanation of the phenomenon which had been proposed
in accordance with the wave-theory by Professor Airy...Professor Mac Cullagh
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fought on the same side. This view was contested by Professor Lloyd...and
Herschel and Hamilton...Hamilton especially offering that he and other Dublin
men held to the wave theory "without waving or wavering."63

This fight had been going on in the B.A.A.S. (fondly called the "British ass") since 183264 and
indeed the wave-theorists had reason not to waver. Historian Robert W. Smith describes
Hamilton's 1832 prediction of a possible light-bending ("conical refraction") based on the
wave-theory. The success of the subsequent experiment seemed a major vindication of the
power of mixed-mathematics.65 Smith quotes a recent biographer of Hamilton, Thomas Hankins:

Hamilton realized that if his prediction of conical refraction could be
verified experimentally, it would be a major triumph. Nothing like it had ever
been observed in the long history of experimental optics, and the fact that he
deduced it without any hints from experiment made his prediction all the more
dramatic.66

But it is not as mathematician, but as philosopher-poet Sir William Rowan Hamilton we seek,
hearing him arguing some parallels with his unification of mathematics, analogies, and
metaphysics and Maxwell's. The Kernel, as we keep saying, is old Kant. Early in Hamilton’s
career we see some poetical connections in an 1834 letter to Viscount Adair:

...Very glad you have Kant from Coleridge for me: try and send it soon. I
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have read a large part of the Critique of the Pure Reason, and find it wonderfully
clear, and generally quite convincing...I seem to have learned much from Kant's
own statement of his views of Space and Time. Yet, on the whole, a large part of
my pleasure consists in recognising, through Kant's works, opinions, or rather
views, which have long been familiar to myself...67

Robert Graves, Hamilton's friend and biographer, adds the connection to Faraday and hence to
Maxwell:

[Hamilton's] studies in the department of metaphysics were
extensive...he was confirmed [in his metaphysics] by his converse with Faraday,
who in his own region of investigation had been led to the conclusion that forces,
rather than material particles, were the ultimate objects of physical inquiry. His
acquaintance with the German language enabled him to master the works of Kant...
His poetical compositions were the genuine outpourings of a noble
heart and fervid imagination...These poetic efforts have an additional interest, as
exemplifying...the connexion which he so strongly insisted on as existing between
the highest provinces of science and the region of poetry...We happen to know that
this view of his, as communicated by him to the poet Wordsworth, was to the latter
an entirely new revelation, and had the effect of raising his conception, which had
before been unduly depreciatory, of the dignity both of science itself and of its
most eminent votaries.68
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Continuing this direction, Graves records the poetic and philosophic exchanges between
Hamilton and Coleridge and Wordsworth in great detail. A minor, but revealing, example of
Graves' emphasis came in an epilogue:

a reply [to Wordsworth] of Hamilton's, more in his style, calls for record.
When asked whether he accepted, as expressing a truth, Locke's comparison of the
state of the human mind at birth to a sheet of white paper, he said, `Yes, but ruled
paper': an answer pregnant with much of his philosophy; which in outline admits
perhaps of no nobler admiration than it has received from Wordsworth in the lines
which form part of what he calls the Prospectus of his poem, `The Recluse':

`while my voice proclaims
How exquisitely the individual Mind
(And the progressive powers perhaps no less
Of the whole species) to the external World
Is fitted: and how exquisitely, too,
Theme this but little heard of among Men,
The external World is fitted to the Mind;
And the creation (by no lower name
Can it be called) which they with blended might
Accomplish. ‘ 69

139

A mind fitted to the external world and that world fitted to the mind--that is the sort of
hand-in-glove analogy that Maxwell seemed to have in mind when he displaced analogies from
"in nature" to "in the mind."
Graves continued in that passage to invoke both Coleridge and Kant, in a rather curious note
on Faith:

It will be remembered how emphatically Hamilton distinguished in the
mind the faculty of Intellect from the faculty of Faith. He felt, if I recall rightly
what I heard from him, that no small part of the proof of the existence of God
rested upon the fact that the great Idea fills, as no other idea can fill, the aspiration
of Faith. In one of his Manuscript Books (I. 1864, pp. 1512) Hamilton transcribes
from penciled notes of 1852, one upon pantheism. Confessing that Coleridge's
statement does not produce in me the satisfaction it appears to have given to
Hamilton, I produce the note principally on account of the comparison, in regard
to mathematics applied to metaphysical reasoning, of Coleridge and Kant.
`Pantheism, much more than Popery, seems to be the danger of our age.
Coleridge confessed to me, and regretted--the confession indeed was needless, but
the regret was interesting--that he had never studied mathematics. Accordingly, in
his philosophical writings, as a general rule, his mathematical illustrations have
seemed to me to obscure the subject (while those of Kant threw light upon every
point to which he applied mathematics). But I must make one signal exception,
on this very subject of Pantheism, Coleridge's mathematical illustration of it
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appearing to me to be perfect.
Let G (said he) stand for God,
and W for the world:
then the theist and pantheist agree in asserting the formula,
W-G=0;
`The World, without God, is nothing.' But, continued Coleridge,
the pantheist inverts the formula, and says this also,
G-W=0 :
or, `God, without the World, is nothing.' Whereas (he said) the
theist, on the contrary, asserts that
G-W=G:
or that `God, without the manifestation of himself, which he has
pleased to make in his created Universe, would still have been the
same personal God.’ 70

Graves is right to be a bit embarrassed by that passage, as Hamilton, Coleridge, and Kant all
had considerably more sophisticated notions of mathematics and faith than that. Hamilton
became a close reader of the German Idealists back in the 1830's. From his Dublin observatory,
he wrote to friend (H.F.C. Logan) in 1834:

Your list of foreign books is very tantalising, but I shall select the
following, namely, Dircksen's Grossten and Kleinsten, and Pfaff and Cauchy on
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the Integration of Partial Differential Equations of the first Order...I wish also to
procure Fichte's Die Bestimmung des Menschen, the original, not the translation,
though I do not pretend to read German with the same ease as French. Schelling,
however, I have a still greater desire to study than Fichte; and I wish to get Kant's
work on the Practical Reason, but am in no hurry, because I have not by any
means finished the Pure Reason yet...
I am glad you agree with me in having a leaning to Idealism ...It has
long been a fundamental article of my philosophic faith ...that one Supreme Spirit
excites perceptions in dependent minds, according to a covenant or plan, of which
the terms or conditions are what we call the Laws of Nature. These terms or
conditions it is the business of physical science to discover...71

Hamilton continued his study of Kant, reconciling him with Coleridge much in the manner the
Maxwell tried to reconcile him with the other (Scots) Hamilton. Also in 1854 Sir William
Rowan Hamilton wrote:

From the glimpses which I have taken of Kant, I should think that Coleridge
would be much less unintelligible to a person who had studied Kant's work, and
that, as a professed disciple, he takes for granted much of the conclusions and
principles of his master; though he has brought to them a genius in some respects
perhaps superior...72
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And Hamilton wrote to Wordsworth himself proclaiming the insights he got from Kant:
My little boy, now about two months old, has not idled me much as yet,
though I own that I sometimes repeat to him portions of the Ode on Intimations of
Immortality, and fancy that he enjoys the sound...
Though I have been much occupied, and perhaps more than formerly,
for the last year and a half, with mathematical pursuits, yet I lately have given way
to my innate metaphysical tendency, and have read a large part of the Critique of
Pure Reason in the original. It has really delighted me, and greatly cleared my
views on many important points...73 c

--------------(c)

Hamilton must have gotten much better at his German, for he was selected to be a

god-father to the son of the distinguished German Historian, Leopold Ranke (the co-sponsors
included Prince Albrecht of Prussia and cabinet minister von Manteuffel).74
--------------We cannot assert that Maxwell saw in his reading of Kant the same things Hamilton saw.
Even so, it appears that as far back as the 1830's, Hamilton was bringing Kant into line with the
fashion of the times, English Romanticism, as would Maxwell in the 1850's. By then the
Apostles were fully versed in this "early" (pre-Reform Bill) poetic philosophy, and were
expecting something newer from the scientist in their midst. Maxwell certainly gave them that,
for this "new romanticism" (henceforth called "neo-Kantianism") had a much different role for
mathematics and perception. The German Idealists had, in a sense, over- emotionalized things,
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at least for this particular Scot, and a much more didactic kind of analogy was required to turn
Faraday and Oersted's qualitative models into Maxwell's measurable phenomena.

THE SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY

While the Irish Hamilton's mathematical methods were seeping into physics, the Scots
Hamilton's philosophy was spreading into arts and letters, stirring up considerable dust in the
battle between technical and general education. Thus the academic ground of Maxwell's musings
was full of apparent anomalies. But behind these paradoxes might lurk a unified philosophy for
science, if Maxwell could only reconcile the two streams of thought represented by the clash of
the two Hamiltons. We might give more attention, then, to Maxwell's admired teacher, the Scots
Hamilton.
Sir William himself had advanced a "Scottish" philosophy, and Maxwell was not the only one
of his students to take it to heart. We will hear from another, James McCosh, in a moment, but
we should say more about the symptoms of this "Hamiltonian" attitude. There is no easy
"system" to codify, as Francis Bowen of Harvard wrote in 1873:

It is unfortunate that Sir William Hamilton did not undertake fully to
digest his metaphysical opinions into system, and to publish them as one orderly
and connected whole. He had a system, for he was eminently a methodological
and self-consistent thinker; but it was built up piecemeal, and so given to the
world, at various times, in successive articles in the Edinburgh Review; in copious
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notes,...and in the memoranda...which his English editors gathered up and
annexed to the posthumous publication of his `Lectures on Metaphysics.’ 75 d

--------------(d) Fortunately, Professor Bowen reassembled the "Lectures" into a very influential textbook.
--------------As we have seen, the two Hamiltons were at odds on most subjects, with Maxwell ultimately
occupying the middle. The "analogy" business, a legacy from Kant, did, however, give them
some common ground. Hamilton (the Scot) wrote:

As we know nothing of the absolute order of existence in itself, we can
only attempt to infer its character from that of the particular order within the
sphere of our experience; and as we can affirm naught of intelligence and its
conditions, except what we may discover from the observation of our own minds,
it is evident that we can only analogically carry out into the order of the universe
the relation in which we find intelligence to stand in the order of the human
conditions.76

The Victorians evidently had a greater tolerance for long sentences than we do, so perhaps
were more taken with both the notions of "analogy" and the introspective basis of knowledge.
Here, it seems, is a call to avoid "materialism" and, as well, to avoid seeking fundamental
knowledge in "experiments" on the "outer world." Whereas to the Irish Hamilton, this linked
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ideas such as emotion and mathematics, to the Scot it linked morality and logic. There was a
kind of Platonic emotion--"love of unity [is] a guiding principle to philosophy" 77--but hardly the
kind of sensual passion the Romantics drew from such as Fichte.
In fact, Maxwell's Scots Hamilton spent a good deal of ink railing at that "Anthropological
Idealist," Fichte. For example:

[Fichte]...outrages, however, still more flagrantly, the veracity of consciousness,
in denying not only that we are conscious of an external non-ego, but that we are
conscious of a non-ego at all.78

Well, whatever that may have meant, it certainly was not the kind of sympathy for Coleridge's
Fichte held by the other (Irish) Hamilton.
The technicalities of Hamilton's philosophical musings take us further into the realm of
academic metaphysics than we might wish, and we might better leave it to Maxwell to play out
the consequences of his assumptions. Or, we could look at a second example of the influence of
his metaphysics on science in the "school-wars" of the later nineteenth century.
Directly in the middle of the English-speaking front of the school-wars stood James McCosh,
another of the Scot Sir William Hamilton's proteges. He had left Edinburgh (with an M.A.
sponsored by Hamilton) before Maxwell had arrived, and proceeded to minister to Scots and
Irish parishes as a Minister of the Established Church of Scotland.79 After a spell at Queen's
College in Belfast, he was, in 1868, "called" to the presidency of Princeton (then The College of
New Jersey), where the burgeoning college reforms were particularly raucous. The historian
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Daniel Kevles chronicles the battles:

McCosh joined in the Darwin wars, arguing that it was `useless' to
denounce evolution. One of the first Protestant theologians in America to attempt
a reconciliation of Darwinism and religion, McCosh never went so far as to accept
The Descent of Man. But this reluctance added to the authority of his basic
admonition: Religion need not quaver before the facts of nature.80
This looked like an appeal for peaceful coexistence between the two contenders for primacy,
the "classical" education (as Sir William had seen it) and the "scientific" education (as the
"modernists" would have it). Kevles continues:

In McCosh's view, the colleges had to prevent the scientific approach to
knowledge from overwhelming all others. An intuitionist as a philosopher, an
opponent of John Stuart Mill's thoroughgoing empiricism, McCosh held that
`fundamental truth," as he called it, could be perceived without experiments (he
once argued that he had been prepared to `receive' [Helmholtz's] theory of the
Conservation of Energy because it followed "directly from a doctrine laid down
by me...in my work on `The Method of the Divine Government'"). In academic
terms, McCosh counseled scholars to `fight determinedly' to hold the curricular
fort of Greek, Logic, and Ethics. In all, Princeton would preserve the well
educated man.81
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On closer look, the opposition here was not "science" but a particular scientific method and
attitude. McCosh was most clear about this in his 1875 book The Scottish Philosophy:

The Scottish Philosophy possesses a unity, not only in the circumstance
that its expounders [from Hutcheson to Hamilton] have been Scotchmen, but also
and more specially in its methods, its doctrines, and its spirit...
I. It proceeds on the method of observation, professedly and really...
II. It employs self-consciousness as the instrument of observation...
III. By the observation of consciousness, principles are reached which
are prior to and independent of experience...82

This should sound similar to Maxwell's ideas on analogies, for his too is derived from
Hamilton. But McCosh, unlike Maxwell and Helmholtz, rejected Kant's priority, claiming Kant
had been properly inspired by Hume, the Scot, but then turned away. McCosh did see the
promise of Romantic Philosophy, but he, like Helmholtz, thought it had gone overboard:

Having allowed idealism to enter, there was no means of arresting its
career. As Kant had made time and space, substance and cause, mere forms in the
mind, Fichte was only advancing a few steps further on the same road when he
made the whole universe a projection of the mind; and, in the succeeding age,
Schelling made it an intellectual intuition, and Hegel a logical process.83
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There was to be a new philosophy, one which did derive from the new scientific discoveries,
but one which subordinated them and their laboratories to higher principles:

Whatever are we to make in these times of metaphysics?...The multitudes
who set value on nothing but what can be counted in money never allow
themselves to speak of metaphysics except with a sneer. The increasing number
of persons who read, but are indisposed to think, complain that philosophy is not
so interesting as the new novel...The physicist, who has kept a register of the heat
of the atmosphere at nine o'clock in the morning for the last five years, and the
naturalist, who has discovered a plant or insect,...cannot conceal their contempt
for a department of inquiry which deals with objects which can neither be seen
nor handled, neither weighed nor measured.
In the face of all this scorn, I boldly affirm that mental philosophy is
not exploded, and that it never will be exploded...
Metaphysics may now have to take a new start by taking advantage of
physiological research...Light may be thrown on purely mental action by the fact
that sensory action travels to the brain at the rate of 144.32 feet in the second, and
from the brain at the rate of 108.24;...and by what is alleged by Donders that a
thought requires 1/24 of a second...By such researches the results reached by the
psychologists may be...modified...and... widened. But all such investigations
should be conducted by those who can understand and appreciate the peculiar
nature of mental phenomena, and allow them their full and legitimate space...84
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In McCosh’s America, such a program for academic metaphysics was to be a bold program for
the 1870's and '80s. Kevles recounts the drive:

Different in their emphasis but alike in their overall public purpose,
McCosh and Eliot [of Harvard] together gave the thrust of institutional leadership
to cultivated America's enthusiasm for the study of the sciences...
An era of educational reform was under way. It was as much a part of
the attack against corruption as were the calls for civil service, tariff, and currency
reform that coalesced in the liberal political movement of the early 1870's...
A fresh generation of college presidents laid down bold policies...Like
McCosh and Eliot, they disagreed among themselves about the proper place in the
curriculum of the classics, modern languages, and social studies and debated the
extent to which the elective system should be introduced. But for all their
differences they were united--and set apart from their presidential
predecessors--by the degree to which their educational attitudes were shaped by
the challenge of science.
There was Noah Porter at Yale, McCosh's chief ally, who welcomed
the expression of `Christian truth' in the form of science...85

And, more directly relevant to the new science of Maxwell and Helmholtz, there was Noah
Porter's most celebrated scientist, J. Willard Gibbs.e
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(e) Actually, Gibbs was "most celebrated" among European scientists--Porter kept confusing him
with the American chemist Wolcott Gibbs.
--------------It would be Gibbs more than any other scientist who would absorb the Maxwell-Helmholtz
agenda (he studied with Helmholtz at Heidelberg in 1867) and would extend and codify its
mathematical structure. Gibbs' "Statistical Mechanics" (1906) would represent the manifesto of
these reforms, and in the hands of Einstein, Schrödinger, and other philosopher-scientists, these
methods of deriving truths about the world from the introspection of logical possibilities prevail
in the less celebrated business of connecting theoretical models to actual data.

ANALOGIES AND FORMULAS

Maxwell's first major success with his "analogy agenda" was presented to the Cambridge
Philosophical Society in two parts--December of 1855 and February of 1856. P.G. Tait thought
the manuscript had already been drafted in 1853--about the same time as the lecture on the theory
of analogies.86 Now famous as "On Faraday's Lines of Force," this paper reiterated his method
and produced a concrete example. He deliberately rearranged the venerable discourse on
action-at-a-distance (direct action between separated objects, as in some views of gravity) vs.
action-by-contact (distant interactions requiring mediating "touching" agencies, as in the ether
theories).
Here the method was spelled out more carefully. The problem with the old way was that one
spoke physics in either mathematical formulae or in "physical hypotheses," the assertion of a
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visualizable agency that qualitatively "causes" the phenomena in question (like vibrations of
ether "causing" vision):

In the first case we entirely lose sight of the phenomenon to be
explained...If, on the other hand, we adopt a physical hypothesis, we see the
phenomena only through a medium, and are liable to that blindness to facts and
rashness in assumption which a partial explanation encourages.87

Some new way was required, somehow combining Fourier-like formulas and Faraday-like
"physical hypotheses":

We must therefore discover some method of investigation which allows
the mind at every step to lay hold of a clear physical conception, without being
committed to any theory founded on the physical science from which that
conception is borrowed...
In order to obtain physical ideas without adopting a physical theory we
must make ourselves familiar with the existence of physical analogies. By a
physical analogy I mean that partial similarity between the laws of one science
and those of another which make each of them illustrate the other.88

What happens to the old action-at-a-distance problem (for instance) when it is treated this
way? The problem, the contradiction between distant and contiguous action hypotheses, isn't
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"solved," it just "goes away":

There is no formula in applied mathematics more consistent with nature
than the formula of attraction, and no theory better established in the minds of
men than the action of bodies on one another at a distance. The laws of
conduction of heat in uniform media appear at first sight among the most different
in their physical relations from those relating to attraction. The quantities which
enter them are temperature, flow of heat, conductivity. The word force is foreign
to the subject. Yet we find that the mathematical laws of the uniform motion of
heat ...are identical in form with those of attractions varying inversely as the
square of the distance. We have only to substitute source of heat for centre of
attraction...temperature for potential [etc.], and the solution of a problem in
attraction is transformed into that of a problem in heat."89

As he later said, The formulas for heat flow were from Fourier, the formulas for "attraction"
were from Faraday (magnetic attraction), and the formal analogies were invented by Wm.
Thomson (Kelvin).f The particular point here was the disappearance through this method
--------------(f) Thomson's role in this will become exceedingly confusing for two reasons--his formulas
turned out to be wrong and he rejected Maxwell's method of analogies (fortunately for posterity,
this example was only a preliminary justification for Maxwell's own analogies).
--------------153

of the paradoxes:

Now the conduction of heat is supposed to proceed by an action between
contiguous parts of the medium, while the force of attraction is a relation between
distant bodies, and yet, if we knew nothing more than is expressed in the
mathematical formulae, there would be nothing to distinguish between one set of
phenomena and the other...90

There was now no problem. Heat flows as if it were carried by a fluid (or was a
fluid)--magnets attract as if they were connected by some "tubes" or "lines"--by the same
argument magnets attract as if they "automatically" interacted across empty space. Maybe even
"molecules" of heated matter transferred heat as if they could automatically do so. None of these
"physical analogies" are "real" anyway, they are formed by the "rules of thought" as a means to
an end--the correct mathematical formula. That's what Fourier had said back in 1810.
For his own contribution, Maxwell then generated formulas for electric and magnetic "action"
(forces) from mathematizing Faraday's qualitative "lines of force" through a fluid flow
co-analogy. The fluid was no more "real" than the "lines of force" or the luminiferous ether, but
was another thinking device (cleverly called an "heuristic" by Einstein). Nonetheless, if magnets
acted as if they were connected by elastic tubes or lines of swirling fluids, and they were to be
pulled apart--the tubes would contract, the fluid flow change and this would produce a tug
between the magnets. The attraction so calculated would be, of course, inversely proportional to
the distance of separation of the magnetic poles. It worked!
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Faraday sent his congratulations and Maxwell was on his way (to the epochal 1865 paper on
“The Dynamical Theory of the Electromagnetic Field”). The idea that he was on his way to
establishing the "reality" of the luminiferous ether--by showing that oscillations in it were
light--is an absurd presumption of his opposition (like Kelvin). Helmholtz got the proper
message, and set Heinrich Hertz to work validating this method by actually demonstrating
transmission of "invisible" light across "empty" space--the so-called "radio" waves of 1888. Thus
it should be said that Maxwell, Helmholtz and Hertz's notions, radio waves, were not
"discovered." They were foreseen as necessary consequences of the "laws of nature"--and those
"laws" were knowable only because they conformed to the "laws of thought" (hence Maxwell's
method). Helmholtz, Boltzmann, Gibbs, and Einstein would all exploit these ideas (and properly
attribute them to Kant as well as Maxwell--alas, poor Hamilton was forgotten), and would all
suffer intense ridicule from their colleagues for doing so. Reluctantly, the scientific world did
eventually accept their formulas, but would never be comfortable with their accounts of what
they meant.
The formulas survived like the smile of the Cheshire cat. The body of the cat, the
metaphysical justification, faded away. In the legends of "progress," the French disease of
Comtean positivism grew into the Viennese fad of logical-mathematical positivism and into the
catechistic logical empiricism and realisms of the late twentieth century. The "fortunate" aspect
of this development was the commitment of these doctrines to the rejection of "metaphysics" in
general and Kant in particular. To the working and confused front-line scientist, this meant that
academic doctrine assured them that philosophy was dispensable, if not downright destructive. A
recent visitor to the Princeton Institute for Advanced Studies wrote:
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Humanists may argue among themselves over the epistemological and
metaphysical status of science, but the scientists, even when ...they have
philosopher's doubts about the final truth of their conclusions, seem to go about
their business as if all those issues were totally beside the point anyway. And if
you should have the terribly poor fortune of being a philosopher yourself, you
certainly don't want to hear what it is that the working scientists themselves have
to say about you and your subject.91

The goal of physics became the successful formula--to be "checked" by experiment. Or, in
absence of a good formula, a fiendishly clever and unexpected experimental result suggestively
defiant of likely future formulas. Maxwell's formulas were needed, his methods weren’t. The
production of analogies had culminated with Einstein in everything that was needed to produce
all possible formulas. The exceptions--Bohr, Schrödinger, Dirac, Heisenberg--could be expected
occasionally to stumble upon a few new formulas, but overall this century of geniuses had
already provided all the heuristics needed for future use.
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CHAPTER 4

Having viewed Maxwell's studies of the 1850's, we now turn to Helmholtz' in the same
period. These occupied his time at Bonn, and show a characteristic shift from physiology to
physics, with a considerable metaphysical sub-text to both. Helmholtz' specific research on
fluids provides an exemplar of the anti-materialism already detected in his "energy,” and his
study of nerve impulses evokes a direct connection to scientific-philosophic predecessors,
Goethe, Hegel, and Schelling. There are influences of Schelling's Naturphilosophie evident in
Helmholtz' musings, and these are shared by Maxwell. Moreover, we can trace to Schelling
some social background to the civil world of Helmholtz, and begin to unify his social, political,
and scientific lives through a single philosophical agenda. Similarly, we can trace a cultural
backdrop to the radical practicalization of science, engineering, and their teaching. The resulting
academic reforms, the Schulkrieg transformed Helmholtz' Prussian context in a remarkably
similar way that the Whewell-Forbes reforms changed Maxwell's. More dramatically to
Helmholtz, the transformations from a "Romanticism" to Realpolitik in his world would, with
his participation, signal the rise of Germany as a technological state. Philosophically, Helmholtz
became embroiled in a “Back-to Kant” movement, which entangled him with a major current
controversy, especially over “materialism.” To reconcile the fashionable pragmatism with the
heritage of metaphysics that both Helmholtz and Maxwell shared will require a rather messy
collage of agendas; political, poetical, scientific, and practical.
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HELMHOLTZ: ABSTRACT PHYSIOLOGY

In 1856 Maxwell left Cambridge for Aberdeen and his first professorship. Helmholtz left
Königsberg for his second, at Bonn, a year earlier. Having achieved mobility through
prominence, Helmholtz wanted a place more central to the intellectual action, and a place with
better weather than the damp, northern port city of Königsberg. His wife's health was poor, and
he hoped a better climate would restore her. Humboldt struck again:

Dear Professor, I was agitating on your behalf long before you honored me
with your confidence. The deplorable state of your wife's health makes a move
from that raw climate most desirable...I have with great effort written a long and
enthusiastic letter..., refuted the opinion of -----,...and based my proposal on our
friendship, your domestic trouble, your splendid talents, and extraordinary
energy.1

Thus was Helmholtz was appointed Professor of Physiology and Anatomy at Bonn in 1855. Did
the better intellectual climate nourish Helmholtz's "curiosity"? His intentions, at least read from
his prior "inaugural lecture" (on promotion at Königsberg in 1852), were to generalize:

Sensations of light and color are only symbols for relations of reality.
They have as much and as little connexion or relation with it as the name of a
man, or the letters of his name, have to do with the man himself ...as to the real
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nature of the external phenomena to which we refer them, we learn nothing, as
little as we learn of a man from his name.2

Reviewing Helmholtz’s work at Bonn (1855-1858) for evidence of Metaphysics-mathematics, analogies, and symbols--one finds at first glance few clues among the continued
mass of empirical physiology. Koenigsberger's list of selected works 3 includes such papers as
"On the Movements of the Thorax," "Contraction-Curves of Frogs' Muscles," "On the Subjective
after-images of the Eye," and "The Telstereoscope"--all not particularly indicating a
metaphysical agenda. But several other works more readily suggest a growing abstractionist
skill, such as "On Combination Tones," "On the Vowel-Tones," "On the Physical Causes of
Harmony and Dissonance," and "On the Physiological Causes of Harmony and Dissonance"--all
preliminaries to his later contributions to acoustics in The Theory of the Sensations of Tone as a
Physiological Basis of the Theory of Music (1862). Since the titles still do not suggest mixed
mathematics and analogies, some argument will be in order, but before that we consider two
other works are patently "theoretical": "On Integrals of the Hydrodynamic Equations which
express Vortex-Motions" and "On General Motions of Fluids."
These latter pieces of work are, like Fourier's theory of heat, not related to the nature of the
"stuff (fluid) itself," but to mathematical "laws": "differential equations" whose consequences
(solutions) have mathematical properties that might be considered analogous to the physical
properties of fluids. Specifically, Helmholtz imagined an "ideal" (frictionless, incompressible)
"fluid" as an abstract, continuous region of three dimensional space characterized by a
formula-recipe giving everywhere values for mass density and speeds of flow. Whether such a
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fiction was a useful analogy for heat “flow” remains to be seen. He then imagined (and drew
little pictures of) a wall-less box fixed in the "fluid" and considered what would flow into and out
of the box according to the rules of conservation of energy. This will remind us of the
"prohibitory" nature of the resulting equations of flow for two reasons. The first is that the
conservation law governing how much flowed into and out of the box was already prohibitory,
expressing what energy flows were permissible. That “law” followed from a prohibition-- by
excluding perpetual motion. The second reminder was embedded in the mathematical method
itself. This particular strategy of mathematics, "differential equations,” had been carefully
developed to find methods to make explicit the "solutions" that consistent with the law and to
prove the solutions were "unique. Thus the equation of flow arises from excluding all
law-disobeying formulas, hence includes in principle the unique recipe for predicted flow.
Helmholtz' invention here was what is now called an "equation of continuity," which represents
restrictions on the speeds and densities of flow permitted by the law of conservation. The rest of
the two papers get even less intelligible and more mathematical, but the result of this exercise
seems to "prove" that once a "vortex," or whirlpool-like flow is initiated, it remains--the law of
conservation of energy turns into a law of conservation of whirlpools. These are not "real"
whirlpools, because "real" water is not frictionless. Nonetheless, experiments with swirling
water did show unusual persistence of vortices, so the analogies showed promise. Maxwell takes
the idea further:
A theory, which Sir W. Thomson has founded on Helmholtz's splendid
hydrodynamical theorems, seeks for the properties of molecules in the ring
vortices of a uniform, frictionless, incompressible fluid. Such whirling rings may
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be seen when an experienced smoker sends out a dexterous puff of smoke into the
still air, but a more evanescent phenomenon it is difficult to conceive. This
evanescence is owing to the viscosity of the air; but Helmholtz has shewn that in a
perfect fluid such a whirling ring, if once generated, would go on whirling for
ever, would always consist of the very same portion of the fluid which was first
set whirling, and could never be cut in two by any natural cause. The generation of
a ring-vortex is of course equally beyond the power of natural causes, but once
generated, it has the properties of individuality, permanence in quantity, and
indestructibility. It is also the recipient of impulse and of energy , which is all we
can affirm of matter... Even in the present undeveloped state of the theory, the
contemplation of the individuality and indestructibility of a ring-vortex in a
perfect fluid cannot fail to disturb the commonly received opinion that a molecule,
in order to be permanent, must be a very hard body. In fact one of the first
conditions which a molecule must fulfil is, apparently, inconsistent with its being
a single hard body.

3a

Carrying this vortex-molecule analogy even further, Maxwell employs the model to allow
vibrations of this “soft” molecule to produce light:
We know from those spectroscopic researches which have thrown so much
light on different branches of science, that a molecule can be set into a state of
internal vibration, in which it gives off to the surrounding medium light of
definite refrangibility—light, that is, of definite wave-length and definite period of
vibration. The fact that all the molecules (say, of hydrogen ) which we can procure
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for our experiments, when agitated by heat or by the passage of an electric spark,
vibrate precisely in the same periodic time, or, to speak more accurately, that their
vibrations are composed of a system of simple vibrations having always the same
periods, is a very remarkable fact.
Later meteorologists imagined that atmospheric air might be weakly analogous to an ideal fluid
(albeit compressible), and whirlpools or tornadoes in the air might be studied by this method.
They are. Even if you don't know the subsequent dramatic history of theoretical
"hydrodynamics," it becomes fairly easy to guess at it by simply extending the metaphors,
following Maxwell's methods, and tinkering with the "law," modifying Helmholtz' equations to
allow compression, etc. As for the subsequently important research in fluids, Helmholtz' agenda
was taken up in England, not by Maxwell but by George Stokes and William Thomson
(Kelvin).a It should come as no surprise that Stokes, Kelvin, and Helmholtz later
--------------(a) On a personal level, Stokes, a colleague of Maxwell's at Cambridge--and disseminator of
French methods in mixed mathematics--later became Helmholtz' second best friend in England,
next to William Thomson (Kelvin). Helmholtz rarely encountered Maxwell, and only obliquely
referred to him once in correspondence as "a keen mathematician." 4
--------------hatched a hydrodynamical theory of the most "ideal" fluid of all, the luminiferous ether, and that
persistent whirlpools (vortices) in the ether were seen as models for persistent atoms of matter in
the "real" world.b

Eventually, the "Helmholtz-Kelvin" ether-vortex model of atoms gave way
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(b) In recent physics the "superfluid" component of very, very cold liquid Helium appeared to
conform spectacularly to Helmholtz's analogy
----- ----------to a "better" analogy, the Rutherford "saturnian" model, but this would take us into the twentieth
century and thus awaits another chapter. Before we stop thinking ahead, though, we should
consider what the role of experiment would have in this kind of speculative physics. It is
irresistible to note that in the case of ether-vortex analogies Maxwell alludes to a more
accessible analogy than a “tornado” --a smoke-ring-- and indeed the intensive experiments on
smoke-rings themselves in the nineteenth century is a testimony to the fruitfulness of the method
of analogies.
Backing up a bit, can we find similar abstractionist tendencies in the other Bonn exercises?
The papers on acoustics indicate a shift from color and to sound--do they also shift from "reality”
(experience--the "man" in Helmholtz' analogy in his inaugural cited above) to "symbol" ("the
letters in his name")

I hope to derive the whole theory of harmony from the fundamental fact
the the ear perceives movements that are regularly repeated...as a continuous
sensation of tone, and that a continuous sensation of tone is felt to be a
consonance, a discontinuous sensation to be a dissonance...I am now
endeavouring to establish thorough basis upon an integration of partial differential
equations of the second order and second degree.5
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It might be suspected here that this intended theory of tones evolves from Helmholtz' earlier
theories of color-perceptions, the connecting link being that sensations of sound and color are a
response to vibrations of the luminiferous aether and of air respectively. Helmholtz had
originally made that connection, but the analogy served only as an initial starting point, for the
exact parallels soon broke down. He had experimental indications of this failure. Back at
Königsberg, Helmholtz had extended the vibratory ideas of light by having a student, E.
Esselbach, "measure" the wavelength and vibratory period of "ultra-violet" light. He then
compared the range of frequencies of ether vibrations of light to the air vibrations of musical
notes, "according to which the entire solar spectrum comprises an octave and a fourth." Since the
audible range of sound ranged over so many more "octaves" than did visible light, there was,
according to Koenigsberger, "little, if any, analogy between sensations of tone and color."6 After
this unsuccessful analogy appropriate mixed mathematical model shifted from the "Newtonian"
scheme of the ratios of whole numbers and octaves (reminiscent of Pythagoras) previously
described to a more modern mathematics of vibrations, "periodic" formulas, and their
arithmetical combinations. Fortunately a complete scheme of such calculations had been
pioneered by Maxwell’s source, Joseph Fourier. Thus Helmholtz' "Combination of Tones" (this
time accepted by Poggendorff) involved the mathematical combination of "sine-waves" and
"frequencies" and the other trigonometric baggage of what has come to be called "Fourier
Analysis." Now having a mathematical analogy, Helmholtz explored the theoretical--then
experimental--consequences of combining tones. For instance, he developed a theory of "vowel
tones," where the vowels "a,""o," and "e" , sung (in presumably a Prussian accent) should excite
sympathetic vibrations in piano strings of calculatable pitch.7 He moved on from "pitch" to
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"timbre"--a quality of tone best described by its German equivalent, Klangfarbe, or
"sound-color."c He continued:
--------------(c) This linguistic oddity--that the sound-color analogy is "built into" the German language
itself--might give hope to some moderns who believe that right reason is not constrained so
much by the rules of logic, as in Kant, as by the rules of language.
--------------In the next place I must attack the problems relating to the origin of timbre, since
that will solve the fundamental problems of physiological acoustics discussed by
Ohm and Seebeck. What kind of vibration corresponds with a single audible
tone? I believe Ohm to be right in his view that the ear analyses and hears the
motions of the air in exact correspondence with Fourier's theory.8

d

--------------(d)Thomas Seebeck had been a Naturphilosopher, assisting Goethe at Jena.9 George Ohm was a
Bavarian physicist who had "...under the influence of Fourier, adopted a highly abstract
theoretical mode of presentation that obscured the theory's close relationship with experiment."10
Both of them distanced themselves from their early commitment to Schelling, but retained the
method of empirical investigation of “unities in nature” (if not the theoretical commitment to
introspection).11
--------------In the paper on Harmony, the color-sound divorce becomes final:
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...[There is a]...capability in the ear of ... analysing the compound system of waves
into simple undulations, according to Fourier’s theorem...How essential is the
physiological constitution of the ear.. Becomes clear by comparing it with that of
the eye. Light is also an undulation of a peculiar medium, the luminous
ether...But the eye is unable to decompose compound colours from one
another...The eye has no sense of harmony in the same meaning as the ear. There
is no music to the eye.12

Could we see here Helmholtz's thoughts returning again to the unfashionable
pre-revolutionary intellectuals, the circles of Goethe, Schelling, and Fichte? About a
month after he wrote the above note on Ohm, he wrote to his father:

It seems to me a favorable moment for voices of the old school of Kant
and the elder Fichte to obtain a hearing once more. The philosophical vapouring
and consequent hysteria of the `nature-systems' of Hegel and Schelling seem to
have exploded, and people are beginning to interest themselves in philosophy
again...
Philosophy finds its great significance among the sciences as the theory of
the source and functions of knowledge, in the sense in which Kant, and, as far as I
understand him, the elder Fichte, took it. Hegel, however, wanted it to replace all
the other sciences, and to find out by its means what is perhaps denied to man, by
which he diverted philosophy from its proper scope, and gave it tasks it can never
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accomplish. The majority of men at first believed in him, and then rejected
philosophy altogether, seeing that nothing came of it. The philosophy of
Schopenhauer at the present time seems really to be due to the fact that he goes
back to the sound old Kantian standpoint.13

It should be now more than obvious that the philosophical agendas both of Maxwell and
Helmholtz did not intend a revolution in ideas, but a reformation. This was the position of the
Scots Hamilton as well. Competing mid-century intellectuals, buoyed by positivism and
disappointed by the failure of the 1848 Revolutions, seemed intent on eliminating all old
philosophy, especially Kant and metaphysics. As of recent days, the heirs of this trend continue
to celebrate the death of Kantian dogma, and to celebrate its slayers--the scientists. An especially
miscast hero is Helmholtz himself, for it is alleged that he "scientifically" validated the ultimate
blow to Kant. The particular fatal thrust was the "discovery" of a practical geometry in
fundamental conflict with that of Euclidxxxx. How he is supposed to have done that, and of what
significance such an event is to the understanding of mind, is one of our next tasks, though
Helmholtz introduces this notion in the above early essays:

I feel the crying want of a special treatment of certain questions, which
have not, so far as I know, been attacked by any modern philosopher, and which
lie wholly within the field of a priori concepts which Kant investigated, e. g. the
derivation of the principles of geometry and mechanics, the reason why we are
logically bound to reduce reality to two abstractions--matter and energy, etc., or
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again, the laws of the unconscious arguments from analogy, by which we pass
from sensations to sense-perceptions...14

NATURPHILOSOPHIE

This continued concern of Helmholtz with the status of Hegel and Schelling with regard to
science requires a little closer look, for we have set him on a collision course with Maxwell's
English interpretation of German Romanticism. In Prussia, this takes us back again to the
half-century prior to 1851, where the intellectual agenda was wrapped tightly questions of natural
philosophy and theology. The poet Heinrich Heine set the scene:

I stood behind the maestro [Hegel] as he composed [the music of atheism],
though in very obscure and ornate signs so that not everyone could decipher them
-- I sometimes saw him anxiously looking over his shoulder, in fear that he had
been understood.15

The self-avowed "scientist" of the notorious group around Hegel at Jena was Friedrich
Schelling. He had originally met Hegel and the Romantic poet Hölderlin at the theological
seminary at Tübingen in the 1790's.16 Then at Jena in the early 1800's he hooked up with Hegel
and Fichte, and with Goethe and the poet Schiller in nearby Weimar.

At that time, though Hegel was five years older than Schelling, he was
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generally considered to be Schelling's disciple, and Hegel's first book was a
comparison of Fichte's and Schelling's philosophies.17

In contrast to Hegel's (arguable) "atheism,"NOTE ZIZEK Schelling, like Herder, rooted his system in
theology:

It will always remain a striking circumstance in the history of German
intellectual development, that at any time the assertion could be made: The
system which merges...God with all things, creature with the creator, and makes
all subordinate to blind, irrational necessity, is the only possible system of
reason...In order to comprehend this we must recall the dominant spirit of an
earlier age. At that time all minds had fallen victim to the mechanistic trend of
thought which attained the pinnacle of its nefariousness in French
atheism...Nowadays,...this type of thought has long since ceased to be and the
higher light of Idealism shines for us.18

In the metaphysical integration of God (principle) with Nature (activity), Schelling introduces the
function of analogy:

By analogy this [God-Nature] relationship can be explicated through
reference to the relationship of gravitation and light in nature. Gravitation
precedes light as its eternally dark basis which is itself not actual and flees into
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the night when light (which truly exists) appears. Even light does not completely
break the seal by which gravity is held. For this very reason gravity is neither the
pure essence nor even the actual being of absolute identity, but it is only a
consequence of its nature.19 e
--------------(e) There does seem to be a typical opacity to that passage that perhaps explains the extraordinary
hostility of later skeptics, up to and including Agnes Mary Clerke.
--------------Characteristically, Schelling integrated art and philosophy in his "life of freedom," to the point
of marrying the divorced wife of his friend, the Shakespeare translator August Schlegel--after the
death of her daughter to whom he had been engaged. The pioneer poet, Novalis, often
considered the founder of literary Romanticism, and folklorist Ludwig Tieck, were also friends,
as was Seebeck. Among their common interests were the writings of the seventeenth century
mystic, Jakob Boehme, and a dialectic `dark, negative principle' seems to have arisen from that
source.20 By way of example, here is a fragment of Boehme's metaphor--wherein the physical
realities are "hieroglyphs" of embedded principles:

For man is the great mystery of God, the microcosm, or the complete
statement of the whole universe He is the mirandum Dei opus, God's masterpiece,
a living emblem and hieroglyphic of eternity and time...21

And here is an example of his principle of opposition, polarity, or "dialectic tension:"
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We understand that without nature there is an eternal stillness and rest, viz.
the Nothing; and then we understand that an eternal will arises in the nothing, to
introduce the nothing into something, that the will might find, feel, and behold
itself...
Now that the will must be in darkness is its contrariety, and it conceives in
itself another will to go out from the darkness again into the liberty...22

This, and similar "organic," holistic perspectives of this "Jena clique" indicate the natures of
“experience” and “experiment” to be integrated in a Naturphilosophie.
The operating principles of Naturphilosophie arose from what seemed to be a notion akin to
Fichte’s revision of Kant. If the perceivable world is as it is because of the automatic rules of
thought, then the un-Kantian faculty of voluntarily thinking something up, or "changing one's
mind," or of imagining the unseeable would all seem to change the physical world. Thus it
appeared that a new idea put one in a new world or (paraphrasing the contemporary philosopher
Thomas Kuhn23), when you change your mind the world changes with it. It this possible?
"Conservative" Kantians thought not. They thought that should be only one possible complex of
"true," "objective" ideas about things, governed by the assumed way things "really were"
(although the infamous knowledge of "things-in-themselves" was forever prohibited by Kant).
Changing minds could only be moving nearer or farther from the truth, and new things imagined
were not really new, but pieced together from the familiar. Kant, after all, was first a physicist
himself--and had originally set himself the task of explaining scientific knowledge: How could
Newton be right about the future course of planets--or, how could Newton's Laws be required of
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nature herself? Yet the more radical Novalis and friends could clearly do un-Kantian things.
They could speaking of the "unspeakable" in such a way that it could be felt and perceived. They
could think and write in totally unprecedented ways, not made up of pieces of the canons of their
predecessors. They could make up their own minds about reality, or perhaps the "true" meaning
of reality. At least they thought they could. Had not Wertherfever proved that Goethe could
"teach" unspeakable Angst to the readers of Young Werther? Had not the researches of Galvani
and Volta uncovered knowledge of the essence of life-in-itself, vitality and animal electricity?
And finally, had not Kant himself anticipated a more "creative" and "metaphysical" outgrowth of
his account of the limits of pure reason? In Maxwell's beloved Kritik, Kant had said

But, it will be asked, what sort of treasure is this that we propose to
bequeath to posterity? What is the value of that metaphysics that is alleged to be
thus purified by criticism and established once and for all? On a cursory view of
the present work [the Critique of Pure Reason] it may seem that its results are
merely negative, warning us that we must never venture with speculative reason
beyond the limits of experience. Such in fact is its primary use. But such
teaching at once acquires a positive value that the principles with which
speculative reason ventures out beyond its proper limit do not...extend the
employment of reason, but...inevitably narrow it...So far. therefore, as our Critique
limits speculative reason, it is indeed negative, but since it thereby removes an
obstacle which stands in the way of the employment of practical reason, nay
threatens to destroy it, it has in reality a positive and very important use...
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...[It is evident that] even the assumption --as made on behalf of the
necessary practical employment of my reason--of God, freedom, and immortality
is not permissible unless at the same time speculative reason be deprived of its
pretensions to transcendental insight.24

In the "back-to-Kant" science of the post-1850's, Helmholtz and Maxwell again argued that
Kant had not omitted a role for freedom--for inquiry, for will, and the free imagination. In fact,
the idea of "analogy," be it mathematical or literary, was their candidate for showing how an
"unseen (and unseeable) universe" can be investigated and explained, and connected to the
observable universe. In particular, the intellectual analogy that parsed the abstract in logic was
the mathematical analogy, while the analogy that demonstrated the unity of intellectual and
physical logic was "the experiment." For them it was as patently evident as it was for Kant that
only that which was conceivable could be experienced, and vice versa. Why had Fichte and
Schelling gone wrong--as they surely must have, or the 1848 revolutions conducted in their
names would have been successful-- philosophically as certain and inevitable as the return of
Halley's comet?
Fichte's overstatement was to presume that since the activity of thinking was bound by Kant to
the activity of the perceivable world, they must be the same thing. That is, "reality" is mental
"activity," consequently the thinker ("mentator") is the author of reality. That such notions are
today implausible stems partly from the habit moderns have of thinking about "reality" as full of
"things," and it's difficult to take seriously a philosophy that fills the head with "things" like
tables and chairs. But Helmholtz's father and Romantic friends considered "reality" to be full of
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"activity" (loving, caring, meaning, attracting, repelling, etc.), and the "objects" of that activity to
be mere "symbols" (the very words of Helmholtz himself). Thus this "ego-world" of Fichte had
possible relevance to the intelligibility of the perceived actions of nature (swirling unseeable
vortices and the like).
As Hegel was to push this idealism into the study of "reason in history," Schelling pushed it
into science:

Against Fichte's conception of the world as the construction of the world
as the construction of the ego, Schelling now insisted that the world of nature is
just as real and just as important as the world of the ego. In fact it is nature, the
objective, that gives to consciousness what the consciousness reproduces anew.25

It then follows as guaranteed that a study of nature, like the Ohm-Seebeck-Helmholtz study of
the rules of hearing, or the Helmholtz-Maxwell study of the rules of seeing, are the study of the
mind, the self, and the ego. Likewise the study of the rules of thinking (logic), detached from
consideration of the objects being thought about, as in the geometry of the ancients or the
mathematics of Fourier, were also a study of nature; its forces and activities. To Schelling as to
Helmholtz the essence of the activity of the world was force--attraction and repulsion--Kraft,
which was, of course, "conserved," that is, eternal.
It must be remembered that the plausibility of this kind of speculation was enhanced by some
hidden premises, notably the general belief in the immanent activity of God--the Lutheran God
preached by Herder at Weimar, or Maxwell's Scots Presbyterian-Episcopal-Anglican God, or
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Ohm's Bavarian Roman Catholic God (he taught at the Jesuit Gymnasium at Cologne).26 The
theological underpinnings of experimental science, art, and morals were overtly a part of
Naturphilosophie, and for that matter, its Victorian successors.f
--------------(f) For instance, the Cambridge theological musings of Whewell and of the theologian-geologist
Adam Sedgwick were a notorious background to the Darwinists debates. Maxwell and
Helmholtz stayed more or less out of those.
--------------The pre-revolutionary scientific community was full of Naturphilosophers. There was, for
instance, our electrical innovator Hans Christian Oersted, who originally studied the activities of
attraction and repulsion to understand the combination and neutralization of chemical acids and
bases.27 He studied in Berlin, Göttingen and Weimar in the early 1800's, and gained authority in
his 1819 demonstration of the attractions and repulsions of the poles of magnets to electrical
currents. Recall that his was the key experiment that called Europe's attention to the programme
of the unification of the Forces of Electricity and Magnetism, followed up by Faraday and
Maxwell.
Recently, the Dane Jakob Clausen traced back Oersted's debt to Fichte and Schelling by
following Maxwell's remark that Oersted was motivated by examining the analogies between
electricity, magnetism, and heat28. A close study of the letters and papers of Oersted and his
contemporaries revealed Oersted's strong personal links to Fourier, Fichte, Schelling, and others
of the "romantic revolution." For example, Oersted admired Schelling's vision, writing:
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We may, therefore, regard the essence of each thing as composed of
innumerable others; but in itself it is only a part of a still greater chain of being,
and is connected by them with a higher unity...Thus all natural laws for together a
unity, which, viewed in their activity, constitute the essence of the world.29

And, encompassing both Schelling's unity and Fichte's personality-in
nature:
That the whole of nature is the revelation of an infinite rational will, and
that it is the task of science to recognize as much of it as possible to finite
powers.30
To Oersted, Schelling's "spirit" of the "infinite all" was revealed in science:

We are apt to feel this [spirit] whenever we trace a connexion between our
inner life an the influences of external nature; but does it originate from our
comprehending nature in too material a manner? It seems to me, in such cases,
we forget, or rather we do not sufficiently remember, that Nature is the work of
the same Spirit to whom we owe our own being.31

That last rather grand remark actually suggested to Clausen a bit of a departure from strict,
intuition-directed Naturphilosophie. Indeed moving away from Fichte a bit, Oersted wrote (in
1812):
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I have not been to see him [Fichte] very often, for owing to the difference
of our views, especially on nature, no very comprehensive communication can
take place between us.32

Even earlier, in 1802, Oersted expressed skepticism towards Schelling himself:

He wants to give us a complete philosophical system of physics, but
without any knowledge of nature except from text-books and without possessing
the same rigorousness of philosophical construction as Kant...33 g
--------------(g) Coincidentally, perhaps, we will later have occasion to cite a strikingly similar
disappointment in strict Naturphilosophie of another pharmacist's son, Justus Leibig, himself
also destined for scientific glory in experimental science.
--------------In Oersted's case, it now appears that this was the beginning of a philosophical career devoted
not to vindicating Schelling, but to correcting him. Here is yet more support for the proclamation
of a "back-to-Kant" agenda carrying beyond 1848. We have attached this motive to the
reflective struggles of Helmholtz and Maxwell, and argue that this
"religio-poetico-philosophical" science (for so it was called by Oersted's pupil Hansteen)34 in the
direct technical ancestry of the physicist-philosophers. Even Oersted's experimental method,
revealed in details of his laboratory notes, is one of demonstrating, not "discovering," through
"experiment" the unities of nature through physical and mental analogy here
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heat-electricity-magnetism (perhaps substituting Count Rumford's notion of "motion" for "heat")
Further support for the view that Oersted veered away from Schelling’s Naturphilosophie,
instead fueling the more “conservative” back-to-Kant” movement appeared in 2013 in
a thorough Oersted biography by Dane Dan Charly Christensen 34a . He chronicles the immense
influence of Oersted, his brother (and sometimes privy councillor) Andreas, his assistant Johan
Ritter,and protege Hans Christian Anderson on a “Golden Age” of Danish arts and letters.
Oersted’s commitment to Kants’s metaphysics as guiding his celebrated experimental work
circulated throughout Europe, particularly through his several tours, visits, and philosophical
lectures.
Another early Naturphilosopher was Loretz Oken (or Okenfuss), who taught at Jena,
Göttingen, Munich, and Erlangen in the 1820's. In 1822 he promoted the movement by founding
a most notable organization for the "democratic" participation of scientists: The German
Association for Scientists and Physicians (Gesellschaft Deutscher Naturforscher und Aertze).35 It
was at meetings of this organization, and its offshoot societies that periodic debates would
establish a consensus on the appropriate agenda for future researches into all sorts of topics. The
Association thus represented an major organizing force in the sociology of science, perhaps even
more powerful than the individual ideas of researchers, or the more elitist academies (like the
venerable Prussian Academy of Sciences, or the Royal Societies of London and Edinburgh).
Oken's society would emphasize the metaphysical rather than the practical. Even in its title he
reflected the inventive nature of experiment. The word Oken used for "scientist" was
Naturforscher. The conventional term was (Natur)Wissenschaftler, a purveyor of learning or a
holder of doctrine. A Forscher is an investigator, presumably of the yet unknown. The
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distinction between the two characterizations was deliberate and figured strongly in successive
reforms of education, scientific and otherwise.
The academic consequence of this subtle distinction of terminology was in the role of
experimental investigation in science and learning. By heritage, the university was primarily a
teaching institution, whose laboratories were for the demonstration of principles
established--Wissenschaft. Exploratory investigation -Forschung--like the travels of Humboldt
and Darwin, or the researches of Maxwell and Helmholtz--had little place in this traditional
university. Helmholtz in Prussia and Maxwell in England would be called upon to change this
prejudice allegedly through their assumption of the direction of the "national laboratories" to be
associated with universities. It was thus that Oken's brand of Naturphilosophie had institutional
consequences indeed.h
--------------(h) The English equivalent of the philosophical language reformer was Whewell who, due to his
command of Greek and Latin was called upon to find new names for new ideas in science. For
instance he coined the english term "scientist," for the philosophically revised work like
Faraday's. The term "natural philosopher" was retained for the more romantically or
philosophically inclined "investigator."
--------------In a modern reconstruction by philosopher Nicholas Jardine, Oken's scientific method,
illustrated by his extensive project of deriving from first principles (God) a classification scheme
for all animals, vegetables, and minerals, was one of "constructive analogy."36 Overtly adopting
the methods of Schelling, Oken, in his 1809-11 Lehrbuch der Naturphilosophie, "exploits
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correspondence between part and whole in the cosmos."37 It is likely that such notions as those
of Oken, Goethe (with whom Oken had a priority dispute over anatomical discoveries),
and Oersted provoked Maxwell's youthful rejection of "Analogies in Nature," and his and
Helmholtz' "back-to-Kant" polemics.
At least this is the position that Friedrich Engels took in his seminal tract on dialectical
materialism, Anti-Dühring. For Engels, materialism was a virtue rejected by the bourgeois such
as Helmholtz:

In his primordial slime and primordial vesicle Oken put forward as
biological postulates what were in fact subsequently discovered as protoplasm and
cell. As far as Hegel is concerned, in many respects he is head and shoulders
above his empiricist contemporaries, who thought that they had explained all
unexplained phenomena when they had endowed them with some power--the
power of gravity, the power of buoyancy, the power of electrical contact, etc., or
when this would not do, with some unknown substance: the substance of light, of
warmth, of electricity, etc. The imaginary substances have now been pretty well
discarded, but the power humbug against which Hegel fought still pops up gaily,
for example, as lately as 1869 in Helmholtz's Innsbruck lecture (Helmholtz,
Popular Lectures, Vol. 2, 1871, German edition, p. 190).38

For Engel's "successor," Lenin, Helmholtz' stance was as much political as scientific:
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In the sphere of philosophy revisionism followed in the wake of bourgeois
professorial "science". The professors went "back to Kant"--and revisionism
dragged along after the neo-Kantians. The professors repeated the platitudes that
priests have uttered a thousand times against philosophical materialism--and the
revisionists, smiling indulgently, mumbled (word for word after the latest
Handbuch) that materialism had been "refuted" long ago. The professors treated
Hegel as a "dead dog", and while themselves preaching idealism, only an idealism
a thousand times more petty and banal than Hegel's, contemptuously shrugged
their shoulders at dialectics--and the revisionists floundered after them into the
swamp of philosophical vulgarisation of science, replacing "artful" (and
revolutionary) dialectics by "simple" (and tranquil) "evolution". The professors
earned their official salaries by adjusting both their idealist and their "critical"
systems to the dominant medieval "philosophy" (i.e., to theology).39

Having established a place for Naturphilosophie in Helmholtz' background, and embedding
him in the Back-to Kant movement, we can make even more direct connections to Maxwell. In
just one example, we recall the transmission of Schelling's ideas to Maxwell's England,
particularly through S.T. Coleridge's relationship with chemist Humphrey Davy and the Royal
Institution. In fact, Coleridge was quite familiar not only with Schelling, but with Oken. In a
biographical study of Oken, Pierce Mullen, wrote:

[Coleridge] owned copies of both [Oken's] First Ideas and Compendium.
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His marginal notes in these works are sometimes illegible and faded but it would
appear that Coleridge was looking into Oken's theories for some justification of
his own views of nature. He approved of efforts to dethrone mechanistic science,
but he deplored Oken's language and truculence...Coleridge continued to bemoan
the lack of a mathematical counterattack upon Newtonian science. Goethe and
Oken and others were leading the assault, but not a single reputable astronomer or
mathematician would join the fray.40

To establish the relations with Schelling, Naturphilosophie, and Maxwell even more directly,
we recall Maxwell's early enthusiasm for F.D. Maurice and Kant, two disparate characters neatly
conjoined by comments by encyclopedist John Robertson:

From Schelling, whom he [Coleridge] praised as having developed Kant
where Fichte failed to do so, he borrowed much and often...
Inasmuch as he finally followed in philosophy the mainly poetical or
theosophic movement of Schelling, which satisfied neither the logical needs
appealed to by Hegel nor the new demand for naturalistic induction, Coleridge,
after arousing a great amount of philosophic interest in his own country in the
second quarter of the century, has ceased to `make a school.' Thus his
significance in intellectual history remains that of a great stimulator. He
undoubtedly did much to deepen and liberalize Christian thought in England, his
influence being specially marked in the school of F.D. Maurice. And even his
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many borrowings from the German were assimilated with a rare power of
development which bore fruit not only in widening of the field of English
philosophy but in the larger scientific thought of a later generation.41

We have now seen some detail of the romantic legacy of Kant, as Helmholtz saw it--the
problems of science were the problems of method and logic. The further arguments in those
problems by Goethe, Schelling, Oken, Seebeck, and the others were promising in that they
explored new phenomena of sensations but flawed in that they seemed not to convincingly
answer to Kant's question--"How is a pure science of nature possible at all?."42
It is clear enough that Helmholtz, Maxwell, and the Scot Hamilton thought that Fichte and
Schelling had erred, but it is not yet clear just how they erred. This is a somewhat technical
point, and before getting into it, it would be well to remind ourselves of the stakes.
It would seem that the response to the challenges of the Romantics was not the exclusive
agenda of the physicists--the entire universe of arts, letters, philosophy, commerce, and
government seem poised for some kind of overhaul in the 1850's. Whether or not our heroes
could be the cause of such changes (if they did occur), or beneficiaries of them requires
consideration. After all, even the role of "cause" in history and thought seemed to (again) change
fashion (somewhat as whimsically as did the length of skirts), and we should be clear on "what
happened" before we continue with the Romantics' account of how (or whether) "it happened."

THE FAILED REVOLUTION
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So far we have described one feature of Naturphilosophie, it's "subjective idealism," a
Fichtean contribution. This rather abstruse doctrine itself does not seem compelling enough to
warrant the continued concern of a successful physiologist like Helmholtz, not to mention
generations of young poets and engineers. It is more likely that it was one example of "ideas in
nature"--the so-called dialectic--that captured popular attention. If one could learn how to
perform this trick, one could generate laws of science, predictions in history, and even formulas
for great art.
The notions of dialectics are so old and so varied that only blurry analogies are useful here
(and it is likely that most dialecticians learned from such aphorisms themselves). To derive the
principles from Kant and Fichte requires a bit of abstraction of the following sort (by Schelling):

Negation is thus the necessary precedent of every movement. The
beginning of a line is the geometrical point, not because it is extended but
because it is the negation of all extension. "One" is the beginning of all number,
not because it is itself number but because it is the negation of all number, of all
multiplicity...Whatever wants to grow must curtail itself.43

The sense of this is to find contradictions essential in the thinking about “activity”, not
"things" in nature. For example, to think about numbers--to count--is necessarily and
contrariwise to think about non-numbers (unities). Similarly, there are contraries everywhere in
thought--and this is not an empirical discovery, but an insight into the conditions of
understanding made obvious by Kant's autopsy of the relationship between subject and object.
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Fichte and Schelling differed in detail on this particular point. Fichte's "ego-philosophy," as
Helmholtz's father termed it, argued that subject and object (the A and B in the report "A is B")
were the very same thing--else how could they necessarily be equal?. So too should the intention
and act be simultaneous aspects, a notion explaining the elder Helmholtz's dismay at his son's
proof of a time lag between shock and twitch. Schelling was a bit trickier on this point, arguing
that subject and object only shared something--they also differed, else they could not be
separated by "is". Thus the paradox of "being (something) and simultaneously “becoming”
(something else, hence, in a sense, not “being”) is not in the nature of "things" but in the nature
of "activity," or "processes." The growth and "unfolding" of events was more than merely "like"
the growth of "ideas," it was precisely that--counting was the unfolding of multiplicity by passing
through a succession of unities, and so on. All but the most tenacious undergraduate must have
fallen asleep by this time, but on awakening must have carried away an indelible image--the
struggle of opposite forces that was somehow behind everything. The struggles of Good and
Evil in the theology of Herder, of Reason and Passion in Goethe's Faust, of Dark and Light in
Goethe's Color Theory, of Hot and Cold in Seebeck's Thermopile, of North and South magnetic
poles in Oersted's magnetism-current activity, of Life and Death in Humboldt's and Müller’s vital
force--all of these inevitable contraries becam embedded in the after-image of a Schelling lecture.
Of course, Schelling didn't invent these dialectic connections, he merely made them academically
legitimate. To return to the theological dialectic, we are reminded of the boundaries of the
Judeo-Christian-Moslem agenda--there cannot be free-standing opposites. Specifically, God
created only "good"--what is called "evil" is simply the absence of "good." There was once
"dark," the absence of "light," until there was light.
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To move from metaphysics to politics (and the Revolutions), we can carry the light-dark
analogy a bit further. In the new philosophy, light was not merely the absence of dark. It was
more. To negate darkness by it's "opposite" was to generate an (eternal) activity--the struggle,
the evolution of the physical world, thus an unfolding "history." The students could go on to the
story of the fall (negating virtue by it’s opposite, sin) or even farther to the origin of the state
)negating the old order by the implicit new order). Even Schelling's own university had unfolded
from a "negation"– the loss of Halle--or the Stein-Hardenberg "civil-service reforms"--or the
battle of Jena itself, where Napoleon defeated the Germans and paraded before the philosophers
themselves--"the world-spirit on horseback," according to Hegel. Now all fields, including
politics, science, history, and theology now contained through the force of logic, philosophy, and
mathematics a dialectic unfolding, a progress. Variations on the themes of progress through
conflict and the inevitability of paradox-driven change appeared everywhere in Europe in this
version of Romanticism, and so this "second part" of German Idealism (the first-part being the
notions of idealism itself) became the "spirit of the age." The Revolutions (of 1830 in Paris and
of 1848 nearly everywhere), Marx and Engels' Manifesto of 1848, the passionate ambiguities of
Turner, the poetry of Schiller and of Wordsworth, and the now-forgotten prose of two
generations of European Romantics now had a theoretical base.
It should also be remembered that this abstruse academic philosophizing had its implicit
predecessors in the stormy literature, art, and politics of the previous century:

In the seventh and eighth decades of the [eighteenth] century, when the
Sturm und Drang agitation was at its highest, it looked as though Germany instead
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of France was to be the scene of a violent social upheaval...
Destruction of every barrier to individual growth; war against authority
of whatever kind; the glorification of primitive, uncorrupted nature, of instinct, of
passion, of genius; the vilification of the existing social order, of regularity, of
learning, on conscious effort--these were the watchwords which inspired the
generations succeeding that of Klopstock and Lessing.44

(Helmholtz was particularly enthusiastic about Lessing's early plays, and equally ecstatic about
the Beyruth performances of Richard Wagner.) 45 i
--------------(i) Very recently, Nancy Cartwright uses Lessing’s theory of fables to illustrate properties of
“models,” a modern extension of Maxwell’s analogies: “His [Lessing’s] is a theory that sees the
fable as a way of providing graspable, intuitive content for abstract, symbolic judgements.”46.
--------------Thus it came to pass that the great German revolution of the eighteenth
century was fought out, not on the political battlefield, but in the realm of letters;
that its leaders were not a Mirabeau, a Danton, a Napoleon, but men like Herder,
Kant, Goethe, Schiller; that its victories were won, not in parliamentary debates
or in street conflicts, but on the stage and in the study; that it resulted, not in a
violent uprooting of the old, hereditary aristocracy, but in the peaceful triumph of
the new, intellectual aristocracy, which, during the hundred years just preceding,
recruiting itself largely from the middle classes, had gradually united in itself the
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best minds of the whole nation.47

The author of the above, Kuno Francke, did not let 1848 get him down, the failed revolution
did bring on change, and by his time, the opening of the twentieth century:

Our whole age is an age of unsolved problems and unsettled conflicts.
Everywhere, all the world over, there is a violent clash between the old and the
new, between the classes and the masses, between autocracy and freedom,
between state and church, between traditional creeds and personal convictions...48

Nonetheless, failure in 1848 (and the previous failure of Paris in 1830) did give the
anti-romantics historical ammunition, for it was the "predictions" of the philosophers that had
been falsified. Many suspected this even before 1848, possibly Helmholtz himself.
Skepticism had even dogged the very Prussian state that had legalized romanticism. The
successful monarch who had "reformed" the bureaucratic state after 1815--Frederick William
III--was himself a romantic (hence the influence of the Humboldts at court). His unfortunate
successor in 1840--Frederick William IV--was, if anything, even more addicted to the politics of
paradox, though most thought it was indecision, not subtle naturpolitik. In those years
bureaucracy bogged down. Austria, Russia, France, and England got all the seats at the
international tables, and Helmholtz's mistrust of his father's Romanticism grew. Koenigsberger
mentions:
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The witty lampoons and satires with which the Berliners revenged
themselves for their deluded hopes, after the accession of Frederick William IV,
were a perpetual source of amusement to him49

What "deluded hopes"? According to Francke:

Frederick William IV, impulsive, imaginative, generous, susceptible to
ideal aspirations, seems for a time to justify the hopes placed upon him by the
friends of freedom and progress. Soon, however, it becomes apparent that this
enthusiastic lover of art, this magnanimous patron of learning, this devout
believer, lacks the one quality indispensable to a monarch; steadfastness of
purpose; that he more and more gives way to a fanciful and capricious desire to
force modern life back into a picturesque but meaningless medievalism. And now
the liberal movement, both encouraged and threatened, rapidly assumes vaster and
vaster proportions, until finally all other questions are merged in one vital,
all-absorbing issue: on the one side the monarchy, officialdom, militarism,
priestcraft; on the other, the people, popular justice, popular armament, popular
religion...This is the struggle which leads to that great outburst of popular wrath
and national enthusiasm which at last sweeps away the whole machinery of
Metternich despotism, and makes, for a time at least, democracy triumphant: the
Revolution of 1848.50
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It seemed as if the heirs of Fichte and Schelling went too far, at least for Helmholtz, who
sided with the Army, not the mobs, in 1848. Perhaps the ego-centered philosophy promoted a
destructive "democracy," where any person's testimony was a good as any others, being
automatically authentic by the rules of inner-logic. But this attitude diluted the authority of
"experts," those, like Bismarck and Helmholtz, who "learned from experience." Helmholtz was,
after all, being criticized by his peers, and to adopt "democratic" solution to the problems of
physics and physiology by conceding to the majority spirit was hardly desirable. The Romantics
had overstepped prudence, and somehow the original program of Kant (and the civil service
reforms of the 1810's) had to be restored.
ENGINEERS

If, as Hegel had argued, the agenda of Romanticism was amendable, then it should not be so
discredited by failed prophecies. Nonetheless, Prussian skepticism grew in the 1850's and 60's,
and more "practical" science was becoming popular. What had killed the philosophical golden
goose? Perhaps it was the very success--the institutionalization--of Romanticism. German
historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler noted:

It is institutions which in the long run guarantee the internalization and
acceptance of political authority...The traditional German ideology of the state,
which hung over the Empire of 1871 like an all-embracing cloud, was derived in
the main from three sources: (1) The practice of absolutism in the German
states...(2) The specific influence of a vulgarised Lutheran Belief in
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authority...(3)...Hegel's idealistic notion of the state which was disseminated by
the Prussian universities from the 1820's onwards.51

And it was not just the universities, but the whole system of state-controlled schools that
legitimized Romantic doctrine. The successive reforms of the "Humanistic" Gymnasium system
were quite effective. Of this, Wehler wrote:

Uniform criteria of standards of education, examinations, and certification
were linked to an automatic system of graded promotion based on experience and
seniority. This, however, could be circumvented by the use of political
`connections.'52

The the effectiveness of this system was unprecedented. Fully eighty two percent of the
Prussians were literate by 1848.

These were boom years; for Helmholtz, for Prussian economics, and for Prussian politics.
Helmholtz kept getting "promoted"--to Bonn in 1855, to Heidelberg in 1858, to Berlin in 1871,
and, eventually, to the highest civil-servant rank, privy-councilor ("Geheimrat") in 1891. The
fact that William II, who conferred this last promotion, was by then an Emperor, suggests the
"parallel" progress of the state itself. Prussia had grown, first from 1850 when it was merely one
German state struggling with more powerful competitors (like Austria) to 1866 when it was the
center of a confederation of northern German states (that defeataed Austria in 1866). It then rose
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to the ruling state of an empire formed on the defeat of France in 1871. With this political rise,
the economic promotion was equally impressive, multiplying industrial output in iron and steel,
transportation, and even agriculture by unprecedented proportions. Like Helmholtz’ household
budget, Prussia's economy did experience setbacks along the way, particularly in periodic
depressions, especially the collapse of the hysterical "Grunder" boom of 1873 ("named after the
great manipulators who founded gigantic enterprises on the basis of paper and little else").53
Yet in these years, public apathy to politics (only 30 percent voted in a crisis year of 186354)
and a craze for new ideas--like those Helmholtz expounded in his popular lectures--made highly
unfashionable the ponderous dogmas of the civil service and public schools. Whether the apathy
towards the established order was a natural shift in fashions or a consequence of civil
management is hard to say. Surely the state was partly to blame. German historian Otto Pflanze
describes the problem:

Under the Prussian `police state' they [royal appointees] possessed
extensive powers to regulate local affairs; hence many citizens were dependent
upon their favor. In the election of 1863 tavern keepers were threatened with a
loss of license for permitting the opposition to assemble or distribute political
literature on the premises...Village mayors were threatened with fines and loss of
position for government candidates...Teachers were told to show "piety toward the
king and authority" by voting conservative. Pastors preached the conservative
virtue of voting as the king desired. Junker landlords put pressure on their
tenants...Employees of government-owned railways were likewise coerced.55 j
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--------------(j)

Incidentally, the conservatives lost that election--badly, a fact which highlights the

unfashionability of "traditional" values.
--------------The Prussians were not necessarily hostile to the government, just indifferent to participating
in it. A visitor to the manufacturing town of Elberfeld-Barmen in 1871 wrote of the patriotic
celebrations marking the first anniversary of the Prussian victory at Sedan. The citizens had
created a gigantic illuminated poster, the "noblest structure of the world's history”. The "first and
foremost" portrait was that of Bismarck, then came

King William, here surnamed `upright' (der Bieder), who was dramatized
as `head master of the works'; Moltke, Roon,...etc. [followed]. The only name
omitted was that of poor Manteuffel. But the enthusiastic crowd gathered round
the poster seemed to have eyes only for the leading name--Bismarck...
By way of finish, the crowd burst out spontaneously into singing the
distich `Der Mann' to an improvised air, something of an impracticable cross
between `God Save the Queen' and `Froggy would a-wooing go.' 56

The educated citizen's arena of ideas moved away from state-sponsored ideologies, and
Helmholtz' Prussia became a nation of voluntary private clubs (Vereine); reading circles, choral
societies, sports clubs, learned associations, poetry clubs, charity groups (like those promoting
"cultivation of potatoes by the indigent,"57) temperance groups, and general discussion groups (to
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which Helmholtz delivered increasingly popular talks on Kraft or the ophthalmoscope).
Professional organizations, investment groups and political clubs also flourished in the "new"
Prussia. Current scholars argue as to what this indicates about the historical significance of
"Bismarckian" Prussia--was this a "feudalization of the bourgeoise" (pre-empting the otherwise
revolutionary forces of liberalism), or was this a social revolution (the invisible success of
1848)?58 To Helmholtz it was a fact of social life--a lucrative and attractive fact that even
supported his celebrity status. He was a virtual tourist attraction at Heidelberg, as was Kuno
Fischer, another Kantian revivalist59 of whom we shall hear. This gave him a platform for his
arguments against his father, namely, that the "abandoned" agenda of Fichte and Co. needed to be
replaced by a Kantian system of new analogies in new mathematical languages. One of these new
languages would have to do with new geometries, and we should not be surprised to find
Helmholtz leading the publicizing of the geometrical work of some Göttingen mathematicians in
the 60's.
Of these new Vereine, two are of special interest; Oken's "Scientists and Doctors” association
(Gesellschaft Deutscher Naturforscher und Aertze) and an organization for the promotion of the
engineering profession, the "VDI" (Verein Deitcher Ingenieure, 1856).60 The former was an arena
for Helmholtz (despite Oken's "conservative" agenda), the latter an arena for his brother Otto, his
son Richard, and Richard's father-in-law, Werner Siemens.
The VDI was necessary because the profession of engineering had previously been considered
morally inferior, especially during the Romantic Era:

They [the university Idealists] tended to divide human activity between
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`higher' cultural pursuits, such as art, religion, and philosophy, and `lower'
civilization, which encompasses politics, economics, and technology.61
Technology in this view was strongly suspected of possibly leading to the
destruction of culture...
During the nineteenth century he [the engineer] found himself looked
down upon by the older, more prestigious professions, especially the lawyers, who
monopolized governmental positions and who became one of the chief targets of
engineers' complaints. Such organizations as the VDI were founded in part to
represent the class interests of engineers. Complaints about lack of status became
a common theme of engineering literature from the late nineteenth century on.
Indeed, they can still be heard today--and not only in Germany...62

Obviously Otto's wish to study (metallurgical) engineering disappointed his father much more
than had Hermann's lapses from Fichte, and the domestic breach ensuing was a nasty one.
Hermann enlisted on Otto's side, against their father, declaring himself enthusiastic about
"practicality."63 Further revealing his sympathies, Hermann supported Richard's plans to study at
the technical school (Technische Hochschule) at Munich. It was specifically the program of the
VDI to promote the establishment and the status of such institutes, which had sprung up all over
German-speaking countries in the 1820's and 30's.
The shaky coexistence of the Technical Institute "movement" with the gymnasium and
university system was to be a source of political, ideological, and cultural conflict throughout the
last half of the nineteenth century. Educational disputes escalated into virtual "school-wars"
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(Schulkrieg), and the arguable victory (parity for technical training) was celebrated by the
Emperor himself in conferring doctoral-degree granting powers on an institute near Berlin
(Charlottenberg) in 1899:

I [Emperor Wilhelm II] wanted to bring the Technische Hochschulen into
the foreground, for they have great problems to solve--not only technical but also
social. To date, these problems haven't been solved in the way I had wished. [The
Technische Hochschulen] can exert great influence on social relationships, since
their connections with industry and labor permit a great deal of discussion and
action.64

This "end" of the Schulkrieg will be of much concern to our consideration of Helmholtz. He
did not live to hear that royal address, but the Institute in question was one of which he himself
had been first "President" in 1888--the Imperial Physico-Technical Institute, or "PTR"
(Physicalische-Technische Reichasanstalt). This appointment in Germany parallels Maxwell's
appointment to the new Cavendish chair in Experimental Physics at Cambridge in ratifying the
coalition of science, industry, and the political elite that supposedly preceded a new age of
technology. One of the current participants in the resulting "feudalization of the bourgeoise"
disputes, Hans-Ulrich Wehler, reflects the significance attached to this coalition:

Although little is known in detail about the way scientific knowledge
develops to the point where it becomes an economically productive resource, or
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about educational investment and its effects, the systematic exploration of
scientific knowledge became so evident that, up to the watershed of the 1890's,
the process of industrial economic growth, which depended on technological
innovation, relied to a steadily increasing extent upon the practical applications of
scientific research.65

At this point in our consideration of Maxwell and Helmholtz, it is hard to see any justification
for such statements--unless ophthalmoscopes and color-tops generated major industries. Either
something more pragmatic came from the Maxwell-Helmholtz "analogy" agenda, or they were
mis-identified as the authors of the "second industrial revolution." Enthusiasts for the former
case might look to the Technische Hochschule movement, then, to see if the new
Naturphilosophie of the universities was being translated into new technologies by the
Institutes--if, as it were, Richard von Helmholtz the engineer was comtimuimg the agenda of his
father Hermann the scientist.
Hermann and his generation didn't father the institutes themselves--that paternity could be
better assigned through Napoleon and his model institute, the Ecole Polytechnique. Vienna had a
"copy" in 1815, as did Berlin in 1821 (Beuth's Technical Institute), but the "flagship" of the
German Institutes began at Karlsruhe in 1825, dominated by a professor of engineering,
Ferdinand Redtenbacher, and "by 1836 almost all German states had higher technical schools
that were modeled on Vienna or Karlsruhe."66 The faculties and staff of these institutes provided
considerable resources to German industry. Among Redtenbacher's pupils were Eugen Langen,
who, with Nicholas Otto was instrumental in developing the internal combustion engine, and
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Heinrich Butz, director of the Augsburg Engine Works and often called the "Bismarck of
German industry."67 However, as Helmholtz and Redtenbacher both noted, there was a wide gap
between the realms of science and the realms of engineering, and the VDI's task was not to close
that gap, but to gain status for the engineers comparable to the disparate fields of law and
science. Redtenbacher, in his Conclusions Concerning the Construction of Machines assigns a
far different role to science than simply a supplier of research results:

Whoever equipped, only with general principles, enters the practical arena,
is like a ship provided indeed with a rudder, but with neither sails nor motor
engine ...No machine can be invented merely by the principles of mechanics; for
there is also needed, besides inventive talent, an exact knowledge of the
mechanical process which the machine is to serve...No industrial business can be
conducted on the principles of mechanics, for this requires also a suitable
personality and knowledge of commercial business. It will be seen that for the
manifold technical activities the principles of mechanics are not entirely adequate
...invention, assembly, arrangement and proportion, and practical work with the
file and turning tool is another matter. A school, which wishes to give suitable
training for a mechanical-technical career should therefore by no means follow a
one-sided scientific course, but must strive to arouse and to exercise all the
powers which are important for the calling of draughtsman, constructor, engineer
and manufacturer.68
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Otto and Richard von Helmholtz joined this practical world of technique and commerce, but
Hermann was committed to make his way in the traditional government-sponsored university
system, standing, perhaps, mid-way between the aspirations of his father and those of his brother
and son.
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CHAPTER 5

From the mid 1850's to the mid 1860's, Maxwell's physics matured. His epic theories of heat
and light emerged, as he had promised, from a very novel combination of physics, philosophy,
and mathematics. His method of analogies took specific shapes in his model of aether vibrations
as light and of molecular motion as heat. Aetherial models, mechanical models, molecular
models, and, most significantly, mathematical models began to unify the diverse laws of physics,
and a new analogy, Faraday's "fields" took shape. There remained the problematic conflict
between discreteness in the molecular motion of heat and continuity in the aethereal motions of
light, but now this dilemma could be attacked with formal mathematical devices, field equations
and statistical averages. Most fortuitously, Maxwell encountered the mathematical work, and its
implicit philosophical commitments, of the Irish Sir William Rowan Hamilton. The sites of
Maxwell's work, particularly Aberdeen and London, as yet showed little effect of his presence,
but their changing contexts of culture and technology still kept pace with his own philosophical
evolution.

MAXWELL IN ABERDEEN

Despite his success at Cambridge, Maxwell really wanted to be in Scotland. His father was
dying in 1856, and would leave him heir to the beloved Glenlair estate in Galloway, and his parttime volunteer work with the London Working Man's College was not going all that well. Not
only was he considered a "poor teacher,"1 but his association with the founder, F. D. Maurice,
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was causing him considerable embarrassment.
Frederick Denison Maurice was first known to Maxwell as a fellow Apostle--in fact it was
Maurice who had revived the club in the 1820's, and incorporated Coleridge's interpretations of
German Romanticism into its agenda.2 He had left Cambridge, objecting on principle to the
required religious oaths (the "Thirty-Nine Articles"), for a public career as a "priest, novelist,
journalist, Christian socialist and professor."3 As socialists did in the era of failed revolutions,
Maurice saw the central problem of society reflected (by analogy) in the Romantic's principles of
a struggle of opposites (unbalanced by Hegel to become an engine for change). Progress would
come about through class-struggle, and, for a Christian Socialist, the struggle must be prevented
from becoming class war. One mode of non-violent progress was through education of the
oppressed classes, and, in this aim Maxwell joined Maurice's Working Man's College in London.
The ruling class, intellectually represented by the professoriate according to Maurice, took a
naturally dim view of such agitation. Maurice was condemned for "heterodoxy" by the principal
of King's College, London--where Maxwell would subsequently be employed in 1860. Worse,
he attracted the enmity of Whewell 4, who had shifted from an academic innovator in the 1830's
to a conservative anti-reformer in the preliminary school-wars of the 1860's.5 1856 was a good
year for Maxwell to get out of England.
Kindly old Professor Forbes recommended him to Marischal College in Aberdeen. Father
approved, so Maxwell returned to Scotland to rethink his career: "I went to old Aberdeen for
Fourier ? ...but I have forgotten what was to be discovered out of him." 6
The England Maxwell left in 1856, and returned to in 1860, was undergoing its own
disenchantment with Romanticism. Brougham and the Scottish curmudgeons were being
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replaced by modernist intellectuals, and a "new era" in England could be said to be led by its
symbol, Prince Albert. Albert organized the exhibition of 1851 not only as a patron of "useful"
science, but as a patron of the arts as well, later championing what was to become the English
alternative to French Impressionistic anti-romanticism: the Pre-Raphaelites. It is tempting, by
stretching, to ally Maxwell's scientific philosophy to the Pre-Raphaelite agenda--for similar
elements abound, namely a reliance on analogy and an insistence on "constructivism" (that is, a
work was meaningful to the mind only through a process of introspective construction-interpretation). The stretch is not all that far, for Maxwell made it himself, commenting as early
as 1857 on Pre-Raphaelite works in the Edinburgh Academy of Painting,7 and even
incorporating their theoretical attitude towards "facts" in a note to his friend and later biographer,
Rev. Campbell:

My notion is that reason, taste, and conscience are the judges of all
knowledge, pleasure, and action, and that they are the exponents not of a code but
of the unwritten law, which they reveal, as they judge by it in the presence of the
facts. The facts must be witnessed to by the senses, and cross-examined by the
intellect...8
Again this is the doctrine of the synthesis of the activities of the mind that Hamilton taught as
deriving from Kant. In his often overlooked "second critique," the "Critique of Judgment," Kant
had argued
But there is also (judging by analogy) another basis, namely, for linking
judgment with a different ordering of our presentational powers, an ordering that
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seems even more important than the one involving judgment's kinship with the
family of cognitive powers. For all of the soul's powers or capacities can be
reduced to three that cannot be derived further from a common basis: the
cognitive power, the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and the power of desire.9

This again provides a chance to inject the romantic agenda into Maxwell's England and Scotland,
for the royally popular art form represented more than the aforementioned prurience. It was seen
as an antidote to Romanticism, an evolution or transformation which may have been directed as
some sort of "return," perhaps to the natural philosophy of Kant and the natural art of "reality."
In positivistic France, the new anti-Romanticism depended on the Impressionist's
reproduction of immediate "impressions" of nature and the Realists' concern directly with the
mundane plights of non-elites. In England the emphasis was on allegory--not the Romantics'
allegory of historic, heroic themes, but a new "realistic" concern with contemporary problems.
The ur-painting was considered to be Ford-Madox Brown's 1855 theatrical The Last of England,
a cryptic allegory of the emotions of emigration.10 The canonical art historian Janson described
this English revolution:

Brown had acquired this painstaking technique some years earlier, after he met
a group of German painters in Rome who practiced what they regarded as a
`medieval' style. He in turn transmitted it to the painter and poet Dante-Gabriel
Rossetti (1828-82) who in 1848 helped to found an artists' society called the PreRaphaelite Brotherhood. Brown himself never actually joined it, but he shared the
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basic aim of the Pre-Raphaelites to do battle against the frivolous art of the day
by producing `pure transcripts...from nature'...11

The style caught on, and became the dominant popular fashion for the second half of the
nineteenth century in England. Maxwell's method of analogies mirrored seemed to be extended
by Rossetti's method of allegory.
Maxwell remained in Aberdeen until 1860, when, upon being beaten out for Forbes' chair at
Edinburgh by P. G. Tait, he returned to London (King's College). While at Aberdeen he married
the principal's daughter (Mary Dewar), lost his father, corresponded with Faraday about this
"field" thing, developed his theory of Saturn's rings, discovered the mathematics of the Irish
Hamilton, and played with a statistical analogy to molecules in gases. In view of the impending
intellectual revolution, any one of these events could be made into a crucial contributing "cause."
Elaborate! He also "discovered" the world of engineering in correspondence with his old friend
(and Helmholtz's new one) William Thomson in Glasgow:
I was writing great screeds of letters to Professor Thomson about these
rings of Saturn, and lo! he was a-laying all of the telegraph which was to go to
America, and bringing his obtrusive science to bear upon the engineers, so that
they broke the cable with not following (it appears) his advice...
Let (u) = "Under the sea," so that 2(u)...represents two
repetitions of that sentence...
....
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2(u)
No little signals are coming to me.
2(u)
Something has surely gone wrong.
And its broke, broke, broke;
What is the cause of it does not transpire.
But something has broken the telegraph wire
With a stroke, stroke, stroke,
Or else they've been pulling too strong.12

This latter episode, Thomson and the transatlantic cable, did much to influence the historical
judgment about the utility of science. His title, "Lord Kelvin" was conferred on him by Queen
Victoria principally for his practical contributions, and he was often known to the general public
as the great "cable engineer."13 His contribution to Maxwell, aside from early friendship, later
opposition to his methods, and the original mathematical theory of heat that started it all, may
have been to serve as an example of Scots success through service as opposed to English self
promotion. Maxwell didn't approve at all of such dramatics as Tyndall's popularizing,14 and was
skeptical of Helmholtz's celebrity.15 As in Thomson's example, Maxwell more humbly adapted
his investigations to possible practical matters, like testing Helmholtz's ophthalmoscope on his
dog Spice16 (untypically, for most of his dogs were named Toby). But these excursions into
useful science were diversions for Maxwell, and misunderstanding viewing/taking them as for
typical of Victorian science misses the point of the Maxwell-Helmholtz "revolution." Maxwell is
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better best known for a more historically dramatic adventures--his dynamical theory of
electromagnetic fields and his dynamical theory of gases, both of which matured in his London
years of 1860-65.
FIELDS

Maxwell lost the Aberdeen job because a reorganization had left room for only one natural
philosophy professor, and that job went to a junior colleague. Forbes died, but Tait, not
Maxwell, got the chair at Edinburgh, so Maxwell "settled" for a chair in physics and astronomy
at King's in 1860. The issue of Maxwell's "poor" teaching may have arisen at this time. The
Edinburgh Courant reported:

It will be no disrespect to the warmest friends of the successful candidate
and we do not mean to dispute the decision of the curators, by saying that in
Professor Maxwell the curators would have had the opportunity of associating
with the University one who is already acknowledged to be one of the remarkable
men known to the scientific world. His original investigations on the nature of
colours, on the mechanical condition of stability of Saturn's rings, and many
similar subjects, have well established his name among scientific men...But there
is another power which is desirable in a professor of a University with a system
like ours, and that is, the power of oral exposition proceeding upon the
supposition of a previous imperfect knowledge, or even total ignorance of the
study on the part of the pupils. We little doubt that it was the deficiency of this
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power in Professor Maxwell principally that made the curators prefer Mr. Tait.17

Maxwell had to settle for a chair in physics and astronomy at King's College in London.
There he picked up the Rumford Medal of the Royal society for his researches in heat, and
continued his optical experiments, displaying in 1861 one of the first color photographs ever
taken.18 These were details. The manifesto of the second scientific revolution was his seven part
masterpiece A Dynamical Theory of the Electromagnetic Field, appearing in 1864 and 1865. Or
perhaps it was his four-part paper in Philosophical Magazine in 1861/62. Or maybe it was The
Dynamical Theory of the Electromagnetic Field of 1865, or On the Dynamical Theory of Gases
of 1867. As is the inevitable case in the history of ideas, new kinds of thoughts in an individual's
head are hard to date. The acceptance of those ideas as an agenda for a discipline is even harder
to date, though Thomas Kuhn's emphasis on the appearance of text-books as evidence of an
agenda is appealing.19 Following that lead, we might look into a retrospective text-book,
Maxwell's legendary A Treatise on Electricity and Magnetism of 1873, recovering fragments of
the original works as needed.
A trek through Maxwell's huge Treatise will be bewildering unless we remember what we're
looking for--the fruition of Maxwell's "method." Specifically, we should look for an analogy--for
how that analogy is in the mind (logic or mathematics), not "in nature"--and for echoes of
resonances with Helmholtz and Hamilton.

For over a century now, our predecessors have

zeroed in on one fundamental analogy, the "Field," and the associated methods, now called
"Field Theories," that will unite our later scientist-philosophers (like Einstein).
To get right to it--what, pray tell, is a "field"?
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44. The Electric Field is the portion of space in the neighborhood of
electrified bodies, considered with reference to electric phenomena. It may be
occupied by air or other bodies, or it may be a so-called vacuum, from which we
have withdrawn every substance which we can act upon with the means at our
disposal.20

So a field is a place--a place where something happens if... In the electric case, then, a field is
a place where, if an electrified body is placed there, it will feel a force. The "source" of this
condition of the space is the "neighboring" electrified bodies.

Note that the field is a condition

of "space" not of "stuff."
We have already remarked on the great Victorian controversy as to whether the "field" was
understood to be a material substance, an "aether" or not. Maxwell is credited with this
materialism, but he appears to have been more cautious. His most influential successor, H.A.
Lorentz, the inventor of a source of electrical fields, the "electron," put the case clearly:

As to its physical basis, the theory of electrons is an offspring of the great
theory of electricity to which the names of Faraday and Maxwell will be forever
attached.
You all know this theory of Maxwell, which we may call the general
theory of the electromagnetic field, and in which we constantly have in view the
state of the matter or the medium by which the field is occupied. While speaking
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of this state, I must immediately call your attention to the curious fact that,
although we never lose sight of it, we need by no means go far in attempting to
form an image of it and, in fact, we cannot say much about it...we may think of
electricity as some substance or fluid... and Maxwell himself has set the
example...Yet, it must not be considered as really necessary...Indeed...there has
been of late years been a tendency to avoid them [substances] altogether...21

This was written in 1909, A few years after J.J. Thomson had "discovered" electrons, and
Einstein had "banished" the ether from Maxwell theory.
The idea of a "field" as a "space with properties" is a simple, but intellectually powerful,
notion. A field is a place full of ifs. It is well to dwell on that for a few seconds moment, s to
consider some analogies: A baseball field is a place (in the neighborhood of, say, umpires)
where baseball is played if it doesn't rain. A magnetic field is a place in the neighborhood of a
magnet where iron filings (little magnetlets) are pushed around if they are placed there. The field
is "there," but "unseen" even if the filings are not actually "there." A "psychic field" is a place (in
the neighborhood of a medium) where thoughts are had if a medium conjures up spirits (who
jiggle the psychic aether).
This latter example was actually advanced as literally an extension of scientific thinking. It
was advocated by, among others, P.G. Tait himself, who wrote--with Balfour Stewart--The
Unseen Universe--a treatise on the scientific basis of spiritualism. Maxwell's early mentions of
Tyndall and his debunking of "table-rapping" seances was only an indication of the growing
Victorian controversy over hidden powers-- a social phenomenon indicative of the same public
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mood that celebrated the Pre-Raphaelites. Late in the century Maxwell's successors at
Cambridge would form a Society for Psychical Research to "scientifically" explore such
matters.22
The notion "field" is not quite the analogy we are seeking, for, in a sense, there are supposed
to be "fields in nature"--there aren't supposed to be "analogies in nature." The right Maxwellian
analogy here is in the mental (mathematical) device logically necessary to "know" what a
particular field does, its "activity." To understand the action of the fields due to, say, an
electrified spoon, one must construct an analogy from which we can deduce what might happen
in the spoon, the appropriate "field equations". The favorite example of this method is Maxwell's
own London analogy of the action of gears and vortices to the action of the magnetic field.
On Physical Lines of Force had used a fluid full of vortices--whirlpools--in contact, but all
revolving in the same direction. Classical mechanics then showed that the forces of magnetism
prevailing between electric currents would obey the same equations as fluid pressures between
the vortices. But there is a paradox here, a logical contradiction. Historian Ivan Tolstoy explains:

But then Maxwell asks himself why the vortices in this model should be
arranged the way they are, i.e. `according to the known laws of lines of force
about magnets and currents' and adds: `we are now having to inquire into the
physical connection of these vortices with currents, while we are still in doubt as
to the nature of electricity...' He proceeds to tie the problem neatly to the obvious
impossibility of conceiving wheel-like motions of perfect vortices in contact
revolving in the same sense. Any youthful meccano devotee knows that gears or
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wheels in contact revolve in opposite directions. To have them turn in the same
sense one must interpose an idle wheel. And so Maxwell assumes layers of small
particles between his vortices, in a kind of rolling contact to act as idle wheels.23

Then a mathematical model of this construction matches the known formulas for forces
between electric currents, the "currents" in the model being the flow of little particles being
driven by the contrived motions of vortices and idlers.
What is there in this model that reminds us of Helmholtz? Later, Maxwell specifically
employs Helmholtz's doctrine of conservation of energy to decide between candidates for the
forces between moving charges--the precise formula that he demands derives from this model .
But even before that there is a Helmholtzian philosophy--the derivation of principles from an
"impossibility" argument. In Helmholtz, you will recall, the impossibility of a perpetual motion
machine was expressed by the conservation mathematics. Here in Maxwell's model, it was the
impossibility of "meshed gears" rotating in the same direction that led to the idler wheels and the
interstitial particles that were analogies to currents. Just why was it "impossible to imagine"
parallel vortices? Surely Fichte would let us imagine anything we please. But there's something
"illogical" about this paradox. We claim we can conjure up such an animal--but can we really?
What does a two-horned unicorn--or a married bachelor--look like? It was Kant who required
the physically imaginable to be logically possible – and actual perception was to be restricted to
the imaginable. Meshed gears spinning in the same direction violate the laws of reason, hence
trying to imagine them is an error--it leads to a paradox. It is entirely incidental that you can't
build such a device--its impossibility, like that of Helmholtz's perpetual motion machine, is
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guaranteed-- a priori.
Some features of this of argument are themselves not new with Maxwell or Helmholtz. One
lurks, usually under the name of "thought-experiment" (Gedankenexperiment) at key junctures in
the history of ideas. Descartes, for instance, played with almost precisely the same vortex model
as Maxwell, though his was for the cosmic aether, and the particles swept along by the whirling
were the planets themselves.24 Galileo before him used the "impossibility" argument in
conceiving the "paradox" of two falling objects linked by a rigid rod.25 According to the laws of
Aristotle, the heavier ball was supposed to accelerate faster than the lighter, and the two linked
together, being even heavier still, should accelerate yet faster. But as one of the individual balls
was very light, it should surely accelerate less than the other, hence slow the larger one down,
and the package should thereby have less acceleration than before the link. Thus the pair
accelerates both faster and slower than the individual. A paradox, a paradox, a most ingenious
paradox. This Galilean argument is remarkable, for it is a Gedankenexperiment that shows that
the alleged laws of motion of Aristotle do not conform with the "laws of reason"--without
actually performing any experiment in the laboratory. Why didn't everybody already know this?
Historically, the experiment was tried many times. Balls of different sizes were dropped from
high places, like the Tower of Pisa, and the result generally vindicated Aristotle26, not Galileo.
Thus like most classical paradoxes, the argument seemed to have some hidden trick that made
the mental difficulty only apparent, not real. The trouble with these tricks was that, like lawyers'
arguments, they could be rigged to be convincing without being actually logical. Under such
suspicions, Galileo's method faded from popularity until Helmholtz and some mathematicians at
Göttingen reminded logicians of the power of such mental methods.
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Still farther back in history the Gedankenexperiment pops up. Aristotle himself, the ultimate
loser to Galileo, had difficulties imagining an arrow in flight, for the agent that was supposed to
move that arrow was nowhere in sight (of the mind's eye).27 A complicated scholastic paradox,
that. Of course, the grandparents to all Gedankenexperiments are assigned to the classical
Greeks, specifically to the "Italians" of the sixth century BC E., Parmenides and his adopted son,
Zeno. The notions they put forth are now too legendary to unravel--Achilles chasing, but never
catching, a tortoise--Achilles covering much ground in trying to get out of a stadium, but never
quite making it--ever smaller grains of millet making ever fainter sounds when dropped, and so
on.28 The point of all these conundrums were to show that the laws of thought--logic--had
priority over the fallible perceptions, and that only the mentally possible could be truly physically
"real." Kant, in taking up this principle, made it apply to physics, and Maxwell and Helmholtz
provided the examples--analogies--to adduce the laws of conservation of energy and the laws of
the mathematical construction of the electric and magnetic electro-magnetic fields.
There are two more philosophical points to be made while here considering Maxwell's field
analogies. The first is to note that the successful outcome of the method results in confirming as
logical formulas already known beforehand--the formulas describing the forces on current and
magnets. Helmholtz too had pre-existing formulas for energy to shoot at (or decide between)-the medieval vis viva , vis inertia, "energy" and "momentum" in his day. This pre-existence
points up one of the peculiar features of Kant, the assumption that certain things must be agreed
upon ("patently given") before reasoning (judging). This appeal to consensus could excite one to
suspect some reason to junk Kant, and this was indeed part of a subsequent peculiarity of field
theorists, like Werner Heisenberg, who admire Maxwell but hate Kant
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The second point to bear in mind is that Maxwell abandoned his vortex model in his later,
more successful writings on "fields." The equations would remain without requiring a visual
mechanical analogy to support them--somewhat like the smile on of the Cheshire cat. This might
be taken as an evolution of Maxwell away from the formal strictures of Kant, for he abandoned
an obvious visual method of analogies for a more formal, abstract mathematical one. However,
the introspective and logical principles of Kant are still there, be the representation visible or
mathematical--and Maxwell did indeed later resort to visual analogies on at least two peculiar
occasions. Once, in the middle of a dispute over the molecular motion theories of heat, he conjured up a now-famous imp – "Maxwell's Demon"--who violated the impossibility rules of
Helmholtz. This episode will later connect the heat and light aspects of the Maxwell vs.
Maxwell problem. At another time, almost at the end of his life, Maxwell was busy making
actual physical models of abstract equations (not unlike Kepler's beverage bar):

I have been making a mechanical model of an induction coil, in which the
primary and secondary currents are represented by the motion of wheels, and in
which I can symbolise all the effects of putting in more or less of the iron core...
I have also been making a clay model of Prof. W. Gibbs'
thermodynamic surface...30

Despite this, one must be careful in examining Maxwell's development into more abstract models
(and Helmholtz's development into more abstract mathematics--especially non-Euclidean
geometry) for signs of a modification, or even a rejection, of Kantian principles. Heisenberg
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would have it so, his rivals Einstein and Schrödinger would disagree. We shall see.

REPLACING THE ETHER

We have already seen that this "new" concept, field, was quite abstract--to be arrived at only
by construction of both a physical and mathematical analogy. What ought to be appreciated here
is what concept this "field" displaced--what notion it was not. It was not a theory of the ether -that idealized space-filling Newtonian-French "fluid" whose wiggles traveled around exciting
sight . Few of his contemporaries seemed to realize this, for they kept assuming that Maxwell's
vortex or mathematical model represented the ether itself--an indispensable tool for
experimental discussions of heat and light . The ether theory was embedded in the academic
tradition of European science. Over in the provinces (and back in 1844), for instance, Edgar
Allen Poe had employed it (in a form he had probably learned in his brief classes at West Point)
as an actor in a story about mesmeric influences--"Mesmeric Revelations":

There are gradations of matter...We have, for example, a metal, a piece of
wood, a drop of water, the atmosphere, a gas, a caloric, electricity, the
luminiferous ether. Now we call these things matter, and embrace all matter in
one general definition, but in spite of this there can be no two ideas more
essentially distinct thatn that [of] metal...and that [of] luminiferous ether...When
we reach [luminiferous ether], we find an almost irresistible inclination to class it
with spirit, or with nihility. The only consideration which restrains us is our
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conception of its atomic constitution; and here, even, we have to seek aid from our
notion of an atom as something possessing solidity, palpability, weight...31

Poe's ether was called "luminiferous" because it was light-producing--though in denser form it
produced heat as "caloric" (Lavoisier's invention). Presumably in rarer form it produced mental
images, like those in a mesmeric (hypnotic) trance--so, at least, thought many of the spiritualists
that Tyndall was trying to debunk.
Maxwell, however, was not trying to enfranchise the ether. His old vortex model, for
example, was just a thinking device--"heuristic." As he said at the time:

I do not think that it contains even the shadow of a true physical theory; in
fact, its chief merit as a temporary instrument of research is that it does not, even
in appearance, account for anything.32

Maxwell was here not denying the ether theory, or confirming it, but simply doing without it-as Fourier had done without any particular model of heat in his mathematical models. Later, in
his Treatise, Maxwell explained:

There appears to be, in the minds of these eminent men [the Germans
Riemann, Neumann, and Clausius], some prejudice, or a priori objection, against
the hypothesis of a medium in which the phenomena of radiation of light and heat
and the electric actions at a distance take place. It is true that at one time those
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who speculated as to the causes of physical phenomena were in the habit of
accounting for each kind of action at a distance by means of a special aethereal
fluid, whose function and property it was to produce these actions. They filled all
space three and four times over with aethers of different kinds, the properties of
which were invented merely to `save appearances'...Hence the undulatory theory
of light has met with much opposition, directed not against its failure to explain
the phenomena, but against its assumption of the existence of a medium in which
light is propagated...
But in all these [German] theories the question naturally occurs--If
something is transmitted from one particle to another at a distance, what is its
condition after it has left the one particle and before it has reached the
other?...Hence all these theories lead to the conception of a medium in which the
propagation takes place, and if we admit this medium as an hypothesis, I think it
ought to occupy a prominent place in our investigations, and that we ought to
endeavour to construct a mental representation of all the details of its action, and
this has been my constant aim in this treatise.33

Obviously Maxwell was not here a pure "idealist"--he seemed to suspect there may “ really”
be a material ether "out there" (noumenally speaking):

Hence our theory agrees with the undulatory theory [as opposed to a
particle emission theory] in assuming the existence of a medium [of finite density]
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which is capable of becoming a receptacle of two forms of energy [potential and
kinetic].34

His successor Lorentz was equally reluctant to give up materialism. Noting Einstein's (apparent)
banishment of the substance to purely heuristic, Lorentz noted:

Yet, I think, something may also be claimed in favor of the form in which
I have presented the theory. I cannot but regard the ether, which can be the seat of
an electromagnetic field with its energy and its vibrations as endowed with a
certain degree of substantiality however different it may be from all ordinary
matter.35

But both Lorentz and Maxwell had to admit that this materialistic sentiment was not relevant to
the legitimacy of field theory which, like Fourier's recipes for heat, were agnostic in regard to the
literal "realism" accorded the models. By the 1990's fashionable philosophers of science
generally embraced the "anti-realist" view of ethers and electrons as useful fictions though they
seldom credited their nineteenth-century predecessors in this regard.36
The whole philosophical thrust of Maxwell's original arguments was to deny the
"knowability" of the ether "in-itself"- -rather,and to "construct a mental representation of...its
action" through his method of mathematical analogy. He could indeed do without the ether as
long as the smile of the cat--the "action" was accounted for by his heuristics.
This still leaves the question of what you get when you construct this notion of "field" (a
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space full of ifs). Clearly you get "actions"--possibilities of dynamical motions. That is, the
"field equations" tell you what is possible (what is not prohibited) under the abstract laws
assumed to go in to compose its make-up. In a more modern field theorist vernacular, this has
become the slogan "what is not forbidden is required"--a description of the current procedure for
"prediction" of particle-like actions preceding the "discovery" of new sub-atomic particles. In a
more ancient philosophical vernacular, this is Leibniz's "principle of sufficient reason" (if
something happens there must be a reason for it to happen)--incorporated formally into Kant's
Critique of Pure reason. (Quill wavers who learned in high school that Kant's work was a
rejection of Leibnitz, not a modification of it, should re-read the transcendental analytic).
Whatever the scholastic pedigree of Maxwell's arguments, they surely represent a different and
more abstract scientific method than a "discovery" through lab experiment approach.
Maxwell's constructions themselves had no particular merit beyond what new notions they
would generate. Two such novelties are legendary. The major "new construct" (his theory of
light) came from noting that quick changes in the motion of charges would result in changes in
the electromagnetic field formulas that would vary from place to place. The formulas looked as
if something was moving through the "field" at a calculatable speed – and that speed was
remarkably close to the estimated speed of light. It was not remarkable in the sense that this was
some surprise--it is what Maxwell was driving at all along--it was remarkable because the model
was so theoretically precise ("perfect," in fact) and the experiments measuring the electrical and
magnetic strengths of sources and the estimated speed of light (around 186,000 miles per second)
were relatively crude. The agenda generated from this detail of Maxwell's work was then to
more accurately measure the speed of light, and the electric and magnetic forces between objects
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to further "confirm" the utility of Maxwell's model. Folklore has it that it was Heinrich Hertz
(under Helmholtz's guidance) who confirmed the utility of the model for "invisible" light
("radio"). In any case, this was the public view of the benefit of Maxwell. Inside the club,
however, more attention was paid to the more abstract and tedious measurement of physical
constants (under Helmholtz's guidance again, as we shall see).
A second innovation of Maxwell is perhaps more illustrative of the philosophical structure of
this kind of science. That notion was called the "displacement current"--and referred to the
mathematical terms in the theory that simulated the flow of charge in regions of the field where
no charge was assumed to exist. Thus it appeared from Maxwell's innovation that the ability of
electric action to pass across empty spaces was theoretically describable by a "ghost current"
(displacement current) which produced the same results at the starting place and destination as if
there had actually been some current in the emptiness. Undergraduates now take as routine this
explanation of a "capacitor"--a little pie-shaped gadget with two wires sticking out that populates
most electronic circuitry. Inside the pie, one learns that there is nothing but pieces of metal
separated by a spacer (an insulator--Maxwell's equivalent of an empty space, electrically
speaking). We are no longer perturbed that, while "nothing" passes through this spacer, electrical
currents act as if something did.
Reflectingve of the analogy of the displacement current, you might see how "light" could be
similarly described as the passage of a particular kind of "nothing" through empty space or space
filled with water or some transparent medium that would interfere with its passage. Thus an
inquiry into the effect of the intervening medium on the passage of light (or displacement
currents) should have come to be a major inquiry ("agenda") for Maxwell's heirs. It did indeed.
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To anticipate just a few lines of thought: After Hertz's "discovery of "radio" came Dewar's
investigations of electrical conduction in gases, leading (sometimes indirectly) to the "discovery"
of electrons (by one of Maxwell's successors at Cambridge, J. J. Thompson), x-rays (by Roentgen
of Germany), "plasmas" (by Dewar), radioactivity (by Becquerel of France). From there came
the strange relations between light and heat that led Max Planck to start the revolutionary
"quantum theory" (usually considered the "second scientific revolution" that here is attributed to
Maxwell and Helmholtz). Also came the drastic reconsideration of the theories of mechanics
required of Maxwell's new look at matter in motion that we now recall as Einstein's Special
Relativity. In all of these examples Maxwell's "theory" organized the inquiries, though
generations of anti-theoretical historians have strained to deny it. After all, isn't scientific
"discovery" supposed to precede speculative theory?
Philosopher Brent Mundy put the answer succinctly:

In brief, neither now nor in the 19th century has the empirical evidence
warranted acceptance of the physics existence of the classical electromagnetic
field...To understand the triumph of field theory on the Continent we must
understand the non-empirical factors which, at the time of Hertz' discoveries,
made it seem important to adhere to the conservationist [Helmholtz] program than
the distant action program .37

HAMILTON THE MATHEMATICIAN
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Maxwell's London years, 1860-1865, were marked by a retreat from worldly affairs (such as
had characterized his Cambridge years) into the abstract realm of theoretical physics and a very
private marriage. His attitude is reflected in a note to his friend C. J. Munro in 1862: "I find that
my belief in the reality of state affairs is no greater in London than in Aberdeen."38
It was not that state affairs were tedious. The country had finished two pesky colonial wars-in India (where a friend, Pomeroy, had been killed) and in China (with France). Avoiding a third,
England would not get involved with the looming Prussian situation over Schleswig-Holstein,
particularly as the prince of Wales married a princess of Denmark. Nationalistic romanticism
was further fading, and the English arch anti-romantic, J. S. Mill was on the ascendant with his
"Utilitarianism" (1862). Perhaps at the peak of his significant contributions to his culture,
Maxwell was already out of philosophical step. Certainly his enthusiasm for the Irish Hamilton
(the "Mathematician") allied him with concerns more appropriate to the first half of the
nineteenth century than to the second.
The Scots Hamilton had been very much in the tradition of Scottish skepticism, and his
proteges, like Maxwell and, earlier, the preacher-educator, James McCosh, were wedded to an
austere, Kantian inner examination of pure reason. Not so the Irish Sir William Rowan
Hamilton, who was as committed to post-Kantian romanticism as his friend and correspondent,
Coleridge, and the leading English Romantics of the period. This other Hamilton was a true
metaphysician and poet, a celebrated Romantic in aristocratic circles. He just missed becoming
godfather to Oscar Wilde,39 that symbol of end-of-the-century decadence, the "last gasp" of
Romanticism, but he did become godfather to Wordsworth's grandson.40 He was devoted to his
poetess sister, writing, for instance in 1850: "Like an old fool, as I am, I have been crying all this
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morning over Elizabeth Barrett Browning's poems..."41
Maxwell probably knew little of Hamilton's aesthetics though, for he was undoubtedly
referred to Hamilton's work by their mutual friend, P.G. Tait--and Tait barely mentions poetry in
his biographical sketch of Hamilton in the Eleventh Brittanica.42 What interested Tait was the
"rational" virtuosity of the man. Hamilton learned about a dozen languages before thirteen
(including Arabic, Sanskrit, and Malay), and gained a reputation as a rapid "calculating boy" in
competition with a visiting American "curiosity" on exhibit in Dublin. He was a self-taught
mathematician at first, then, at Dublin University was "first at every subject in every
examination." Tait believed that Hamilton would have won graduating medals, had his career as
a student not been cut short by an appointment to the Andrews Professorship of astronomy at the
University. Presumably this promotion of an undergraduate to a chair had something to do with
a precocious study of Laplace's famed Celestial Mechanics in which Hamilton had discovered an
embarrassing error by the "French Newton." Tait suggested that Hamilton was a poor
observational astronomer, but made that up by his original researches in mixed mathematics,
citing his world famous "method of Varying Action" and his less celebrated "method of
Quaternions." Without yet knowing what these animals are like, we can nonetheless suspect a
philosophical affinity to Maxwell and Helmholtz in the term "method." One of the major
characteristics of methods of analogies is that they are indeed methods--a means to another end
(the indirect appreciation of a state of affairs that acts as if it were produced by the analogy).
Perhaps this variation of scientific falsify is embedded in Hamilton's translation of Schiller's
poem, "The Ideal":
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My mind, with forceful grasp. As if it
all could clasp,
Sought to embrace whate'er the universe
might bear;
All loving forms to try. Of art or imagery.
How great appeared the World. While yet
in bud close furl'd!
When it was open all, how poor it show'd
and small.43

Well, maybe the emerging ideas of the world show'd mostly poor, but not necessarily the
particular ideals he saw in the kind of research Faraday was promoting. Back in 1841 he had
anticipated the "bud" in which the world was synthesized--in a letter to a fellow Schiller
translator, the astronomer Sir J.F.W. Herschel, he wrote:

I like much the notion of motion being perhaps a successive excitement of
powers...And I have been struck by a remark of Faraday's which was somewhat to
the effect, that the mechanical motion of an electrically excited body must be
considered to produce, or be equivalent to, a current of electricity. Light, heat,
chemistry, electricity, crystallography (with galvanism, magnetism, etc., as more
obviously related theoretically) have been the good while suspected, not to say
known, to be all branches of one science, as yet imperfectly discovered, but to be
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probably established in this generation, and in our own time!44

Hamilton had met Maxwell in Aberdeen in 1859, introduced to him by Tait. The
occasion was a meeting of the British Association, and Hamilton had presented a paper: On the
Application of Quaternions to the Geometry of Fresnel's Wave-Surface. Whatever this
"Quaternion" business was about, Hamilton had been reluctant to share the details with the
assembled company (including Maxwell). He had penciled a note to himself:

Not about to lecture on Quaternions; nor do I pretend on the present
occasion to produce any new property [of Fresnel's Surface],...but merely to
exemplify the conciseness and simplicity with which the language of quaternions
enables those who have acquired some familiarity with that language to express
and combine general conclusions, and even physical hypotheses, and then to
transform the resulting formulae, and to interpret the new equations so obtained. I
said hypotheses: for I desire it to be distinctly understood that I do not by any
means adopt any such hypotheses, not at all pretend to express, or even to form,
any opinion of my own on such a question as this: Are the vibrations of the ether
(if such vibrations actually exist) perpendicular or parallel to the plane of
polarization?45

Again we see that characteristic feature of the "new" mathematical-analogy method: the
characterization of phenomena without commitment to the "reality" of the cause (here the
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ether).
This new "mathematical language," Quaternions, is (in Tait's opinion), the second greatest
invention of Hamilton, and came too late to influence Maxwell in his original construction of
analogies and the Electromagnetic Theory. Maxwell did, in the first edition of the Treatise in
1873, try to bring some attention to Quaternions (Hamilton died in 1865):

I am convinced, however, that the introduction of the ideas , as
distinguished from the operations and methods of Quaternions, will be of great
use to us in the study of all parts of our subject, and especially in electrodynamics, where we have to deal with a number of physical quantities, the
relations of which to each other can be expressed far more simply by a few words
of Hamilton's than by ordinary equations.46

Other prominent mathematical scientists had the same high hopes. Robert Graves, Hamilton's
nineteenth century biographer, lists several late-century Quaternion fans: W.K. Clifford (often
ranked with Maxwell as the most distinguished genius of his era), Tait (who wrote a text on the
subject), a half-dozen forgotten Europeans, and "Professor Benjamin Pierce of Harvard
University."47
These names are striking, first in the omission of two of our analogy experts, Helmholtz and
J.W. Gibbs (who called the methods "multiple algebra"), and second in the inclusion of Pierce.
Benjamin Pierce (generally pronounced "purse") is father of C.S. Pierce, the notorious inventor
of a philosophy wholly antagonistic to the metaphysics of Maxwell and Helmholtz--
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"pragmatism" (the term was borrowed by William James--a variation, "pragmaticism" did not
catch on). Like J.S. Mill's earlier "Utilitarianism," pragmatism centered on the methods of
useful, accurate, and concise thought as clarifying ideas that had originated not in introspection
but in observation. While a connection between Hamilton's philosophy and Pierce's is not at all
far-fetched, the commonplace is that they are said to be polar opposites. It is academically much
safer to say that son Charles' philosophy did not accord with father Benjamin, or that Graves
knew not whereof he spoke, or that Pierce was interested in the utility of the method (suggested
by Maxwell), not the hidden Romantic philosophy that Hamilton thought it supported.

MAXWELL AND HEAT

Maxwell's second great application of his mature method of analogy was to a "dynamical
theory of heat." This is not surprising, as the subject of heat was what brought him to the fore of
his profession, starting way back in the his undergraduate years with Forbes. What does surprise
some is the superficial ostensible conflict between Maxwell's "theory of light" and his "theory of
heat"--a problem earlier mentioned as "Maxwell vs. Maxwell." In an overview, the theory of
heat depends on the theory of molecular matter, while the theory of light depends on the theory of
aetherel matter. While Poe, for instance, could join the two views of matter by making aethereal
molecules, and Thomson (Kelvin) speculated about making molecules out of aethereal vortices,
the two views of matter have some inherent incompatibilities. The legendary conflict is between
aethereal (space-filling) notions of continuous matter (no gaps, no voids, no distances over which
action had to be mysteriously transmitted) and notions of molecules separated by... (what?), such

242

that they could combine and rearrange to construct the chemical world. The philosophical gap
between continuity and discontinuity (as between revolution and evolution) was as dramatic as
the technical gap--especially in the Victorian age of Darwinist vs. Creationist biology and
geology. For the authority of Maxwell to be split between a continuous theory of aether (for
electricity and light) and a discontinuous theory of matter (for heat) is an historian's crisis.
Explanations of this duality range from psychological schizophrenia (related to incongruities in
his family background and upbringing) to a social dialectic (the Hegelian dynamic of the struggle
of intellectual theses and antitheses creating progress).
Perhaps disappointingly, the view from considering Maxwell's method does not support such
dramatic interpretations of the dilemma. As we have seen, Maxwell did suspect the existence of
an aether, and, as we shall see, he also suspected the existence of molecules. But in the business
of scientific explanation, "existence" was never an issue. It was sufficient to show that events
occurred "as if" matter was so constructed. The function of metaphors, analogies, heuristics, and
the rest was not to generate objects of study, but to lead to somewhere else--to a "correct"
deduction of the "action." To what end? To establish an "agenda"--a scheme (method) by which
further such deductions would succeed for hitherto "mysterious" phenomena. And where might
it all end? This was the subject of considerable metaphysical dispute. Helmholtz' mathematical
friend DuBois-Reymond became famous for his notion that inquiry could never end--there were
certain things that could not be "known" by any method. His Latin phrasing was compact:
Ignoramus--Ignorabimus (we are ignorant--we shall remain ignorant).48 On another front Oken,
the forgotten student of Schelling, Hegel, and Herder, would have the inquiry end in a synthesis
of the material and spiritual, for
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Man is God wholly manifest...Man must represent the whole world in
miniature. Now since in man are manifested self-consciousness or spirit, Physiophilosophy has to show that the laws of spirit are not different from the laws of
nature; but both are transcriptions or likenesses of each other.49

Incidentally, the "laws of nature" for Oken were the same as those for Goethe: laws of
polarity (the eternal struggle of north and south magnetic pole, of light and dark, of positive and
negative electric charge, of life's activity and death's inactivity, etc.).
Oken and DuBois-Reymond represent extremes, but only extremes of one "camp," the
Idealists (like the Dublin Hamilton, who was somewhere between poles). The other camp, the
"Realists," had their versions of "the aims of science" (to take, ironically, the title of a recently
published book by the modern inheritor of the anti-metaphysicalists, Sir Karl Popper). This
camp, however, did not recognize the contributions of Maxwell in the fashion described here-"science" to them was not what Maxwell did (in this representation of him).
Thus the "higher" metaphysics of Victorian science arise from a consideration of Maxwell vs.
Maxwell (space-filling fields vs. l,ocalizable particles), and it remains to confuse this pretty
picture by looking more carefully at another venue of the discourse : "heat."
Put simply, Maxwell constructed two models for heat from which the analogies should arise
– a mathematical and a pictorial model of randomly jittering and colliding molecules confined to
a box. Within the constraints of Helmholtz's principle of conservation and the related laws of
material motion of Newton, and the intervening astronomy - like calculation schemes of Laplace,

244

the collisions of the molecules with the walls of the box would "average" to a uniform
"pressure." As in the experiments with heat and gases the relationships between pressure,
density, and temperature (of, say, gas in a balloon) were strictly analogous to average collisional
pressure, density, and average energy of motion of the molecular of the pictorial model.
This was not particularly original. Such methods of combining theories of matter in motion-"mechanics"--and theories of heat had been made into a virtual agenda by the German physicist
Rudolph Clausius. Clausius, interestingly a professor at the socially suspect Technische
Hochschule in Zurich, "fathered" physical thermodynamics in 1857 with his article "On the Kind
of Motions We Call Heat." The notion was "in the air" before that. In the posthumously
discovered papers of this founder of "caloric" thermodynamics, there is reference to the late
eighteenth-century experiments of Benjamin Thompson, Count Rumford, implicitly connecting
heat and mechanics.50

We shall hear from him later.

Clausius himself had already slipped the "motions" idea into Poggendorff's Annalen der
Physik in an 1850 article on the French “caloric” master, Sadi Carnot:

We shall not consider here the kind of motion which can be conceived of
as taking place within bodies, further than to assume in general that the particles
of bodies are in motion, and that their heat is the measure of their vis viva..."51

Incidentally, Clausius also slips in reference to Mayer's memoir on “energy”, the one rejected by
Poggendorff along with the later argument by Helmholtz on Kraft.a
---------------
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(a) Reflecting the romanticism of the notion, the Mayer article was eventually published by
Liebig and Wö hler in the journal of chemistry and pharmacy.52
--------------Maxwell's contribution, in addition to bringing Clausius' agenda into the English mainstream,
was to add particular mathematical sophistication, and so to derive some more subtle properties
of gases – notably "viscosity," or "stickiness" of gases.
The origins of the details of Maxwell's innovations involve the history that statistical
calculations had in the consideration of the mechanics of groups of molecule - like particles.
Maxwell had used such methods before, particularly in his Aberdeen study of Saturn's rings. It
had so happened in that study that the notion of a solid, thick ring of matter surrounding Saturn
did not fit the rules of orbiting matter. Since the period of orbiting matter differs at different
distances from the planet (as shown by Kepler, Newton, and Laplace), a solid ring would be
"trying" to rotate at different periods throughout its thickness. This would, in theory, produce
such enormous gravitational stresses that any such solid matter would have to break up into many
smaller pieces, each piece orbiting as an individual satellite. How, then, could such a swarm of
rocks (or icebergs, in more modern theories) not just produce a cloud rather than an organized
ring? With a bit of statistical razzle-dazzle, Maxwell showed how a disorganized bunch of
orbiting rocks could--on the average--appear to be a solid object, a ring (or actually two rings at
the time).53 This model calculation has been taken as a precursor to Maxwell's more general
"statistical" agenda, as will be argued below. More than just a general theme, the particular work
on Saturn's rings seems to have inspired such "modern" work as Hantaro Nagaoka's 1910 theory
of the "Saturnian atom." Writer Richard Rhodes reconstructs Nagaoka's direct adaptation of
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Maxwell's 1859 Saturnian model and his colleague Ernst Rutherford's similar 1911 model of
electrons in orbit around a "nucleus" as a crucial development of modern atomic theory:
One reason Rutherford was unaware of Nagaoka's Saturnian model of the atom is that it
had been criticized and abandoned soon after Nagaoka introduced it because it suffered from a
severe defect, the same theoretical defect that marred the atom Rutherford was now proposing.
[Maxwell's] rings of Saturn are stable because the force of gravity.is attractive. The force
between Nagaoka's Saturnian electron rings, however, .was repulsive.54
Later this "instability problem" was compounded by the 1914 theory by Bohr of suspending
classical stability requirements for "quantum" orbits, a move that subsequently involved him in a
famous replay of the inner conflicts of the Maxwellian agenda. Even later, in 1925, Werner
Heisenberg again took up the problem of stability, "creating" a new "matrix" mechanics of hotly
argued metaphysical implications. There are direct documentary links of Bohr and Heisenberg
not only to Maxwell, but to Goethe, Kierkegaard, and others of the romantic philosophical
context we here assert. They lie beyond our century-of-interest, but constitute one hint of
relevance of the now almost forgotten nineteenth century physicist-philosophers.
By exploiting his experience with statistical modeling, Maxwell went on to deduce other
"averages" in a swarm of molecules (besides pressure) that Clausius hadn't gotten to. He
considered the diffusion of two gasses into each other, and worked out "mean-free-paths" (the
average distance a molecule would travel before collision--distances of millionths of inches in
"real" gases). He and his wife actually experimented with the speed of outflow of gases through
holes in order to "confirm" the predictions of the model of viscosity in 1865. The culminating
work was the 1867 "Dynamical Theory of Gases," though he continued major contributions to
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heat theory for the rest of his life, notably commenting on extensions of his work by the Austrian
Ludwig Boltzmann and the American J. Willard Gibbs.
Metaphysics aside, this successful introduction of statistics into physical calculations creates
the kernel of the "internal" controversy of “Maxwell vs. Maxwell.” The work of Boltzmann and
Gibbs eventually was carried on by Planck and Einstein early in the century, and variations on
that work by Niels Bohr and Erwin Schrödinger, among many others, led to the mid-century
crisis in foundations. Again put over-simply, were the fundamental laws of the physical world
statistical in nature? Were single events, after all, just accidents--their significance to be
understood only in the averages to which they contributed? Oddly perhaps, Maxwell and his
successors Boltzmann, Gibbs, Einstein, and Schrödinger thought not. They, after all, were all
adherents to the doctrines of Kant, to whom there was no such thing as "accident" (remember the
principle of sufficient reason--Leibniz's: nothing happens without a sufficient reason). Why
then, did they all resort to statistics, the mathematics of accident?
It is hopefully now evident why this description of “Maxwell vs. Maxwell” was called
"simple." It seems to make "internal" sense, but seems to lead to some kind of intellectual
dilemmas, perhaps even paradoxes. And so it did, agitating even Maxwell's friends, including
Thomson (Kelvin) to dub this kind of thinking "mathematical terrorism."55 The two issues that
lead the pack are the question of cause vs. accident in the laws of matter, and the question of
continuity vs. discontinuity in the substance of reality.b
--------------(b) Quill-wavers use terms like "epistemology" for questions of knowledge and "ontology" for
questions of reality (substantiality).

248

--------------Within two years, Maxwell published major work supporting both sides of these questions:
aether and causality vs. molecules and statistics, or “Light vs. Heat”, or “Maxwell vs. Maxwell.”
He and the missus even demonstrated experimental analogies to parts of the heat work, as Hertz
was to do for the light. What might have been Maxwell's philosophical position amid these
technological controversies?
"Ontologically," Maxwell did favor an aether, as we have seen, and a molecular reality as
well. Later, in 1874 he wrote Lewis Campbell of his forthcoming encyclopedia article on atoms
and molecules (and the possible molecular theory of biological evolution):

With regard to atoms...the easiest way of showing what [they] can't do is
to get some sort of notion of what they can do. If atoms are finite in number, each
of them being a certain weight, then it becomes impossible that the germ from
which a man developed could contain (actually, of course, for potentiality is
nonsense in materialism, unless it is expressed as configuration and motion)
gemmules of everything the man is to inherit ... Francis Galton, whose mission it
seems to be to ride other men's hobbies to death, has invented the felicitous
expression "structureless germs." Now if a germ...contains within itself a power
of development into some distinct thing...it is nonsense to call it structureless...
In your letter you apply the word imponderable [massless] to a
molecule. Don't do that again. It may also be worth knowing that the aether
cannot be molecular.56
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The "real" existence of molecules, being experimentally "undetectable" directly, had been a
severe problem to the chemists, leading to all sorts of wild speculations about the constitution of
the "unseen universe." These included various proposals for a "structure" to molecules-arrangements of "atoms" of a single, primal, character (or possibly several fundamental kinds of
atoms)--or various speculations about the number of different kinds of molecules required to
make up the varieties of known (and yet to be discovered) elements and compounds. As
Maxwell's letter indicates, this game of hidden structure had spread from the chemists to the
biologists. The "epistemological" message of this outlook is that atoms and molecules were part
of an agenda, a strategy for physics and biology to create useful analogies. It didn't matter to
these agendas whether atoms were "real" or not--the theories using them rested on the
mathematical analogies they supported (the smiles on the Cheshire cats).
This was not to say that a "belief" in molecular reality was a hindrance in research, in fact, it
probably was helpful in maintaining the enthusiasm of a beleaguered investigator. The physicist
finally responsible for vindicating the validity of atoms, Jean Perrin,57 came to believe in them,
and to convince the twentieth century:

A table will serve to recapitulate usefully the various phenomena which
enable N (the number of molecule in one gram molecule of a gas ...) to be
calculated which taken altogether form what may be termed proof of molecular
reality...
...I think it is impossible that a mind, free from all preconception, can
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reflect upon the extreme diversity of the phenomena which thus converge to the
same result, without experiencing a very strong impression, and I think that it will
henceforth be difficult to defend by rational arguments a hostile attitude to
molecular hypotheses...58

Perrin's 1910 table of evidence included calculations from the color of the blue sky as well as his
Nobel Prize-winning experiments confirming Einstein's 1905 theory of “Brownian Motion.” The
latter concerned the effects of diffusion of invisible molecules on motion visible particles
suspended in fluids. While material atoms flourished, material aether was taking a beating. But
even after the optical experiments of the American A.A. Michelson and the “relativity” theories
of Einstein had (allegedly) banished the aether to the status of a no-longer-useful hypothesis, J.J.
Thomson (a successor to Maxwell at Cambridge and himself a "discoverer" of the electron)
claimed that "the aether is as real as the air we breathe."59
There were many others who continued the "reality" quest even later into the twentieth
century. Candidates for "reals" continued to be generated, particularly the sub-molecular "parti
cles." Eventually, in mid-century, "real" particles were required to manifest a literally un-real
("virtual") existence to account for their apparent presence in situations where they where tech
nically forbidden. In late-century the oxymoron "virtual reality" came to represent pretty much
what the founders had intended for their metaphors--functional fictions--a world of "as if."
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CHAPTER 6

In the 1860's Helmholtz was at Heidelberg, and there came in contact with the scientific,
philosophical, and political agendas that would be subsumed in the methods that made him a
renowned physicist-philosopher. He met the legendary researchers in heat and light, Kirchoff and
Bunsen, finding their respective attitudes of mathematical physics and "Romantic" experimentalism
quite congenial. He, like Maxwell, came across the mathematical work of Riemann, and integrated
it into his ever more abstract color theory. He adapted the statistical models of Göttingen's legendary
Karl Gauss, and passed them on to American J. Willard Gibbs, who would succeed our founders
as the spokesman for the particular mathematical analogies in heat.

HELMHOLTZ AT HEIDELBERG

It was at Heidelberg that Helmholtz made the transition from physiologist to
physicist-philosopher. His years at Bonn, the 1850's, were still centered in physiology, but there
were already excursions into mixed mathematics and physics. His fame as a scientist of color
and tone naturally attracted foreign acclaim, and this led to his call to Heidelberg, then in the
state of Baden, in 1858. This was indeed foreign territory, and the King of Prussia tried to keep
him at home, but the attraction of working with celebrities like the poet Heine and the
mathematician Neumann were compelling. He stayed for thirteen years, until called to Berlin at
about the same time that Baden was incorporated into the new German Empire (1871). These
were the mature years of Helmholtz's career. Personally, he lost his wife to illness, and gained a
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second, Anna von Mohl, in 1861. Professionally, his professorial duties in physiology continued
to take him into more of the physicists' realm, roughly as an intermediary between the electrical
and thermal modeling of Maxwell and Kelvin and the abstruse new mathematics coming out of
Göttingen University. His colleagues at Heidelberg themselves won fame, from "Bunsen and
Kirchoff" (always mentioned together), who became celebrated for their studies of spectra, to
visitors like the American Gibbs and the Englishman Arthur Schuster (who would try to found a
model of Heidelberg at Oxford University--the "Clarendon Laboratories").
Later, in 1891, Helmholtz would recall his moods of the Heidelberg years:

I must confess that the departments in which one has not to trust to lucky
accidents and inspirations had the greatest attraction for me. Yet as I have often
been in the predicament of having to wait on inspiration, I have had some few
experiences as to when and how it came to me...Often enough it steals quietly into
one's thoughts and at first one does not appreciate its significance...In other cases
it comes quite suddenly, without effort, like a flash of thought. So far as my
experience goes it never comes to a wearied brain, or at the writing table. I must
first have turned my problem over and over in all directions, till I can see its twists
and windings in my mind's eye...And then... there must be an hour of perfect
bodily recuperation and peaceful comfort, before the kindly inspiration rewards
one. Often it comes in the morning on waking up...It came most readily, as I
experienced at Heidelberg, when I went out to climb the wooded hills...The least
trace of alcohol, however, sufficed to banish it.1
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Probably the most significant of these inspirations was the notion that mathematical
puzzle-games, like that of Riemann at Göttingen, could be used in the British analogies about
matter, heat, and electricity.
Seven years after Helmholtz had left Heidelberg for Berlin, Mark Twain came to recount his
tourist adventures in A Tramp Abroad. It was 1878 and there had been a few major changes since
Helmholtz's stay, but much of Helmholtz' milieu can be reconstructed from Twain. As for the
changes, Heidelberg became a part of the Greater German Reich, Baden having been absorbed in
the grand unification of states following the German victory over France in 1870-71.
There had been a Greater Germany of sorts before the war in the form of the customs union
(Zollverein), which formed an economic shadow government, complete with an elected
Parliament that many had hoped would evolve into an excuse for unification of the south with the
newly constituted North German Confederation. This geopolitical situation put Helmholtz's
Baden in an awkward position. It was perhaps the most pro-Prussian of the southern states (its
Grand Duke was the son-in-law of the Prussian King, William I). Even Baden remained neutral,
though, when Prussia launched a lightning war on neighboring Catholic Austria. Its citizens
remained wary of too close association with the emerging northern juggernaut.
Later, Mark Twain did not concern himself with such militant details as the Franco-Prussian
war had been handily won. The war was famed for its decisive start in 1870 when the Germans
won the dramatic Battle of Sedan and went on to besiege Paris within a few weeks. The siege
was a long and difficult affair, and Helmholtz, then of Berlin, had much work as a volunteer
surgeon. To later generations the decisive loss of the French signaled their eclipse, and the rise of
the new united Germany as a model for effective modernism.
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After Sedan Heidelberg began its drift into a picturesque tourist trap, with its venerable
University remaining its best hope to retain some world significance. By the time Mark Twain
came to visit, the tourist tales were of ancient glories of the Holy Roman Empire and the colorful
dueling societies and student prison of the University--not of the presence of the great minds,
Kirchoff, Bunsen, and Helmholtz.
There may be one small exception to this neglect of science, for in Twain's narrative of his
travels there is a considerable passage on the nature of glaciers occasioned by a humorous
proposal to travel by riding a creeping glacier. Twain worked from an English-language science
text (by somebody called "Whymper") as his celebrated aversion to the German language would
dictate, but the details of the physics of glaciers could well have been paraphrased from one of
Helmholtz' most celebrated Heidelberg lectures "Ice and Glaciers" (1865). Among remembered
scientist in Twain's, Whymper's, and Helmholtz' accounts was the eminent geologist, Maxwell's
teacher James Forbes.2 While it was the slow speed of the glaciers that engaged Twain and
Forbes, Helmholtz was more interested in the theory of their motion, which, to him, exemplified
a triumph of the "mechanical theory of heat" of Thomson (Kelvin) and Rudolph Clausius.3 This
particular triumph concerned the effect of increased pressure on melting point of ice, but one
suspects that Helmholtz' rousing ending with a poem by Goethe ("Mahomet") about melting
glacial waters rushing to "Father Ocean" did more to transport the Heidelberg audience then "the
kind of motions" he called heat.
Twain rafted down the Neckar, which ran through the town, and admired the ruined
castle--and painted it so badly that he jested that his work could be mistaken for "a Turner."4
That remark dimly hints at the low esteem into which formal Romanticism (epitomized artists by
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Turner in England and Casper David Friedrich in Germany) had fallen by the age of Realism,
Impressionism, and the pre-Raphaelites. To a foreigner, German Romantic philosophy had a
reputation of dreamy vagueness, and the embryonic Heidelberg "phenomenology" (a term
adapted from Hegel by Helmholtz) might easily resemble sort of a metaphysical "Turner," though
more probably a "Friedrich"--for the latter's art was of meticulous, dramatically evocative detail.
Helmholtz came to Heidelberg as a distinguished physiologist and amateur physicist--he left
as a distinguished physicist (to take the chair in physics at Berlin), and almost never published in
physiology again. What may have "turned" Helmholtz from physiology to physics was not so
much his research, but his association with the mathematico-physical agenda at pre-war
Heidelberg, particularly that of Gustav Kirchoff.
The short story of Kirchoff and Bunsen has it that they "discovered" the "spectrum" of
individual colors of light emitted by heated and burning objects. The subsequent fate of this
discovery generated much of the physical context which first justified, then destabilized the
Maxwell-Helmholtz heat and light agendas.
Inquiry into these mysterious patterns of color led in two directions, one chemical and one
physical. The chemical path led to the inquiry into the source of the colors--to an atomic theory
of matter and then to the electron-around-the-nucleus ("saturnian atom") of Bohr and Rutherford
in the teens and 1920's. Presumably the lights were generated by "electrons" jumping from
"orbit" to "orbit," not unlike fleas, as a fortuitous analogy by Paul Ehrenfest would have it. Such
"quantum leaps" would broadcast Hertzian oscillations of a color characteristic of the distance of
the jump. That was to be the end of the (short) Kirchoff-Bunsen chemistry tale, for the
Heisenberg, et. al. revolution was to destroy, in Cheshire-cat fashion, that particular atomic
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analogy. The physicists' path led to an inquiry into the connection of the colors with heat--to
Max Planck's turn-of-the-century theory of how heated objects get to radiate in the first place,
and Einstein's 1905 reformulation of Maxwell to get a theory of light in flowing streams
("Needle-rays," or Nadelstrahlung). This path also crashed, as Einstein's idea (this distinct from
his other theory, Relativity) was absorbed into Bohr's and, in a way, poisoned it enough to
precipitate the quantum revolution. Thus the moral of the short story of Kirchoff and Bunsen's
discoveries and their consequence is that the intellectual stakes were, in retrospect, quite high.
To get a more constructive understanding of the scientific agenda and the role of mathematics
and analogy and their relationship to the the Maxwell-Helmholtz agenda requires the long
story--of Heidelberg, Helmholtz, Kirchoff, and Bunsen.
The clue to the notion that the short story is somehow skew is in the image of the "discovery"
of Kirchoff and Bunsen. Just how did they stumble upon this amazing phenomena--the “blackbody spectrum?” One characteristic of the method of analogies is that ideas precede
understanding of phenomena, not the other way around--what is "discovered" is a actually way to
vindicate a patently given theoretical analogy. In short, theory comes before
demonstration-experiment in this philosophy. Fortunately for our team, Kirchoff held this view
himself. He was a theoretical (mathematical) physicist--not primarily a laboratory worker
(though his physical labors--like Maxwell's--supported his reputation with the anti-intellectuals
who denigrated theorizing as philosophic twaddle). Perhaps we should see if this is a plausible
reading of his vita.
Gustav Robert Kirchoff was a born Prussian, and graduated from his home-town University,
Königsberg, with a Ph.D. in 1847, two years before the arrival of young Helmholtz. His major
257

professor was Franz Neumann, himself a mathematical modeler of heat, optics, and electricity
often mentioned in Maxwell's Treatise. Kirchoff taught a bit in Berlin until 1850, when he got a
full appointment to the University of Breslau. It was at Breslau that he met Robert Bunsen, a
Ph.D. in the chemistry of minerals and crystals from Göttingen (where his father had been
librarian and professor of philology).5 In 1852 Bunsen was called to Heidelberg, and arranged a
position there for Kirchoff in 1854. Helmholtz showed up in 1858, and, after he had eventually
moved on to Berlin in 1871, helped bring Kirchoff there in 1875. Bunsen stayed in Heidelberg,
though he had been the first of the trio to get a shot at Berlin in 1863.6
Kirchoff's subject, from the Neumann days, was electricity. He was working on a general
mathematical description of the motion of electricity in conductors of various geometric shapes;
in thin plates, in circular plates, in two adjacent spheres, and so on. The methods he used were
those Maxwell had discovered in Fourier and Thomson, and he taught them to the new
physiologist, Helmholtz. He came close to beating Maxwell to the formal light-electromagnetism
connection (qualitatively it was an old idea by Faraday--the trick was to get at it with the new
mixed mathematics)--but fell short.7 Kirchoff's electrical analogies were quite helpful to
Maxwell, as can be gleaned from his acknowledgments in the Treatise. Kirchoff's work is cited
four times; once for a method of measuring electrical resistance in a wire (an experiment to be
sure, but one that requires particularly messy mathematical modeling to connect the
measurements to the desired measuree).8 In another citation, one finds Kirchoff coupled with
Georg Quincke, another Königsberg product, who succeeded Kirchoff at Heidelberg.9 The
Quincke connection firms up the impression of good communication among the heat and light
researchers, as he was a great influence on the young Willard Gibbs in Berlin in the year the
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latter came to Heidelberg to study with Helmholtz.
In the same Treatise Maxwell cited Helmholtz six times, only once for his then ancient
conservation of energy and several times for his Heidelberg work. In one place Maxwell draws
formulas from a Helmholtz memoire on fluids,10 reminding one that the method transcends the
phenomena. Fluids, electrical flow, heat, etc. are all examples of "models" obeying the "laws of
thought"--the method of mathematical analogy. Another reference to Helmholtz concerns a
purely geometrical method of replacing calculations of integrals by counting features of
geometrical shapes. Maxwell attributed the idea to Gauss, with "some progress to report, chiefly
due to Riemann, Helmholtz, and Listing."11 We will see shortly Gibbs picking up such methods.
Another of Maxwell's citations to Helmholtz refers to Kirchoff-inspired work on the magnetic
effects of moving conductors,12 while yet another deals with the dramatic, pre-Heidelberg paper
on fluid vortices.13 a
--------------(a) We have already described this "proof" that ideal vortices were "indestructible" as a
philosophical example of analogism. Historically, it fueled Kelvin's search for an ether-vortex
atom. A later French genius, Henri Poincaré, would blow the whistle on such analogies by
finding serious limitations to Helmholtz's proofs.
--------------Bunsen is not cited by Maxwell, of course, for he had nothing to do with this mathematical
physics--he was, after all, a chemist.
Bunsen's career epitomizes the "other path" of science in the nineteenth century--collect facts
and forget speculating on them--especially avoid mathematics. A bit uncharacteristic for a
259

Göttingen brat, but perhaps chemistry, particularly as practiced by Bunsen in the mode of Liebig,
was a more characteristic science of the age of industry. T. S Kuhn numbered Liebig (and
Helmholtz) among those who might be tainted by Naturphilosophie14, as Liebig had studied with
Schelling (though later dismissing him), and and subsequently became one of the "fathers" of
industrial chemistry in Germany's renaissance. Bunsen's early work was on a Liebig agenda, the
chemistry of poisons, particularly Arsenic. Falling prey to the occupational hazards of a
non-mathematician, he lost one eye in a lab explosion, and nearly poisoned himself to death.15
He studied heat loss in burning in English furnaces, leading to his only published memoire, this
on methods of gaseous measurements (1857). He pioneered in the field of experimental
photochemistry (lights given off by burning substances), early skating in that peculiar area
between physics and chemistry (known, oddly enough, as physical chemistry) enough to earn
"grandfather" status from the "father" of physical chemistry, Wilhelm Ostwald.b
---------(b) Early in the twentieth century this Ostwald was to become notorious for his new science, for
his odd philosophy (he tried to reintroduce Naturphilosophie into modernized Germany, for his
exhaustive archives of current investigation, and, most of all for his opposition to the theory of
atoms. He was lesser known for his logarithmic grading of sensations in his 1918 Harmony of
Colors (Harmonie der Farben), a familiar fingerprint of romantic analogism. He cited Bunsen as
the "classic example for all future researches in physical chemistry."16
---------The particular lab work that united the two disparate men, Kirchoff and Bunsen, arose from
Bunsen's invention of a smokeless coal gas burner for the new laboratory at Heidelberg. The
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important feature of the famous "Bunsen Burner" flame was not that it was smokeless, though
that was its purpose, but that it was colorless (or at least sort of a transparent blue). When some
chemical was introduced into the Bunsen flame, it produced colorful displays, so called
"spectra." Obviously the color displays were different for different chemicals, and thus was
established the basis for the study of chemistry by the colors emitted by heated
objects--"spectroscopy." At this point, Kirchoff was invited to see if his mathematical methods
could produce any models of the process that would vindicate any the theorists claims to an
"explanation." Kirchoff came up with rather a weak model, a "law" that related the heat taken in
by a chemical and the light given off. The historical significance of Kirchoff's efforts is more in
the fact of his attachment of the analogical agenda to the chemical one than in any major
accomplishment in the theories of heat and light themselves. The historical significance of
Bunsen's efforts are tangential to this work, but it is intriguing to quote an early twentieth century
estimate, the Eleventh (“scholar's edition”) Brittanica:

Bunsen founded no school of chemistry; that is to say, no body of
chemical doctrine is associated with his name. Indeed, he took little or no part in
discussion of theory, and...he preferred to spend his energies in the collection of
experimental facts. One fact, he used to say, properly proved is worth all the
theories that can be invented. But as a teacher of chemistry he was almost without
rival, and his success is sufficiently attested by the scores of pupils who flocked
from every part of the globe to study under him, and by the number of those pupils
who afterwards made their mark in the chemical world. 17
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For Helmholtz, then, Heidelberg was an immersion into the center of the struggle over
method, mathematical or experimental. As Göttingen would subsequently be the source of
wisdom in the mathematical side of this philosopher's battle, so Heidelberg was to become the
materialist's home. The victory of Göttingen physics, in the form of Heisenberg and Born's
quantum mechanics, would provoke an ominous Heidelberg revenge in the Nazi era "Aryan
physics," constructed at Heidelberg by Nobel laureate Philip Lenard partly from the
anti-mathematical attitudes exemplified by Bunsen. Alan Beyerchen described it:

For Aryan physicists, the theorists' attitude of inner certainty and superior
knowledge may have been their most irritating characteristic...
This weakness for logical certainty was precisely what the Aryan
physics adherents rejected as unscientific and un-German. For them the
foundation of science was measurable experience, upon which mechanical models
of natural processes were based. These models were `proper' theories.
Mathematical constructs deriving largely from imagination were abstractions
foreign to nature...18

Besides this inquiry into heat, light and color, there was a lot of other work for the Heidelberg
researchers to pursue independently. It was diverse enough so that Bunsen didn't make a chemist
of Kirchoff, and Kirchoff didn't yet make a physicist of Helmholtz. Simply reviewing a list of
Helmholtz's accomplishments in the Heidelberg years (1858-1871), we find mostly physiology:
seven papers on sound before being promoted to pro-rector in 1862 (almost none after the
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publication of the Theory of the Sensations of Tone in 1863), ten papers on vision and
physiology after 1863, and the occasional odd paper on electricity and fluids before 1868. Late
in the 1860's, after visits to Paris and London, Helmholtz translated the English agenda, in the
form of Tyndall's lectures and Thomson (Kelvin) and Tait's general text, Natural Philosophy
(this a prototype for all future texts in physics). Thereafter, Helmholtz's interests seem to shift
again, this time towards full-time physics. Papers and lectures appeared on fluids, on geometry,
and on electrodynamics in increasing frequency. By 1870 he was called to Berlin as a physicist,
not a physiologist, and he took Magnus' chair in physics in 1871.

GEOMETRY AND PHILOSOPHY

We have been hinting that a most dramatic force in the distillation of the mathematical
analogy strategy was in the adoption by our heroes of particular innovations arising from
Göttingen University. It is now appropriate to take up this issue in the form that Helmholtz and
Maxwell did in the 1860's: the invention of non-Euclidean geometries by Georg Riemann.
Georg Friedrich Bernhard Riemann had been a mathematics student at Berlin and Göttingen
in the late 1840's, earning his Ph.D. in 1851. In order to teach at the University, he had to submit
some research examples and deliver a research agenda--the Habilitationschrift and the
Habilitationvortrag respectively. The Schrift, on Fourier's methods, was forgettable, but the
Vortrag, on the foundations of geometry, was epochal. There has been much dispute over the
role of Riemann's mentor, Carl Friedrich Gauss, in this work. Gauss did select the topic from a
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list of three proposed by Riemann,19 but from there it is arguable as to whether he helped or
hindered the development of the subsequent field--"non-Euclidean Geometry." This dispute is
not a mere squabble over priority, but a question of the nature of mathematics and reality--as
envisioned by the founders of the inquiry. Gauss and Riemann had sharply conflicting
philosophies of mathematics, and if the artifact carries its intentions, it does make a difference as
to whose agenda the new geometry advances. Helmholtz had no doubt who the sponsor was--he
actually requested a copy of the Vortrag from friends in Göttingen in 1858, though may not have
received one (it had been delivered in 1854, but was not formally published after Riemann died
in 1866). He no doubt had heard that this remarkable lecture was more on philosophy than on
mathematics. It contained very few equations. When he again heard of it in an obituary of
Riemann, in 1868, he wrote to an acquaintance, Schering:

In thanking you for sending me the two little notes about Riemann, there is
one question I should like to ask. In your notice of his life I find it stated that he
gave a Habilitationsvorlesung on the Hypotheses of Geometry. I have myself
been occupied with this subject for the last two years in connexion with my work
in physiological optics, but have not yet completed or published this work,
because I hoped to make certain points more general. For instance, I cannot yet
make everything as universal for three dimensions as I can for two. Now I see by
the few indications you give of the results of the work, that Riemann came exactly
to the same conclusion as myself.20
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Notice that Helmholtz' interest is not in "pure" geometry, but geometry "applied" to the
color-problem. In a popular lecture at Heidelberg in 1870, Helmholtz expanded on this
application:

The system of colours is an aggregate of three dimensions, inmasmuch as
each colour, according to the investigations of Thomas Young and of Clerk
Maxwell, may be represented as a mixture of three primary colours...In the same
way we can consider the system of simple tones as an aggregate of two
dimensions, if we distinguish only pitch and intensity...We can, as we know from
daily experience, compare the vertical distance of two points with the horizontal
distance of two others...but be cannot compare the difference between two tones
of equal pitch and different intensity, with that between two tones of equal
intensity and different pitch. Riemann showed, by considerations of this kind, that
the essential foundation of any system of geometry is the expression that it gives
for the distance between two points lying in any direction...
Whilst Riemann entered upon this new field from the side of the most
general and fundamental questions of analytical geometry, I myself arrived at
similar conclusions, partly from seeking to represent in space the system of
colours, involving the comparison of one threefold extended aggregate with
another, and partly from inquiries on the origin of our color ocular measure for
distances in the field of vision.21
The issue here was not who was "first," Gauss, Riemann, or Helmholtz, but what geometry
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was all about in the first place. These three Germans had quite different views on the subject, as
do most philosophers of science still. At the end of the above lecture, Helmholtz took a stab at
the question:

(1) The axioms of geometry, taken by themselves out of all connection
with mechanical properties, represent no relations of real things. When thus
isolated, if we regard them with Kant as forms of intuition transcendentally given,
they constitute a form which any empirical content whatever will fit...This is true,
however, not only of Euclid's axioms, but also the axioms of...

[Riemann].

(2) As soon as certain principles of mechanics are conjoined with the
axioms of geometry, we obtain a system of propositions which has real import,
and which can be verified or overturned by empirical observations...If such a
system were to be taken as a transcendental form of intuition and thought, there
must be assumed a pre-established harmony between form and reality.22

Even more critical to this account of the potentialities of the scientific mind is the question of
to what degree (if any) do the intentions of the author reside in his production. Are Gauss',
Riemann's, or Helmholtz's philosophical biases and motives transmitted, like some virus, to the
user of their equations? Put in that form, the notion that an artifact (and equation, painting, or
poem) contains the artificer's intention seems, at best, romantic sentimentality. Positivists like to
point out that a Rodin sculpture makes as good a doorstop as a Brancuzzi, and
Maxwell-Helmholtz field theories work as well for a philosopher as an engineer. To them utility
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is in the eye of the utilizer. But rearranging the form of this inquiry into the artifact-intention
relation, one can begins to see a problem somewhat like the object-subject or object-context
befuddlements of Kant and the romantics. Or, at any rate, Helmholtz and the other heirs to the
post-romantic tradition thought of such things.
So too did some early moderns--in an obscure bit of coincidence, a later Göttingen product,
the physicist Werner Heisenberg simply assumed that an artifact "carried with it the spirit by
which it was created" (hence the nuclear technology following his quantum mechanics would
spread a world-uniting philosophy).23 Following this coincidence back a little, we find that one
of Heisenberg's co-geniuses, Max Born, spent some time in philosophical studies at Göttingen
under Edmund Husserl and his successor, Martin Heidegger.24 And it is Husserl who brings us
back to the mathematical-philosophical cauldron of the 1870's, for he was a student (in Vienna)
of Franz Brentano, a virtual "Helmholtz of Philosophy." While there seemed no direct
connection between Helmholtz and Brentano in those years, the two appear to have been on
parallel tracks, and we will later make those tracks, philosophical and scientific, converge.
Brentano (a relative of the faintly remembered Ludwig ("Lujo") Brentano the economist and
of Klemens Brentano the romantic poet) was a psychologist-priest who carried the Kantian
agenda of introspection to a controversial conclusion. Mental phenomena (not just "thinking,"
but "seeing," "loving," "wanting”--as in Schopenhauer's "willing," etc.) all seemed to have
necessary "objects." Roderick Chisholm's description of Brentano's famous "theory of
intentionality" follows this thought:

Reference or `direction upon something' (Gerichtetsein) thus is common
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and peculiar to what is mental, and Brentano classified mental phenomena in
terms of the different ways in which they may refer to, or be directed upon, their
objects. There are three ways in which one may be `intentionally' related to any
object A. (1) One may think of A, or, as we sometimes say, have it `before the
mind'...(2) One may take an intellectual stand with respect to A [accepting or
rejecting it]...(3) One may take an emotional stand with respect to A [loving or
hating it].25

Helmholtz' "intentions," particularly certain conclusions shared with Riemann over the
foundations of geometry, will be explored shortly, but the mere record of his Heidelberg musings
already serves well to connect some of the strands of our story--the convergence of science and
philosophy in the nineteenth century. This again challenges that assumption that the
scientific-industrial revolution underway was splitting science away from philosophy, somewhat
reminiscent of the manner that Galileo was said to have split science from religion. On the
integrative contrary, Helmholtz saw himself as much misunderstood multidisciplinary man. In
1881 he wrote:

...I have quite given up hope of living long enough to see any reformation
in philosophy. In my thoughts I rail against the faculty philosophers, like
Schopenhauer, but I will not put this on paper...Yet when I see the mathematicians
and physicists gradually coming round to my ways, it at least gives me hope for
the future. I expected opposition as a matter of course from the faculty people...,
268

but I did not anticipate that...they would deduce the wildest
misunderstandings...The individual [who studies philosophy in the light of
mathematics], even if he be a Riemann, will always be regarded as a crank who is
discussing unfamiliar matters as an amateur.26

Maxwell also recognized Helmholtz' struggle. Back in 1862, before Helmholtz gained a
second fame for for his mathematical philosophies (the first English language reports on
Riemann were sent by Helmholtz), Maxwell noted: I think you asked me about Helmholtz and
his philosophy. He is not a philosopher in the exclusive sense, as Kant, Hegel,...are
philosophers, but one who prosecutes physics and physiology, and expresses therein not only
skill...but wisdom to know what are the desiderata...27

J. WILLARD GIBBS

Among other adventures of his Heidelberg years was Helmholtz's 1868-1869 teaching of the
university-wide general course on progress in the natural sciences. The significance of this event
lies in one of his attentive audience, one of the many foreign visitors for whom learning from
Helmholtz was essential to their careers, Josiah Willard Gibbs, recent Ph. D. from Yale.
Through Gibbs, the complex dialogue between German science and philosophy was transported
to America, there to interact with the Scottish and English imports. Gibbs, who would, like
Maxwell, have few direct students, gained fame in scientific circles chiefly for his mastery of the
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new theoretical methods in the domain of heat. Two such legacies are now called "Gibbsean
Thermodynamics," epitomized in a monumental 300-plus page article "On the equilibrium of
Heterogeneous Substances," and "Statistical Mechanics," summarized in a 1902 textbook. The
former work was directly derived from the methods of Helmholtz (there even survives a
"Gibbs-Helmholtz equation") and was the subject of Maxwell's clay model-carving. The latter
work, finished after the death of the "founders," was the link between the nineteenth century
analogical methods and the twentieth century "second scientific revolution," the so-called
"Quantum Mechanics".c
--------------(c) Einstein, a reluctant revolutionary, was once asked to recall the most powerful thinkers he
had ever known. His unequivocal answer was Hendrick A. Lorentz, the Dutch expert on the
Maxwell agenda. Einstein added, "I never met Willard Gibbs; perhaps, had I done so, I might
have placed him beside Lorentz."28
--------------Gibbs seemed the epitome of the provincial American. His ancestors were clustered in the
collegiate and clerical intellectual elite of New England, and he was raised in faculty housing at
Yale, where his father was professor of philology at the Divinity School.29 He grew up at Yale,
studied at Yale, taught at Yale, lived with his sisters at Yale, and died (in 1903) at Yale, seldom
leaving the area, with the dramatic exception of his incredible study tour of France and Germany
from 1866-1869. His education was, at first, classical--Latin, Greek, and the Liberal Arts in the
English-Prussian tradition. Then in college he excelled at natural science, mathematics, and
engineering, though in America such subjects were not designed to meet "practical" goals.
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Daniel Kevles describes his milieu:

In higher education, science had come a long way since the early
nineteenth century, when theology, the classics, and moral philosophy dominated
the curriculum...In 1828 the Yale faculty sensibly concluded in a report that set
the coming standard for higher educational policy: `As knowledge varies,
education should vary with it.' More important, the Yale professors emphasized
that one requirement of liberal education was to encourage in students `a proper
balance of character,' a balance that could be achieved only by exposing them to
the different branches of science as well as literature...
Subjects were to be taught for the sake of `the discipline and furniture
of the mind,' in the persistent doctrine of the Yale report. Students were to learn
physics in order to become `familiar with facts, with the process of induction, and
the varieties of probable evidence,' not to become physicists or engineers.30

There was, it seems, something lacking in Gibbs' education, namely a higher level knowledge
of contemporary ideas in mathematical physics with which to attack research problems at the
level of the Europeans. So to get into the game he had to go directly to Europe. Lynde Phelps
Wheeler, Gibbs' student, successor, and biographer, describes the rationale:

It is difficult to compare this preparation for a career in science with that
available at the same time in England and on the continent of Europe...It can,
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however, be said that the instruction in mathematics and science in Europe was,
on the whole ...less concerned than was ours with the applications of science, that
it was somewhat more advanced, and that there existed an appreciation of the
value of science for science's sake alone which was almost wholly wanting on
this side of the Atlantic."31

Whatever the parity was between America and the continent, the curricular philosophies
would be uprooted in the late nineteenth century by the American version of the Schulkrieg. The
early reforms of Whewell and the later innovations of the academic movements that gave
"national laboratories" to Maxwell and Helmholtz, and the Princeton based Scottish philosophy
of Hamilton and McCosh, would clash in America as well as in Europe. Though a loyal observer
of the resulting arguments at Yale Faculty meetings, Gibbs ignored the academics and
concentrated on his mathematical methods. He went abroad for training, not an education.
Gibbs' philosophical souvenirs from his study abroad are not recorded, but his technical
shopping can be inferred from his sketchy study notebooks (regrettably the Heidelberg notebook
is missing). In France he attended the courses given by prominent mathematicians and physicists.
Their names have not yet appeared in this study, but that of Darboux in mathematical theory of
heat and Liouville in rational mechanics will suggest to historians the kind of methods he
learned. For our purposes, we might think of them as more modern versions of Fourier--that is,
much more sophisticated mathematical convolutions much more detached from any commitment
to a physical theory of heat. Gibbs studied a lot of "pure" mathematics--number theory and
"higher" geometry. Probably not non-Euclidean geometries, as Riemann's papers had just been
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posthumously published in German, and may not have made it to France by this time. He may
have studied too much (16 hours of lectures a week and lots of outside reading), for he suffered
some kind of a breakdown at the end of the first semester.32
After recuperating on the Riviera, accompanied by his older sisters, Anna and Julia, Gibbs
moved on to a more moderate study in Berlin in 1867. There again the names of his instructors
are mostly forgotten, but were at the time formidable. Helmholtz' great predecessor in theories of
heat, Rudolph Magnus, taught general physics, and Dr. Gibbs thought it wise to attend even this
introductory course. Karl Weierstrass and Leopold Kronecker taught advanced mathematics.
Locked in some arcane philosophical battle over the philosophy of mathematics, Weierstrass and
Kronecker attracted only a few hardy students, but Gibbs was one of them. Actually, elements of
the issues between the battling mathematicians were precisely the same as those concerning
Helmholtz and the "pure" philosophers of Göttingen and Zurich (like Brentano)--what was it in
"knowledge" that was also "real" (if anything)?. We might focus a bit on thes conflicting
philosophies of mathematics.
In a way the Kant-Hamilton position was that nothing in knowledge was real--all that
knowledge was a "description" of aspects of what could be (in principle) perceived. This line
was avoided by Maxwell, but picked up at late-century Göttingen to evolve into the
"phenomenology" of Edmund Husserl. To the more "traditional" idealists, of Schelling
derivation, everything in knowledge was real--that which could be imagined was therefore in and
of the world. Kronecker, for instance, distrusted the imagination, and is celebrated for his
attempts to found mathematics on a basis of the (platonic) necessities of whole numbers--his
celebrated (derided) maxim being "God Himself made the whole numbers--everything else is the
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work of men."33 Weierstrass was more of the opinion that mathematics was a made-up game,
whose attachment to the "real" world was more a matter of convenience than of philosophy.34
Gibbs never said (to Wheeler) what he thought about all of this, but his upcoming encounter with
Helmholtz suggests a number of doctoral dissertations in the history of philosophy yet to be
written.
More celebrities than this taught Gibbs (Quincke, for instance), but we must move on to his
reading, for there his notes reveal more attention to the contemporary problems. He took notes
on works by Gauss on statistics, William Rowan Hamilton on rational dynamics, Thomson
(Kelvin) on electricity, Fresnel and Kirchoff on "the relations between electrodynamics and light"
(including Hamilton again). What is intriguing in those notes is what is missing: Hamilton on
Quaternions, and Maxwell, Clausius and Helmholtz on heat and light. These, with Riemann,
were the innovators that Gibbs would interpret to the twentieth century, and were they founders
of the physical-philosophical revolution for which he shares much of the credit and blame.35
After Berlin, Gibbs moved on to Heidelberg for the academic year 1868-69. War fever was
just beginning as the state of Baden was reorganizing its army to blend with Prussia's for the
likely event of war with France. The University continued business as usual, with Helmholtz
teaching the general introduction and his colleagues expounding advanced topics. Kirchoff
lectured on mathematical physics, Bunsen on experimental Chemistry, and Paul
DuBois-Reymond, brother of Emil, Helmholtz's long-time friend then at Berlin, on "pure"
mathematics. Moritz Cantor taught the history of mathematics, and we might conjecture that it
was in this course that Gibbs learned that mathematics could be understood as an historical
agenda instead of a timeless rediscovery of truths, a point at issue in the mathematicians' battles.
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Lacking his Heidelberg notebooks, we cannot document exactly where he learned what, but
judging from his subsequent paper, his first publication Graphical Methods in the
Thermodynamics of Fluids (1873), he successfully attached himself to Helmholtz's peculiar use
of mathematical analogy.
Gibbs' debut in mathematical physics is seldom remembered, except for the fact that it was
published in the Transactions of the Connecticut Academy of Sciences. The assumed obscurity
of this journal is often cited as a factor in the awesome neglect of Gibbs' reputation in today's
histories. Wheeler took offense at this slight, pointing out that the Transactions were exchanged
with at least 140 foreign associations, and that Gibbs himself took great pains to communicate
his work by mail all over Europe:

Thus it would seem that the distribution was sufficiently large to have
permitted anyone abroad who so desired to obtain access to Gibbs' papers, even if
he had not been included in Gibbs' personal distribution of reports. The truth
would seem to be that when, with the gradual increase of interest in the no man's
land between physics and chemistry, some of Gibbs' results were independently
rediscovered, and attention had been drawn to the fact that these were not new
discoveries but were all contained...in Gibbs' monograph, the natural human
reaction of blaming someone or something else for the oversight came into play.
Thus the alleged `inaccessibility' of the Transactions of the Connecticut Academy
became a sort of scapegoat for those Europeans who, perhaps not altogether
unjustifiably, were then apt to ignore North America as a possible source of
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anything of theoretical interest.36

Although the seminal monograph Wheeler mentions is Gibbs' third, the first is where we seek
evidence of the transmission of the European agenda to America--and what we find is a clear
example of Maxwell's methods of mathematical analogies. Here there were, as required, two
models--a thermodynamic system, a blob of unspecified fluid undergoing physical changes as a
result of temperature changes, and a mathematical model. What Gibbs adds is a geometric
analogy to the mathematical model. The same relations among changing variables (energy,
pressure, temperature,etc.) expressed in the calculus can be more clearly expressed in the
geometry of the areas of figures drawn on two- and three-dimensional diagrams. The
thermodynamics here modeled came partially from a text and an article by Clausius of 1865. As
Gibbs had missed Clausius's work in Berlin, we can presume that Helmholtz brought it to his
attention in Heidelberg. This suggestion becomes more probable in light of two other cited
sources in Gibbs: P. G. Tait and "Professor Rankine." These two are Scotsmen. Tait was the
intermediary between Maxwell and Thomson (Kelvin)--and good friend of Helmholtz--and
William Rankine was a fellow Edinburger who become a Glasgow civil engineer and professor
at Thomson's Glasgow University. c Of more concern to Gibbs was the new thermodynamic
variable
---------(c) He was also the author of the popular patriotic song "They Shall Never Have Gibraltar."37
---------"entropy" invented by Clausius, about which he noted:
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The term entropy, it will be observed, is here used in accordance with the
original suggestion of Clausius, and not in the sense in which it has been
employed by Professor Tait and others after his suggestion. The same quantity
has been called by Professor Rankine the Thermodynamic function.38

The only other authors cited by Gibbs were a Frenchman (Cazin) and a German (Zeuner), and
thus none of his European teachers actually appear in this monograph--but the style and subject
are clearly Helmholtz's, and the method so novel that no reference to related published works
would be expected.
A brief look at Gibbs' early work raises in passing another of the alleged reasons for his
obscurity: a "logical severity and mathematical conciseness."39 Wheeler dismisses this as no
more abstruse than was the famous Maxwell. He claimed to have taught both authors to graduate
students with equal ease. However, since to other students, Maxwell's mathematics are
notoriously difficult, this parity with Gibbs' style does suggest a degree of avoidance by readers.
More convincingly, Wheeler notes that Gibbs did not write "popular works" as did Helmholtz,
nor did he have "translators" to the general public such as Maxwell did in Tait. Gibbs
"marketed" his ideas, but only to an august audience of specialists--his 1876-1893 mailing list of
reprints has over 350 names on it40 (and is a nice clue to the "invisible college" of researchers
who cared about such difficult subjects). Virtually all of our players got copies of papers by
Gibbs: Helmholtz got all 17 on the list, Kirchoff 12, Boltzmann 11, Kronecker 16, Weierstrass
13, Maxwell all until he died, Thomson 16, etc. It is striking to note that the vast majority of the
350 were academics, few, if any, were engineers or engineering associations, like the VDI. As
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with Maxwell and Helmholtz, Gibbs' heart was in the "world on paper" of mathematical
analogies, and unlike them, he seemed to have little interest in practical inventions or popular
enlightenment. There are many who would disagree, citing the practical consequences of his
work, exemplified by the theory of the difficult chemistry of Portland Cement, or the intriguing
mathematical theory of the steam-engine speed regulator, the "flyball governor."
This latter invention deserves mention. Gibbs' model for the governor involved a very messy
model derived from his European studies of Maxwell and Sir William Rowan Hamilton.
Maxwell had himself originated this study the early 1870's.41 Helmholtz and Gibbs took shots at
it, as did several generations of Wranglers in the Cambridge Tripos and graduate candidates at
American universities. The "physics" of the problem is really irrelevant, though the problem
concerns an "ideal" device to regulate engine speed. The model consists of two weights
("fly-balls") attached by hinges and springs to a spinning shaft such that if the spin increases the
weights swing out and slow the rotation, and if the spin decreases the springs draw the weights in
to increase the rotation. Thus the device acts a regulator, or "governor," keeping at a preset rate
the spin of a shaft--say of a steam engine. In fact, such governors had been a standard feature of
steam engines since the eighteenth century. What attracted Gibbs and others to this venerable
gadget was that the mathematical description of its action, particularly expressed in the format of
the elegant general dynamics of the William Rowan Hamilton, allowed particularly intriguing
mathematical methods to be exercised (in Whewell's sense of mental "exercise"). Abstracting
and generalizing these methods, and using the "governor" action as an analogy to other
self-regulating systems, the full power of the Maxwell-Helmholtz agenda could be displayed.
According to C.W.F. Everitt,
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Maxwell's [1864] paper "On Governors" is generally regarded as the
foundation of control theory. Norbert Wiener coined the name `cybernetics' in its
honor, from `kybernetes,' the greek for `steersman,' from which, via a Latin
corruption, the word `governor' is etymologically descended.42

Perhaps Gibbs too could be credited in the ancestry of modern cybernetics, but even so, this
"result" of the mathematical fly-ball governor problem is far from practical engineering. The
issue was to the power of mixed-mathematics and the analogical agenda, not to design
steam-engine parts.
Finally, in considering Gibbs, we would have liked to hear more from him on his direct
connection with the abstractions of Maxwell. In 1888, in reply to a compliment on his address
on "multiple algebra," he wrote:

...My object in writing it was threefold; to vindicate the value of the
methods of Multiple Algebra, to call attention to the fundamental importance of
Grassmann's work in this field, & lastly, to express my own ideas on the subject...
My first acquaintance with quaternions was in reading Maxwell's E. &
M. where Quaternion notations are considerably used...I therefore began to work
out ab initio, the algebra of the two kinds of multiplication, the three differential
operators [del] applied to a scalar & the two operations to a vector...To these
subjects was added that of lin. vec. functions which is also prominent in
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Maxwell's E.&.M.
....
At all events, I saw the methods which I was using, while nearly those
of Hamilton, were almost exactly those of Grassmann...I have no doubt...the
methods of Grassmann are superior to those of Hamilton...43

There's not much Continental philosophy here, only a technical bow to Maxwell, Hamilton,
and Grassmann. In case you're wondering, Hermann Grassmann was a Berlin mathematician
whose 1862 Ausdehnungslehre fell into Gibbs' hands. This was a revision of his
pre-revolutionary (1843) mathematical invention that "was totally disregarded by the
experts...The new version fared no better than the first."44 Discouraged, Grassmann turned to
linguistics, producing influential studies on the Sanskrit language. At least that was well
received. Still, in the year of his death, 1877, Grassmann was still trying to promote his algebra
through a revision of the Ausdehnungslehre. Just why Gibbs was trying to elevate this man to
the ranks of Hamilton and Maxwell is characteristically unrecorded, but that is what he tried to
do. These days it is in the Gibbs form that Maxwell's electromagnetic theory is taught to
physicists, and Grassmann's algebra seems to be an abstract formality that, coupled with
Hamilton's "quaternions," suggest a deeper structure to these ideas than have been yet exploited.
By direct contact with Helmholtz and indirect contact with Maxwell,Gibbs then deserves his
genealogical place in the center of the "second generation" of "mathematical physicists."

THE GUYS FROM GÖTTINGEN
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While Helmholtz was in Heidelberg, it seems that equally important developments in method
were going on in Hanover, a small state later annexed by Prussia in 1866, after the Danish war
and after Helmholtz had gone to Baden. Given the mathematical fame of its Göttingen
University, we can presume that Helmholtz would have gone there had he been called, but
Göttingen wasn't looking for physiologists. It did attract other sorts of ambitious scholars,
particularly philologists and mathematicians. We will first seek connections to our agenda by
looking to Göttingen for earlier dialectics: conservative politics and liberal sympathies, pure and
applied mathematics, practical and metaphysical presumptions and, of course, the ever-unifying
analogies.
We have met a number of Göttingen products (e.g. Bunsen, William Siemens, Born,
Heisenberg, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow), but by far the most representative Kernel of the
mathematical discourse, and the most influential on Maxwell and Helmholtz, were Riemann and
his reluctant sponsor, Gauss.
The legend of Karl Friedrich Gauss (who died in 1855) dominates mathematical history. He
was a prodigy, inventing whole new fields of mathematics before he was thirty. Then, claiming
that mathematics was only for the young, he switched to "useful" mathematical applications for
the rest of his career. Given this was in romantic Hanover (home of the English monarchy of the
Georges--George II had founded Göttingen University), "applied" mathematics meant astronomy.
Thus it followed that Gauss used observations of the newly discovered planet Ceres to develop a
statistical method of determining the paths of planets to great precision using only a few
observations. As Ceres had been lost at the time, and was found again from Gauss' prediction,
this feat alone was enough to make Gauss a legend. This hardly ever impresses mathematicians,
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but physicists who labor hard at extracting gobs of information from very few expensive
measurements are ever grateful. More to the point, the statistical methods evolved from Gauss'
work were precisely the mathematical tools that Maxwell employed in his "other theory," the
Dynamical Theory of Gases. The methods were quite general, independent of the particular
model used, so Maxwell probably missed the astronomy lesson, and picked up the ideas from
another Gaussian "application," his investigation of the magnetic storms on Earth. How this
came about will be another clue to the traces of metaphysics in this otherwise positivistic story.
It happened that Gauss had also applied his art to a mountain of geomagnetic data he had
collected from all over Germany. Within the story of Gauss and his "Magnetic Association"
(Magnetischeverein) lie the direct connections to our players: Humboldt and his exploratory
travels and dream of international science, Helmholtz and his famous electrical device to "cancel
out" the earth's magnetic field in a laboratory (still called the "Helmholtz coil"), Maxwell and his
abstract mathematizing of electromagnetism (employing "Gauss' Theorem"), Riemann and his
non-Euclidean Geometry, Gibbs and Hamilton and their newer multiple algebras, and so on.
Further, we must introduce a new player, Gauss's collaborator in his geophysical applications,
Wilhelm Weber, who will finally connect us to Sir William Siemens, the telegraph, and the myth
of practical uses of scientific ideas.
We begin in 1807 when, after his youthful success as a mathematical genius, Gauss got a job
as director of the Göttingen observatory ,on the strength of his fame in having "found" Ceres
after its discoverer, Piazzi, had "lost" it in 1801.45 By 1817 he had revolutionized theoretical
methods in astronomy (via geometry), and decided to become a scientific explorer in the mold of
Humboldt. He made several surveying expeditions, trying to map the whole Kingdom of
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Hanover, inventing instruments and methods as he went.d In 1829 he discovered that people
were ---------(d) This survey is celebrated on the obverse of the current German ten-mark German bill. A
survey map and surveying theodolite are show. On the fromt side we see Gauss' portrait, some
Göttingen buildings, and a graph of his famous "Gaussian curve," a key element in his statistical
modeling theory.
--------------measuring magnetic "declination" (variations in the "dip" of a compass needle) as clues to the
location of the north pole and "true" geometrical shape of the earth. Thus on his surveying
expeditions he began to make such measurements himself, and then urged foreign associations
and universities to set up their own "magnetic observatories." He collected literally millions of
bits of data, and by 1831 had hired an assistant, Wilhelm Weber, to sort it all out.

Though

Weber never did make much out of that morass of data, he and Gauss did seem to detect some
kind of "magnetic storms" in them, and thus generated enough international interest to form the
Magnetic Association to track such storms. There were six volumes of reports and papers from
this group from 1836-1841--15 from Gauss, 23 from Weber--and it was from the first report that
Maxwell read of Gauss' "General Theory of Terrestrial Magnetism."46
Meanwhile, Weber lost his job in 1837, having been ousted by the King of Hanover himself,
Karl August, for protesting a withdrawal of a "liberal" constitution. This had been sort of a
rehearsal for the Revolutions of 1848, and with Weber were ousted six other professors (thus the
now famed "Göttingen Seven"), including (one always adds) the Brothers Grimm. The inclusion
of the latter suggests a Göttingen fashion of Naturphilosophie, in which the Grimms' philological
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collection of folk sayings was a very dramatic "scientific" endeavor to discover all variations of
dialect and word origin and find the ur-language from which they all sprang. Weber's interest in
collecting magnetic data was of a similar intent, and his association with the "seven's" liberal
politics reminds us of the breadth of application of the Jena agenda (ironically enough, Weber
was educated at Halle, and wrote his doctorate on the theory of the acoustics of reed organ
pipes).47 Gauss, even with his Humboldtian sympathies, was a staunch conservative and
Royalist, and enthusiastically supported the dismissal of Weber, though they continued their
work by correspondence from Leipzig. It may have been that Gauss hated this romantic
dilettante, or at least that some personal differences could be one motive for their celebrated joint
"invention" of the telegraph. Their telegraph, a modification of one they read about, was required
to connect Weber's laboratory and Gauss's observatory, which were separated by a mile--and
neither collaborator wanted to visit the other in person. The Gauss and Weber instruments rigged
up to measure the small electric and magnetic pulses in this telegraph were much cited by
Maxwell, as was their notion that moving charges exerted different forces on each other than did
stationary ones. This latter point was much contested--a similar idea had been generated by
Ampère in Paris, and much of Maxwell"s "theory" of electromagnetism actually came from
squeezing competing models by Gauss and Weber, Ampère, and Helmholtz into a mathematical
framework--then deciding which one fit best. There is still some confusion as to whose formula
"won," since in the hands of Maxwell, you will remember, formulas are only the final bow at the
end of a thought process, or the tools left around after the building of an analogy.
Somewhere in there, Gauss kept on reformulating geometry, trying to get the mathematics of
flat maps to make sense on a spherical model. The practical problems involved had been dealt
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with by such geographers as Mercator and Bleue in the seventeenth century, but the mathematical
theorems were intriguing. What, for instance, can one make of the angles of a triangle drawn on
a sphere (or a football)--they differ from angles drawn flat, but can one precisely say how?
Gauss’ student Riemann hatched up a whole new way to do geometry on curved surfaces, one
which violated the rules ("Euclidean geometry") that Gauss was trying to use (Riemann's
"Parallel lines" met, Gauss and Euclid's never did). Gauss didn't much like this innovation
(much as he didn't like Weber's--he was a rather vain man), but died shortly after the idea broke,
leaving legend writers to decide who--Gauss or Riemann--really invented the new geometry.
Others, of course get some "credit"--Lobachevsky and Bolyai are often mentioned,48 but in our
study the important people are those who made the ideas public property--the movers and
shakers. Here that means Riemann's publicist, Helmholtz.
Despite Gauss' exhaustive work in astronomy and applied mathematics, his earlier genius as a
"pure" mathematician and his emphasis on the distinction between that and the less distinguished
"applied" mathematics dominated his reputation at Göttingen. Several generations of ambitious
logicians generated elaborate agendas of reformulating the abstract foundations of arithmetic,
geometry, analysis, and the like. This agenda came to be characterized as a program of
"formalization," so that physicists and philosophers who wanted to include mathematics in their
inquiries had to look to Göttingen to determine if their formal logic was of sufficient rigor.
It would be remiss to omit that the Göttingen agenda was not exclusively the province of
males. Philosopher Emily Silverman has recounted the career of a female contributor to the
mathematical side of mixed-mathematics, Sofya Kovaleskaya, a Göttingen Ph. D. in
mathematics. This overlooked Russian was a minor celebrity in her day, winning the French
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Academy's prestigious Prix Bordin in 1888 for her work in the intricate mathematics involved in
the dynamics of a rigid body.49
Kovaleskaya originally came to the attention of our founders as a classmate of Gibbs at
Heidelberg, auditing classes with Helmholtz, Kirchoff, Bunsen, Paul duBois Reymond, and our
biographer Koenigsberg. As a woman she was not allowed to formally enroll at Heidelberg, nor
was she matriculated at Berlin, where she followed Helmholtz in 1870. Her studies and research
there were mostly done with Karl Weierstrass, one of the battling Berlin
mathematician-philosophers we mention as a tutor to Gibbs. In fact, Kovalevskaya's studies with
Weierstrass began the year after Gibbs', with an audited course in "selected problems in
Geometry and Mechanics." During the war, she took six weeks off to participate in the Paris
commune in 1871, probably not endearing her to patriotic Berliners like Helmholtz. Thus it is no
surprise that Berlin turned down her application for a Ph. D., despite support from Weierstrass
and several promising papers, including "Supplements and Remarks to Laplace's Investigations
of the form of Saturn's Ring," by now a staple exercise in the Maxwell-Helmholtz agenda. She
then applied to Göttingen, and did get her degree in 1874. Her subsequent career in Russia,
Berlin, Paris, and Stockholm, where she wound up as a professor, was distinguished, and crossed
our agenda many times, for instance in a flawed paper on the refraction of light in a crystalline
medium.50 Swedes partilularly admired her astrophysics, as you can see from a fragment of the
1891 obituary poem by Fritz Laffler:

Imaginative, fiery soul, your
Boat of spirit weighed its anchor
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Now to wander through forever,
Mid the stars, where you ever
Tarried...
...

Has your thought gone up, designing
when the stars were saying 'love you,'
When great Saturn's ring was shining
In the dark blue sky above you
...
Rays of light, you saw them, gazing
At them with insight amazing
They refracted when in crystals
Now what are they in the distance? 51

Among professional mathematicians, Kovalevskaya's celebrity was greater in "pure"
mathematics, more in the tradition of her adopted Göttingen than in the emerging philosophical
agenda of our physicist-philosophers.
By the early twentieth century, Göttingen mathematician Felix Klein and his successor, David
Hilbert, were virtually czars of mathematical truth, and their "applied" students, Born,
Heisenberg, and John von Neumann became responsible for developing the formal, "axiomatic"
side of the second scientific revolution. Through some quirks of history, the physical side of the
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new science was not developed at Heidelberg, or even at Berlin (despite Einstein's presence
there), but at Munich, Copenhagen, and Zurich. Not unexpectedly, the English version of the
quantum mechanics (by Dirac) was developed at Cambridge. Thus Maxwell's status as a founder
is reflected in the academic geography of subsequent ideas, while Helmholtz's is not so easily
mapped.
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CHAPTER 7

Maxwell's "retirement years" in the late 1860's gave him time to sophisticate his mid-career
work. While he expanded his reputation as a scientific authority in a Victorian society that was
listening more to its scientists, he deepened his study of two particular strands of his agenda.
One, illustrated here by a minor work in mathematics, was to explore the relationships between
mathematics and reality, the other was to develop his mathematical theories of heat. The latter
brings into this story the celebrated Austrian Ludwig Boltzmann, with whom Maxwell's thermal
studies are ever linked. As with the intrusion of Gibbs in Helmholtz' story, Boltzmann brings
into the game a larger world of discourse, particularly connections to the celebrated modernism
of late-century Vienna. The Maxwell-Boltzmann-Helmholtz research onto heat, its
analogies--the "statistical thermodynamics"--and its alleged laws of physics, The First and
Second Laws of Thermodynamics, provided a powerful subtext to all sorts of moral,
philosophical, and political discourses. Did it also fuel the second industrial revolution?

ON HILLS AND DALES

Maxwell went into early retirement in 1865, apparently to escape the unsatisfying chores of
teaching. He maintained an apartment in London, though, and came back in 1866 to do some
more evening courses for workingmen. Before being lured out of retirement for the new
Cavendish lab, he produced a number of theoretical works that indicated a more subtle and
philosophical view of his earlier virtuoso performances in heat and light. The paper on
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governors came out in 1868, showing him grappling with the extended possibilities of
"traditional" mathematics. A peculiar-sounding paper, On Hills and Dales, came out in 1870--a
very clever work of pure mathematics, following Gauss' work in geometry into an abstract region
now known as "topology."
In this paper Maxwell proved a very formal theorem tying down the respective numbers of
peaks, dips, and other regions of quick change on a curved surface. The whimsical title evoked a
model of the abstract surface, say the map of a Scots county. In such an analogy, Maxwell's
theorem would require that if you had, say 3 peaks ("hills") and 3 ridges, then you would have
exactly 7 depressions ("dales")--under certain conditions at the borders. An Oxford professor
called it "Noah's Theorem," since presumably Noah could count the emerging hills and dales as
the flood waters receded.1 Such a theorem was not a feature of the land, but a mathematical
property of maps--maps that were understood by a Euclidean geometry. Now, of course, a
Riemannian map might have another ratio of hills to dales. Did that mean that by running around
a county and counting puddles, one could "prove" the "reality" of one or another kind of
geometry?
That was not a whimsical question, for the linchpin of the Kantian commitment of the old
Scots Hamilton and the newer strict "neo-Kantians" lay in the logical necessity of certain "truths"
beyond, outside of, and prior to any particular experience (hence the famous term synthetic
apriori). If geometry was thus true "before" experience, than it couldn't be proven "by" any
experience, even Noah's. But a difficulty now arose with Riemann and Helmholtz' "discovery"
of a useful "alternative" geometry. Presumably if . Euclid and Riemann contradicted, one of the
two must be "physically" wrong. In that case perhaps experiments might prove the "rightness"
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of a geometry, and Kant was wrong. At least Helmholtz said so.2 And so too did the Heidelberg
experimentalists who opposed the intrusion of mathematical "truth" into measurably reality. The
world was to be discovered, not imagined.
In England, Tait and Kelvin gleefully pounced on the anti-Kantian success of Riemann and
Helmholtz's work to refute fuzzy-headed theorists--waging a particularly harsh battle of words
with the Viennese physicist Ludwig Boltzmann, who they intimated was a mathematical
"terrorist." The problem here is that we have seen that Maxwell and Helmholtz were, despite
polite nods to the lab people, "a priorists" themselves, and this obscure philosopher's quibble
needs to be straightened out. What we are driving at is to show that Maxwell, Helmholtz,
Boltzmann, Gibbs, and Einstein were in fundamental agreement with Kant on the nature of
mathematics and the imagination. Thus this slippery non-Euclidean business is a red-herring that
has misled several generations of observers who presumed that science had finally destroyed
Kantian ideas.
One of these moderns, positivist Hans Reichenbach, even had Gauss's surveying expeditions
portrayed as a geometrical laboratory where Gauss was trying to find out whether the three
interior angles of a triangle "really" added up to 180 degrees.3 This tale is oft repeated in defense
of "physical geometry,” but it really has no historical license. As Gauss did his triangulations
long before he met young Riemann, it is doubtful that he had in mind "experimenting" with
geometries. The idea behind this speculation was, however, not patently implausible, especially
in light of the famous Eddington experiments of 1919. These were astronomical measurements
to verify the utility of Einstein's use of non-Euclidean geometry in cosmological mapping. When
it appeared that astronomical triangulation had indeed "proved" that Riemann's geometry, as
291

employed by Einstein, was the "true" geometry of the cosmos, the final demise of Kant's a priori
was proclaimed, and precursors of the funeral werere constructed as far back as the time of
Gauss. In addition to the alleged experiments there were biographical indications that science
had refuted Kant, not the least of which was Helmholtz's own statement to that effect:

The strictest Kantians emphasise the particulars in which Kant in my
opinion suffered from the imperfect development of the special sciences in his
day, and fell into error. The nucleus of these errors lies in the axioms of geometry
which he regards as a priori forms of intuition, but which are really propositions
tested by observation, and which if proved incorrect might eventually be rejected.4

Surely this information conflicts with our neo-Kantian portrayal of Helmholtz, Maxwell, and
Einstein. It seems indeed a large gap in the teeth of the Cheshire cat, and some fancy tap-dancing
will be required to get around it. For now, however, we are relieved to find Maxwell not making
such philosophical significance for geometry in Hills and Dales.
Still, we can use Maxwell's arguments to illuminate the particular function of reason in such
allegedly empirical considerations. The stakes may be made clearer by building a simple model
of Maxwell's argument.
Draw a circle or other closed figure and divide it up by drawing three intersecting lines across
it. The lines may intersect--if so, count the number of intersections ("vertices") as "hills." Count
each line (three) as a "ridge." Count the number of blank spaces as "dales." You will find that
the number of ridges plus the number of hills plus one will give the number of dales. Add,
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subtract, or move a ridge and the numerical pattern will not change. This suggests a provable
theorem, and Maxwell provided the formal proof..a
--------------(a) This is a much simplified model of the actual problem, a variation on an old argument by
the much neglected eighteenth century mathematical physicist, Leonhard Euler, but it contains
right the analogies for our argument.
--------------One distinct feature of this model invokes the rules of geometry by which the theorem is
proved. The Kantian point, that geometry is prior to experience, comes from a "second" feature:
the representation of spaces and vertices as hills and dales. For argument's sake, suppose some
Noah had spotted an extra hill, without seeing the required extra dales. Would that be a test of
the formula, requiring rejection of Maxwell's proof? Again setting aside Helmholtz's statement
for the later tap-dance, the answer should be no. In a mismatch between correct proof and
evidence, it must be the evidence, not the logic which is tainted. Assuming our puzzled Noah
counted correctly, the failure of the formula points to the use of a bad model, not bad reason.
Maybe Noah mis-identified a dale, overlooked a puddle, or committed some other such blunder.
The analogy, after all, was in his head, not in nature. Thus the a priori here can survive any
"experimental" test, and Kant is not yet in deep trouble.
The other purpose of this model-model is to suggest how reason actually works to establish
"true" theorems. The trick lies in the "demonstration" suggested--draw the figure and count, then
you will "see" that the hill/dale count is indeed inevitable. But just how does one "see?" Don't
you remember your high school geometry teacher (or computer screen) insisting that you "see"
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the "obvious" in some silly diagram? And, finally, when you did "see," what was it you "saw"?
The Kantian logician claims that you saw that the situation could not be otherwise. It was
impossible that there were more than two sides to each line, more than four spaces near the
vertex of two lines, etc., so it "followed that..." In other words, the convincing argument rested
on some "axiom" which was "self evident" in that to assume anything but the axiom was
nonsense ("self-contrary"). The reliance of this model of logic on "negatives" and impossibilities
should remind us of the original sources of Helmholtz's conservation of Kraft--that it is
impossible to create a perpetual motion machine, so it "follows that..."
It may well have been the reliance on such negativism that led the later champion of modern
anti-metaphysicalism, Ernst Mach, to include Helmholtz (in 1883) and Boltzmann (in 1901) in
his lists of supporters prefacing the first and fourth editions of his epochal Die Mechanik. In that
tome, Mach argued that "instinctive knowledge" of experience pre-informs scientific
abstractions, and that "it is a peculiar property of instinctive knowledge that it is predominantly
of a negative nature."5
It was an example, the "impossibility" of accepting "perpetual motion" as an empirical fact in the
mechanics of the seventeenth century mechanic Simon Stevin (Stevinus) that provoked Mach to
that observation.
Even a half-century after Mach, a lone post-positivist physicist-philosopher, Percy Bridgman
(Nobel Prize, 1946), claimed

It must be admitted, I think, that the laws of thermodynamics have a
different feel from most of the other laws of the physicist.
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There is something more palpably verbal about them--they smell more of
their human origin. The guiding motif is strange to most of physics: namely, a
capitalizing of the universal failure of human beings to construct perpetual motion
machines of either the first or the second kind. Why should we expect nature to
be interested either positively or negatively in the purposes of human beings,
particularly purposes of such an unblushing economic tinge? 6

It is also this negativism, the rejected "other world" of the impossible-to-imagine, that
underlies Maxwell and Helmholtz's notion of the utility of mathematics in physics. Hills and
dales, experiments on viscosity of gases, and views through the ophthalmoscope of the three
dimensional world being portrayed on a two dimensional retina, were all models that
demonstrated the utility (clarifying power) of abstract axioms and laws. If the experiment failed,
then did the "law" fail? Maxwell, Kant, and Hamilton said not, and, despite Helmholtz's words
to the contrary, they proceeded in their mathematical physics accordingly.
This metaphysical agenda was not without opposition. There was, for instance, a sometimes
bitter personal feud between partisans of Weber and Helmholtz7 over the "correctness" of
respectively proposed "laws" of the attraction of two moving charges (i.e. "currents"). Maxwell
more or less "settled" the argument in favor of Weber by showing that his formula was consistent
with the law of conservation, whereas Helmholtz's wasn't.8 There was no experiment here, just
another formal consistency argument--it was "impossible" to logically assume or imagine both
Helmholtz's law of attraction and his law of conservation were simultaneously true for this
analogy (Gedankenexperiment).
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Hills and Dales was not a major work, though it here is used to make a major point. The more
influential work of Maxwell's retirement was his Treatise on Electricity and Magnetism. The
book contained little that was obviously new, but it put all of the technical arguments together,
provided an exhaustive historical summary, and presented it in a coherent and convincing form.
This was not a popularization by any means, for the book was notoriously hard to read by even
competent mathematicians of the day. But it was, nonetheless, convincing.b Trusted experts,
even rivals like Tait, Thomson (Kelvin), and Helmholtz vouched for the legitimacy of the
--------------(b) This was a case similar to Newton's great Principia, which is said to have convinced the
philosopher John Locke despite the latter's mathematical incompetence. He simply had a trusted
expert--Newton's rival Christian Huygens, attest to the technical reliability, and accepted the
philosophical remarks as "proven."
--------------mathematics, and licensed hardy intellectuals to dig out the descriptive parts of the theory
embedded in the non-mathematical prose. Unfortunately, what the amateurs missed was the
method, and what they got was an inference of over-literal visions of the material aether.
Maxwell tried to point out that aether was formally only a heuristic device, but was ignored. So
it was that the myth of Maxwell's paternity of the Victorian aether obscured his most important
method-analogy, the "field."
Beyond his text on Electromagnetism and another on Heat, there was much to keep Maxwell
busy in "retirement." In 1868 he tried to get a job as Principal of St. Andrews, where his beloved
Forbes had moved and was then retiring. Maxwell didn't get the job, despite Thomson's
296

recommendation. The historian Ivan Tolstoy speculated that there might be some political
elements in this, as a protege of the Duke of Argyll was appointed instead.9 Some of Maxwell's
civic conservatism lies hidden in that remark, for the Duke, the University's Chancellor, was a
supporter of the new liberal Gladstone government. The politics of this becomes murky, for the
Queen, to whose conservative principles Maxwell was loyal, hated Gladstone. Nonetheless, she
happily married her daughter, Louise, to the Duke of Argyll's son. One supposes this was more a
geographical sentiment than a political one, for Victoria loved Scotlandc, where her favorite
castle, Balmoral, was located. The royal marriage took place in 1871, after Maxwell's
--------------( c ) Louise might not have, for she rejected Scots servants in her new household--"I won't have
an absurd man in a kilt following me everywhere" 10 (a rather cruel reference to her mother's
rumored amorous Scots servant, John Brown).
--------------disappointment, but perhaps it. illustrates how Argyll's clout in London could heavily outweigh
Thomson's had he a mind to overlook a conservative Scots physicist like Maxwell.

Beyond

politics, there was also Argyll's own intensive commitment to the romanticism of the spiritual
materialists so popular in Victorian circles. In 1883 he wrote his own treatise on science, called
"The Unity of Nature." It was a sequel to his theological tract of 1866, "The Reign of Laws," and
in it he complained of Maxwell's timidity in declining a materialist (and spiritual) interpretation
of atoms:

We speak and think of "atoms," even in the inorganic world, as endowed
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with properties so wonderful and mysterious that some men doubt their existence,
and others, like Sir J. Herschel and Professor Clerk Maxwell, can only regard
them as "manufactured articles.11

He correctly saw Maxwell treating atoms as analogies, not as "real," and inevitably rejected a
similar non-materialistic treatment of the ether as well:

The luminiferous medium is, therefore, in itself invisible; and in its nature
can only be arrived at by pure reasoning--reasoning, of course, founded on
observation...and...Light is nothing but the undulatory movement of a substantial
medium.12

As it happens that the major villain of this tract was Charles Darwin, not Maxwell, we can read
into Argyll's attitude only a hint of why he might have preferred another candidate for St.
Andrew's.
There were domestic chores too, funerals (Faraday in 1867, Forbes in 1868), a church building
project (he became a kirk elder),13 and his only foreign experience, a visit to Italy in 1867
(dazzling Campbell by his agility with languages--"the only language he had difficulty in
mastering was Dutch").14 This idyll, however, was to come to an end, when he was "called" back
to Cambridge in 1871, around the time Helmholtz was called to Berlin.
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MAXWELL'S DEMON

There was still mop-up work to do in the years at Glenlair. The heat business needed to be
put into historical perspective, as had been done for the electromagnetic theory. This required a
paper, On the Dynamical Theory of Gases (reflecting the 1860 Illustrations of the Dynamical
Theory of Gases) in 1867, and a text, The Theory of Heat, in 1870.
The paper on heat gave due credit to Rudolph Clausius (in case it had been overlooked in
1860):

It is to Professor Clausius of Zurich, that we owe the most complete
dynamic theory of gases. His other researches on the general dynamical theory of
heat are well known, and his memoire On the Kind of Motion we call Heat are a
complete exposition of the molecular theory adopted in this paper. After reading
his investigation of the distance described by each molecule between successive
collisions, I published some propositions on the motions and collisions of
perfectly elastic spheres, and deduced several properties of gases, especially...the
nature of gaseous friction. I also gave a theory of diffusion of gases, which I now
know to be erroneous, and there were several errors in my theory of conduction of
heat in gases which M. Clausius has pointed out in an elaborate memoire on the
subject.15

There are many illuminating associations in this passage, in particular to the sociology of
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ideas (Maxwell's relationship with Clausius) and the philosophy of science (Maxwell's method of
analogy). In the case of Clausius, we simply note that he was at a Technische Hochschule in
Zurich, not at a more prestigious German University, but, evidently, Maxwell was no scientific
snob. He had indeed been corrected by Clausius over technical errors and, in turn, corrected
Clausius, but there did not seem to be any particularly acrimony, as there often was in other such
interchanges at the time. The particular sociological note connected to the comment on error
comes not from the fact of an error, but from the subject in which the error occurred: the
diffusion of gases.
Details of this problem--how to describe the process of two gases mixing with one another-agitated Maxwell, Clausius, Boltzmann, and Gibbs for many years. Maxwell fouled it up,
Clausius didn't do much better, and Gibbs almost got it right. At least Gibbs may have got close,
for his obscure argument seemed to lead to a paradox (called, naturally, "Gibbs' Paradox") when
applied to a certain thought-experiment in mixing gases. The fate of this paradox included a
1905 response by Einstein which dipped back into Maxwell's theory of diffusion.d This still
didn't satisfy many people, and some today credit Paul Ehrenfest for a "resolution," while others
are still
--------------(d) It is unfortunate for popular history that Einstein's work was published in 1905, hence
overshadowed by two other more renowned works of that year, the "Electrodynamics of Moving
Objects" and "On a Heuristic Viewpoint Concerning the Production and Transformation of
Light. These two "other" works are better known as the "Special Theory of Relativity" and the
"Theory of the Photoelectric Effect" (the latter, not the former, being cited as the justification for
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Einstein's Nobel Prize). The popular titles are historically unfortunate, for they obscure the
obvious relations between Einstein's work and Maxwell's in the terms "Electrodynamics" and
"Heuristic.”
--------------mumbling. Without going into the paradox (which is particularly awkward in intermediate
texts), we note the mode of theorizing here, for the trouble with this part of theory was not in
experimental failure at all, but in logical consistency.
The methodological hint in the passage from Maxwell's above comment on the diffusion of
gases is in the sentence "I published some propositions on the motions and collisions of perfectly
elastic spheres, and deduced several properties of gases..." To get the point, you have to know
what a "perfectly elastic sphere" is. It is a fiction, a heuristic, a model with analogical reference
to another model (also a fiction--this time a "molecule"). Specifically it is a theoretical
(Gedanken) sphere which collides with other spheres undergoing a change in motion. But the
collision is required to occur without loss of energy of motion (the term Kraft having been by
then abandoned). This violates another principle of physics.
These imaginary colliding spheres, then, have a built in logical difficulty, for if they are
unlawful, they cannot have any analog in nature! Clausius and Kelvin's famous "second law of
thermodynamics" forbid natural systems from such agitation without the production of "heat."
This heat should be produced by frictional, "inelastic" collisions and, if it were not, the system
would be in forbidden perpetual motion. This is our second connection of a law of
thermodynamics to a prohibitory rule.
Helmholtz had based his "First Law" on different prohibition, non-conservation of energy.
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Clausius' "new" kind of perpetual motion ("of the second kind") was not prohibited by this rule.
Helmholtz had only forbade systems where more "work" could be extracted from a system than
was put into it. A "second law" of thermodynamics comes into play here, and the implicit
conflict between the two laws will lead to the later struggles of Boltzmann, Gibbs, and Einstein.e
At present, it is enough to know that Maxwell's elastic spheres are flawed fictions, and
deliberately
--------------(e) Modern instructors like to rephrase the first law as "you can't get something for nothing"
and the second law as "you can't break even." This sets up the audience for the "third law of
thermodynamics"--"you can't even quit the game." There actually is a third law of
thermodynamics, one posed by Walther Nernst in the 1900's. We shall hear from him in later
chapters.
--------------so, for only "part" of the behavior of gases will result from this argument. The fact that
Maxwell's method always only gives "parts" or "aspects" of insights into the logic behind nature
is significant further evidence of his rejection of the holistic ambitions of Naturphilosophie.
What did Maxwell do with these imaginary spheres? He says he "deduced some properties of
gases." How? One can fantasize about these spheres all day, and never "deduce" the kinds of
things Maxwell did, namely formulas for the rate of diffusion of two different gases and formulas
for effect of frictional drag, "viscosity," on gases escaping a chamber. The former were flops,
though setting a "puzzle" that led eventually to success. The latter were successful, according to
the experiments of Mrs. Maxwell. Maxwell deduced all of this, of course, with yet another
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fiction, a mathematical analog to the "world on paper" of the elastic spheres. He used the kind of
equations he already knew from the study of electricity and the study of fluids (via Maxwell and
Helmholtz), only this time he included statistical formula of the kind involved in Saturn's rings
(via Gauss, Kovalevskaya, and Boltzmann). This recalls the lesson of Fourier--the mathematical
model need make no reference to the nature of the phenomena itself. With the rules of
mathematics, then, Maxwell "deduced" formulas that would suggest that the bouncing spheres
would mix and flow at certain rates. Whether gases would behave according to these formulas,
and why they should, and how one could know whether they did or not, was all part of the
difficult philosophy of science Maxwell was inventing.
The methods of Clausius and Maxwell, abstract though they were, were acceptable to
Thomson (Kelvin) and Tait, who included them in their Theory of Heat (translated into German
by Helmholtz). But when Boltzmann of Vienna got hold of this argument, and effectively got rid
of the elastic spheres altogether, the happy Scottish philosophy broke down into an ideological
war (including Tait's "terrorism" charge). Boltzmann didn't change the method, he just pointed
out an obvious feature of its use by Maxwell, Clausius, Kelvin, and Tait--they had one too many
models! Analogies only require two models--what you're saying and to what you are referring (in
Brentano's sense, what you say and what you "intend" or "mean"). In the method, those
corresponded to the mathematical formulas on one hand (what was said), and the molecules on
the other (what was meant). Who needed the elastic spheres? And so disappeared the tail of the
Cheshire cat (along with the aether and other so called "mechanical models" of physicists'
systems), at least from the camp of Maxwell, Helmholtz, Boltzmann, Gibbs, and Einstein.
What then would the success of Maxwell's formulas prove, or their failure disprove? Setting
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aside the question of what a "success" would be like, the striking point is that such studies of heat
would not bear on the question of the existence of molecules themselves. As in Fourier's fluid
"caloric" notion of heat, or the luminiferous aether model of electrical transmission, the
"mechanical model" of heat was a mental fiction useful only as an aid to the imagination--an
imagination that was concentrating on another topic. As in the case of aether, the existence of
molecules was a hot topic those days. Perhaps Argyll was wrong and Maxwell was inclined to
believe in aethers and molecules, but they were not requirements for his theories. These
requirements, as indicated in his work on heat, were "ideas" of a specific mental "quality." These
"ideas" were models (experiments and formulas), and the "quality" was logical
consistency--freedom from paradox. In the mathematical model this meant strict derivability
from a prohibitory principle (the first law in Maxwell's case). In the experimental model this
meant a repeatable result. Since Romantics and statistical philosophers tell us that nothing ever
repeats, the repeatability of laboratory data must be imposed theoretically by taking "averages" of
many trials of the "same" experiment. Even this is suspicious, because the "same" experiment
never exactly recurs, especially if you are strict about the second law. Gibbs was especially sage
about noting this necessary fiction, inventing the peculiar theoretical notion of "ensemble." An
ensemble is an infinite number of replications (repeated visions) of a model of a single
experimental situation. He then referred statistical outcomes of various theoretical formulas to
this heuristic, so that any one experiment was analogous to one "complexion" of an ensemble. If
his formulas said that a large proportion of the complexions of an ensemble resulted in some
state of affairs, say a gas pressure uniform throughout a box for some number of different
complexions, then that state of affairs would be the predictably likely outcome of a model
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experiment. That may sound a bit obtuse, but it points up the subtle care with which
philosophical nit-picking had to be dealt in this new philosophy. What Gibbs effectively did was
to abstract the models of physics to a degree out of reach of all but highly experienced
mixed-mathematicians. By 1906 (the year of Boltzmann's suicide and the year after Einstein's
papers "vindicating" him), even non-scientists noticed this. America's The Nation complained:

...Today, science has withdrawn into realms that are hardly
[intelligible]...physics has outgrown the old formulas of gravity, magnetism, and
pressure, has discarded the molecule and atom for the ion, and may in its recent
generalizations be followed only by an expert in the higher, not to say the
transcendental, mathematics...In short, one may say not that the average cultivated
man has given up on science, but that science has deserted him.16

Maxwell was not hiding the fact that there was some tricky philosophical business going on
here. His infamous "demon" points this up. Maxwell asks us to imagine a tiny weightless imp
guarding a door in a partition separating two chambers of heated, moving molecules. Like a
disco doorman, the demon allows only fast ("hot") molecules in and slow ("cold") molecules out.
After a while most of the molecules on one side of the partition will be fast, most on the other
slow. The result would be a system originally at uniform temperature "spontaneously"
(demonically) separating into separate hot and cold regions, as if "heat" had spontaneously
flowed from cold to hot. This is precisely what the Clausius-Kelvin second law prohibits, so the
demon is somehow a paradoxical idea. But Kant doesn't allow us to have paradoxical ideas, so
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we are confused by the demon--or the second law--or something. Some moderns put the demon
down as another whimsy by "Jas. Alex. McMerkwell." f Others take it seriously.
----------------------(f) Maxwell was fond of inventing funny names like this for himself.

17

He once derisively

called Tyndall "T double prime," an elaborate pun on Tait's calling himself "T" and Thomson
"T-prime". Part of the pun depended on the notation "prime" referring to a small quantity,"
hence Tyndall was to be doubly insignificant.18
--------------Gibbs, for instance, had to deal with experimental models of the demon. In 1883 he published
(in Science magazine) "On an Alleged Exception to the Second Law of Thermodynamics, ” but
this did not end the issue. Philosopher Lawrence Sklar has recently updated the “attacks” on
Maxwell’s Demon. He reiterates Maxwell’s purpose in inventing this puzzle:

In his later work, Maxwell frequently claims that irreversibility captured by the
Second Law is only ‘statistically true’ or ‘true on the average.’ At the same time
he usually seems to speak as though the notions of randomness are only due to
limitations on our knowledge of thee exact trajectories of the ‘in principle’
perfectly indeterministic, molecular motions. Later popular writings, however, do
speak, if vaguely, in terms of some kind of underlying ‘objective’
indeterminism.19

So this dynamical theory of gases, with its formulas, prohibitory laws, and demons set a
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research agenda for the Victorian physicists. There were challenges, both to unravel the
paradoxes and to extend the scope of the method. And, of course, the experimenters were
expected to produce model systems that did or did serve as convincing analogies to the formulas.
There were no analogies in nature herself, but the physicists puzzles seemed to be filled with
little else.

ENTER BOLTZMANN

We shall leave Maxwell in Scotland, and move to Austria, where Ludwig Boltzmann was on
the verge of his claim to fame, the "H-Theorem" of 1872. He was closer linguistically to
Helmholtz in Heidelberg, both being bound for Berlin, but their two countries, Austria and
Germany, were in many ways even more different from each other than from Great Britain, and
Boltzmann's work was more linked to Maxwell's than Helmholtz's. Philosophically, it would be
Boltzmann who would give a name to the game of mathematical analogies; in 1895 he would
christen it "theoretical physics," noting "even the formulation of this concept is not entirely
without difficulty".20
The setting for this development, Austria, or, after 1867, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, was
an ancient power, a mixture of lands, people, and languages subject at various times to the
Habsburg rulers from the days of the revival of the Holy Roman Empire. The ethnic diversity of
the Empire was legendary--it is said that the mobilization orders for the 1914 war were given in
fifteen different languages.21 Vienna, Budapest, and Prague were its glamour cities, and
Boltzmann's home-town, Vienna, was to increase its glamour by pushing to the banks of the
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Danube river (which had been uninhabitable due to flooding until engineering works of
1870-1876).22 In 1858-1860, when Boltzmann was a teen-ager, Vienna had cleared its ancient
fortress walls for the famous Ringstrasse, a beautiful 150 foot wide promenade separating the
then-suburbs from the inner-city. This ringed the site of the Imperial Palace (Hofburg),
Embassies, Hotels, St. Stephen’s Cathedral , catacomb-tombs of the Habsburgs, Opera House,
and the fabled University. Recently the University, like the city of Vienna, had seen hard times.
It had been revived from neglect by Empress Maria Teresa, only to be plundered by Napoleon. It
revived again, only to be severely depopulated by the exodus of wealthy citizen before invasion
by the French and Italians in 1859. The Boltzmanns themselves moved away to Linz for
Ludwig's secondary schooling, including piano lessons from the composer Anton Bruckner.
Bismarck took credit for diverting the invasion of Vienna in the Prussian war of 1866 and thus
Boltzmann could return for his doctorate in physics from the University in 1867, just as the new
dual Austro-Hungarian monarchy was inaugurated. Boltzmann's education was thorough, both in
Linz (a stopping place of the celebrated Kepler) and at the University. World-class scholars
were, or had been, there. The Göttingen tradition was represented in the revived University, but
was perhaps practiced more influentially at the nearby Imperial Engineering Academy, for they
had housed the Hungarian Janis (Johann) Bolyai.23 Bolyai is another of those Gauss-driven
geometers who were messing around with Euclid's postulates, and we might pause add him to the
mathematical background to our new metaphysician.
Bolyai's father, Farkas (Wolfgang) had studied at Göttingen and was a friend of Gauss' (sort
of, for Gauss was not too friendly in person--though over 7,000 of his letters survive). With
Gauss's approval, he included his son's attempt to build a new geometry in one of his own books
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(Tentamen) in 1822-23. But, it is said, that Gauss claimed that he had already thought of that,
though never published, so the young Bolyai dropped the subject--until the Russian Nicolai
Lobachevsky and Gauss' pupil Riemann made it popular (with, of course, Helmholtz's publicity).
The younger Bolyai died in 1860, before the big Riemann boom was on, but, by Boltzmann's
time he was already known as the one of Vienna's own who had beaten the Hanoverians and
Russians to the geometrical punch.
Boltzmann's origins in the home city of Bolyai was probably one secondary factor that impelled
Helmholtz to invited him to visit in Berlin in 1871, early in his residence there.
Of more immediate influence on Boltzmann was one of his mathematics professors, another
Hungarian mathematician, Joseph Petzval. According to the historians Mehra and Rechenberg,
Petzval was "a brilliant personality, though not easily accessible to students" and "exerted an
important influence on the scientific community in Vienna, where he lived to an advanced age
(he died [in] 1891)."24 Among Petzval's "side" interest in mixed-mathematics was optics, and he
theoretically derived, and then had built, pairs of color-correcting lenses.
Is this yet another color theorist, one to connect Goethe to Boltzmann? Not really, for this
color-correcting problem was more an example of the traditional use of mathematics in physics,
much like the case of the flyball governor. Since the days of Kepler and Galileo it had been
known that a lens would bend different colored light rays at different angles, hence a lens shape
that would "focus" an image of one color would not for another. It became a classical problem in
geometry to devise a shape, or sequence of shapes that would focus all different colors the same
way.g There is probably no universal solution, but Petzval's attempt was apparently a good
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(g) Newton himself had first gotten the attention of the Royal Society by devising a solution.
Like Alexander with the Gordian knot, Newton cut through the problem by using curved
reflecting mirrors instead of lenses--for all colors reflected at the same angle. The idea wasn't his
originally, but he actually produced a working reflecting telescope that was quite impressive. Of
course, he didn't solve the mathematical problem of how to create an "achromatic" arrangements
of lenses.
--------------approximation. Nowadays the practical problem is solved by using coatings on lenses, while the
mathematical problem remains an unattractive mess. It didn't particularly attract Boltzmann or
Helmholtz, who had much more dramatic uses of mathematics in mind.
A second principal influence on Boltzmann at Vienna was the director of the Physics Institute
where he studied. This was Josef Stefan, a graduate of Vienna himself, with some experience in
physiological research in addition to mixed mathematics.25 h It was probably through Stefan that
--------------(h) There survives today a Stefan-Boltzmann equation (often called Stefan's Law) that figured
prominently in the quantum revolution in the early twentieth century.
--------------Boltzmann learned of the broad range of possibilities in the life-of-the-mind, for Stefan had his
fingers in the same pies as did Maxwell and Helmholtz. Before being advanced to Rector at
Vienna (and Geheimrat of the Empire), he was dean of the philosophical faculty (1869-1870),
thus being plunged into the extra-scientific academic controversies.

As we have mentioned,

one of these controversies was in the philosophy of psychology--just how active was the mind in
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determining its own contents? Among other Viennese, we have already met the plumber of
"intentionality," Franz Brentano, the ex-priest who taught "alongside" Stefan and Boltzmann.
We might also meet some of his pupils of the 80's, notably Alexius Meinong, who studied with
Brentano from 1875-187826 and Edmund Husserl, in class from 1884-1886.27 The latter was the
developer of a "phenomenology," and took it to Göttingen, where it fell into the hands of Martin
Heidegger and eventually bounced off of Max Born. The former, Meinong, also jangled the
Göttingen agenda, but in mathematics, not philosophy.
Such were the concerns that Stefan thought were part of a proper Viennese education. Public
service was important as well, and Mehra and Rechenberg relate that "To the international
public, Stefan became known as President of the Scientific Commission of the International
Electricity Exhibition (1883) and of the International Conference on Musical Pitch (1885)."28
The latter reminds of not only of Helmholtz' research, but of Boltzmann's lifelong love of the
piano, and the continuation of that concern with his foremost "pupil," Erwin Schrödinger.i
Obviously there is evident here a polymathic tradition at Vienna stretching back to Stefan from
Schrödinger through Hasenhorl (Bolltzmann;s successor at Vienna) and Boltzmann (Stefan’s
student).
-------------(i) Actually, Boltzmann died just before Schrödinger arrived in Vienna, but the legend was still
powerful, and Schrödinger seems to have particularly tried to follow in the great path, or paths,
set by Boltzmann. These were transmitted to him, Schrödinger said, by "the young Fritz
Hasenöhrl").29
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More particularly, there are multiple connections from Stefan's extraordinary range of studies
to the Kernel of the Maxwell-Helmholtz complex. Mehra and Rechenberg amplify:

‘Stefan was a universal scientist and he treated all fields of physics with
equal care,’ remarked his student Ludwig Boltzmann later...Thus he worked
successfully both on experimental and theoretical topics, especially in the field of
the kinetic theory of gases, on problems of thermodynamics (evaporation, surface
tension, ice formation, solutions), on heat conduction and diffusion in gases and
liquids, and on acoustics. ... [He was] one of the earliest continental supporters of
the continuum field concept of electrodynamics, proposed by...Faraday and of the
systematic theory developed on its basis by...Maxwell--the other [continental
supporter] being...Helmholtz. For the second of his principal fields of work, the
kinetic theory of gases, he found much evidence. Especially, he constructed a
device called the `Diathermometer,' which allowed him to measure heat
conduction in gases...He also performed several calculations in kinetic
theory...which agreed with the calculations of Maxwell and his colleague Joseph
Loschmit. Perhaps the greatest future implications had a formula, which Stefan
presented in 1879 to describe the energy of heat radiation to a body: he claimed
that this energy is proportional to the fourth power of the absolute temperature of
the emitting body...This relation was confirmed theoretically five years later by his
student Ludwig Boltzmann, who combined arguments from thermodynamics and
Maxwell's theory of electrodynamics...30
312

Now who was this Loschmit? He was yet another of Boltzmann's teachers at Vienna, and a
dimly remembered player in the development of atomic theory, but, in this story, is perhaps one
too many Viennese to keep track of. We have met a host of new characters here, and it might be
useful to take a hint from Charles Dicken's Victorian habit of neatly wrapping up loose ends and
dispose of a few. The geometers, the Bolyais and Lobachevsky, are favorites of mathematicians,
but do not appear in later works of our heroes. Petzval and Stefan are prominent teachers, but
Petzval is now forgotten, and Stefan's Law will be of minor interest in this saga. Brentano is
remembered only as a source for Meinong, who would stir up trouble with the Göttingen crowd,
and ought to be remembered (along with the notion of "intentionality"). Born and Husserl came
too late to be included in a nineteenth century opus. Hassenöhrl is memorialized, not only as
Boltzmann's teacher, but as a victim of the insanity of war, for his career was ended by World
War I (October 7, 1915). Schrödinger, in his autobiographical sketch written for the Nobel Prize
Foundation, wrote "Hasenöhrl was killed in battle, and I feel that otherwise today his name
would now stand instead of mine."31 j

There are two other of Boltzmann's Viennese

contemporaries one is expected to consider – Sigmund Freud and Ernst Mach, for they are the
--------------(j) The Allies' parallel scientific victim was the young genius Henry Moseley, and the loss of
both colleagues was mourned by the international community of physics, despite the nationalistic
antagonism.
--------------most famous representatives of the ferment of science, culture and society that characterize
Vienna's contributions to modernism.
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As to Freud and psychoanalytic theory, there was some interaction of his agenda and the
Maxwell-Helmholtz-Boltzmann concerns. The obvious bridge was physiology, and indeed,
physiologists concerned with, say, the Helmholtz theories of vision, were also battling with
Freud's theories of the mind. Again, the assiduous Mehra and Rechenberg turn up connections to
Goethe, through one Johannes Purkinje, "founder of Austrian physiology" and to Helmholtz and
Boltzmann through Ewald Hering. Reminiscent of the Naturphilosophie in the roots of
perception, Hering's agenda included

...the physiology of smelling, visual perception and colour vision of the
human eye. He developed, for example, the six-colour theory, based on the
antagonistic pairs of colours: black-white, blue-yellow, and red-green, opposing
the usual Young-Helmholtz three colour theory; also in the theory of visual
perception he disagreed with the great Hermann von Helmholtz by proposing a
`nativistic' theory of space perception as opposed to the latter's `empiristic'
theory.32

The first part of that agenda is, of course, Goethe and Schelling's kind of science, and the last
comment cryptically suggests that Helmholtz's evolution away from such `naturalism' was not
necessarily popular in Vienna. Since the physiology of space perception (and thus the status of
geometry) was intimately bound up with the psychology of self-perception, we can anticipate
similar "conservative" influences on Freud. Quite recently, S.P. Fullinwider published a more
direct argument linking Freud and Helmholtz. He writes
314

Recent explorations into Sigmund Freud's intellectual development by
Frank Sulloway and Lucille Ritvo have directed attention to the significance of
evolutionary theory for psychoanalysis. In this paper I shall pursue the
exploration by showing how Darwin was received by members of the so-called
Helmholtz circle (Hermann von Helmholtz, Emile du Bois-Reymond, Ernest
Brücke) and certain of Freud's teachers in the University of Vienna medical
school. I will make the point that the Leibniz-Kant background of these several
scientists was important for this reception. I will argue that the Leibniz-Kant
tradition came forward to Freud by two roads, Helmholtz' unconscious inference
as foundation for a physiology of the senses, and Arthur Schopenhauer's not
unrelated uses of the principle of sufficient reason to explain the possibility of
lawlikeness in a universe of lawless energies. Finally, I will suggest ways in
which Freud received and used the tradition...33

Though influential, these physiologists and psychologists of Austria were indirect
intermediaries in the relations between physics and philosophy being forged by Helmholtz,
Maxwell, and Boltzmann, and we can leave further fishing for another book.
Not so the other famous name of the time--Ernst Mach. At the same time Tait was attacking
Boltzmann from England, Mach was sniping from Vienna. The untimely intervention of a third
critic, the chemist Wilhelm Ostwald, complicated a tangled discourse on method that engaged
even the general public, and Mach's later strong influence in the school-wars can be partly
attributed to his popularity from this discourse. The philosophical "Vienna Circle" that took up
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the causes of Mach in the twentieth century may well have hatched the intellectual virus that
ultimately discredited the whole Maxwell-Helmholtz-Boltzmann-Gibbs-Einstein-Schrödinger
agenda, though such controversial propositions need some careful preparation. So, before we
meet Mach, we might consider just what Boltzmann did that made everybody so mad.

THE BOLTZMANN FACTOR

What made Boltzmann such a target was that he not only developed the scientific methods he
had learned, but he went public with what he thought about their philosophical implications. In
contrast, Maxwell confined his speculating mostly to correspondence, except for his impetuous
collegiate papers. Helmholtz's public acclaim was for his popular lectures in useful stuff,
physiology of music and color or glaciers and such. His philosophical lectures were confined to
university ceremonials, and nobody paid much attention to those dull things. Gibbs was never
known to discuss anything philosophical with anyone--especially at Yale. But Boltzmann opted
to be a public influence, and, despite the formidable opposition of Tait, Kelvin, Mach, and
Ostwald, he was quite good at it. A lapsed member of the Vienna Circle, Karl Popper, admired
his arguments:

Take Boltzmann: There are few greater scientists. But his greatness
can hardly be said to consist in his having staged a major revolution for he was, to
a considerable extent, a follower of Maxwell. But he was as far from a "normal
scientist" as anybody could be: he was a valiant fighter who resisted the ruling
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fashion of his day--a fashion which, incidentally, ruled only on the continent and
had few adherents, at that time, in England.34

The continental reaction was further described by one of Popper's students, the late
philosopher Paul Feyerabend, himself a highly successful controversialist:

The effect of his teaching upon the younger generation of natural scientists
can hardly be exaggerated. `All of us younger mathematicians were then on
Boltzmann's side,' Arnold Sommerfeld wrote about the Lübeck discussions on
energetics in 1895, when the `bull,' Boltzmann, supported by the mathematician
Felix Klein, defeated the `torero Ostwald despite the latter's expert fencing.'
Svante Arrhenius and Walther Nernst studied with Boltzmann at Graz, Paul
Ehrenfest attended his Vienna lectures, and Einstein--not inclined to listen to
lectures--read his published work and was strongly influenced both by the physics
and by the philosophy it contained. Wilhelm Ostwald called Boltzmann `a man
who was superior to us all in intelligence, and in the clarity of his science.' On the
occasion of Boltzmann's sixtieth birthday, thinkers from many different
countries--among them A. Chwolson, Pierre Duhem, Gottlieb Frege, Max Planck,
and Ernst Mach--contributed to an impressive Festschrift (Leipzig, 1904). Two
years later Boltzmann, who was subject to severe depression, committed suicide.35

Some Dickensian housekeeping is in order. Einstein, Nernst (of the third law of
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thermodynamics), Mach, and Ostwald have already been briefly mentioned. They will be
important; in the agenda (Einstein), in the opposition (Ostwald and Mach), and in the illusion of
practical science (Nernst--who was the only one of these people to get rich from science). The
"Lübeck discussions" were at a conference held to thrash out the philosophical disagreements
among Naturphilosophers represented by Ostwald, neo-Kantians, championed by Boltzmann,
and "Positivists," exemplified by Mach. This conference illustrates the visibility of the
metaphysical sub-text of the scientific revolution, and we will come back to details later. The
short story has it that the anti-Boltzmann forces, Ostwald's "energeticists" and Mach's
"positivists" both opposed the concept of atoms, though for different reasons. As the atomic
theory was ultimately established as scientific dogma, it is presumed that Ostwald and the
Machists "lost" the debates.
Continuing identifying Feyerabend's cast, we find Arnold Sommerfeld and Paul Ehrenfest to
be perhaps the two most dramatic successors to Boltzmann and company. Both are now
characteristically neglected, despite Sommerfeld's six-volume text showing how to employ the
mathematical analogies across the whole range of physical problems, and despite their
reputations as teachers and developers of the methods.k Ehrenfest was a Ph. D. student of
Boltzmann's
---------(k) Heisenberg, for instance, claims he learned the physics for his revolution in shuttling back
and forth between Göttingen and Copenhagen, but learned a "peculiar" mathematical physics (he
called it "number mysticism")36 in-between--from Sommerfeld at Munich.
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(1904) and later Einstein's close friend and supporter of his (and Schrödinger's) futile attempt to
stop the erosion of "intentionality" in mathematical physics. We have mentioned his credit for
resolving Gibbs' paradox.l
--------------(l) By a tragic irony, Ehrenfest took his own life in 1933, as had Boltzmann in 1906, though not,
as legend has it, in response to professional problems but rather to personal ones.37
--------------Arnold Sommerfeld, as noted, thought Boltzmann won the Lübeck debates. But some
partisans of the other side, notably the Machists, led by the aforementioned Pierre Duhem
thought otherwise.m They pointed out that you shouldn't lump the Ostwaldites and the Machists
together
--------------(m) Ironically there exists a Gibbs-Duhem equation.
--------------as they oppose each other, and that the Machists really won. Duhem himself, a constant critic of
Maxwell's equations,38 is now remembered not for his science, but for "founding" the academic
study of the history of science. Eye witness accounts of the Lübeck spectators often suggested
that the highly popular Ostwald really won. Nobody `wins,' really, such a debate, but at least we
have a chance to learn more of the influential players–the “famous:” Ostwald, Mach, and Duhem,
and the “forgotten:”, Sommerfeld and Ehrenfest.
Others too in Feyerabend's list are only recently obscure: Arrhenius invented the `ion' (of
which you will recall The Nation complained), and collaborated with Nernst and Ostwald in
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Leipzig to "invent" physical chemistry (thus Gibbs' methods creep in). Felix Klein was the
world's leading mathematician, from Göttingen of course, and would get in a terrible wrangle
with Gottlieb Frege, a philosopher of sorts, about the geometry business (hence the Helmholtz
connection). That wrangle, carried on by their successors, mathematician David Hilbert and
philosopher Bertrand Russell may have permanently fractured the discourse on logic and the
foundations of mathematics (the verdict isn't in yet). Max Planck, of Berlin, was a major success
in the new physics, perhaps the first quantum revolutionary (or the last of the classical
dinosaurs--there is divided opinion), and A. Chwolson has seldom again, if ever, been
mentioned in the history of ideas. Too many new characters to absorb at once, but these are
indeed some of the "younger generation" that inherited or rejected the role of mixed
mathematical analogizing in science begun by Maxwell.
As Boltzmann seems to have stirred things up, we might look at some details of his crimes.
His most famous arguing points stemmed mainly from the "heat" and "statistical" side of the
Maxwell-vs. Maxwell heat-light agenda, though his enthusiastic studies of electrodynamics
probably showed more insight into the underlying method. Examining some of this "unknown"
electrodynamic work, we find his first publication, while still a graduate student, on a problem
posed by Stefan on the theoretical distribution of electric currents in a spherical conductor:

When I came--still being a student at the university--in closer contact with
Stefan, the first thing that he did was to hand me copies of Maxwell's papers [on
electrodynamics]; and, since I did not know a word of English at that time, he
gave me an English grammar book...39
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He kept up this kind of work at his first important post at Graz. He had stayed on at the
Vienna Physical Institute for three years after graduating in 1866, and got "the call" to Graz in
1869 at the age of 25! He was to spend his most productive years there (with a three year
interruption as professor of mathematics at Vienna in 1873-1876), until 1890, when he moved to
Munich, and then back to Vienna in 1894. Ironically, in his 1876 reappointment to Graz he beat
out Ernst Mach for the position.40
It was in his first years at Graz that Boltzmann was invited by Bunsen to Heidelberg and by
Helmholtz to Berlin. These were working visits, and it was in Helmholtz's lab in Berlin (in
1872) that Boltzmann made laboratory measurements of electrical properties of insulators
designed to "confirm" Maxwell's electrodynamics. Recall, though, that the role of experiments in
the Maxwell-Helmholtz agenda is not so much to "confirm," but to show the "applicability of"
the mathematical model to a laboratory one--to show the analogical match between the abstract
logic of the theory and the details of perception of the material world, as required by Kantian
doctrine.
Important as his electrodynamic researches were, Boltzmann's work at Graz saw the
beginning of his advances in heat--beginning in the kinetic theory of gases as begun by Maxwell,
and ending with the foundations of Statistical Mechanics as generalized by Gibbs. He also
acquired a wife, then a student at Graz. Professor-student marriages are much frowned upon in
the trade, and Boltzmann's happy fortune must have been the source of considerably unfriendly
gossip. Again, Mehra and Rechenberg provide excellent detail:

In 1876 Boltzmann married Henrietta von Aigentler, a mathematics and
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physics student at Graz, who was 10 years younger than himself. In those days it
was very unusual for a girl to study at a university; thus in her second semester the
philosophical faculty in Graz passed a rule excluding female students. She was
able, however, to make a petition to the Austrian Minister of Education, a former
colleague of her father at the Graz court of justice, whereupon the rule was
suspended. However, she did not continue her studies after becoming engaged to
Boltzmann.
The Boltzmanns had five children, two sons and three daughters...41

Before this, the famous "Boltzmann factor" was born in 1868. Maxwell had already figured
out, by mathematical gymnastics, the probable distribution of speeds in a group of colliding
"elastic spheres." That is, given the temperature of the system he could model the average energy
of a "typical" member of the group with a startling statistical trick by Gauss. He could also
compute what fraction of the group would fall into what speed range (hence the name
"distribution" for "how the speeds were "distributed"). What Boltzmann added was a
consideration of the same problem with the extra influence of "outside" forces (like a wind
blowing through the collection of spheres). What Boltzmann subtracted was the mechanical
model. He did this by tacking terms onto Maxwell's equations, adding new analogies for new
circumstances. The usual undergraduate example-model is to consider air molecules bouncing
around in a box on the surface of the earth, and extending miles up into the sky. Assuming the
temperature was uniform (which is in no way true of the model, but is useful to illustrate the
method), one can then calculate the proportions of the molecules at different altitudes which
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would have high or low speeds, and the relative population of the box at low or high altitudes.42
Needless to say, in the student example, the air pressure (a result of the population of molecules
at a certain level) drops off quickly with altitude. Since nowadays everybody “knows” this to be
the case in the "real" atmosphere, Boltzmann's method appears to be vindicated, and what works
for air must then work for the more esoteric models of experiments where Boltzmann's
calculations give controversial, counter-intuitive results.
The student example illustrates the "application" of Boltzmann's method, not its assumptions.
The argument was itself purely mathematical (and Kantian)--"if" forces represented by a certain
formula were added, "then" the distribution (population) of "elements" (spheres) would alter by a
derived formula, here containing a peculiar mathematical formula known henceforth as
"Boltzmann's factor".

One might think that the student example of the atmosphere could be

"tested" right away, say through the measurement of atmospheric pressure in high altitude
balloon flights. Long after Boltzmann became famous, this indeed was done, and scientific
ballooning became quite a fashionable fin-de-siecle scientific "programme." Even this, however,
failed to establish the "legitimacy" of Boltzmann's methods. For one thing, the temperature at
higher altitudes varies quite unexpectedly, and the simple example thus required considerable
adjustment, much of it mathematically sophisticated and arguable. So it was that Boltzmann's
factor argument could be, in absence of convincing utility, hotly contested.
From our metaphysical point of view, this is not surprising, for Boltzmann's factor had been
born from mathematical ("a priori"), intuitive sources, and was not really considered a potential
"fact of nature" until generations later. Boltzmann's contemporaries, critics and friends, had to
face his argument on philosophical grounds. To realize just how far off in the future the
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appropriation by the experimentalists of Boltzmann's work was to be, consider this excerpt from
a distinguished modern text describing the "test" of just the Maxwell part of the
Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution:

Unfortunately, it was not possible to make a real test of the Maxwell
distribution until 70 years after it was derived. By that time the existence of
atoms was not in doubt, but a test of the formula was still important, and one was
made by J. F. Zartman in 1931. He used an evacuated system...containing an oven
and a rotating drum with a slit in it. When the slit was aligned with [an exit hole
from] the oven, a pulse of atoms [from the oven] was admitted to the drum. A
glass plate opposite the slit collected the atoms, and the variation in the density of
the deposit on the glass could be used to deduce the velocity distribution, the fast
atoms being deposited at one end of the plate and the slow atoms at the other end.
The agreement with Maxwell was good.
Another test was made by Rainwater and Havens in 1946, using
neutrons which had reached thermal equilibrium in a block of paraffin...the result
was in excellent agreement with the Maxwell velocity distribution, and it
demonstrated the generality of the distribution by showing that it governed the
behavior of particles whose existence was not even suspected when Maxwell
originally derived the law.43

Variations on this experiments continued beyond 1946, by Otto Stern, with Estermann and
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Simpson in 1947, and, with the Boltzmann factor included, by Miller and Kusch in 1955.44
Clearly given the lateness of the "confirmation" of the empirical applicability of the
Maxwell-Boltzmann statistical method, its notoriety in the 1880's arose from other sources than
experiment. Those sources were, of course, ideological--as in Tait and Kelvin's rejection of the
role of mathematics, or in Ostwald's objection to the presumption of the existence of atoms, or in
Mach's objections to the mental, not empirical origins of a purported "law."

GRAZ, CHANCE AND THE H-THEOREM

We again have arrived at the early 1870's. In 1870-71 there was war between France and
Prussia, marking perhaps a turning point in Europe's political, intellectual, and psychological
order. An enduring symbol of the interaction of these forces is perhaps the image of Monet, one
of the new "impressionist" painters, fleeing the bombardment of Paris to London, where he
painted a luminous version of the crystal palace! The radical artists might have been young, as
was Sofya Kovalevskaya and her fellow Paris communards in1871. But the intellectual
revolutionaries, Maxwell, Helmholtz and Boltzmann, were in mid- to late-career. As for
Helmholtz and Maxwell, their great ideas were afloat, and their post-war fate was to become
dignitaries, scientific advisors to the reform administrations, and sage philosophers who warned
the younger generation against excesses like those of Schelling or of the 1848 idealists.
Boltzmann, however, was midway between "generations," and still had some astounding
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"number mysticism" to perform, notably the dreaded "H-theorem" of 1872. n
--------------(n) The historian Stephen Brush notes laconically that "the letter H was introduced by S. H.
Burbury in 1890. It does not seem to stand for anything in particular...Boltzmann originally used
the letter E..." 45
--------------The setting for this development was not the Vienna with which Boltzmann's name would
later be linked, but Graz. There is an incidental symmetry here with Maxwell of Cambridge
producing his major work in the academic provinces, Scotland and London, and Helmholtz of
Berlin producing his work at Bonn and Heidelberg. Let us tarry here a moment.
Graz of the 1860's and 1870's was no rustic backwater. It was a major industrial city, the
second largest in Austria proper, and had an ancient and traditional architectural and historical
setting that nourished our pianist, butterfly-collector, literateur, scientist, and philosopher,
Boltzmann. There were up-to-date features: coal fields nearby at Kolflach, the beginnings of the
new industrial cornucopias of chemical works, iron and steel foundries, and scientific and optical
instrument shops, along with more traditional industries of vinegar-making and art and
printmaking. The city was surrounded on three sides by the south faces of the Styrian Alps.o It
headed a valley (Grazer Feld)
--------------(o) Styria was the name of this ancient province of the Habsburg lands--in fact it was the royal
seat of a branch of the Habsburgs that provided the embattled Holy Roman Emperor that
succeeded Rudolph II in Bohemia.
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--------------as it straddled the picturesque river Mur. This site led to a flattering French pun on the names
Graz and Mur--the "city of grace on the river of love" ("La ville des graces sur la riviere de
l'amour") 46 as well as a not-so-flattering invasion by French armies in the Napoleonic campaigns
of 1797 and 1809. The invading French had blown up one of the traditional landmarks of Graz, a
fortress and wall atop the Schlossberg, a hill that dominated the city where the Habsburg armies
had held off Hungarian invasions in 1481 and Turks in 1529 and 1532. By Boltzmann's time the
threat of invasion, even from the recently belligerent Prussians, had receded such that the ruins
on the Schlossberg were then city picnic grounds, where Boltzmann often met academic friends,
notably, for our purposes, colleagues from the nearby Technische Hochschule. Apparently the
social gap between engineers and scientists was not as wide in Graz as in Vienna or Berlin, for
among Boltzmann's Hochschule picnickers we find, for example, one of Clausius' students (from
the Hochschule in Zurich--hereafter abbreviated by the initials "ETH"- for Eidgenossische
Technische Hochschule), Carl von Linde.47
Linde would go on to the Technische Hochschule in Munich to become one of Helmholtz'
son's teachers, as well as a major pioneer in refrigeration technology, in one of the
least-mentioned success-stories of the boom in German technological expansion after 1870. He
was recognized by the technology-booster William II though, for he was ennobled (hence the
"von") in 1897,48 and often cited as the teacher of Rudolph Diesel, of engine fame. Indeed the
Clausius-Linde-Diesel connection was precisely the kind of historical link between science and
technology that buttressed the belief that the main agenda of academic science was (or should
have been) to support industrial development. It is also a link that illustrates the gap between the
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university and Hochschule agenda, for the institutional settings were not the universities at
Zurich, Munich, or Graz. We cannot here sneak in Boltzmann's philosophical agenda, for it did
not seem to reappear in the details of the work of either Linde or Diesel.p
---------(p) Coincidentally, Boltzmann and Linde became reacquainted, when Linde presided over the
"first engineering laboratory in Germany" in Munich49 while Boltzmann taught at the University
there in 1890-94.
---------There were other minor historical coincidences surround Boltzmann's stay in Graz, notably
the Kepler connection. While Hegel certainly fell for the intuitivism of Kepler, Boltzmann, like
Helmholtz, did not. Maybe it was because Boltzmann was respectful of the Catholic tradition in
Austria, and Kepler's reputation in Graz was more that of a Protestant figure than a scientific one.
The Protestant Reformation that had succeeded so well in Prussia and Northern Germany had
failed utterly in Habsburg lands, especially Austria, and more especially Graz. In 1530 the
Lutheran doctrine had been introduced in Graz, by the preacher Jacob von Eggenberg, and in
1540 he founded a Lutheran School to spread the faith, the "Paradise School." Kepler was later
hired to teach there, and did, until the Archduke Charles had their 20,000 Protestant books
burned in a square (itself to become site of the local lunatic asylum).50 Boltzmann seems to have
foregone the honor of being designated the new Kepler in Graz, whereas later Einstein, in
Kepler's Prague, would be seen in precisely that romantic historical aura by such literary
acquaintances Franz Kafka and Max Brod.q
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(q) Walther Nernst, for instance, on reading Brod's novel on Kepler told Einstein: "You are this
man Kepler".51
---------This, then, is the setting for the H-theorem. The technical motive for this production has
already been hinted at--there was no "proof" of the validity of Boltzmann's arguments of 1868.
What he had done was to deduce an already existing formula (Maxwell's "distribution") from
abstract principles. With a method in hand he could then modify the result to include more
extended situations. In the absence of experimental relevance, what kind of an argument would
justify all of this effort?

To be clear, we should break the argument down into easy parts:

The method of 1868 (the "Statistical Thermodynamics"), the "principle" (in Brush's phrase "the
equal a priori probability postulate52), and the result of 1872 (the H-Theorem).
The method involved the application of the logical laws of chance and statistics to determine
the likelihood that a collection of elastic spheres (or molecules, or ping-pong balls, or whatever)
would arrange themselves "by accident" in such a way as postulated by Maxwell. To "picture"
this, imagine a snapshot taken of a box of spheres. It will show a "distribution" of positions and
of speeds (presuming the spheres have little speedometers on them so you can see the speed of
each in the snapshot). Record the speed distribution by counting the relative number of fast and
slow spheres (there is a famous hump-backed diagram for this in texts). Incidentally, Gibbs later
called such a "snapshot," nowadays called a "microstate, a "complexion." Let the games
continue, that is, allow the "random" motion and collisions to change things. Now take another
picture. This shows another complexion with another velocity distribution. Do this lots of
times--a very, very many times (infinitely many if you are Gibbs). Compare the snapshots.
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According to Boltzmann's proof, you will find very few complexions that are "peculiar"- say a
snapshot where all the spheres line up to spell your name. Such an "improbable" event is allowed
in this argument--whether it is also required in an endless repetition of snapshots is a sticky point
in a sequence of arguments by Boltzmann, Gibbs, and the French mathematician Henri Poincaré.
Now forget the fascinating improbables--look at the common repetitions. Most of the pictures
will show pretty much the same distributions--a uniform smear of spheres ("uniform space
distribution") and fractions of fast to slow spheres fairly close to those given by Maxwell's
formula. Thus the "most probable" distribution is Maxwellian, and is proved to be necessarily so
by Boltzmann's "proof." This can now be extended to novel situations by plugging in
Boltzmann's factor to include other aspects of the spheres' behavior, like "gravity" pulling on the
system from just below the photograph.
This is a little tricky, so it would be helpful to repeat the argument via another model. Rather
than having elastic spheres in random motions, let us take playing cards dealt fairly into a lot of
poker hands, shuffling between each deal. The "laws of chance" predict that among the hands,
exotic "macrostates," like straights, will be less common than ordinary hands, like pairs. The
distribution of "good hands" can be easily calculated without actually dealing any "real" cards.
The rules of that easy calculation are the ones Boltzmann actually used for "molecules" rather
than "cards." In Maxwell's own words: "The true logic for this world is the Calculus of
Probabilities."53
So much for the method, or style of Boltzmann's mathematics. The principle (or postulate or
axiom) Boltzmann needed to get specifically the Maxwell distribution was striking. Each
complexion must be given equal likelihood--hence Brush's phrase "equal probability postulate."
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Why? Because if you didn't make that assumption, you wouldn't get the right (Maxwellian)
answer--hence the term "a priori." This was a striking vindication of Kant's original
"transcendental deduction," where principles were "discovered" by finding that they inexorably
and undeniably led logically to the states of affairs "known to exist" ("patently given" in our
earlier phrase).
But is it so? Is any hand of poker as likely as any other? It seems so (remembering that a
"hand" is not a thing of "value," like a flush," but just a string of specific cards--or
numbers--chosen at "random," i.e. "dealt fairly"). Is any complexion of spheres as likely as any
other? Since they are not of-the-world, but on-paper, we can imagine it so. If we do so, our logic
will demand a Maxwell velocity distribution of spheres. Can we "really" imagine such a thing?
As we shall see, the philosophical world divided among three answers: yes, no, and none of the
above. But did gas atoms, if such existed (and the existence of such things was in much doubt),
act the same way as playing cards? As we noted, they seemed to do so in the 1930's and 1940's,
when doubts about them were much diminished.
Already, by 1862, this egg laid by Clausius and Maxwell and hatched by Boltzmann had
raised these somewhat abstract speculations. Many readers will at this moment suddenly recall
Einstein's later plaint: "I cannot believe that God plays dice with the world" (there are
innumerable variations on that saying).54 This is as perplexing as Helmholtz's rejection of Kant's
geometry, for it comes from the premier "statistical" physicist of our century--but it illustrates the
stakes in Boltzmann's thermal poker.
This suggests some reasons why much of the later Viennese celebrity of scientific philosophy
revolved around the division of chance and accident in the cosmic law and order--as seen or
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mis-seen by physicists. Few of the academics, however, were equipped for the larger problem,
the H-theorem itself. The mathematics in this part are messier still, and it would be better to look
at our model of the method at get an idea of what is going on. Return to our collection of
snapshots (if you must, call the collection an "ensemble"). Lay them in a row in order of the time
that they were taken, or better, assemble them into frames in a moving picture. The chaotic
collisions will result in an "evolution," ever changing complexions. But Boltzmann proved (or
thought he proved, some said) that, in time, the complexions always tended toward the Maxwell
result! The chaos in the early part of the movie evolved into a wobbly equilibrium later on. R
--------------(r) This was not so in the poker analogy, successive hands didn't get better and better (they only
do that for one's opponent). That shows some literal limitations on the model (there are as yet
unmentioned details required to make things come out this way). However, this "partial" model
is wholly sufficient for the valid analogy.
--------------That this was so for a Boltzmann system thus seemed to many to be a proof of a law of physics.
It was not the First Law of Thermodynamics, which Maxwell had used to describe the
equilibrium-probable state. It was Clausius' Second Law of thermodynamics, which provided the
temporal evolution of the systems toward equilibrium. Boltzmann here "proved" the conjecture
by Kelvin and Clausius that systems out of thermal equilibrium would always tend tend towards
uniformity. For instance they assumed that hot and cold mixtures of things (fast and slow
molecules if you believed in such things) would tend toward a uniform, "in-between"
temperature. Maxwell made that point abundantly clear with his demon. But they had been
332

advocates of a world ordered by design, not one ordered by chance. Remember that Kelvin
opposed the theory of evolution as did, in part, Maxwell. And here was Boltzmann apparently
"proving" that the Second Law was an evolutionary law of accident, of insurance statistics and
the like.
While this first reaction to Boltzmann's statistical style is a bit oversimplified, it does point to
the philosophic (and moral) issues that would gain him notoriety. It would take some subtle
philosophy to make this line of argument plausible to a larger philosophical audience, and there
were Germans who could do so--Hans Vaihinger at Halle, Hermann Cohen and Friedrich Lange
at Marburg, and Kuno Fischer at Heidelberg--though these academics were unequipped
mathematically to absorb Boltzmann's examples into their revisions of Kantian philosophy.
Because of this, the uproar over Boltzmann's work was usually over the examples, not the
principles, as we have seen in the case of the the Lübeck disputes.
People ascribed to Boltzmann "intentions" ranging from the dramatic rejection of causality, of
law-and-order, of evolution, and of God, to the more technical "intention" of fudging the specific
rules of logic in the thermodynamics game. But to those around 1872 to whom the formulas of
physics, if correct, contained no "intentions" at all, but a true (or false) description of reality,
Boltzmann's own reasons for doing his deed were irrelevant (as were Kepler's--doing "the right
thing for the wrong reason"). Had Boltzmann "discovered" something, if so what, and what did
it imply?
To the physicist-philosophers, Maxwell and Helmholtz for instance, Boltzmann had hardly
upset any major doctrines. He had merely extended Maxwell's argument to a wider range of
cases-on-paper, and ingeniously shown logical-mathematical details of the interconnections of
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well established methods. Boltzmann discussed all this with Helmholtz in Berlin. Maxwell did
not leave much of his opinion, but it was sure to be favorably disposed to a fellow analogist.
Gibbs' dramatic generalization of Boltzmann's "Statistical Thermodynamics" into his "Statistical
Mechanics" was still far in the future, as was Max Planck's timid curiosity about the implied
"elemental chaos" in nature 55, so there would be plenty of opportunity for hardy
science-watchers to digest this turn of events before the mathematics got too esoteric. The pieces
of the Boltzmann arguments that reflected on the other academic agendas of the time, like the
argument over the "reality" of atoms, or the argument over meaning and message, or over minds
and matters, were central enough to make him a celebrity in diverse intellectual circles, and he
eventually returned to Vienna in 1894 with exactly that status.
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CHAPTER 8

The Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71 marked a major upturn both in the fortunes of Helmholtz
and his Germany. Helmholtz moved to Berlin, and plunged deeply into research in
electromagnetic theory. The philosophical component of his agenda was advanced by the
introduction of Franz and Carl Neumann's idea of "potential," an even more abstract notion than
"field" or "energy." The experimental demonstration of the power of such analogies was
highlighted by his work with Boltzmann toward "discovering" radio waves. While this was
going on, Helmholtz's Germany was undergoing arguably related ideological upheavals,
exemplified by the Kulturkampf waged against religious dogma by, among others, Rudolph
Virchow.
While Helmholtz pondered, Germany's technological industries exploded, and her economic
and political significance became awesome. Looking first at one of the sciences considered
responsible for this drama, chemistry, we find Helmholtz absent from the front lines, but his
colleagues and relatives are in the forefront of industrial development. The details of the
beginnings of the German chemical theory in the Naturphilosophie of Justus Liebig, and its
application to dyes and drugs by August Hoffmann and Englishman William Perkin demonstrate
a philosophical evolution parallel with Helmholtz's in physics.
In addition to the "unfolding" of post-war science, politics, and industry, there was also
movement in the academic philosophy linked to Helmoltz' particular fondness for
"science-fictions," that is, the method of analogies. The formal justification of the priority of
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immaterials, like "potentials" and energy, peaked with the publication of Hans Vaihinger's "As
If," itself coming with a pedigree in studies in philosophy by Kuno Fischer, Friedrich Lange, and
Hermann Cohen. Like the other stories, the chemical industry and the rise of the German
Empire, the evolution of academic philosophy shows both remarkable parallels with, and
remarkable independence from, Helmholtz's philosophical physics. As an anti-climax, a
potentially seminal conversation between Helmholtz and Vaihinger fizzles out.

THE HELMHOLTZ-BOLTZMANN EXPERIMENT

The years 1870-71 saw abrupt shifts in in Helmholtz's career, He was just completing some
inquiries into mathematical methods in electrical theory when Magnus at Berlin died, and the
papers were full of speculation that Helmholtz would succeed him. Well, the papers were not
exactly full of such academic gossip, for there was the war with France to report. Helmholtz
volunteered his rusty medical services on the battlefield. It was a short war for him, as he was
abruptly called to Berlin University. He eagerly and took up his post there, and promptly
indulged his new-found fascination with electrical mathematics. Right away he wanted to make
some measurements to check out some conjectures, and invited Boltzmann to come from Graz to
work on them. The matter was of some urgency, since he was being heartily attacked by
Wilhelm Weber (then back at Göttingen) and his partisans for his metaphysical physics, and by
neo-idealist philosophers for his physical metaphysics. As Koenigsberger, his biographer, hints:
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[Helmholtz wrote]: `That any one, holding such principles as I have put
before you, who instills into his students wherever possible the principle, `A
metaphysical conclusion is either a fallacy or a masked empirical inference,' will
not be viewed with much favour by the believers in metaphysics and a priori
intuition...Metaphysicians...are not generally very courteous in their polemic;
one's own progress can indeed be estimated by the rising discourtesy of the
opposition': and even if he met these discourteous scientific rejoinders with the
dignity of a great thinker, the unqualified attacks upon his person and his family
had none the less a depressing effect on him, and Helmholtz at this time passed
through a critical period.1

Actually, the specific crisis Koenigsberger mentions was a bit later, in the mid-1870's, when
"The entire University of Berlin united solidly with him, as the Philosophical Faculty had on a
previous occasion."2 (In fact, they elected him Rector). But the "previous occasion" dated from
this first year at Berlin, and the "attacks on his person and his family" suggest a more extensive
squabble than the technical duel with Weber.
Some details of these arguments may illuminate the more subtle details of the
Maxwell-Helmholtz agenda. In outline: the storm arose first over an abstract use of an arcane
formula of his old Königsberg friend Franz Neumann--then subsided while the formulas evolved
into some experimental work by Boltzmann, resulting in a premature "proof" of Maxwell's
electromagnetic theory of light six years before the celebrated experiments of Heinrich Hertz
(himself working for Helmholtz on the same problem).
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The important part of the story for experimental history is the later "discovery of radio
waves," the important part for the philosopher is the earlier use of Neumann's formula (actually
several formulas by Franz and his son Carl of Leipzig). At issue were a number of candidate
formulas for various actions between moving electrically charged bodies--by Maxwell, Ampère,
Carl Neumann, Weber, and even Riemann and Clausius.3 As Maxwell, following Faraday, had
originally thought that these actions could be modeled via a space-filling "field," so Neumann
had produced a space-filling formula, a "potential-formula." The utility of such a
potential-formula was that it could be manipulated by standard mathematical operations ("taking
a gradient" in modern slang) to produce force-formulas for "fields"--an abstraction hidden behind
an abstraction. What Helmholtz had done was to invent a Neumann potential-formula with a
"dummy" constant k that would yield each of the competitors' different force-formulas when
different values for k were chosen--choosing k to be one gave Franz Neumann's formula, zero
gave Maxwell's, minus one gave Weber's and Carl Neumann's, etc.4 Now this is a spectacular
invention: a formula-formula. A mere formula takes in numbers and gives out other numbers, a
formula-formula takes in numbers and gives out formulas. This was not a radical idea in
mathematics, but it was indeed a unique advance in mathematical physics, where formulas had
analogous counterparts in experimental models. The "field" was already an abstract analogy, and
now it could be deduced from a "higher-level" abstraction--the "potential" (the suffix "-formula"
has been unfortunately abandoned by moderns). What was the appropriate analogy to a potential?
What kind of physicist's animal could such a beast be?
Young Carl Neumann had an idea about that, and perhaps it was this idea that brought the
metaphysician's wrath down upon the Helmholtz clan. In 1870 Carl had published a rather
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provocative address he had delivered at Leipzig: "On the Principles of Galileo-Newtonian
Theory." In it he claimed that "potential" was a fiction. So too, he said, were absolute space,
electric fields, and all the other fundamental quantities and laws of physics. By "fiction" he
meant not only "not-real," but logically impossible. His favorite fiction, absolute space, the
fiction of Galileo and Newton, was particularly logically absurd--but it was precisely the logical
glitch in these fictions that made them so useful. Hence the other name for such useful lies:
"heuristics."5
It is hard to tell how notorious this idea really was in 1870, but it got into the hands of
theologian Hans Vaihinger of Halle, who churned it in with the academic neo-Kantian
philosopher-wars, claiming fictional status for all sorts of ideas, from aether to God. These
heuristics are often considered a post-war lunacy boom of neo-idealism culminating in the 1911
classic by Vaihinger, "The Philosophy of As-If." After all, they could be called literally
"science-fiction." Scientist Tait's "Unseen Universe," and Kelvin and company's Society for
Psychic Research belong to the same period, as does the art-nouveau grotesqueries of
Boltzmann's Vienna, all often denigrated as some kind of "degeneracy rehearsal" for the
upcoming Wars-to-end-all. The panic arose from large groups that we might call scientific
"fundamentalists." Such folk, then and now, are bound to take the words of
authority--science--literally, and will vilify those who take them as "merely" heuristic. These
complaints against metaphorical science were particularly strong in two skeptical groups--the
"materialists," (sometimes "positivists"), following the anti-metaphysical doctrines of Comte, and
the "idealists" still clinging to the "reality" of "transcendentals" (those called "metaphysicians" by
Helmholtz). It didn't help matters for Vaihinger to call his philosophy both "idealistic positivism"
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and "positivist idealism."6
This philosophical matter will be taken up directly, but the other trail, the experimental fate of
the potential-formula is a more visible tale. It goes thus: Helmholtz took his generalized
Neumann's formula, and combined it with formulas of Maxwell's theories, thus demonstrating,
for instance, that Weber's formula was inconsistent with energy conservation, and that Maxwell's
electromagnetic field equations resulted from a particular choice of the parameter k.
Koenigsberger relates the story from here:

[Helmholtz] gave F.E. Neumann's potential-expression a form in which it
included the two different potential-expressions laid down by W. Weber and
Clerk Maxwell for each pair of current-elements. Investigations of the law for the
different values of his constant k had shown that Weber's law led to inconvenient
results: on the other hand, Maxwell's hypothesis...required... knowledge of the
dielectric constant of the air, or the velocity of transverse electric waves in air,
which likewise could not be determined from previous experiments. It was thus
of primary importance to determine this latter constant by experiment, which were
accordingly undertaken by Boltzmann in his laboratory, with the view of testing
Clerk Maxwell's now famous electromagnetic theory of light. This distinguished
physicist, whom Helmholtz vainly endeavoured to secure for Berlin at a later time
as successor to Kirchoff, wrote to Koenigsberger in April, 1902, that in
consequence of [an error in interpreting Maxwell], the requisite agreement was
not obtained; he therefore left Berlin in the firm conviction that Maxwell was
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entirely wrong, and was on the point of printing his criticism of the theory. As
early as November 1, 1872, however, he wrote to Helmholtz: `...I was always
under the impression (and I believe you expressed the same idea when I was in
Berlin) that on Maxwell's theory of the identity of light and electricity, the
dielectric constants which I had determined must always be equal to the refractive
indices. On now [reexamining the numbers]...[I] noticed at the same time that
they were always nearly equal to the square of the latter. The thought flashed
through my mind that Maxwell's theory might require this --...I looked up
Maxwell's treatise, and there sure enough was plain to read that [Maxwell had
argued thus]; so that I must look on my experiments as a confirmation of Clerk
Maxwell's Theory.'7

So Helmholtz was on the verge of a breakthrough, "confirming" Maxwell's theories, but
blundered by a missing square root. Boltzmann corrected the error, and we thus expect history to
celebrate the Boltzmann-Helmholtz "discovery" of radio waves in 1872. Not really, that fame is
assigned to Hertz of 1888, but in any case there were many other similar measurements going on
at the time--remember, Helmholtz was a relatively new convert to this line of research. though
had dabbled in it back in his dissertation with Stefan. Modern historians, notably T.S. Kuhn, are
quick to point out that the "priority" or "first discovery" is more of a myth than a historical
fact--in this sense, "discoveries" are made apparent within a community of scholars (his
"disciplinary matrix," our "agenda") as part of the normal development of a collective
problem-set. A quest for "who was first" (caused by the "precursitus virus," Joseph T. Clark once
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wrote8)--Hertz or Boltzmann--serves only to obscure the question of what, if anything is being
discovered, be it heretofore unseen phenomenon or unthought fiction.
Controversial as these researches may have been, it still seems likely that there were more
sources for the attacks that included Helmholtz' family and required the rallying of the Berlin
Faculty behind their new recruit. Perhaps Helmholtz' authoritative manner contributed to his
difficulties. Joseph Mulligan chronicles Helmholtz' many admiring students, but in a footnote
mentions one dissenter:

...Boltzmann found Helmholtz somewhat cold and officious, the typical
"Geheimrat" or privy councillor...[In 1871 Boltzmann] soon found that "A single
glance from Helmholtz made it clear that cheerfulness and humor did not befit
the scholar." Despite the personality difference, which seems to have been mainly
the difference between Vienna and Berlin, Boltzmann felt that the only person to
whom he could talk about certain physics problems was Helmholtz.9

It was also unlikely that these critics of Helmholtz included the scientific critics of
Boltzmann, namely Thomson and Tait. Helmholtz was personally close to both, translated their
works, and spent a leisurely holiday with them prior to coming up to Berlin. The usually
apocryphal story of the scientist working while playing seems to be valid in this case of
Helmholtz's holiday. Koenigsberger writes:

From [Glasgow] he went on to the yacht-races at Inverary, taking part in
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them on Thomson's yacht, a two-master, and one of the finest and more
commodious of the forty yachts, all fairly large, well-appointed and elegant, that
were competing...Helmholtz and Thomson studied the theory of waves `which he
loved to treat as a kind of race between us'...`Thomson...always carried his
mathematical notebook about with him, and would begin to calculate in the midst
of the company if anything occurred to him, which was treated with a certain awe
by the party. How would it be if I accustomed the Berliners to the same
proceeding?'
The return voyage was very pleasant and comfortable, and on calm
days he and Thomson experimented on the rate at which the smallest ripples that
appeared at the surface of the water were propagated.10

That sporting interest in ripples grew up in later years to become a most fruitful mathematical
theory of waves, informing such disparate studies as boating and nuclear physics.a But at the
time
--------------(a) This latter point refers to the remarkable success of the subsequent mathematics in actual
calculations of the fissioning potential of a vibrating liquid drop--this an analogy to the oddly
behaving Uranium nucleus in 1939. The theory trail covers many of the later physicists,
including Maxwell's successor at the Cavendish, John Strutt, the third Baron Rayleigh, and
atomic theorists John Wheeler and Niels Bohr, who borrowed Rayleigh's equations to model
nuclear fission.11
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--------------Helmholtz’ curiosity seemed to give him a great deal of public grief, and his popularity in
Heidelberg seems followed by some yet unexplained resentment in Berlin.

HELMHOLTZ'S UNSEEABLE UNIVERSE

Helmholtz's Berlin was in the throes of one of the nineteenth century's most amazing
phenomenon, rapid modernization. The war had not caused this boom, only legitimized it by the
perceived moral victory of scientific Germany over romantic France. The political-economic
administration fell into place--the reformed customs union (Zollverein) of the pre-war "North
German Confederation" with its parliament was now seen (by Bismarck) as a "political pre-form
to a united Germany, as it would have representation from the south and universal suffrage."12
Others, like the naturalist Heinrich Hart, welcomed the war "...like a spring wind that blew away
the stale and airless winter of the Biedermeier period."13
This spring, though, was blustery. We have seen indications of crisis in Helmholtz's career,
and we find crises too for other citizens--notably Roman Catholics, who were suffering an attack
from the government (the Kulturkampf), and investors, who suffered a tremendous financial
collapse after the hysterical post-war investment bubbles (the Grunderzeit). All three crashes
came around 1873. We will forego the opportunity to speculate on the interaction between hard
economic times and Helmholtz' philosophical struggles, but his ambivalent position of the
religious issue requires some attention. His friend Rudolph Virchow supported the Kulturkampf
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in parliament, in fact he named it. We can only surmise that loyalist Helmholtz supported the
policy as long as Bismarck did, then was left in a quandary when Bismarck switched sides. The
practical issue that dragged academician Helmholtz into the fray seemed to be in questions of
control of schools and the role in them of state ideology.
It is hard to imagine that the Kulturkampf was simply a consequence of religious bigotry
among such enlightened men as Virchow and Helmholtz. The immediate background for the
crisis was seen in the ecumenical council held by Pope Pius IX on the eighteenth centenary of St.
Peter and St. Paul. in 1867, just after the disastrous loss of Catholic Austria to Protestant Prussia.
The result of this, the "First Vatican Council," was (on the proposal of a Cardinal Manning) the
pronouncement of the dogma of papal infallibility in 1870, the year of the war between Catholic
France and Protestant Prussia. From the Prussian side, the doctrine looked like papal meddling
in geopolitical affairs, and the wrongly suspected propaganda arm of Rome, the Jesuit teaching
order, seemed thus to be an unpatriotic influence promoting the authority of Rome over that of
Berlin. Later, on assuming the Rectorate of Berlin University in 1877, Helmholtz delivered an
address on academic freedom, revealing his attitude on the matters of the religious aspect of the
Kulturkampf :

In the German Empire of to-day, the most extreme consequences of
materialistic metaphysics, the boldest speculations on the basis of Darwin's
evolutionary theory, can be promulgated as freely as the extreme deification of
Papal Infallibility. 14
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That is, absurd scientific-moral doctrines, like absurd religious ones, should be tolerated in a
free university (but not, it is presumed, in a state-run school system, or a state-run church).
The early results of the Kampf, the "May Laws" of 1873" were to expel Jesuits from Germany,
to erase Jesuit teaching by reforming the exams for entry into the Gymnasium and University,
and to require examinations in politically correct philosophy, and World and German History as
qualification for ordination as a state-controlled) priest or minister.15 There was also curricular
reform for the schools. The new minister of culture, Adalbert Falk, beefed up requirements in
history, geography, natural science, and geometry (Helmholtz's favorite).16 Son Robert's agenda
may have been affected by these reforms, for the tracks from secondary education to professional
success were rearranged. The Gymnasium became designated as the only legal preparation for the
Universities, while the residual humanistic-classical Volkschule, the new science-math-language
driven Oberrealschule, and the hybrid Realgymnasium would qualify its students (at best) only
for the Technische Hochschule. The historian Gordon Craig notes that it was not until 1900 that
graduates of the Realschule could even take civil service exams, when "the `monopoly of the
Gymnasium' was finally broken as a result of a long campaign waged against `the humanists' by
the `realists'."17
Helmholtz was on the side of the "realists," despite his own beginnings in the Humboldt era.
This was a new Empire, and his children needed the science, math and language training to
"compete." Under the new system, Robert eventually graduated from the Munich Technische
Hochschule, while daughter Kathe married an up-and-coming technician, Arnold von Siemens,
Werner's son. For his own part, Helmholtz served his Kaiser loyally on several commissions of
education to effect Falk's reforms. Surely, then, he was a bit distressed, as was Virchow, when
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Bismarck backed away from the Kulturkampf, revoked the May Laws, and fired Falk in 1879.
These events may be foreshadowed in Helmholtz' reservations about some elements of the
reforms. The suppression of external dogma was accompanied by a move to revise internal
dogma, and the official Protestant churches and schools were heavily pressed to incorporate the
new facts of patriotic science. In this case, however, these controversial facts were not
Helmholtz's discoveries, but those of the "extremist" Darwinists and the profitable technocrats.
It was not just in the support of the Bismarck's government that Helmholtz showed his
"patriotism." As a faculty member of the flagship University, he turned part of his attention to
practical matters (or at least gave the impression he was doing that). Among the titles of his
papers and addresses for the years 1871-1888 (before Helmholtz went to the new institute for the
new Emperor--William II) we find such non-physiological "practical" titles as:

On a Theorem Concerning geometrically similar movements of Fluid Bodies and
its Application to the Problem of steering Air-balloons (1983)
Whirlwinds and Thunderstorms (1876)
Telephone and Timbre (1878)
On the Formation of Clouds and Thunderstorms (1886)

Actually, apart from serving on international commissions, that was nearly all of the "useful"
work Helmholtz did in those days, and even that reveals his mathematical-philosophical
sympathies. As one can easily guess, the "Air-balloon" paper is more about "Theorems" and
"geometric similarity" than about "applications," and the telephone business concerns a
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mathematical theorem by Fourier. The same list contains 21 papers on theoretical
electrodynamics and electrochemistry, only a few on physiology and thermodynamics, and five
(in 1876) on some abstract mathematical methods including William Rowan Hamilton's
principles and his "Principle of Least Action".18
This latter work is perhaps the most revealing example of the abstractness that the
Maxwell-Helmholtz agenda had attained. Fortunately for us, Helmholtz was aware of the
difficulty that non-specialists might have in following this path, and tried to be accommodating.
In one of those papers, he noted:

A law which is to comprise the total sum of alterations in Nature must
necessarily deal with concepts of the most abstract kind, from which everything
has been eliminated that refers to the particular properties of the natural bodies
known to us; for the most part it is necessary, indeed, under such conditions, to
form new abstract concepts for the purpose, which, when any one hears them
defined for the first time, shall evoke no previous concepts or experiences--that is,
in popular parlance, make him think of nothing.19

The "nothings" of which one is to think are not the dreaded manipulations of arcane
mathematics. Instead, we are to visualize "concepts," These "concepts" include "concealed
masses," that are to be even more "real" than the mere content of our senses. Koenigsberger
explains these metaphysical notions:
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Just as the forces of heat had at an earlier period been referred to the
concealed motion of tangible masses, and Clerk Maxwell had recognized in
electrodynamic forces the action of concealed masses in motion, so Helmholtz now
proposed in general to admit the motion and energy of these concealed masses in
the treatment of physical problems, since in the invisibilities that lie behind
phenomena, he saw only motion and mass that are incapable of being demonstrated
to our senses.20

It was this kind of science that drove the philosophy-minded wild, particularly the assertion,
with Hertz, that such "motion" and "mass" were not themselves physically sensible. If you can`t
"see" motion, what do you think you do see when a car goes by? According to Helmholtz, you
"see" by receiving force or energy through your senses-faculties, so that "force" and "energy" are
parts of the sensible world, whereas motion and matter are features of the unseeable "real" world.
Again Koenigsberger points to the drama of this attitude:

The hypothesis that Helmholtz here puts forward and is constantly
elucidating, to the effect that all phenomena come about uniformly through the
action of concealed masses, by concealed motions and rigid combinations was
subsequently stated by Hertz (as a corollary to this fundamental idea of
Helmholtz, which stands for the most significant advance that has been made by
modern mechanics) in correct language in the somewhat wider assumption: `that
the complexity of the real world is greater than that of the world that lies open to
349

our senses; we admit that an unknown agent is at work, but we deny that this
agent has a specific character, like the concepts of force and energy; the unknown
must still be Motion and Mass, distinguished from the visible not by its own
nature, but simply in relation to us, and to our normal modes of perception...Force
and Energy are no more than effects of Mass and Motion which are not always
perceptible to our senses.' 21

We can guess other qualities of this unseeable universe, for instance "potential" which, we
remember, was some formula attached to systems that gave out "force" when treated to some
mathematical operation. This particular example is crucial, for it shows the role of mathematics
in this game. Mathematics here "connects" the two worlds--the realms on either side of an
equal-sign are different, and the relations between the sides are those of analogy, not of
"identity."
Indeed many philosophers were driven wild, hence the accusations of Tait and Kelvin that
these guys (mostly Boltzmann) were ignoring the world of the senses--or of Ostwald that these
guys had the wrong composition of ultimate reality (it was supposed to be "energy," hence his
science was "energetics")--or of Mach, who conferred only fictional status to this supposed "real"
unseen world (after all, it included "atoms").
The idea that the tangible, empirical world so accessible to our senses was "concealing" an
abstract world not so sensible was, of course, encouraging to the popular mystics and
metaphysicians that Helmholtz hated. On an earlier visit to London (1863), he had noted the
tendency to fiction by the audience of his and Tyndall's public accounts of heat:
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But the competition of popular lectures in London is so great that they are
on the verge of degenerating into a mere shop-window display. Tyndall, as a
matter of fact, has a vast talent for popular discourses...A spirit-rapping medium
recently spelt out his celestial name, which was `Poet of Science.' 22

Yet technically Helmholtz could not do without such "unseen" universes. The motion of
bodies in such a shadow universe obeyed the mathematical rules of "rational mechanics," that is,
his Conservation of Energy, and Hamilton's "Law of Least Action," whereby a "body," left to its
own devices, will move in such a way as to expend the minimum "action" (a peculiar relative of
energy). In effect, this is to assert that the fundamental law in the concealed universe is a
principle of laziness--systems do the least they possibly can under the constraints given by the
appropriate laws. In this world-on-paper, then, balls roll downhill, not up, and hot objects cool
down, not up. The Irish Hamilton had mathematically incorporated this principle (assigned to a
French Enlightenment savant, Maupertuis) into a very generalized method of treating fictional
mechanical systems, and it was this kind system that so fascinated Maxwell, Boltzmann, and
Helmholtz as a possible means to analogies for the visible universe--the laws of thermodynamics
and electrodynamics. Whether this line of thought is revealing or muddled, it is a far cry from
the "scientific" concerns of much of the rest of the academic world.
Helmholtz's more illustrious colleagues at Berlin spent considerably more time than he in
affairs of state and commerce. Virchow's politics were already notorious, but perhaps more
indicative of the New Germany was the success of August von Hoffmann from the chemistry
department (the departments of chemistry, physics, and mathematics were not as disparate in
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those days, so Helmholtz undoubtedly knew Hoffmann). If having discovered that the scientist
Helmholtz was not directly responsible for the new industrial revolution we still want to find the
scientific authors of the economic miracle, Hoffmann is a prime candidate.

CHEMISTS AND ROMANTICS

Two of Helmholtz's colleagues in the chemistry department were gaining a reputation as
virtual authors of the commercial revolution: The ancient Justus von Liebig and his one-time
student August Hoffmann. Devotees of the science-as-national-resource theory will not be
perturbed that Maxwell and Helmholtz didn't seem to be spawning industries, for legend has it
that the early technological revolution was driven by chemists, not physicists.b
--------------(b) A memorable synopsis of this point, a common cliche has it that World War I was a
"chemist's war," while World War II was the "physicist's War" (or "Wizard War" in a famous
phrase by Winston Churchill).
--------------This legend has it that chemistry-driven national prosperity had little to do with physicists like
Helmholtz (and even less to do with mathematicians). Conversely, we claim that more detailed
reconstruction, at least of the Liebig-Hoffmann story, may have less to do with prosperity
(though undeniably it involved commercial successes), and more to do with Helmholtz--in the
sense of the academic agendas, as at Berlin, became directed more towards an internal
philosophical discourse than towards a public purpose.
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It helps to be familiar with the legend first, for it identifies the key players (Liebig,
Hoffmann, and William Perkin), the key industrial competitors (Germany and England), and the
profitable products (coal-tar derivatives, textile dyes in particular).
It seems that in the Romantic Era (1800-1850), Liebig invented "organic" chemistry, the
study of the composition of living as opposed to non-living, "inorganic" substances (traditionally
minerals at the time). Hoffmann, his student, became especially interested in the composition of
coal-tar, a by-product of the coal-mining industry hopefully providing a practical source of "gas"
for lighting, etc. Hoffmann is said to have discovered an extract of coal-tar gas called "aniline."
Then in England his teen-aged student, Perkin accidentally converted the aniline into a
commercially valuable dye, and thus an important industry was born. A typical modern
encyclopedia entry covers the story:

In 1856 the young English student W.H. Perkin, while attempting to make
quinine in his home laboratory, accidentally made the first synthetic dye, mauve,
and founded shortly thereupon the coal-tar dye industry. The industry grew
rapidly, first in England, then in Germany, and finally in the United states, until all
but a small fraction of one-percent of all dyes used for fabric were synthetic or
coal-tar dyes.23

The details of this story support the morals to be drawn: the goop on William's lab coat turned
out not to be quinine, but the stain was permanent--hence the "serendipity" rationale for research
support. The industry flourished in Germany, not England, because of the concentration of
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coal-based industries in the Ruhr Valley (or "Aniline Valley" as one author quipped)--hence tying
research specialties to national resources. Later it is said that the United States had to develop its
own chemistry because of the World-War I embargo of German products--hence the geopolitical
significance of technological industries. The lesson many drew from the failure of England and
the success of Germany was that basic science should be a national resourse, as it spawns
industrial progress.
The founder himself, Justus Liebig, foresaw a "flaw" in English science, which might predict
Germany's "edge." In an 1842 letter to Faraday recalling a visit to England, Liebig commented

What struck me most in England was the perception that only those works
which have a practical tendency awake attention and command respect, while the
purely scientific works which possess far greater merit are almost unknown...In
Germany it is quite the contrary. Here in the eyes of scientific men, no value, or
at least but a trifling one is placed on practical results. The enrichment of science
alone is considered worthy of attention.24

This is all quite compelling, but it is here claimed that the details of the story of the rise of the
chemical industry do not support the crucial role awarded "pure" research. It would seem that the
work of Liebig, Hoffmann, and Perkin followed more the Maxwell-Helmholtz agenda in
evolving from a romantic Naturphilosophie to an austere Neo-Kantian analogical methodology,
while the industrial development of chemicals depended on other technological fact stores.
As a guide for re-examining this story, we should bear in mind the features of the
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metaphysical discourse about the fictional "world-on-paper." We will particularly point to the
original links with Naturphilosophie, illustrated by Liebig's studies with Schelling, the university
settings, and the recurrence of analogies and heuristics, intentionality, the synthetic a priori (the
mental origin of scientific law), and phenomenology (pure description as opposed to
"explanation"). The peculiar use of mathematics one might expect will not be required, as that
would need more argumentation than we should spend on this example.
We start with the founding ancestor, Justus Liebig. He was born and spent his youth in
Darmstadt, in the independent state of Hesse-Darmstadt. This matters because the state
university was at Giessen, where Liebig was to set up his most influential school. Officially,
Liebig wasn't actually eligible to teach there as he had never attended in his youth. He had run
away from home and gone to a foreign college, Bonn in Prussia. He then transferred to Erlangen
to study science with the reputedly greatest scientist around--Schelling! As he ultimately
graduated from Erlangen, he needed some good political influence to get onto the faculty at
Giessen, and he secured that help in Paris from Alexander von Humboldt!
Liebig's reasons for running away from home might be significant. His father was a middle
class tradesman, a maker of fabric dyes! Dad experimented in his home, with little Justus as an
assistant, and sent the boy at fifteen to work to learn more "chemistry"--to an apothecary shop at
Appheim. Reportedly upset with the primitive craft, and being a clumsy laboratory worker
(several explosions are mentioned25), Justus ran away to find a place to learn more; Schelling's
Erlangen.
He was not actually satisfied with Prussia either:
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Indeed, as he himself said afterwards, it was a wretched time for chemistry
in Germany. No laboratories were accessible to ordinary students...
He left Erlangen, where he subsequently complained that the contagion
of the `greatest philosopher and metaphysician of the century' (Schelling), in a
period `rich in words and ideas, but poor in true knowledge and genuine studies'
had cost him two precious years of his life.26

So, impressed with Naturphilosophie, but finding it in want of experimental science (as did
Goethe and Oersted), he sought a more "experimental" mentor, Alexander von Humboldt in
Paris. Von Humboldt got him into a private chemical laboratories in Paris (Gaultier and
Gay-Lussac of Arcueil fame), and then, when he thought he was ready to return, arranged
waivers and such to get him a faculty position at Giessen. Von Humboldt was like that--recall
that he had also "sponsored" young Helmholtz in avoiding the army and getting to Königsberg,
presumably to advance the cause of the new science.
After he became successful, Liebig moved on to Munich University in 1852. As he was near
Heidelberg, he often hung out with Bunsen and Kirchoff there, but had nothing to say about
meeting Helmholtz, save noticing in correspondence with Wöhler that Helmholtz had been
"called" to Berlin27. For symmetry recall that Helmholtz had tried to meet Liebig in the
Exhibition year, 1851, but Liebig had gone to England to meet the Queen, and Helmholtz found
only a muddy laboratory:

I was astonished to see the equipment caked with mud and dirt...but other
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factors made it not disappointing...This was the laboratory of the unassuming
Liebig, still the most important living chemist and a teacher of powerful and
brilliant influence...28

Liebig remained in Munich through the wars with Prussia and France and the Unification, and
died in Berlin in the year of the crash, 1873. While his Munich research (including comparing the
effect of cannabis and hashish on the brain, nerves, and memory29) was significant, the chemistry
that made him famous (and had prompted the invitation of the King of Bavaria) was his early
work at Giessen. The transition will take us from the background of von Humboldt, Schelling,
and Naturphilosophie to a pre-Maxwell method of analogies.
Liebig became famous for his Giessen studies partly, if not wholly, through self-promotion.
He was a controversialist, often attempting to disprove rather than prove someone's chemical
discovery. Along with the famous annalist Poggendorff he created "The Journal of Chemistry
and Pharmacology," which carried many of his own investigations. Early on these discoveries
were distant relatives of his father's recipe-hunting, for example his extraction of organic
"radicals" from the oil of bitter almonds (with Wöhler, the inventor of synthetic urea, in 1832).32 c
His study of ether
--------------(c) Foreshadowing the dye-business, those oils of bitter almonds grew up into a beautiful green
dye in 1877 via the work of O. Fischer and Dobner).31
--------------and alcohol to establish an "ethyl theory"32 also created techniques later used in Perkin's
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coal-tar"naphthalene" dye-extracting.33
Sometime in 1838 Liebig decided that his main mission as a chemist would be to study the
"chemistry of life," a combination of the "organic" philosophy of Schelling and the "social
utility" doctrines of Humboldt (and perhaps a "profit-making" goal of his father's). He probably
got a push from reading the recently published "History of Chemistry" by yet another Scot (and
yet another Thomson), Thomas ("Tommy") Thomson of Glasgow. Tommy was a Scots chemist,
founder of the first "school of practical chemistry in a British university" (Glasgow).34 He was
not closely related to our William Thomson (Kelvin), or his brother James, or their father, a
professor of engineering and mathematics at Glasgow, but undoubtedly knew them all, and
shared in that particularly Glaswegan practical bent that eventually won Kelvin (Thomson) his
knighthood and provoked Liebig's Germany-England comparison.
Not that Liebig, protege of Humboldt, needed any pragmatic urging from Scotland, but
Thomson's notions might appeal to the son of a dye-maker, especially in that they contain much
of the "natural philosophy" of the Romantic age. Thomson lectured:

The animal and vegetable kingdom presented a still more tempting field of
investigation. Animal and vegetable substances may be arranged under three
classes, acids, alkalies, and neutrals. The class of acids presents many substances
of great utility, either in the arts, or for seasoning food. The alkalies contain
almost all the powerful medicines that are drawn from the vegetable kingdom.
The neutral bodies are important as articles of food...All these bodies are
composed (chiefly, at least) of hydrogen, carbon, oxygen, and azote [nitrogen];
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substances easily procured abundantly at a cheap rate. Should chemists, in
consequences of the knowledge acquired by future investigations, ever arrive at
the knowledge of forming these principles from their elements at a cheap rate, the
prodigious change which such a discovery would make upon the state of society
must be at once evident. Mankind would be, in some measure, independent of
climate and situation; every thing could be produced at pleasure in every part of
the earth; and the inhabitants of the warmer regions would no longer be the
exclusive possessors of comforts and conveniences to which less favoured regions
of the earth are strangers... Even already some of these effects are beginning to
develop themselves;--our streets are now illuminated with gas drawn from the
bowels of the earth; and the failure of the Greenland fishery during an unfortunate
season like the last no longer fills us with dismay...35

Thomson went on to describe the state of the art of the chemistry of urine, saliva, digestion,
respiration, etc. Investigating every topic in this text except the fisheries of Greenland, Liebig
did indeed study the chemistry of "animals and vegetables." This included theories of the
chemistry of cooking, and allied digestion and nutrition. Guided by Humboldt's "life-principle,"
he chemically "analyzed" animals--their blood, flesh, bile, urine, etc. He even investigated
coal-gas, included in the animal-vegetable, or "organic," kingdom as coal was presumed to be
dead vegetation. The food-science in particular led him to the chemistry of vegetables, and the
delicate recipe-chemistry that was already known about them--especially by the dye-makers,
who, after all, had been extracting dyes from vegetables for almost as long as textiles had existed.
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Looking back, this seems fortunate for history, for it was in the chemistry of the indigo-dye plant
that Liebig and Hoffmann began to see a parallel color chemistry in coal-gas extracts like
nitrobenzene and naphtha. Following this thread eventually led Hoffmann to the vegetable-drug
Quinine and thus Hoffmann to mauve dye.d
--------------(d) Technically it was not actually Quinine that first attracted Hoffmann, but the related
Chinchotannic acid, extracted from the barks of several Indian trees. This colorless acid
oxidizes, or "rusts," on contact with air to produce a colorful "chinchona red" dye very profitable
to India.36
--------------In addition to the organic chemistry of color, Liebig's "chemistry of life" gave him experience
in the chemistry of odors, particularly the ammonia compounds associated with another of his
great discoveries, artificial manure. This investigation is now forgotten, for its great
demonstration on a ten acre state experiment station in Giessen was a total failure. Apologists
note that he was not wrong, for fertilizers were ultimately synthesized from both ammonia and
coal-tar. It was just that Liebig's artificial manure was not water-soluble, and tended to wash
away during rains, spreading an unpopular stench throught Giessen. Salvaging something from
this work, Liebig gained valuable experience in relative solubility of chemicals, more vital
information that would connect the rather separate worlds of coal-tar dyes and medicinal quinine.

It was in this "organic" phase that Liebig handed off to Hoffmann the coal-gas and naphtha
(actually "naphthalene") investigation which led to Hoffmann's "discovery" of aniline in 1843.
360

Of course he didn't "discover" anything, except that certain chemicals isolated by earlier chemists
all belonged to the same family, but this was a formidable and brilliant insight, and it will be
obvious that the role of analogical thinking in this insight was crucial. Thus, as advertised,
Liebig's story shows chemistry's roots in Naturphilosophie and the Romantics. The tales of
Hoffmann and Perkin will show more the role of analogies

SCIENCE AND INDUSTRY: THE DYE WORKS

Who was Hoffmann, and what was he doing in Giessen with Liebig? Well, he happened to be
born in Giessen, in 1858, and presumably met the local legend in his youth (Liebig was only 15
years older than Hoffmann). This was Liebig's dye-period, not his fertilizer-phase, but even the
good smelling chemistry did not attract our youth. He went off to a foreign land, Hanover, to
attend college. He studied law and philology at Göttingen, in the days of Gauss, Weber, and the
Brothers Grimm, and seemed destined to become a philosopher-scientist like so many our
ex-philology majors had. But, it is said, when back at Giessen on holiday, Liebig persuaded him
to give up "useless" studies, and stay there and do chemistry. He did so, and obtained his
doctorate from Giessen in 1841. The same (anonymous) biographer who regretted his later loss
to England also records his discovery:

[Hoffmann's] first research in Liebig's laboratory at Giessen was on
coal-tar, and his investigation of the organic bases in coal-gas naphtha established
the nature of aniline. This substance he used to refer to as his first love, and it was
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a love to which he remained faithful throughout his life. His perception of the
analogy between it and ammonia led to his famous work on the amines and
ammonium bases and the allied phosphorous compounds, while his researches on
rosaniline, which he first prepared in 1858, formed the first of a series of
investigations on colouring matters, which only ended with quinoline red in
1887.37

Formaldehyde and organic perfumes also grew out of these coal-gas experiments, but for the
inquiry of the commercial impact of all of this, we must focus on quinine. What did this drug
have to do with the Hoffmann-Liebig agenda, such that Perkin was looking for it when he stained
his lab coat? And what was Hoffmann doing in England?
In 1845 the Albert, Prince Consort to the young Queen Victoria (then eight years on the
throne) and patron of the practical arts, sponsored a Royal school of practical chemistry.
Presumably patterned after Tommy Thomson's Glasgow laboratory, it was to be a national
resource, designed to produce the kinds of benefits for England that Tommy Thomson had
promised, and that the Prince could show to the world in a grand exhibition. This school was the
to be called Royal College of Chemistry, and for it he spirited away from Bonn University one of
the more promising "practical" chemists of Europe, August Hoffmann. Hoffmann had only just
arrived at Bonn from his doctorate with Liebig, yet the government gave him a special
appointment including a two-year leave of absence to help out the English. He finally returned to
Bonn 19 years later (presumably his leave was up) and within a year got the call to Berlin (1865),
where he died in 1892, having been ennobled by Prince Albert's grandson, Kaiser William II.
362

Of Hoffmann's researches in England, we recall his fame rests on whatever he taught his
student, William Perkin. For it was Perkin who, when oxidizing pure aniline with potassium
dichromate produced a beautiful purple stain. Well, not exactly--what he got was a black goo,
from which the purple dye was extracted by a process so much discussed in later years as it
became an “industrial secret.” There are two themes in the Perkin-Hoffmann story we are
seeking: the question of quinine and its analogical relations to aniline, and the question of the
utility of science, specifically coal-tar chemistry, whatever its heritage.
For the first part, the actual philosopher's analogy between quinine and aniline involves the
world-on-paper of the theoretical organic chemistry, as practiced by such men as Berzelius and
Kekulé at European Universities. Like mathematics, the symbolic (geometrical) significance of
their strange structure diagrams and "radicals" are unintelligible to outsiders, and we can only
presume that there was, as claimed, a theoretical rationale for imagining quinine might be
synthesized from aniline--even in the imagination of a graduate student. Historian Anthony
Travis gives us some hint of the picture-mathematics:

Hoffmann appears to have left no record of his original research on aniline
dyes, nor, for that matter, of the extent and nature of the more private commercial
transactions...Therefore...we must rely almost entirely on his published papers
[between 1862 and 1864]...
From the 1840's until the late 1860's, chemical constitutions were
expressed mainly through type formulae. The "type" was a basic configuration of
symbols related to a simple parent substance, and was introduced for creating
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order among chemical substances according to their reaction patterns. Type
formulae were not structural formulae; they indicated the "rational composition",
showing which particular groupings of atoms replaced hydrogen in the parent. In
1849, Charles Adolphe Wurtz discovered methyl- and ethylamine, which
encouraged Hoffmann to make an important contribution towards type theory.38

If he was like most graduate students, Perkin left the theorizing to Hoffmann, and satisfied
himself with the empirical plausibility of the quinine project. There were promising
connections--after all, quinine was associated with a vegetable coloring--those red plants of
India. It would be highly profitable if it could be made synthetically, for it was a very popular,
but expensive, pharmaceutical. It was popular in "iron tonics," and used as an antiseptic and for
treatment of bronchitis (though the ammonia in which it was mixed now seems to have been the
active ingredient in these effects). One professor Binz at Bonn is credited with a close study of
quinine's medical utility, finding the most dramatic in its effects as an "antipyretic," or
fever-reducing agent.39 Quinine also had some misplaced folk rumors floating about it . One
has it that soldiers in India had to take it, dissolved in alcohol, to ward off malaria. They were
said to have developed such a "taste" for the resulting "gin-and-tonic" that it was was then
imported to delight a gin-drenched Victorian England. Actually quinine is soluble in citric acid
(lime juice), and the gin was to kill its awful taste, but, anyway, "quinine water" was thought to
be quite a popular beverage. And it was much rumored that it might be a source for opium.40
The potential profits and the weak connection with colors would not make a quinine-project
appealing to either Hoffmann or Perkin, so we would expect even more revealing chemical
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analogues to make the study promising. As experimental chemists often find analogies in the
methods of synthesis, we can look there for possible parallels in coal-tar, quinine, and aniline
preparations. Aniline, for instance, was originally extracted not from coal-tar, but from the plant
indigo, the widely used source of vegetable dyes.41 It was isolated from coal-tar first in 1834, by
F. Runge (as Hoffmann later proved), who found it turned beautiful bright blue on treatment
with chlorine.42 "Analogously," quinine turns beautiful bright green when treated with chlorine
(and ammonia). There are more, many more, suggestive parallels, especially associations with
ammonia, naphtha (originally a petroleum product), coal-tar, aniline, and so on--enough so that
the modern chemist looking back must wonder what took everybody so long to suspect that
quinine and aniline were close chemical relatives. Perhaps obscuring the obvious were the
thousands of other dyes, hundreds of coal-tar components, and dozens of pharmaceuticals--such a
maze of connections that it was unlikely that our particular parallels would stand out easily. We
can only presume that it required the added theoretical structural analogies to "suggest" an
experiment to relate the chemicals, as is today the practice in such chemistry. In any case, it is
doubtful that Perkin's accident was quite so accidental. But he had found a new "aniline" dye,
with perhaps less profit-potential as quinine, for the dye business was considerably less lucrative
than pharmaceutics.e
--------------(e) The industry took off in Germany--from 7.5 million marks/year in 1862 to 92 million in
1883--only after the alizarine dye was developed).43
--------------Perkin's dye was very pretty, similar to the aniline and alizarine mauves that became so
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popular that, with Queen Victoria's patronage, the 1890's became styled the "mauve decade." But
it didn't really stain well at all, despite the legend of Perkin's lab coat. Still, it looked possibly
profitable, and young, eighteen-year-old Perkin took his notes to Perth's,44 the local dye-works,
for advice. They didn't buy in, suspecting that the process was too expensive, so Perkin left the
Royal College in 1857 to try, with the help of his father and brother, to set up his own factory at
Greenford Green (near Harrow). "That date may therefore be reckoned as that of the foundation
of the coal-tar industry, which has since attained such important dimensions--in Germany,
however, rather than in England."45
While it was obviously notorious that Germany should undergo the chemical-industrial
revolution (though England was still a larger coal-gas producer in 1900), Perkin was not a total
flop. Indeed aniline Mauve was not a very good product (among other things, it was a nasty
poison). But the ultimate production of a faster, safer product, alizarin, first derived from coal tar
by Germans in 1868 and commercially patented in England by Perkin in the 1870's, eventually
became the product that made the market take off and the Mauve Decade to ensue. Perkin
himself quit the coal-tar business prematurely (for profit, anyway) in 1869, and went into "pure"
chemistry. Like his physicist parallels, he was later honored: for his industrial ingenuity (the
Royal Society's Royal Medal in 1879 and a London celebration of his "mauve" in 1906), and for
his "academic" chemistry (the Royal Society's Davy Medal in 1889 and, as president of the
London Chemical Society, a "Longstaff medal" in 1889). His knighthood, conferred by King
Edward, not by Queen Victoria, was presumably for public service, not academic service (as his
intense studies of optical effects in chemicals in magnetic fields would hardly attract industrial
interest at the time).
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One point to be made in this history is that there does not seem to be any significant scientific
explanation for the transfer of industry from England to Germany. Hoffmann did not return to
Germany with patents in hand ready to start up rival dye works--he went to the University of
Berlin to take up "pure" chemistry. The gulf between the academic agendas (as that in the later
careers of Perkin and Hoffmann) and the industrial agenda (as will be evident in the later careers
of coal-tar products) was enormous. There was a gap in intention (profit vs. ideas), in location
(Universities vs. Hochschulen and laboratories), in method (research vs. development), and in the
social and political assumptions of the day.

THE ACADEMIC PHILOSOPHERS

It would seem there was a vast gulf between the views of academic scientists and
industrialists as to what science was supposed to be about. One would think that the academic
interpreters of this gap would have been the "professional" philosophers. Yet we have seen
Helmholtz scorn the academics (while trying to resolve their Kantian puzzles on his own), and
we can imagine the disinterest in their subject on the part of industrial laboratory directors.
Maxwell, Boltzmann, Helmholtz, (and most of the others we have met) began their scholastic
careers memorizing the required maxims of the great "scientific" thinkers, particularly Kant,
Schelling, Goethe, and Hegel. They were aware that times had changed, especially in 1848 and
1870, and these philosophies needed updating or replacement. The new anti-intellectual
"materialist" philosophers, like the French followers of Comte (notably Ernst Renan, author of
yet another "Life of Jesus," and the historian Hippolyte Taine) were gaining some respectability,
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particularly with the apparent "scientific" backing of the theory of evolution. The notorious
second-generation Romantic Friedrich Nietzsche was attacking this "objectivity" trend, hoping to
restore the "Dionysian," poetic bases of Kantian Science:

The extraordinary wisdom of Kant and Schopenhauer have won the most
difficult victory, that over the optimistic foundations of logic, which form the
underpinnings of our culture. Whereas the current optimism has treated the
universe as knowable, in the presumption of eternal truths, and space, time, and
causality as absolute and universally valid laws, Kant showed how these supposed
laws serve only to raise appearance--the work of Maya--to the status of true
reality, thereby rendering impossible a genuine understanding of that reality: in
the words of Schopenhauer, binding the dreamer even faster in sleep. This
perception has initiated a culture which I dare as tragic. This wisdom, unmoved
by the pleasant distractions of the sciences, fixes its gaze on the total constellation
of the universe and tries to comprehend sympathetically the suffering of that
universe as its own46

Helmholtz agreed, of course, that Kant had revealed that the metaphors of science rested on a
metaphysical, even theological, foundation. But Nietzsche's conclusion, the infamous "death of
God," undoubtedly provoked Helmholtz's post-war disavowal of Kant. Sociologist of science Sal
Restivo interprets even pre-war Nietzsche as an incipient anarchist.47 Nietzsche's concession to
metaphysics is evident in this passage:
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...even we godless antimetaphysicians still take our fire, too, from the
flame lit by a faith that is thousands of years old, that Christian faith which was
also the faith of Plato, that God of truth, that truth is divine.

And Restivo couples that with a firm rejection of the subsequent scientific illusions:

But what if nothing should prove divine he [Nietzsche] continues, but
error, blindness, the lie--"if God himself should prove to be our most enduring
lie?" Science is so dangerous, he warns, because of its "impetuous demand for
certainty." It possesses the potential for divesting existence of its "rich
ambiguity," and for reducing life to "a mere exercise for a calculator and an indoor
diversion for mathematicians." It is an idiotic crudity, a mental illness, "the most
stupid of all possible interpretations of the world," this science, with its
interpretation of the most superficial aspects of existence, the most apparent
things that permit "counting, weighing, seeing, and touching, and nothing more."48

Modern students usually know what these new philosophies that so disturbed Nietzsche were
like; Social Darwinism, Positivism, Pragmaticism, etc., but might wonder what happened to the
abandoned "traditionalists"--those expert in the historical roots of modern philosophy, and those
most well equipped to modify or reject them as new circumstances suggested.
We have already met some of these academics. In the south at Graz and Vienna in the 1880's
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were the "psychologists," like Meinong and Brentano, looking for the operations of "mind" that
were compatible with the new thoughts. In the north we met briefly their successor, Hans
Vaihinger, and his idea of heuristic fiction. Such academic discourses would subsequently
collide with the scientific ones (not only in the well-known "Vienna Circle" of the 1920's, though
that example alone justifies curiosity), and so it will be useful to look at the philosopher's
Germany apart from Helmholtz's Berlin. What we are seeking is the "professional" philosopher's
relation to Maxwell and Helmholtz's "back-to-Kant" attitude. They too grew up with (and out of)
the Romantic philosophies of Hegel, Fichte, and Schelling, and also would seek a better way to
answer Kant's original question--how was science possible at all?
The four practitioners of philosophical agendas most parallel to the scientists were Kuno
Fischer, Friedrich Lange, Hermann Cohen, and Hans Vaihinger. Briefly, Fischer revived Kantian
studies after the Revolution of 1848, and Lange followed up this development at Marburg.
Lange's successors at Marburg, Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp, rejected his notions of
neo-Kantian science, particularly the notion that scientists' "ideas" alter the data they view.
However, Lange picked up a disciple at Halle in Hans Vaihinger, and Vaihinger's influential
book "As if" represented, as it were, a philosopher's version of the Maxwell-Helmholtz agenda.
This left the end-of-the-century German philosophy with two "camps"--Vaihinger's
"mind-active" notions, and Cohen's "passive data-gathering" interpretation of Kant, their
common source. Cohen's students are better known today, particularly Paul Natorp and Ernst
Cassirer, but Vaihinger's arguments are perhaps more representative of the agenda of science as
Maxwell and Helmholtz wanted it to be. Maybe we should go over that more carefully.
Before the Revolutions, Kuno Fischer was a theology student at Halle (and, after the
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Revolutions, so was Cohen). He was, as many academics were, sympathetic to the revolutionary
cause, and this made it a bit difficult to find a post after the counter-revolution. His hope to
rescue Kantian studies from the ravages of the Romantics may have rescued his career, though,
for he was hired in 1850 by a foreign University, Heidelberg (before Helmholtz arrived).
Unfortunately, in 1853 he was "fired" for what was seen as "pantheistic" beliefs. This was
Roman Catholic territory in South Germany at the time, and the Lutheran backgrounds to
Kantian philosophy may not have pleased the precarious government trying to stay independent
of the Protestant north. Berlin, of course, liked Fischer's style, and he was called there, and then
to Jena in 1856. Finally, in 1872, after Heidelberg was part of the empire, he was called back
(just after Helmholtz left), and remained there until retirement in 1903.

Like Helmholtz and

Maxwell, Fischer thought Fichte and Hegel had "gone too far" in liberating the imagination from
the original rules of right thinking. He "founded" a "back-to-Kant" movement much along the
lines that Helmholtz later seemed to advocate (though we do not know if Helmholtz was a
Fischer fan), particularly being prodded (as had Helmholtz) by Schopenhauer's "pessimism."49
What Fischer supplied to the academic discussions on the philosophy of science (particularly on
questions of the reality of atoms and the appropriate scientific methods) was a textual basis for
subsequent scholastic debate--the book "History of Modern Philosophy" of 1852 to 1877. More
specifically to our worried innovators, Fischer supplied historical authority to the key missing
ingredient of the Maxwell-Helmholtz recipe: a justification as to why abstract ideas had to be
fictional (indeed, as Vaihinger would argue and Maxwell demonstrate, they had to be, in a sense,
false). For good or ill, Fischer imported the idea the built-in internal contradiction in mental
affairs from Hegel. The dreaded "dialectic" was a principle that (more or less) required
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contradictions in all things logical, hence imaginable, or even "real." The details of this
argument get dense very quickly, but when Vaihinger picked up the idea that heuristics were not
only fictions (like Santa Clauses), but "false" or "impossible" (like Maxwell's Demon), it came
with a pedigree extending back to Kant through Fischer, Schopenhauer, and Hegel.f
---------(f) Fischer himself thought Vaihinger perhaps a bit overboard on the freedom of the imagination.
Thus it was that Vaihinger, in turn, mentions Fischer only once in his "As If," and then to point
out that he had missed a crucial point in the history of early Kantian studies, hence failed to fully
realize the necessity of the "Theory of Fiction."70
---------Fischer "started" the back-to-Kant agenda, and became a most effective salesman (we
mentioned that his popularity at Heidelberg rivaled Helmholtz's). Probably the most important
franchise became that of the "Marburg School," where Friedrich Lange eventually held forth.
Lange's origins were in Duisberg, a Prussian industrial city in the Ruhr valley (actually on a
canal between the Ruhr and the Rhine). In the 1830's, when he attended gymnasium there,
Duisberg didn't even have a university--it had had an early Protestant university (from 1655), but
the French wars had ruined it, and it was abandoned in 1802. By the 1850's it did have
flourishing light industries, a socialist-leaning newspaper, good schools and churches for its
roughly 30,000 inhabitants (with a surprising large fraction of Roman Catholics), and a
monument to its most illustrious scientist, Gerhard Kromer. The latter was the real name of the
more recognizable Mercator, the sixteenth century cartographer who established the conventional
solutions for fitting the spherical earth onto flat maps, a prelude to Gauss' problems at Göttingen.
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This may be merely coincidental for, unlike the influential legends of Kepler in Tübingen,
Prague, and Graz, the example of Mercator did not seem to invite emulation by the Duisberg
youth. The school and paper were a little more interesting to us, for the editor of the leftist
newspaper in 1861 was a former schoolteacher and secretary of the chamber of commerce, our
Friedrich Lange. He had quit schoolteaching in protest over the police-state tactics of the
Bismarck government in the elections of 1861 (we earlier quoted Otto Pflanze's description of
the repressive circumstances surrounding that very election).
Lange had studied philosophy at Zurich and at Bonn, and did his Ph.D. dissertation on the
philosophy of "education and world-views."51 The latter term, "world-view" (Weltanschauung),
is often taken to be a code-word for a "romantic." It implies a "gestalt," or panoramic
consciousness that has "in the background" the rules of formation for any particular object that
might come into the mind's "view." Fans of world-views defend the necessity of having rules of
thought prior to any particular thought. They note that this is a built in mind-system actually
originated by Kant (and was converted into the preconditions of psychological experience by the
Romantics). Opponents of world-views point to their similarity to "prejudices," pre-judgments
unjustified by experience. Thus world-view holders couldn't learn from experience or their
mistakes. Such a notion would not make room for "experiments"--investigative science.
In any case, Lange, a passionate Schiller fan, liked the notion of Weltanschauung, and thought
it had implications for teaching: teach the rules of right thinking before the mere "facts". Being a
Bonn man, he could get a job in the Prussian school system to try out his ideas. Unfortunately,
his world-view seemed to generate liberal social facts, hence he was told to shut up or leave
school. He opted for Switzerland when Duisburg’s paper and chamber of commerce proved
373

unsuitable places for a Ph. D. to expound his Romantic views.
After ten years in Switzerland, Lange finally got a university position, at Zurich, and later, in
1873, moved up in prestige to Marburg--located physically and ideologically between Bonn and
Berlin. It was at Marburg, where he taught until he died in 1878, that Lange enters our story, for
there he was especially responsible for two developments: the "Marburg School" of neo-Kantian
Philosophy, and (through his writings) the line of revision of Kant that Helmholtz and Company
had been seeking--a project taken up by Hans Vaihinger at Halle.
Lange's ideas should now seem quite in keeping with the prevailing puzzles confronting the
academic epistemologists and scientists. He was a product of Romanticism, a Schiller devotee
(as were most of our thoughtful academics), and he opposed materialism, particularly that of the
then influential French. Yet later Vaihinger would write of him as providing the clue to
reconcile the materialists and the metaphysicians:

This separation of our sensations from the matrix of our subjectivity,
following on the lines laid down by Berkeley and Hume, was subjected to a
thorough examination by Mill and Taine, and was stressed in Germany by Lange
in reviving the doctrine of Kant. 52

Lange was not intending to fall into such illustrious anti-idealistic company. He was
originally concerned with theological ideas, and still defended them. He tried to demonstrate
"from the standpoint of the ideal" (in a famous characteristic phrase) that "truth" and "good" were
mental "ideals," but not "merely ideas." Instead, ideals were "governing ideas" by which the
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material world could make sense. Vaihinger noted:

"Lange specifically declares himself opposed to the agnostic way of shunting
religious ideas into the domain of the unknowable, i.e. against Spencer [of "Social
Darwinism"], Tyndall and even J.S. Mill."53

Though Lange's attention was on the status of social ideals--he was especially interested in
deriving a just constitution from some eternal principles--he did mention the fictitious nature of
some physical ideals as well:

...Lange calls the atom `a necessary mode of conceiving an unknown state
of things'. In this sense Lange compares `the atoms and their vibrations' with a
scaffolding' that is torn down as soon as the structure is finished, though it is
absolutely necessary for the structure. When Liebig calls the concept of the atom
an arbitrary `convention' and when Schönbein, in this connection, speaks of the
`play of fantasy,' we must, he [Lange] tells us, remember that this `play of fantasy,'
so far from serving to deceive reason, rather guides and aids it.54

As politics and science are guided by fictions, so too was even economics. Lange saw the
analogies of the Scots economic philosopher, Adam Smith, as a necessary "starting point for
investigations."55 Even mathematical entities were idealizations required of the Kantian mind, he
argued, in agreement with Helmholtz's esteemed Heidelberg mathematical colleague Paul
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DuBois-Reymond.
According to Lange, Helmholtz's Kraft, as argued by Du Bois-Reymond, was a "mental
fiction," from which physical experience could be derived.56 As we have seen, Helmholtz quite
agreed, deriving the physically feelable "force" (or field) from an abstract "potential." Neumann,
the author of that idea was also included in our heuristic story-tellers. The characteristic of the
"science-fictions" of Liebig, Helmholtz, DuBois Reymond, and Neumann--the notion that the
entities of the world-on-paper were necessarily paradoxical untruths--was thus carried into
academic philosophy by Lange. His most influential follower in this would be the distant
Vaihinger, while the academics who would most try to put the brakes on this "Fichtean" outburst
of the generative power of the imagination would be Lange's successor at Marburg, Hermann
Cohen, and Helmholtz's Heidelberg "rival," Kuno Fischer.
Hermann Cohen, a religious philosopher (from the Jewish Theological Seminary at Breslau,
Berlin University, and with Ph D. from Halle) was named to Lange's chair at Marburg on the
latter's death in 1876. He had already the requisite credentials in Kantian studies, having
wrangled with Kuno Fischer over the arcane doctrine of Kant's ding-an-sich (the supposed
hidden "essence" of material things that may or may not have been fictitious--depending on one's
reading of Kant). He took up not Lange's defense of the ideal, but a more conservative defense
of a priori principles. For example, he argued, as had Kant, that the success of Newtonian
science (as in the discovery of Neptune) demonstrated that abstract laws of nature could be
discovered by the logician. There were such laws also in moral, religious, and political life, but
these laws should not be "created" by thinkers as "heuristics," "models," or "scaffolding of
thought," as Lange had argued. Rather, Cohen thought the social laws should be discovered in
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the "ordinary" way, by finding principles from which the experiences (or moral maxims) of the
world could be logically deduced. Despite his Kantian conservatism, Cohen's authoritative
connections between the rules of philosophy and the regulation of social behavior led to a rather
unfortunate reputation:

[There arose a] legend of a kinship between Kant and Marx. This was
enough to color the politician Cohen with a red tinge--and if his true patriotic
German feeling separated him from Jewish orthodoxy and Zionism, his rather
innocent socialism did not make him a favorite with either his government or his
faculty.57

Cohen finally retired in 1912, after some alleged disappointment over not securing the
appointment of a disciple, Ernst Cassirer, to succeed him. Cassirer tried to carry this
"conservative" neo-Kantian philosophy back into direct contact with modern physics--with
Einstein's relativity theories and the 1925 quantum theories--but by the 1930's, the divorce
between science and "metaphysics" was finalized, and his remarks are today generally ignored.
That brings us directly to Vaihinger, yet another Halle man. His "As If" contains a revealing
autobiographical sketch of his intellectual background. One thing it reveals is the mid-century
gaping separation of the German philosophical agenda from the scientific one. Helmholtz, for
example, seemed to discount the scholastic neo-Kantian revival, and young Vaihinger and
company seemed to know little about aethers, mathematical models, or Maxwell's equations.
Professional philosophers did learn something of atoms via popularizers like Liebig and
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physiology via popularizers like Helmholtz, but the lack of concern with contemporary agendas
in "research" seems to have lost them the opportunity to find kindred spirits in science. In this
compartmentalized environment, we will find that a potentially dramatic conversation between
Vaihinger and Helmholtz will turn out to be an anticlimactic disappointment. Still, for
symmetry, let us trace the path to this meeting.
Vaihinger began his chronicle:

I was born in a Swabian parsonage near Tübingen in 1852 and so I grew
up in a very religious atmosphere. It was not exactly bigoted, but it had a limited
horizon, for instance, the names of the Liberal Hegelian [theologians]...were
spoken of with horror in our home. My father, who was the author of a good
many theological works, had written a pamphlet against Strauss [one of the
Hegelians]. When I was twelve years old I was given into the charge of an
excellent master...[who] awakened the ambition of his pupils by telling them how
Kepler in the 17th century and Schelling in the 18th century had sat on the
benches of that ancient school of Latin [Stuttgart Grammar School]...[He] used to
tell me too about his Sanskrit studies...especially...the great Mahabharata epic and
occasionally...he would tell us how this Indian epic contained the same sort of
legends as the New Testament...I was gradually led to the conception of the
ethical value of myth.58

Added to this early introduction to heuristics, Vaihinger related a marked interest in Herder, in
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whom he saw a forerunner of Darwin's theory of evolution. He encountered Plato's myths,
particularly the famous cave (where supposed "realities" were only shadows on the walls), and
claimed them to be the "seed" of "the World of `As If'.59 He also recounted his early fascination
with Schiller, arising from family connections (his grandfather was Schiller's teacher).
"Thus equipped," he entered the Theological College at Tübingen, which had "lingering
memories" of Schelling, Hegel, the poet Hölderlin, and others of that school. His intensive
studies in secular matters, particularly a prize winning essay of theories of consciousness, soon
diverted him from theology to philosophy, and from there he traced the same development as
Helmholtz--from massive doses of Kant to the Romantics:

It was natural that the systems of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, in spite of
their wonderful architecture and their wide ranges, could not hold me for long,
although in accordance with the plan of studies of the College I had concentrated
on these three systems. It was Fichte's preference for the practical and Hegel's
theory of contradiction and its significance for human thought and reality that
appealed to me most.60

In a now-familiar course, Vaihinger moved on to the "pessimism, irrationalism, and
voluntarism" of Schopenhauer, and the notion that the power of human thought has
evolved--from a device of "will" to achieve its "biological" ends (survival, etc.) to a free-standing
capacity to create its own ends--ideals. This notion, he recalled, grew into his 1872 "Law of the
Preponderance of the Means over the Ends," a notion "supported" by Darwinian Evolution.
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Vaihinger's reconstruction of his path then passed through contemporary philosophers of mind
and, he particularly notes, "the great ideas which were revolutionizing science at this time...with
special reference to the `Law of the Conservation of Energy'..."61
From there he returned to Kant, Classical Languages and Myth, and finally arrived at his
graduation essay, his "theory of consciousness," that put the historical pedigree on his portrait of
mythologies as necessary fictions. Tired of study ("the ground was burning under my feet"), he
went to Leipzig to report for a required year of military duty, but was rejected because of poor
eyesight. Of course he then hung around the University of Leipzig, chatting with faculty and
haunting the city's public library. There he came across a second edition of Lange's book ("now
at last I had found the man for whom I had sought in vain during those four years in Tübingen").
He described his agenda:

There were two possible ways of working out the Neo-Kantianism of F.A.
Lange. Either the Kantian standpoint could be developed, on a closer and more
accurate study of Kant's teachings, and this is what Cohen has done, or one could
bring Lange's Neo-Kantianism into relation with empiricism and positivism. This
has been done in my philosophy of `As If,' which also leads to a more thorough
study of Kant's `As If' theory.62

The subsequent studies in Leipzig were again intense, but Hans soon had to return home for
"personal reasons." Fortunately, on his way home, he did get to spend one more term in the
north--at Berlin in 1876. There he met a Berlin philosopher, another Tübingen legend, Eduard
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Zeller, who brought him to a friend--Helmholtz! Vaihinger does not make much of this meeting:

The help that I got from him and his friend Helmholtz...was more or less
valuable to me, but what was really important was that I came across the writings
of Gruppe...63
Nonetheless, even a minor role for Helmholtz in the beginnings of `As If' that Vaihinger
started that summer enhances our suggestion that the two agendas were strikingly parallel. We
then wonder what the Tübingen Philosopher and the Berlin Physicist talked about in the summer
of 1876.

Unlike his philosophical predecessors, Vaihinger had taken pains to learn at least

some mathematics. In prowling the library in Leipzig:

I threw myself into analytic geometry and the infinitesimal calculus. Both
these lines of study revealed wonderful new truths to me...Besides this, they gave
me striking examples of methodic fictions...64

This did not, however, give him the kind of mathematical fluency to follow Helmholtz's
research, which by then had gone even beyond the differential equations of the Maxwell agenda.
Helmholtz was still a few years short of his burst of enthusiasm for Hamilton's even more
esoteric methods, being at that time involved in some electrical papers and the
"geometry--fluid--air balloon" analogy. But even that was far out of the reach of elementary
calculus and analytic geometry. Vaihinger, in fact, didn't learn of the "Hamilton vs. Hamilton"
fight over the relations of logic and mathematics until the following fall, when, on taking a
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teaching post in Strassburg, he came across J.S. Mill's Examination of Sir William Hamilton's
Philosophy.
Still, Helmholtz's thoughts on the philosophy of consciousness had been developing for a long
time along the same lines as had Vaihinger's, and were from essentially the same academic roots,
though in this Helmholtz was the amateur and Vaihinger the technician. In "As If," Vaihinger
summarized his theory in fifteen propositions, but we need only note a few:

(9)...all thought-processes and thought constructs appear a priori to be
not essentially rationalistic, but biological phenomena.
(10) In this light many thought processes and thought constructs appear
to be consciously false assumptions, which either contradict reality or are even
contradictory in themselves, but which are intentionally thus formed in order to
overcome difficulties of thought...and reach the goal of thought by roundabout
ways and by-paths. These artificial thought-constructs are called Scientific
Fictions, and distinguished as conscious constructs by their `As If' character.
(11) The `As If' world, which is formed in this manner, the world of
the `unreal' is just as important as the world of the so-called real or actual...
(15) It is senseless to question the meaning of the universe, and this is
the idea expressed in Schiller's words: `Know this, a mind sublime puts greatness
into life, yet seek it not therein.' This is positivist Idealism.65

These "thought-constructs," God, atoms, the luminiferous aether, the square-root of minus
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one, etc., were a "means to an end" because the perceptible world acts as if they were "real".
That meant one must search, with the aid of heuristics (which, like our Cheshire cat, fade away
after the investigation is done) for the way in which the world acts--"as if" fictions were truths.
Vaihinger argued emphatically that he did not mean "hypotheses"--they are presumed logically
possible and tentatively physically true. He meant fictions, which are not "true" but useful. He
was not a "pragmatist," to whom the useful was justified by its very utility, but an "idealist."
This meant that the utility of thought was guaranteed by metaphysical principles that allowed one
to distinguish good from bad ideas--something that escaped the pragmatists. Had he been
consulted, Vaihinger would have advised that a hunt for the aether, or atoms, would be a futile
and irrational misunderstanding of such fictions. Helmholtz, Maxwell, Hertz, Gibbs, and
Boltzmann thought that too. Though they considered that there might be, after all, such realms of
reality "out there," they, with Vaihinger and his Schiller, were content to leave that to the
metaphysicians and theologians--reality was not the issue before the court of their scientific
method.
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CHAPTER 9

In 1871 Maxwell returned to head the new research laboratory at Cambridge, the "Cavendish."
This signaled the coming-of-age of his science, and the subsequent squabble by electrical
engineers over the utility of his abstract theories reflects his growing influence. Abroad, America
seemed to be the chief benefactor of the electrical discoveries, particularly through the industries
of Thomas Edison. But as in the case of the English-German development of chemical
industries, the English-American electricity boom seemed to separate the agendas of "pure" and
"applied" science, and the metaphysical agenda of our philosopher-scientists did not easily
emigrate. America was also the beneficiary of Maxwell's initiatives in heat, leading to the new
statistical mechanics of Gibbs via Boltzmann. Again the philosophical presumptions did not get
exported along with the formulas. The metaphysics got held up, this time in Vienna, particularly
by the famous "Vienna Circle." Particular theoretical conundrums about notions of evolution,
infinity, causality, and chance made the statistical thermodynamics of Maxwell and Boltzmann
impenetrable to the logicians, much like their ambiguous anti-materialism had confused the
chemists.
SCIENTISTS VS. ENGINEERS

In 1871 Maxwell finally returned to Cambridge. His Treatise was nearly done, and he was
being heavily lobbied by his admirers to head up the new Cavendish Laboratory. This was a
legacy of the seventh Duke of Devonshire, a distant relative of the eccentric eighteenth century
genius, Henry Cavendish. The Duke had generously endowed a new laboratory and chair, both
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to honor an ancestor and to promote the modernization program of the late Prince Albert. In
view of his endowment of a laboratory that came to be led by mathematicians, Maxwell,
Rayleigh, and J.J. Thomson (always called just "J.J."), not experimenters, we might search
Duke's motives for connections to metaphysics and analogies.
Our William Cavendish, Duke of Devonshire (formerly Lord Burlington) inherited one of the
greatest fortunes in England, yet he chose not to live the easy life of some of his notorious
ancestors. The family biographer, John Pearson, wrote:

Never particularly happy since a wretched adolescence when he was
bullied cruelly at Eton, even as a young man he had found relief in three
activities--hard work, evangelical Christianity, and his family.
Instead of simply enjoying the privileges of a noble man in unreformed
Cambridge, he had achieved the laudable distinction of emerging second in the
entire university in the rigorously competitive mathematical examinations.
`Placed Second Wrangler and high in the classical tripos at Cambridge,' wrote
Lord Esher, `he had never recovered from the shock...'1

That was way back in the 1820's, before the student days of the illustrious mathematicians he
would endow, but the Duke apparently kept up some later contact with his alma mater and its
wranglers.
The combined Burlington-Devonshire wealth was staggering, but so were the debts, so
William's post-graduate mission was to restore the unencumbered family fortune. This he did, by
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hard work and cost-cutting--firing, for instance, a superfluous architect of the family buildings,
Joseph Paxton.2 Paxton, we might recall, got a better job--designing the Crystal Palace. The
Duke more or less owned a few villages, including, most fortituously, Barrow, the site of
Britain's largest single deposit of iron ore. From this holding he easily became chairman of the
boards of the several local enterprises, including the railroad and steel works. He thus became
probably the single person to profit most from England's industrial boom, gaining a reputation as
"The Second Iron Duke" (Wellington was the first), and a penchant for profit and philanthropy.
Politically, he was vaguely Liberal (his son married Gladstone's niece), so it is not surprising that
he reconnects to our story by becoming Chancellor of Cambridge. Pearson described this
achievement:

With his impeccable private life, his sorrow [at the death of his wife], and
his sense of service, the Seventh Duke was unassailable; for who but the most
hard-boiled cynic or egalitarian could criticize a duke who, with all the Cavendish
possessions to enjoy, found his greatest self-indulgence in his presidency of the
Royal Agricultural Society--which he founded--or of the Iron and Steel Institute
[of Sir William Siemens]? And when Prince Albert died in 1861, who was more
fitting to succeed him as Chancellor of Cambridge University than the former
Second Wrangler, whose whole life exemplified the sense of service and
profoundly serious ideals of the Queen's lamented Consort? It was as Chancellor
that, in 1870, the Duke made his own historic contribution to the future of the
university and British science, by spontaneously offering 6,300 pounds to pay for
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the building and apparatus needed for a laboratory of experimental physics.3

Who would criticize? The engineers, that's who--the very employees of his and Siemens' iron
works, and, more directly, the rising class of electrical engineers, who would become fierce
critics of the mathematizing of Maxwell and friends. We will examine this "opposition" in more
detail in a moment, but a peek ahead should dramatize the gap that was to grow between
Cavendish's Cambridge and Britain's industrial enterprise. In 1866 S. A. Varley (prominent in
laying the Atlantic cable) was among the inventors of the self-exciting dynamo, work for which
he felt he never received proper credit. He often professed the belief that pioneers like himself
were being pushed aside by glib-talking, mathematics-spouting professors of physics, many of
whom, it seems, were Maxwellians. These professors, Varley claimed, were trying to establish a
monopoly of authority; reaching deep into the bag of traditional British invective, he denounced
Maxwellianism as `scientific Popery.' Maxwell's field theory, Varley said, `rests solely on
hypotheses,' and Hertz's experiments `do not seem to bear very directly on practical
electrodynamics.'4
With that kind of attitude around in the Duke's enterprises, and the political obscurity of
Maxwell (recall that the Duke of Argyll found more suitable appointments), not to mention
Maxwell's conservatism5, the choice of Maxwell as founding director reflects interestingly the
Duke's motives. Following the wishes of the Chancellor, the university offered the chair first to
Thomson. This made sense, for he was revered by both academics for his mathematics and
"practical men" for his cable work. Happy at Glasgow, Thomson declined. So did the next
choice, Helmholtz, who had just been called to Berlin. This invitation to a foreigner, though a
387

relative of Siemens, reinforces the impression that the Duke was trying to promote academics of
the mathematical persuasion, not politicians or industrial innovators. Perhaps this echoes the
choice of the late Prince Albert with his ill-fated Royal College of Chemistry and its German
head, Hoffmann. Maxwell seemed to be the third choice, being especially promoted by a
promising and aristocratic young faculty member, the third Baron Strutt, Lord Rayleigh.6
Rayleigh, you might recall, was the mathematical water-ripple expert who would later succeed
Maxwell as Head of the Cavendish.
Perhaps the Duke of Devonshire later regretted the slight to engineering by the preference
shown the "pure scientists" at his lab. He had to field complaints to that effect when he headed
"Royal Commission on the Advancement of Science." There he heard spirited testimony from
the likes of Glasgow's William Rankine, the most recent of a line of Glaswegan professors of
"practical science" (engineering) who clamored for a share of the status afforded the Cambridge
and Edinburgh mandarins. This signaled the rise of a competitor to the academic scientists and
practical technologist--the academic engineer.a
--------------(a) The parallel rise of the Technische Hochschule movement in Germany is striking. The
symmetry between Maxwell's role in Cavendish's Laboratory and Helmholtz' in Siemens' PTR
further illuminates the gap between science and the second industrial revolution.
--------------The background for this development takes us back to Maxwell's Scots roots and early
school-wars between the likes of Forbes and Hamilton. Among others, Maxwell's old professor
James Forbes had spread his and Whewell's "revolution" to the "other" Scots university,
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Glasgow, by pushing for a "Regius" chair in Civil Engineering to be there established in 1840.7
His candidate, Lewis Gordon, had experience in such primordial engineering works as Marc
Isambard Brunel's Thames Tunnel, a most celebrated exemplar of the practical value of science.b
Indeed Forbes'
--------------(b) Marc's son, Isambard Kingdom Brunel became even more celebrated as England's most
successful engineers. He was especially famed for developing railroads and for his design of the
transatlantic cable-laying steamship, Great Western. His sometimes consultant on electrical
matters, William Thomson, won his title, Lord Kelvin, in connection with these public works.
--------------Edinburgh University itself got a Regius Professor of Technology in 1855, but, as historian Ben
Marsden pointed out, "professors appointed by the Crown to Regius Chairs founded after 1807
remained outside the college elite."8 Gordon's commission, for example, was initially rejected by
the Glasgow faculty senate. The struggle for academic status for engineering and technology had
flourished since that time, fostered particularly by Scots the like of Rankine and Thomson
(Kelvin), and devotees of Whig government like Argyll, Devonshire, and the Prince Consort
himself.
It appears, then, that the Duke wanted and elite institution, not a “practical” one, so the choice
of Maxwell made sense. The gap in agendas between building tunnels and analogies is clear in
the program Maxwell proposed for the Cavendish:

The special researches connected with heat I think are most
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deserving...are those relating to the elasticity of bodies, and in general those
which throw light on their molecular constitution; and the most important
electrical research is the determination of certain electrical quantities, and their
relation to each other.9

Again this is the stuff of the Maxwell-Helmholtz agenda, not research to meet the needs of the
nation or its industrial engineering progress.
As with his other work, Maxwell approached this new administrative job with Scots
thoroughness, touring several laboratories, including Thomson's, to determine the appropriate
design for the new facilities (funding some of the equipment himself). For the opening
ceremonies of the new lab, Maxwell is remembered for two accomplishments--a practical joke in
which he gulled the public into attending the wrong inaugural lecture, and, in the right lecture, an
attempt to explain his philosophy to his patrons.
The "joke" as later recounted by the third Cavendish director, "J.J." Thomson, was that
Maxwell announced his first undergraduate class as if it were the expected ceremonial
inauguration. J.J. quotes a student attendee (Horace, later Sir Horace, Lamb):

The dei majores of the University, thinking that this was his first public
appearance, attended in full force, out of compliment to the new Prof. and it was
amusing to see the great mathematicians and philosophers of the place, such as
Adams, Cayley, Stokes seated in the front row, while Maxwell, a perceptible
twinkle in his eye, gravely expounded to them the relation between the Farenheit
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and Centigrade scales...It was rumored Maxwell was not entirely innocent in this
matter, and that his personal modesty, together with a certain propensity for
mischief, had suggested this way of avoiding a more formal introduction to his
Cambridge career.10

The later "right" ceremonial lecture deserves more attention, for it again sets out Maxwell's
philosophy of science and his view of the role of the university in that enterprise. As to the
utility of the products of science, Maxwell said:

[the example of] electric light projected on screens ...illustrates [the]
highest doctrines of science in games and gymnastics, in traveling by land and
water, in storms of the air and on the sea, and wherever there is matter in
motion...11

But the university laboratory was for teaching principles, not finding them. On this point,
Maxwell made it even more clear what the Cavendish laboratory was to be for:

...Experiments of illustration...present phenomena to the senses of the student
in such a way that he may associate with it some appropriate idea...Experiments of
research--those in which measurements of some kind are involved--are the proper
work of a physical laboratory...
This characteristic of modern experiments--that they consist principally of
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measurements--is so prominent that the opinion seems to have got abroad that, in
a few years, all the great physical constants will have been approximately
estimated, and that the only occupation which will then be left to men of science
will be to carry those measurements to another place of decimals...but it will be
out of place in the university, and ought to be classed with the other great
workshops of our country, where equal ability is directed to more useful ends...12

Here yet again is the "neo-Kantian" division between thought and thing --between illustration of
ideas and measurement of experience. And what was the academic agenda to bring to that
division but the analogical connections between the two?

It is not till we attempt to bring the theoretical part of our training into
contact with the practical that we begin to experience the full effect of what
Faraday has called `mental inertia'--not only the difficulty of recognizing, among
the concrete objects before us, the abstract relation which we have learnt from
books, but the distracting pain of wrenching the mind away from the symbols to
the objects, and from the objects back to the symbols. This however is the price
we have to pay for new ideas.
But when we have overcome these difficulties, and successfully
bridged the gulf between the abstract and the concrete, it is not a mere piece of
knowledge that we have obtained: we have required the rudiment of a permanent
mental endowment. When, by a repetition of efforts of this kind, we have a more
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fully developed the scientific faculty, the exercise of this faculty in detecting
scientific principles in nature and in directing practice by theory, is no longer
irksome, but becomes an unfailing source of enjoyment, to which we return so
often, that at last even our careless thoughts begin to run in a scientific channel.13

So then, what do we get if follow this advice and direct practice by theory, and dance between
the abstract and the concrete? In the words of a modern computer scientist (as reported by Tracy
Kidder in The Soul of a New Machine), "we get to do it again." That is, the analogical agenda
involves mathematical models and experimental set-ups from which to draw analogies. However,
the "product" of this effort is in neither the formula or the fact, but whatever "faculty" grows out
of the act of participation--mixed mathematics is not a spectator sport.

MAXWELL AT THE CAVENDISH: THE "MAXWELLIANS"

What Maxwell did at his new research laboratory was, to most observers, an anticlimax. He
pattered around the Cavendish with Tobi, supervising research students, and taught a few courses
(rather poorly, if one follows J.J.):

During the erection of the laboratory he lectured each term in such rooms
as happened to be vacant. He said he went about like a cuckoo, dropping ideas
about heat in the chemical laboratory in the October Term, about electricity in the
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botanical laboratory in the Lent term, and about magnetism in the New Museums
in the Easter Term. His lectures were quite elementary and were not so well
attended as they ought to have been. Some who attended have expressed the
pleasure they got from the quips and cranks and dry pawky humor which now and
then broke through the crust of science.14

The research work he had outlined to the Vice-Chancellor would be done by students, not by
Maxwell himself. In a paragraph (that is full of references unfamiliar to all but historians and
physicists) J.J. recounted some of the work of the laboratory:

Important researches were made between 1874 and 1879 in the laboratory
by G. Christal...on the accuracy of Ohm's Law [of electric currents]; by Donald
MacAlister...on a new proof that the attraction of a point charge of electricity
varies as the inverse square of the distance; by R.T. Glazebrook...on the wave
surface in a biaxial crystal; by Arthur Schuster...in spectroscopy; by J.A.
Fleming...on the measurement of resistances.15

What is noticeable about that list is what is not in it, neither mathematical investigations nor
useful inventions. Maxwell had already explained the function of a laboratory ("guided by
theory") as a place to manufacture the physical models that were part of the analogical method,
and that is just what went on. Maxwell personally, however, seemed to have dropped out of the
field, and took up the task of an historian:
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Maxwell himself did not do any continuous experimental research in
Cambridge. Though he came to Cambridge in 1871, the laboratory was not
opened until 1874. Afterwards, the greater part of his time was spent in editing
the works of Henry Cavendish, a pious duty for a Cavendish professor.
Cavendish, though he published only two papers, left twenty packages of
manuscripts on mathematical and experimental electricity. Maxwell copied these
out with his own hand. He saturated his mind with the scientific literature of
Cavendish's period; he repeated his experiments.16

It is tempting however, to think that Maxwell was still trying to say something about the
agenda in this extraordinary effort. After all, there were other contemporary things on his mind,
especially the newer mathematics. There was, for instance, the more obscure inventions of the
Irishman, Sir William Rowan Hamilton. Maxwell commented:

I am getting converted to Quaternions and have put some in my book [the
Treatise], in a heretical form, however, for the Greek alphabet was used up, and
have used German capitals from A to Z to stand for Vectors, and, of course,...[the
symbol `del,'an inverted triangle] occurs constantly. This letter is called `nabla'
and the investigator a Nablody.'17 c

--------------(c) This notet "nabla" is irrelevant to the purposes of this book, but is included for those
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physicist-readers who have learned the apocryphal story of "nabla" and Edward Teller. It is said
that while English speaking students always use the term "del" for that symbol, Teller, a
Hungarian, insisted on "nabla." Thus it came to be assumed that "nabla" is Hungarian for "del."
Not so, according to Campbell, the recipient of the above note from Maxwell. Campbell claims
that "nabla" is the name of an Assyrian harp of the shape of an inverted triangle--hence the
"heretical [un-Christian] form" mentioned by Maxwell.
--------------So in his last years, Maxwell was occupied with a history of a mathematical experiment,
Hamilton's Quaternions, and some opaque thoughts on a four-dimensional geometry that couldn't
possibly be a part of nature. To C. J. Munro he wrote:

I am quite sure that the kind of continuity which has four dimensions all
co-equal is not to be discovered by merely generalizing Cartesian space equations.
(I don't mean by Cartesian space that which Spinoza worked from Extension--the
one essential property of matter, and quite the best glue to stick bodies together).
I think it was Jacob Steiner who considered the final cause of space to be the
suggestion of new forms of continuity.18

Again this remark is all but unintelligible to non-specialists (and, to be honest, not too
illuminating to specialists either). It does show, however, an integration of philosophy and
mathematical speculation in the same sense as the youthful thoughts on method that began this
work.
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Finally, there was the model-building mentioned earlier--a "toy" to demonstrate "induction"
(whatever that is) by turning wheels, and a clay "statue" of Gibbs' "thermodynamic surface." Put
them all together: (1) A narrative of how Cavendish arrived at his formulas--not what the
formulas allegedly said, (2) A fascination with a kind of "multiple algebra" (for that is what
Gibbs called Quaternions--a way to do many mathematical steps in one operation)--what
mathematics can do, not what it can mean, and (3) The ever present models. These were all done
at the Cavendish and in his spare time. They are all about "fictions"--words on paper or
constructs not normally found in nature. And it is the resulting analogies and the process of
making them that are significant, for they were the the aims of science, the "endowment" of his
inaugural lecture.
Perhaps it may be said that these activities did not fit together, especially since the students
often made their models without Maxwell's mixed mathematics, as he had. A clue to the
coherence, however, comes from one of Maxwell's students not mentioned by J.J. (in that
passage--the two were great friends)--John Henry Poynting. In brief, Poynting was a researcher
at the Cavendish, and an especially close student of Maxwell (some say that Poynting was
Maxwell's only real "disciple"). His research, for which he became notorious (to today's
struggling undergraduate who has to deal with his invention), was connected to the
electromagnetic phenomenon called "induction," a key concept in Maxwell's electromagnetic
theory. His success is often called "Poynting's Theorem," which indicates that it was a
mathematical model, not a physical one. In one of the earliest "textbooks" in electricity, joint
authors J.J. and Poynting make it clear that they intend such abstraction:
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The belief in the identity of energy is no doubt metaphysical, as
metaphysical as is our belief in the continued existence of any portion of matter
and its identity under various modifications19

Quite so, for what Poynting "proved" was that by a clever manipulation of Maxwell's
equation, one could show how energy could appear to travel from one part of an electrical device
to another, “as if” it were flowing through an intervening "empty" space (i.e., a "field"). The
phenomena involved were not new. Faraday had started just here when he explained by a
qualitative analogy how a moving magnet could "induce" a flow of electricity in a distant wire,
”as if” the magnet were surrounded by whirling "tubes of force." Maxwell had started just here
when he strove to replace Faraday's analogy with a mathematical one. What Poynting had done
was to "dot the i" of Maxwell's career by showing explicitly that Maxwell's difficult morass of
mathematical statements actually did what he had wanted them to do--"describe" the interaction
of one piece of electrical motion with another distant piece “as if” the interval contained a
"field." And there was no commitment in those equations to a physical substance to carry that
field, i.e. the luminiferous aether, as there had been no commitment by Fourier to the "nature" of
heat, nor by Liebig to the "nature" of atoms, etc. Faraday "discovered" induction, Maxwell
"explained" it, and Poynting made it mathematically "consistent." Or at least they thought they
did.
Others thought so too, and, after Maxwell's death in 1879, they constituted a "school" of
electrical theorists, described by the Historian Bruce Hunt as "Maxwellians." He introduces
them:
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Although he was a professor at Cambridge, Maxwell made little effort to
establish a "school" to promote his theory. J. H. Poynting (1852-1914) was the
only one of his students to become a leading Maxwellian--and he had studied
gravitation under Maxwell, not electricity. Many of the most important
Maxwellians had little to do with Cambridge; they learned Maxwell's theory from
his book. But they shared more than an interest in electricity and a characteristic
set of Maxwellian ideas; they also formed a network sustained by correspondence
and personal friendship. They came to see themselves and were regarded by
others as constituting a community of interest. Most of them were physics
professors: Poynting at Birmingham, Silvanus Thompson (1851-1916) at London,
George Francis FitzGerald (1851-1906) at Dublin, and Oliver Lodge (1851-1940)
at Liverpool; H. A. Rowland (1848-1901) at Baltimore was an American member
of this group.20

That's another bunch of new players, each part of his own independent drama, and there is not
time to relate all their sagas. But three of them, Lodge, FitzGerald, and Rowland will connect
Maxwell to other venues in our story: FitzGerald will connect to Einstein, Rowland to Gibbs,
and Lodge to an unexpected group, The Society for Psychical Research (those "table rappers"
and spiritualists who so annoyed Tyndall and Helmholtz).
Taking up the first of the trio, we note that FitzGerald's name is associated with the
background to Einstein's special theory of relativity. In quantifying the "electrodynamics of
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moving objects," he is said to have gotten the right mathematical formulas for the wrong reasons.
That is, Einstein's immortal 1905 work did not produce the "E equals M-C-squared" formula
(that came later), but instead showed the compatibility between some formulas of FitzGerald
(and Lorentz) and formulas of Maxwell's fields. These “Lorentz-FitzGerald” formula-recipes had
it that moving objects would have to contract in length. This was required so that the
Maxwellian magnetic fields resulting from the atomic charges in the object would work out not
to affect unwanted stresses in the object. Einstein rejected the contraction, but achieved
Maxwellian-compatibility by a more dramatic alteration in the way “space and time” (distance
and duration) should be treated in Maxwells dynamics. What was wrong about FitzGerald's
reasons, and right about Einstein's is another story--here we only mention that his name survives
in modern physics as a legitimate Maxwellian, though his ideas and methods are mostly
forgotten.
As for the second Maxwellian, Henry Rowland, American historians recall him, particularly
through the work of Daniel Kevles, as the late-century "leader" of American Physics. He
organized the professional associations, developed a model laboratory at Johns Hopkins, and
annoyed "practical men" like Alexander Graham Bell with his pleas to divorce "pure science"
from profit and industry.21 It was Rowland who, in 1880, brought Gibbs to Baltimore to give the
first public lecture course to use quaternions.22
And finally, Oliver Lodge was a member of yet another loose association in addition to the
Maxwellians. These were students of "scientific" spiritualism, particularly in the notions that the
luminiferous aether might support not only electromagnetic waves, but thought waves as well.
Brian Wynne studied a group of these late Victorian students of "Psychics," and it includes
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(besides Lodge) Tait, Rayleigh, FitzGerald, and J.J.23 Needless to say, Maxwell would not have
approved of this kind of thing, but the formal Society was not formed until 1882, after he died.
The Maxwellians, then, represented the next generation of the Maxwell-Helmholtz agenda in
England, extending the method (Poynting), creating experimental models (Lodge), finding
unsolved difficulties (FitzGerald), and spreading the word (Rowland). But the academic and
industrial worlds were not always receptive to this new doctrine.
There were many academics, particularly experimentalists, who detested this
philosophical-mathematical hand-waving. The most celebrated of these was Tyndall, perhaps the
most effective popularizer of science in Victorian times. He was of a faction of academic
scientists called the "professionalizers," who wanted to see the field purged of amateurs,
philosophers, mathematicians, and others misguided about the dependence of science on
meticulous experimentation. The Darwinists, particularly the biologist and popularizer T.H.
Huxley, dominated this faction (for it was easier to argue from Darwin's experiments than from
Faraday's that the root of all knowledge was discovery).
There were academic competitors among theorists too, who had their own doctrines to place
in battle against Maxwellianism. The most celebrated was Wilhelm Ostwald, our German
champion of an "Energeticism" buttressed by a revival of pure Naturphilosophie. He was
especially notorious for his an unflagging opponent of the atomic hypothesis. Of him, FitzGerald
argued:

Professor Ostwald ignores such theories as that of the vortex atoms
[Kelvin's aether whirlpools], which postulate only a continuous liquid in motion;
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but, it may be, this is omitted because it is merely a way of explaining the atoms
[a heuristic?]. He also ignores metaphysical questions, such as whether motion be
not only the objective aspect of thought, and also whether an intuitively necessary
explanation of the laws...is not postulated by the fact that the Universe must be
Intelligible [Kant's position]. Consequently, his attempt to deal with nature in a
purely inductive spirit is unphilosophical as well as unscientific. The view of
science which he puts forward--a sort of well arranged catalogue of facts without
any hypotheses--is worthy of a German who plods by habit and instinct. A Briton
wants emotion--something to raise enthusiasm, something with a human interest.
He is not content with dry catalogues, he must have a theory of gravitation, a
hypothesis of natural selection.24
Thus within the circle of English academic "Electricians" there were factions--the
Maxwellians, the rival "materialists," and the "experimenters"--and these factions overlapped a
great deal. It was such a diversity of interpretation of Maxwell's "theories" that accounts for fact
Hertz' 1888 demonstration of "radio waves" made of Maxwell-Poynting formulas seemed more
to promote the opposition's morale than to spread the mathematical method. They seemed to
think that these were waves in some atomic "stuff," and vindicated their laboratory search for
pure aether, in both liquid and vapor form.

ELECTRICITY AND INDUSTRY

In the late Victorian era there was also opposition to the Maxwellians from outside academia.
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Some of these called themselves the "practical men," for they were the engineers and mechanics
whose industry brought on the technological revolution without the need for higher mathematics,
academic philosophizing, and "research." After all, the advances in some of their most
successful fields, electrical and steam power and telegraphy, had been made well before the
theoretical explanation of electricity-in-motion or molecular-motion had even begun. Though
there was occasionally a university contribution, like Siemens' and Weber's telegraph, those
methods were inferior to those that ultimately proved to be the industrial standards--developed
for the most part by poor engineers and college drop-outs.
As Germany had its VDI, England had its trade and technical organizations--like the Society
of Telegraph Engineers (later the Institution of Electrical Engineers). By the 1880's their parallel
campaigns in England were beginning to make an impression on established ("pure") science.
There was even an engineering section of the British Association for the Advancement of
Science, and one of its presidents, William Henry Preece, was actually made a fellow of the
Royal Society.25 Preece, Chief electrician at the government Post Office (which had taken over
the nation's telegraph system) and president of the Institution of Electrical Engineers led the
"practical men" in opposition to the university elite. In one celebrated instance, Preece actually
blocked publication of the researches of one of the Maxwellians (Oliver Heaviside--a very
peculiar member of the club). These studies were on the calculations of power and signal
transmission over long distance telephone lines, a subject Preece knew from practice.
"Pretentious and impudent" Preece said of Heaviside--"Really dreadful stuff, rank quackery"
Heaviside said of Preece.26
Beside the reputations and integrity of the combatants, what was at stake here was a principle,
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or rather a method, of the Maxwell-Helmholtz agenda--codified in Poynting's theorem. One
notion Preece and his colleagues objected to was the physicists' idea of "self-induction."
This notion of self-induction arose from Maxwell and Poynting's way of addressing the
transportation of electric and magnetic influence across space. A source of disturbance, such as
the jiggling currents in the telegrapher's transmitting station, was to result in a jiggling of the
potential-formulas for electric and magnetic influences throughout the "field" (or aether)
surrounding the wires (and penetrating into them). Any other nearby wire in this field would, as
a result, have its electrical atoms jiggled, so the motion was effectively transmitted across space
(or through wires concentrating the fields--for “wireless” transmission across empty space was
not accomplished until Hertz in 1888). So far, so good, everybody had been doing that since the
1830's. But the Maxwellians pointed out that the transmitting wire resided in its own field. That
is, the wire would create a "signal" in the field that would alter the signal in the transmitter that
produced it. In turn, this would alter the original field, and thus alter the transmitted signal, and
so on ad finitum. In Poynting's calculations this didn't lead to a catastrophe, it only lead to
self-induction--a "transmitter" (electrical current jiggler) interfering with itself to lower the
effectiveness of its task. This was the Maxwellian analogy to a practical problem the telegraph
engineers had already encountered. They had detected mysterious "retardation" when they
boosted the power and the frequency (jiggle-rate) of their transmission. Instead of fiddling with
analogies, the engineers like Preece fiddled with transmitters, measuring and cataloguing the
amount of retardation for different systems, and recording the results in their handbooks and
technological fact-books. The conflict arose when those table-rapping, mathematical academics
tried to claim that they understood retardation better with their theory of "self-induction"--a
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theory automatically hidden to anyone not conversant with higher mathematics. The "practical
men" had their own sensible idea of retardation--that it was caused by extra resistance in the
wires that slowed the flow of electricity at higher power levels.
Bruce Hunt recounted the plan for an intellectual showdown, where representatives of the two
sides squared off at a meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science in Bath
in 1888. As with the Ostwald vs. Boltzmann Lübeck debates in the same decade, different
versions may be told of who "won." The Bath debates were peculiarly muddled, for they were
held just as the announcement of Hertz's demonstration of Maxwellian "radio waves" reached
England, and the deck became instantly stacked on the side of transmission with self-induction.
The Maxwellian argument carried the startling notion that the "retardation" measured in the wires
(and presumed by the engineers to be caused by the wires themselves) was not for wires only. It
applied to "wireless" transmission like Hertz's, hence, in wires or aether, was due to
"self-induction." And self-induction itself was explained through the analogy of an invisible
"field"--”as if” there was a disturbed aether swimming around the wires interfering with the flow
of signals. The Maxwellians were indeed triumphant. The materialists had their proof of the
existence of the aether, the psychics had their medium for telepathy, the mathematicians had a
consistent analogy, and the ignorant engineers were put down.
Heaviside celebrated:

Self-induction's `in the air,'
Everywhere, everywhere;
Waves are running to and fro,
405

Here they are, there they go.
Try to stop 'em if you can
You British Engineering Man27

However, the practical men did not see them selves as defeated. After all, the telegraphs that
they built didn't stop working when Hertz "discovered" that they were theoretically wrong. And
even if they did stop, the company called a repairman, not a mathematician.
Hunt concluded:

The old-style `half-educated electricians' were not, for the most part,
converted to Maxwellianism, but were simply left behind... [A] new
generation--Britain's first generation of academically trained electrical
engineers...--was raised from the first on Maxwellian principles. Such
Maxwellians as FitzGerald, Lodge, and Silvanus Thompson played leading roles
in promoting electrical engineering education. These new engineers, trained in
theory and mathematics, were able to handle the new technologies involving
alternating currents and field effects far better than were their "practical"
predecessors, who were displaced as electricity simply got beyond them. The
quintessential "half-educated electrician" Edison, after a long struggle against
alternating current, essentially gave up work in power engineering once it was
adopted...28
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The mention of Edison in this context calls up the American version of the role (or lack of
role) in revolutionizing the electrical industry. We have seen the tale of Hoffmann in the
background of the German chemical industry, and there is a similar legend for Hertz and
Edison's General Electric Company. There is even a slight historical mixing of the stories, for
William Crookes, one of the scientists "behind" an early success by Edison was once Hoffmann's
assistant. The American electrician's tale is another story of science-driven progress, though in
this story Edison and his old-fashioned "practical" ways were the impediment to progress, while
successor J.P. Morgan and his Maxwellian engineer, Charles Steinmetz, reaped the profits.
The American tale goes something like this:
So Varley and Preece were "wrong" after all--but the telegraph systems they had
developed did not stop working in 1888--and the debate did not stop then. The well known
opposition of Thomas Edison to the introduction of "alternating current" ("A.C.") in his
American power transmission companies arose from exactly the same issue: self-induction and
the mathematical methods justifying it. Edison had to give way to investor J. P. Morgan.
Presumably this was because the old delivery system at the time used constant voltage ("Direct
Current"--"D.C."), which was well understood by the practical men like Edison. In fact, they too
had an analogy--the flow of electricity was like the flow of water, and there wasnb\n’t a
convenient fluid analogy to alternating current. They certainly didn't need Maxwell’s
mathematical phantoms (fields) to do their jobs. But the efficiency of the D.C. system was
challenged by the dreams of other inventors, notably George Westinghouse and Nikolai Tesla.
Morgan, the new chief of General Electric, was a Göttingen product, and thus had respect for the
power of the abstract. He promoted the Maxwellian Steinmetz to chief engineer, and Steinmetz's
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calculations showed A.C. to be vastly more profitable. General Electric, sans Edison,
"converted" to A.C. The Maxwellians were right, the "practical" Edison was wrong, General
Electric became the model for an enormous industry, and the twentieth century became an age of
electricity. All because of Hertz. That is why, for instance, a measure of the rate of alternation
of the varying electricity--the number of complete "cycles" in a second, is now called "Hertz"
("Hz")--in his honor.
Like the Hoffmann-Perkin story, there is much truth behind the legend. Edison indeed
resisted A.C., and later considered that his "greatest blunder." Matthew Josephson comments:

It was as if he [Edison] could not really visualize the inherently complex
electrodynamic of heavy-current engineering, as he had failed to visualize radio
waves when he was almost upon them...For the era of giant electrical power a
modern breed of engineers, armed with the calculus, men like Tesla, Charles P.
Steinmetz, and B.G. Lamme would lead the way along high-voltage transmission
lines...To the Westinghouse organization would go the glory of harnessing and
distributing the monstrous hydroelectric power of Niagara Falls--which would
have been impossible by Edison's methods.29

But was the operating factor in this industrial progress really a clash of calculations and
ideologies? There were clues here to the contrary. For instance, Westinghouse's competing A.C.
system was not obviously more profitable at the time--around 1888. Also it was not necessarily
the Maxwellians who thought A.C. was a good idea. For example, among his associates that
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thought Edison should switch was the engineer John T. Sprague.30 And of Sprague, Hunt has the
following comments:

While Varley had some support from other "practical men," the
Maxwellians for the most part ignored him as an extreme case. They found the
more moderate John T. Sprague worth refuting. Sprague, a self-described
`half-educated electrician' had written a widely read book on electricity in 1875.
He carried out a long battle against Maxwell's theory, and particularly the
Poynting flux...Rejecting FitzGerald's claim in his Bath address that Hertz's
experiments proved that `non-conductors can and probably always do, as
Professor Poynting has taught us, transmit electromagnetic energy,' Sprague
countered that `As far as I can see the Hertz experiments prove nothing,' and that
the Maxwellian theory was nonsense.31

Thus it seems that Edison and Sprague, both anti-Maxwellians, split on the question of A.C..
The issue was probably not mathematics, but safety. Andre Millard carefully chronicled this
"battle of the systems," finding Edison engaging in considerable research efforts in practical
A.C., but rejecting it for his company (then Edison Electric) on grounds heavily influenced by
economic and safety concerns. These latter worries became notorious, as Edison became
convinced of the dangers of high voltages from research for a New York State commission
looking for "humane" ways of execution. The resulting animal experiments at West Orange, N.J.
convinced Edison of the hazards of rival Westinghouse's attempts at high-voltage A.C. systems.
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When the later Edison General Electric Co. did offer A.C. systems, despite Edison's reluctance,
they qualified their proposals with the statement that the technology was "dangerous and
inefficient at best, but procurable on demand."32
While Edison thought A.C. was unsafe, J. P. Morgan, the former Edison backer, thought D. C.
was unsafe. He had installed one of Edison's earliest lighting systems in his own home, and had
a very bad time with mishaps.33 And, in addition, the rival gas companies were waging a general
campaign to convince everybody that electricity was more dangerous than gas. Even more, the
Morgan decision to buy out Edison in 1888 was undoubtedly fueled more by business concerns
than ideological ones (and he hadn't yet met Steinmetz).
Then there is the problem of Edison's management of his own legend. He was notorious for
taunting the academic world, and always described himself as a self-taught (and blissfully
ignorant) inventor. Yet historians continually find evidence of Edison's careful study of
academic journals, and of his utilization of "research" when he needed it. Andre Millard, for
example, cites numerous examples of Edison's cultivation of expertise with the "academic
sciences."

Despite his many pronouncements to the contrary, Edison was not opposed
to basic scientific research provided that it was directed toward some practical
goal, however remote. His disdain of what he called `theo-retical' science came
from his lack of confidence in the theory and his belief that research in academe
was pointless and slow, the kind of research that Edison, the self-confessed
hustler, would not tolerate in his laboratories. This prejudice...has earned Edison
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an undeserved reputation or trial-and-error methods instead of systematic,
scientific research...34
In one case, Helmholtz's researches on sound seem to have influenced
Edison's (somewhat inefficient) work on the phonograph.35 In another Maxwell's
mathematics of fields may have produced important improvements in the dynamo:
A deeper understanding of the magnetic circuit, inspired in part by the
theories of James Clerk Maxwell, enabled electrical engineers to obtain more
powerful magnetic fields. The greatest success was scored by John Hopkinson, a
scientist retained by the English Edison companies who was influenced by
Maxwell's mathematical model of the electromagnetic field. Hopkinson
shortened the field magnets of the Edison dynamo and did away with the multiple
cores, improving the magnetic circuit and bringing an increase of efficiency of
around 95 percent.36

Edison even preceded Hertz' transmission of "etheric" waves when, in 1887 he developed the
"grasshopper telegraph," a wireless device to transmit telegraph signals from a moving train to
stations via electromagnetic "induction."37
A few more examples from Matthew Josephson's study also suggest that Edison's
anti-science publicity was misleading:

In the period 1878 to 1881, more and more university-trained scientists
were added to the staff at Menlo Park...These men usually surpassed Edison in
411

theoretical knowledge, but he was the conductor of the `symphony orchestra'...38
In England, Sir William Crookes had lately made great progress toward
very high vacuums by means of an improved type of pump...On learning of this,
Edison decided to get hold of one of the first of these new vacuum pumps to reach
America, which was then at the laboratory of Princeton College...39

Crookes is the Hoffmann connection we mentioned earlier. He was another one of the major
figures in the post-Maxwell generation of electricians, and played a key role in the shift of
research from light- and radio-waves to electrified matter flow, "electrons" and some kinds of
"radio-activity." While his work will lead us away from American engineering, it will lead us
back to the materialist wars waged in the name of Maxwell and Helmholtz, so we might ask what
Edison knew of this English pump-maker.
William Crookes was not only an inventor, but a trained chemist. He began his career as a
personal assistant to Hoffmann at the Royal College of Chemistry, and rose to a knighthood
(1897), the presidency of the British Association, and even the presidency of the Royal Society
itself in 1913. Moreover, he became the president of the Society for Psychical Research in 1897,
and was a key operator in introducing that group to the burgeoning Theosophy movement.40
Crookes was not a Maxwellian, in the sense that he was not known as a practitioner of
mathematical speculation. He was after all, a chemist, not a physicist, and was particularly adept
at manipulating laboratory apparatus.
If not searching for the synthetic a priori, what was Crookes doing with these clever vacuum
pumps? Among other things, he was trying to isolate aether in a tube--by pumping all the gases
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comprising air leaving, presumably, pure aether, in liquid or vapor form. If successful the
remaining aether would be "invisible," so how would he know if he actually had anything left?
He planned to discharge an electric spark through the tube, hoping that the resulting aether
waves would be visible, as Maxwell's analogy suggested. This all turned out very badly for
Crookes. He never did find any aether and ultimately abandoned the idea. His tube did light up,
but he came to believe that the glowing stuff in his tube was just left-over air, but air in a new
"fourth state of matter" (the other three being liquid, vapor, and solid states). His colleagues
thought him a bit spooky, especially because of his spiritualist ideas that this could be a the
medium of communication with the dead. An historian of spiritualism comments:

The most cursory glance at his distinguished scientific career will indicate
that William Crookes was a man of uncommon ability. He is the most important
witness on the side of spiritualism. If what he recounted is true, the accepted
natural laws no longer hold sway; if he was hoodwinked, then almost anybody
could be hoodwinked. Some maintain that he deliberately allowed himself to be
taken in because of an amorous attachment to Florence Cook, the medium...
Generally speaking, scientists thought that they had better things to do
than bother with spiritualism. It was difficult not to have preset ideas on the
subject, and even those who rated Crookes highly as a scientist looked askance ar
his meddling with the supernatural.41

Thus it was for others to gain fame from Crookes' experiments with "vacuums." Edison
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pumped out his lightbulbs, J.J. "discovered the electron," Becquerel "discovered" radioactivity,
and Roentgen "discovered" x-rays--all but Edison within a few years of each other, and all with
the help of a "Crookes tube" (or related "Geissler" or "Plücker" tube). Modern physicists are
quick to point out that, in retrospect, Crookes was (sort of) right after all--he had actually
discovered a "fourth state of matter," now called the "plasma" state--only too early for such a
thing to be recognized as a legitimate part of the theoretical agenda. Still, in the context of the
late nineteenth search for the atom and its electrical analogues, Crookes was not that out of synch
with the post-Maxwellian materialist wars, for there were also other mathematical physicists
interested in the stuff left over after all the matter was pumped out of Crookes' tube. Some called
this "the continuum," as Historian Jed Z. Buchwald noted:

The British [after Maxwell] did generally believe in atoms, but they used
them in rather special ways, particularly in electromagnetism. The British
physicist conceived of the universe as a continuum studded with structures called
`atoms.' These things were built out of the continuum itself...
Thus the goal of many a British theory was to create a general
dynamical formula which would lead to large classes of observed phenomena.
Having done so, one could then try to envision `atomic' structures in and of the
continuum which were compatible with the dynamical formulation...One could
(very loosely) say the British physicists of this period were `inverted' atomists.
Instead of building the world out of atoms, they built atoms out of the world--their
`world' being the continuum proper.42
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PARADOX AND CHANCE

The theories of light and electricity, however dramatic, are only half of the story of "Maxwell
vs. Maxwell." We have left the question of heat hanging with Boltzmann in Graz (and Gibbs at
Yale). Perhaps the most natural path back to Austria is lit by the attacks on Boltzmann by Tait
and Thomson, among others, occasionally mentioned earlier.
The issue behind the English academic opposition to Boltzmann was not so much
methodological as it was phenomenological. Boltzmann, in his H theorem and elsewhere, had
used a heuristic about heat that suggested that the chaos of randomly moving molecules could be
exploited to describe the mechanics (matter in motion) of the physical world. Molecules and
atoms were not, in themselves, offensive to the British, as we have just seen, but Boltzmann's use
of their mathematical analogues was. The fixed point of the objection was in the implication that
chaos and accident seemed a fundamental feature of the hidden, controlling physical
universe--and that violated Victorian scruples, religious as well as scientific.
To the layperson, the statistical heresy had an obvious source--not in the atoms, but in their
assumed motions, "the kind of motions we call heat" (recalling Clausius' title). Why (or how)
could Boltzmann, Maxwell, and Clausius attribute "automatic" or intrinsic motion (random
motion at that) to the building blocks of the world? What (or who) made them move? If
Boltzmann was "right" (which they doubted), this mysterious internal motion in things accounted
for physical attributes, not only heat and temperature, but viscosity, friction, electrical
conductivity, and, in the case of living, organic structures, growth, decay, and evolution. So
powerful was the scope of this heuristic for heat that Germans called it Ur-motion
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(Ur-Bewegung), primal motion.
Ironically, the offending philosophical agent, Ur-motion, was well known to experimental
scientists of the Victorian age. It had been "discovered" by a Scots Botanist, Robert Brown,
around 1827. He had observed small pollen grains suspended in a fluid undergoing motion, and
surmised that their motion "arose neither from currents in the fluid nor from its gradual
evaporation but belong to the particle itself."43 This being an era of Naturphilosophie, it was
widely assumed that Brown had observed a fundamental life-form, a motion akin to the Greek
version of the action of the soul itself (the "soul" explained the power of self-motion, as opposed
to motion by some external "force"). Since the pollen were, after all, the seeds of life, the
so-called "Brownian Motion" was first seen as clear evidence of the uniqueness of organic over
inorganic matter.
Later anti-Romantic investigators found a similar effect in inorganic, mineral dusts, and thus
such studies became "evidence" against the "organic" Romantics--to such a degree that the
Ur-motion is now often associated not with Brown, but with the arch professionalizer Joseph
Tyndall. It was by this route, the "Tyndall Effect," that British materialists came to see molecular
or atomic motion as their own ideological province. Now with Boltzmann and his H-theorem,
the mathematicians had invaded the squabble with their "terrific mathematics" (Tait's phrase),
and from this point on the atom-wars became a nearly inexplicable melee. Some moderns like to
say that the war was won by the mathematicians--with one of Einstein's "other" papers of 1905
(on Brownian Motion), or with Einstein's later work (and that of Smoluchowski). Or, it is said
that the war was won by the materialists or "mechanists" by the demonstrations of Jean Perrin.
Defending the theorists, we have, for example, a close study by Roberto Maiocchi, who argues:
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The explanation of the phenomenon of Brownian motion, given by
Einstein in 1905 and based on the kinetic-molecular conception of matter, is
considered one of the fundamental pillars (or even the main one) supporting
atomism in its victorious struggle against phenomenological physics in the early
years of this century.44

Recounting the "positivist" history of the sequence of experiments and inductions that lead from
Brown to Einstein and Perrin, Maiocchi notes:

This schema is rather reassuring in its linearity which shows a regular
sequence of scientific developments (observation assessing the facts which are to
be explained, progressive and definite confirmation of the theory through new
observations). As a schema it is also mistaken...Only when Einstein had
constructed, independently of the experimental accounts, a sufficiently articulated
theory, did the experimenters [e.g., Perrin] know what had to be observed and
only after this theoretical clarification did the observations turn out to be
conclusive.45

Perhaps it might be better said that nobody has won (yet). The historian Mary Jo Nye
concludes:
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It can be contended that Perrin's experiments were really the last ostensible victory
for the mechanists; that afterwards, relativity, quantum theory, the behaviour of
the electron and other perplexing aspects of a new physics produced fundamental
physical concepts which are really structures of pure thought, incapable of
realisation in any sense which would properly be termed material.46

It is clear that the forces of "pure thought" contending in these struggles were marshaled in the
nineteenth century, particularly by Boltzmann. In the above passages, Nye traced the English
warriors only as far back as an intermediary between Boltzmann and Einstein and Perrin, the
early twentieth century astronomer James Jeans. Fortunately for our argument, Jeans was an
avowed neo-Kantian, and had retreated under pressure from the anti-romantics into astrophysics,
as had many of the beleaguered successors to Maxwell and Boltzmann, including Einstein and
Schrödinger.
Boltzmann's particular crime seemed to be his use of mixed mathematics to account for the
second law of thermodynamics. Kelvin's physical "law" explained evolution, growth, and decay,
and Boltzmann wanted to rest it purely on the abstract rules of chance--of statistics. Thomson
(Kelvin), a champion of materialism (recall his vortex atom) was the "first" to attack, pointing
out a blunder (or, rather, a paradox) in Boltzmann's equations. The historian Martin Klein has
tracked the origin of this skirmish back to 1867 (from a note on a letter from Maxwell to Tait
wherein Maxwell tells Tait of his demon).47
The contested flaw, the so-called "reversibility paradox," was that Boltzmann's equations
rested on two contradictory models. In one, the molecules of a system would collide, due to their
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ur-motion, and mix and rearrange to "evolve" into a uniform state or "equilibrium." The
disparate faster, "hot" regions would cool, and the slower, "cold" regions would heat until all
tended toward the same intermediate average motion and temperature. That was peachy, for that
matched one version of the Kelvin-Clausius second law. Where the paradox arose was in a
second model for the theorem for the same system. If one took the system near the end of its
evolution toward equilibrium and suddenly reverse the direction of each molecule, there were
contrary predictions from the theory. On one hand, by the arguments of Tait (and Boltzmann's
friend Loschmidt48) the system should retrace its steps and return to its initial messy state. A
modern analogy would be in a film of the process run backward--the earlier frames were farther
from equilibrium, regardless of the order displayed. On the other hand, by the very theorem that
got us to this reversal the new system should still evolve according to the second law, hence flow
further toward equilibrium, not back to the farm. A paradox, a paradox, a most ingenious
paradox. The historian Theodore Porter noted:

Boltzmann quickly recognized that he was confronted with a deep
paradox, the problem of reconciling the flow of heat, which manifestly depends
on the direction of time, with the laws of mechanics, which do not. Elastic
collisions in a mechanical system are perfectly reversible, but heat is always
observed to flow from warm to cold bodies.49

This puzzle is central for the many modern theorists who are still grappling with the alleged
paradoxes in successor arguments to Boltzmann and Gibbs. Recently popular theories of
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"Chaos" or "Non-Equilibrium Thermodynamics" still fling reversibility paradoxes around, or
out, with as much or more passion as our protagonists did. However, one might notice (as did
Poincaré), that the problem is in the models, not in the theorem. That being so, Maxwell didn't
mind at all that the analogy didn't hold completely--it wasn't supposed to. Porter cited a Maxwell
speech from 1872:

The modern atomists have therefore adopted a method which is, I believe,
new in the department of mathematical physics, though it has long been used in
the section of statistics. When the working members of Section F get hold of the
report of the Census...they begin by distributing the whole population into groups,
according to age, income-tax, education, religious belief, or criminal convictions.
The number of individuals is far too great to allow of their tracing the history of
each separately, so that...they concentrate their attention on a small number of
artificial groups. The varying number of individuals in each group, and not the
varying state of each individual, is the primary datum from which they work...
The equations of dynamics completely express the laws of the historical
method as applied to matter...But the smallest portion of matter which we can
subject to experiment consists of millions of molecules, not one of which ever
becomes individually sensible to us...so that we are obliged to abandon the strict
historical method, and to adopt the statistical method. In studying the relations
between [the sums of large quantities of molecular quantities], we meet with a
new kind of regularity, the regularity of averages,...which can make no claim to
420

that character of absolute precision which belong to the laws of abstract
dynamics.50

The neo-Kantian philosophy behind this address allows "theorems," the products of the
rigorous imagination, to be exact, while the models from which analogies arise (including
experiments as models) clearly need not be. Average temperature and measurable temperature
are analogous in a necessarily inexact form.
Porter continued to follow the metaphor of social statistics in the explanations of Maxwell
and Boltzmann, and found frequent references by both to a mid-century phrenologist and
Comtean social historian, Thomas Buckle. This suggested an external influence on the atomic
heat debates. Porter writes:

Doubtless it would be too brave to argue that statistical gas theory only
became possible after social statistics had accustomed scientific thinkers to the
possibility of stable laws of mass phenomena with no dependence on
predictability of individual events. Still, the actual history of the kinetic gas
theory is consistent with such a claim.51

That is a reasonable perspective on the materialist side of the theories, but not on Maxwell,
Helmholtz, and Gibbs. The "phrenology" of Buckle is a good example of our situation of two
kinds of "science" in direct conflict, with the physicist-philosophers moving sharply away from
the empiricists even as they cite them as predecessors. Here, it seems, an incipient "statistical
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thermodynamics," diverges from a "statistical social science." Let us examine this more closely.
Phrenology was the "science" (or pseudo-science to skeptics) of correlating the shape of
contours and bumps on the head with patterns of social behavior. Presumably the shape of the
skull reflected the shape of the brain within, which allegedly which controlled this behavior.
According to one scholar, Steven Shapin,52 this science began in Vienna towards the end of the
eighteenth century as physiological research by Franz Joseph Gall and Johann Spurzheim. The
former is well known, the latter obscure--for instance, Gall gets two citations in Helmholtz's
Physiological Optics, Spurzheim none. Their phrenological doctrines spread to become a
common popular subject in the 1820's and 1830's, particularly in Britain, and more particularly in
Edinburgh. The phrenologists became particularly adept at explaining social phenomena, like the
decay of the "old town" of Edinburgh and the rise of the "new town" in terms of the statistical
behavior of different groups of the population--some inevitably coming to dominate or recede
through the laws of averages. The phrenologists identified the "segments" of population by their
psychological "type" and "tendencies," according to "scientific" measurements of skull shapes.
This, then, was the background of the "empirical science" of Buckle's "social statistics," and was
the kind of studies Maxwell was referring to as the work of "section F" of the British
Association. By Maxwell's time, the phrenologists of his Scots youth, despite a formidable
accumulation of data (which is said to be more "scientifically accurate" than that of their rivals),
had "collapsed." Presumably the same Victorian rejection of the Romantics also defeated the
phrenologists, but, in any case, we hear little of them by the late century. This temporary success
of statistical methods, and the resulting rise of statistical methods in the experimental and social
sciences may indeed have enfranchised the materialists of the late Victorian atom-wars, but the
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theorists had no use for such spurious claims. It had been their fixed philosophical aim to create
mathematical complexes that made no commitment whatever to the physical "nature" of
phenomena. Fourier's theory of heat was not as important as Fourier's theory of theories in this
regard. However, Maxwell and Gibbs were of such pacific temperament as not to try to impose
their philosophy on the warring materialists, and remained mostly silent in the fray. When
Maxwell did comment, as in the above address, it was to try to produce harmony between the
factions. In the 1930's, Arthur Eddington, an astronomical colleague of Jeans and another
spokesman for Neo-Kantians, similarly argued to popular audiences that the experimental and
theoretical agendas were not contrary, but two different ways to the same ends--the laws of
nature. He claimed that you could indeed find the laws by collecting data, doing experiments,
and generalizing. You could also find the same laws by simply looking at the structure of
knowledge that was required to express the law, the "epistemology". This was Maxwell's
opinion expressed in his Association address and in his defense of atomism--there may indeed be
aether and molecules, but they are not needed in the epistemological field theories.
Since Maxwell's work really "bypassed" the materialists' problems, he, unlike the
"Maxwellians," remained above the atom-wars. Posterity treats him well for that, unlike poor
Eddington, who occasionally gets cited as a "Quaker mystic." This ill treatment is more for his
neo-Kantian philosophy (“selective subjectivism”) than his celebrated contributions to
astronomy. Helmholtz too escaped most of the battle, but his "follower," Boltzmann, became
embroiled in a fight he should not have needed to wage. Maybe that was because of his location
at the time--Vienna of the late nineteenth century.

423

VIENNA'S POSITIVISTS

Boltzmann did not actually move from Graz to Vienna until 1894 (to take Stefan's chair),
though he probably could have, for his fame in physics had soared. It was not his controversial
theories of heat that made his reputation as much as his advocacy of the electromagnetic theory.
He had worked with Helmholtz on electrical experiments anticipating Hertz's triumph of 1888,
and after that he took on the job of a "Maxwellian" in Austria. Brush comments:

In the 1890's Boltzmann again revived his interest in electromagnetic
theory, perhaps as a result of Hertz's experiments, which he repeated before a
large audience in Graz. He published [`Lectures on Maxwell's Theory...'] in 1891
and 1893, along with some papers in which he suggested new mechanical models
to illustrate the field equations. In 1895 he published an annotated German
edition of Maxwell's paper "On Faraday's Lines of Force" in Ostwald's ["Classics
of the Exact Sciences"]. Boltzmann was partly responsible for the eventual
acceptance of Maxwell's theory on the Continent, although he did not advance the
theory as much as did Lorentz, nor did he grapple with the difficult problems that
ultimately led to Einstein's theory of relativity.53
He did continue to work on heat at Graz, generalizing his statistical methods into something
he called "Ergodic Theory." His new analogy, the "Ergoden" was another idealization, a
theoretical collection of systems of elastic spheres (or molecules, or ping-pong balls). Each
system would have the same energy, but a different complexion, or particular distribution of
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individual energies. We have already seen this idea in the form of Gibbs' "Ensemble," and
indeed it is this key analogy that gives Boltzmann joint credit with Gibbs for inventing a whole
new field of mathematical physics--"Statistical Mechanics." The dates of birth of this science are
several: Gibbs published his epochal book, "Statistical Mechanics" (the source of Einstein's
expressed admiration), in 1902. Göttingen Mathematician Felix Klein, probably the "dean" of
Continental mathematics at the turn of the century, declared Boltzmann a co-inventor by asking
him to write an article on "Statistical Mechanics" for his "Encyclopedia of the Mathematical
Sciences" in 1905.54 After Boltzmann's tragic death in 1906, Paul Ehrenfest took up the task, and
developed it until his own suicide in 1933. Victorians would have thought there was a curse on
this subject.
The attacks on Boltzmann's heat theories started when he was at Graz. At that time the
attacks from his future friends, like Thomson and Tait, were about his neglect of materialism and
experiment. Later complaints from his future colleague at Vienna, Ernst Mach (who once taught
at Graz and whom Boltzmann beat out for a later job there), were about his neglect of theoretical
heuristics and his defense of materialism. Another post-Graz colleague, Leipzig's Wilhelm
Ostwald, also struck at the competitor to his Naturphilosophie and "Energetics." Boltzmann,
though he was making himself famous now as an electrician, responded energetically.
Perhaps the attacks from England have been somewhat exaggerated. At least this is Brush's
opinion. In a book review, Brush explained:

The term "paper world" is even more appropriate than [indicated]..., since
in an 1878 article...Tait attacked the `modern manikins of paper science, who are
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always thrusting their crude notions on the world; the anatomists who have never
dissected, the astronomers who have never used a telescope, or the geologists who
have never carried a hammer' (Tait, Scientific Papers, Vol. II, p. 497). But Tait
meant not scientists like Boltzmann but cranks like antivivisectionists who pester
legitimate scientists with irrelevant criticism and unwanted suggestions.
Moreover he went on to argue that the physicist must also be a `genuine
mathematician' (at least in the sense that Faraday supposedly thought
mathematically without using symbols). Nevertheless it is easy to see how Tait's
label `paper scientist' could be extended polemically to cover the armchair theorist
who claimed to make discoveries about the world with mathematics.55

In any case, Boltzmann himself seemed to think he was some kind of a target. He went all the
way to Oxford to hear a debate on his mathematics--to the 1894 Meeting of the British
Association. Boltzmann seems to have thought he "won," for he proposed a similar debate to the
"German Association" (our acquaintance, the Deutscher Naturforscher und Artze). He wrote to
Ostwald:
At the Naturforscherversammelung [meeting of the German Association]
Professor Helm will report on Energetik. I would like, if possible, to provoke a
debate a la British Association, mainly for the purpose of learning myself. For
this, it is first of all necessary that the main representatives of this direction [i.e.
Energetics] be present. I need not mention how much especially your presence
would please me.56
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That was the origin of the celebrated Lübeck debate--provoked by Boltzmann, not his critics.
We earlier cited the young Arnold Sommerfeld's view of the confrontation of "the matador and
the bull," Ostwald and Boltzmann. Ostwald "lost" the debate in the eyes of the young
mathematical modelers, but "won" in the eyes of the general philosophers, or so said the local
papers. Ostwald, (an organic chemist in the mold of Liebig) kept picking up support, for instance
from a young Göttingen experimenter and later Nobel Prizewinner, Walther Nernst. Nernst had
collaborated with Ostwald at Leipzig, and would eventually take up Helmholtz's post at Berlin.
Ironically in 1901 Ostwald received a small research paper (on fluid friction and heat) and a job
application from an unpromising young E.T.H. graduate, Albert Einstein. He didn't reply. Less
than a dozen years later, Ostwald would announce his abandonment of Energetics because of the
irrefutable mathematics of Einstein and the laboratory models of Perrin--both based on the
Boltzmann-Gibbs methods.
It was in this celebrity mode, then, that Boltzmann returned to Vienna, and the legend of
end-of-the-century Vienna was amplified by his presence. The University was a magnet for the
radical innovations that were to change many agendas of the coming twentieth century. Carl
Schorske sets the stage:

The renaissance-style University...was an unequivocal symbol of liberal
culture. Accordingly, it had to wait to realize its claims to a significant building
site on the Ringstrasse. As a citadel of secular rationalism, the University was last
to win recognition from the diehard forces of the Old Right, and suffered from the
rise of a popular, anti-Semitic New Right. The siting of the University and even
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its architectural style occasioned years of conflict within the government and
among its shifting constituent social interest groups. For years the University
dwelt under the shadow of its role in the Revolution of 1848. The Academic
Legion, composed of faculty and students of the University and other institutions
of higher learning, had been the heart of revolutionary Vienna's organized fighting
force...On assuming office in 1849, the aristocratic, pious, but enlightened
conservative Minister of Religion and Instruction, Count Leo Thun, had sought
both to modernize and to domesticate the University...From 1853 to 1868, Thun
and his collaborators worked to create a new English- and Gothic-style University
quarter...--to no avail.
The University problem was resolved only when the liberals came to
power [in the early 1870's]...57

The University went on to get its buildings and collect its distinguished faculty--Stefan, for
instance, and eventually his illustrious student, Boltzmann.
Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin tried to capture the Viennese cross-currents into which
Boltzmann plunged:

The origins of Schönberg's twelve-tone system of musical composition are
something quite else. The historian of music must presumably focus his attention,
in that case, on the technical problems posed by...Wagner, Richard Strauss, and
the earlier works of Schönberg himself...Likewise with the artistic breakaway by
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which the painters of the Secession separated themselves from the established
activities of orthodox academic art; likewise, again, with the beginnings of `legal
positivism' in the jurisprudence of Hans Kelsen; with the literary ambitions and
fortunes of Rilke and Hofmannsthal; with the analytical methods of Boltzmann's
statistical thermodynamics; the parts played by Adolf Loos and Otto Wagner as
precursors of the Bauhaus school of architecture, and the philosophical program
of the Wiener Kreis ["Vienna Circle"].58

The most interesting of these new agendas from our viewpoint is the formation of the
legendary Vienna Circle. Another short version of its legend will help organize its relation to the
Maxwell-Boltzmann story:
The Vienna circle "formed" around questions of the philosophical implications of the
revolutionary new sciences and logics. With Ernst Mach's skeptical critique of materialism as
their inspiration, the philosophers, led by physicist Moritz Schlick, established an
anti-metaphysical, method-based mode of philosophy known as "Logical Positivism."
Transported to England by Ludwig Wittgenstein and A.J. Ayer, and to America by Philipp Frank,
the doctrine came to dominate Anglo-American philosophies of science and language. Logical
Positivism and its successor philosophy, "Logical Empiricism" continued their hold (particularly
their anti-metaphysical and anti-Kant attitudes) until the 1960's, when the next generation shifted
its agenda again. Popularized by Thomas Kuhn, the new view of science now struggles for a
name and a doctrine. A candidate description, (called by some "Humanism" to reflecting the
American influences on the transfer from Vienna to Boston in the 1930's), was proposed by
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historian Gerald Holton. His characterization of the new philosophy, a combination of Positivism
and Existentialism59, has failed to win assent, but the sense that the new philosophy needs a new
history has become clamorous in the late twentieth century.60
Recently, Philosopher Ronald Giere summarized the latter phase of this descent from the
Vienna Circle:

In 1960 logical empiricism was the Anglo-American philosophy of
science. It had no serious rivals. Within the philosophy of science it still provides
the primary foil for current investigations.
The personal and social origins of logical empiricism are only now
beginning to be investigated. They are three. First was the mathematical and
logical work of Hilbert, Peano, Frege, and Russell...Second was the classical
empiricism of Hume as transmitted through Mill to Russell and Mach...Third was
science, which primarily meant the physics associated with Einstein--relativity
theory and quantum mechanics.61

The yet unfamiliar quartet of Hilbert, Peano, Frege, and Russell will be introduced shortly, but
we should first look closer at the roots of this movement in Vienna, and in Boltzmann. In a
critical review of the collected works of Moritz Schlick, the "center" of the Circle, the
Philosopher Michael Friedman dropped the following bombshell:

However, if one reads the early (pre-1930) works of the positivists
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themselves, a very different and, I think, much more interesting picture emerges.
The verificationism of the positivists did not develop along a direct line from
Hume and Mach via Russell and Wittgenstein. At least equally important is an
evolution from German neo-Kantianism and neo-idealism via Hilbert [of
Göttingen] and Einstein.62

And, in a footnote, Friedman names names:

The neo-Kantian and neo-idealist influence on the early positivists has
been widely neglected--again, largely because of positivism's own anti-Kantian
rhetoric. To get an initial appreciation of this influence, one has only to list some
of the authors referred to by the two great works of the period: Schlick's General
Theory of Knowledge and Carnap's Afbau (1938). Names such as Cassirer,
Driesch, B. Erdman, Külpe, Natorp, Schuppe, Vaihinger, and Wundt
predominate. (As Alberto Coffa has emphasized to me, Schlick's own initiation
into neo-Kantianism probably came from Helmholtz via Planck, who was the
adviser of Schlick's Ph. D. dissertation [Berlin, 1904]).63

We have met many of these ancestors of positivism before: Natorp and Cassirer were
students of Hermann Cohen, and Vaihinger and Helmholtz are two of our featured players. They
do not immediately seem to connect very directly to Boltzmann's Vienna. That connection is
easily made through the Göttingen mathematicians and through Boltzmann's future colleague,
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Ernst Mach. However, that association is not one that would endear Boltzmann and his
neo-Kantianism to the positivist revisers of history. Mach was an opponent, a vocal one, to
Boltzmann's alleged atomism. Perhaps a stronger stronger connection is through Schlick's
adviser, Max Planck, who assisted Boltzmann in attacks on Ostwald. Mehra and Rechenberg,
however, uncovered a complicating detail:

However, Boltzmann did not really enjoy Planck's support, for at about the
same time Planck's assistant Ernst Zermelo (1871-1953) made a serious objection,
the `recurrence argument' (Wiederkehreinwand), against the H-theorem.64

This brings us back to where we started, Boltzmann returning to Vienna under siege. The
British attack on his methods had been blunted by the success of the mathematicians, despite
Tait's grumbling. Mach's attack flopped as the atomic theory spread anyway, though Boltzmann
was not actually guilty of materialism. The Viennese intellectual ferment seemed suitable for
such an embattled genius. Even Wittgenstein wanted to study with him. But this attack By
Zermelo was another matter, for it went to the substance, not the style, of Boltzmann's actual
position. And Zermelo was not, as it turned out, only a minor player in the development of the
logical and mathematical innovations that the Viennese felt were the new winds in modern
thought. From his point of view, Boltzmann's arguments were of unsuitable rigor--unworthy of
analysis by the "Vatican" of mathematics, the Göttingen of Hilbert and Klein.
Zermelo's objection, "the recurrence problem" seems like a simple enough piece of logic.
Suppose you took a Boltzmann system (Ergoden) of ping-pong balls and let it do its shaking and
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moving forever. Now it would seem that eventually the motions of the ping-pong balls should
repeat itself, or at least the positions and motions of the balls would `recur.' Why so? Well,
infinity should be a long enough time for whatever is logically possible to actually happen. This
is the perspective behind the old tale of zillions of monkeys typing for zillions of years and
coming up with Shakespeare's plays. "Whatever can happen will happen," as the phrase goes.
So what? Well, Boltzmann's theorem of statistical evolution claims that doesn't happen--systems
get more and more "averaged" as time goes on--to return to an original state would be going
backward in time (the arrow of which is established by the theory). This dilemma is, of course, a
close relative of the "reversibility paradox" of Thomson, but carried more weight in German
academic circles. The main reason for this was that Zermelo's argument was not about the nature
of atoms or heat, but about the nature of a very abstract notion indeed--infinity. Among other
logical quirks in this notion was the problem that, according to Zermelo and William Rowan
Hamilton's sparring partner Georg Cantor, there are no fixed ratios of sub-populations of infinity.
Philosopher Storrs McCall explains:

Cantor showed long ago that there exist no well-defined proportionalities
among infinite sets. For example, it might be thought that in the set of all natural
numbers the proportionality of odd and even numbers was the same, namely 1/2.
But if the integers are ordered [with odd numbers in every third position] as
follows:
1 2 4 3 6 8 5 10 12 7 ...
then the proportion of even numbers appears to increase to 2/3. In
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Cantorian set theory, fixed proportions among infinite sets do not exist.65

Fortunately for Boltzmann, this made the recurrence problem seem to most an exotic one,
worrisome only to advanced mathematicians, and the Viennese philosophers could be satisfied
with a rather weak defense. The insiders, however, worried much about this paradox, and it was
eventually our Frenchman Henri Poincaré who temporarily bailed Boltzmann out. What
Poincaré did was to prove a theorem that said (in effect) that in the world of mathematics this
simplistic kind of infinity was not long enough for every possible "event" to happen, so
recurrence was not a problem. This was either good or bad news to the Göttingen-type
combatants, and all sorts of new kinds of infinities were invented (e.g. by Zermelo himself), and
new ways of dealing with the old-style infinities (e.g. "topology") got a boost from Poincaré.
However, this turn-of-the-century revolution in mathematics was (and is) largely invisible to the
amateur, and its impact on the agenda of mathematical physics was, at the time, relatively slight.
Boltzmann, Planck, Helmholtz, and Einstein had enough to worry about with the new geometries
without considering the new infinities. Likewise, the Vienna circle liked the sound of these
things, but rarely knew enough of them to join the revolution. The legendary exception was
Göttingen's contribution to the the Vienna Circle, mathematician Kurt Gödel, but his almost
mystical presence still has not been made clear.
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CHAPTER 10

Helmholtz capped his career as director of Germany's national laboratory, the P.T.R. There he
laid down the research agenda that would ultimately preoccupy much of twentieth-century
physics. His incorporation of new geometries into applied physics accelerated the Göttingen
formalists, Klein and Hilbert, in articulating the philosophical foundations of geometry. While
Helmholtz' back-to-Kant approach was plugged as the best idea, opposing philosophers,
particularly the Vienna Circle, captured the methodological flag, at least for the first half of the
new century.
Helmholtz’ interest in light had better results. Through Heinrich Hertz, both his physics and
philosophy spawned productive inquiry via analogical methods, and dominate the background of
the dramatic “discoveries” of radio waves, radioactivity, and x-rays. The fact that the
"discoverers" were, in one way or another, participants in the original heuristic, analogical
methods of Maxwell and Helmholtz got somewhat lost, however, when various antimetaphysical
spokesman, particularly Ernst Mach, claimed the successes of science justified their ideological
stances in another round of "school-wars." Ironically, the true successor of the
physicist-philosophers, Albert Einstein, was a direct product of experiments in modern
schooling. Though he often rejected any relevance to his early training, his independent studies
in Helmholtz, Boltzmann, and Hertz appear to have been crucial in forming the peculiar heuristic
agenda that led him to his triumphant synthesis of the laws of heat, light, and electromagnetic
theories.
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GÖTTINGEN: GEOMETRY AND PHILOSOPHY

In the Maxwell side of our saga we saw how his ideas migrated to Vienna--through
Boltzmann. We should now ask how Helmholtz's ideas arrived there. Oddly enough, it was not
primarily Helmholtz's physics that carried his agenda south, it was his geometry. This is rather a
tangled tale, but the upshot of it is that our scientific-mathematical-philosophical agenda did
reach the salons of Vienna from Berlin--and was rejected !
As it was to be a mathematical express, the route from Berlin to Vienna passed through
Göttingen. The passport that Helmholtz's ideas held was founded on his theoretical physics, but
the geometrical relatives soon emerged. We begin at the end of this trail with the memoirs of
Max Born--tales of his student days as assistant to the great Göttingen mathematician, David
Hilbert. It was in the mid 1900's, after Helmholtz died, so Helmholtz was remembered only
through his books and his students. Hilbert talked to one of them, Walther Nernst:

Nernst was not convinced however; every time I met him he said in his
most friendly high-pitched voice `My dear young colleague, you ought to have
considered not the energy, but the free energy--you must not have read your
Helmholtz properly, nor my book on theoretical chemistry.1

That is not really a very strong example of Helmholtz's influential Berlin work, but it does
provide a first entry into the Berlin-Göttingen connection, for Hilbert's students Born, Jordan,
and Heisenberg were the Göttingen innovators that finally "ended" the classical mechanics in the
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1920's. Born identifies the "Helmholtz" that one had to read in the old days in a reference to his
co-conspirator, Pascual Jordan:

Before going to Göttingen, Jordan had acquired knowledge of classical
mechanics by studying the relevant portions of Hermann von Helmholtz' Vorlesung
ber Theoretische Physik (Lectures on Theoretical Physics 1897-1907)2 a

--------------(a)

This book really got around. At Göttingen it fell into the hands of Fanny Cook Gates, who

took it to Canada (attracted by the opportunities for women demonstrated there by Harriet
Brooks) to work for another eventual Cavendish professor, Ernest Rutherford3. He wasn't
surprised, he had read it growing up in wild New Zealand. But the Berlin-Göttingen connection
was even stronger in mathematics than physics.
--------------Göttingen in the 1880's was home of the celebrated successor to Felix Klein, David Hilbert.
He, like Helmholtz before him, and Kant before that, was a Königsberg student. He spent a
summer studying at Heidelberg, but Helmholtz was in Berlin then, and as Hilbert skipped the
traditional semester at Berlin, he thus missed being a direct Helmholtz student. He did, however,
study Helmholtz's writings on non-Euclidean geometry, and took up the subject at Göttingen.
Hilbert had a lot more in common with Helmholtz than just Königsberg and Geometry. They
were both extending the footsteps of Kant. Hilbert first championed Kant in his dissertation
defense. On a visit to Berlin, he discussed the matter with Helmholtz 5 and Leopold Kronecker
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--------------(b ) The somewhat skeptical Constance Reid suggested that this was more polite than sincere 4.
--------------(remember him--the man who thought the whole numbers were "the work of God"?). He
eventually went on to almost single-handedly restructuring the agenda of mathematics for the
twentieth century, including the foundations of geometry. While philosophical, not mathematical
concerns have brought Hilbert to our attention, we might dwell on a bit of his technical work for
a moment. We find a brief review of that work in a citation of a Bolyai Prize awarded in 1910 to
Hilbert by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.c
--------------(c) Reid somehow dredged this work up, and noted that the citation was written by none other
than our off-stage Frenchman, Henri Poincaré (who happened to be secretary of the prize
committee).
--------------Among the list of theorems, proofs and solved problems that only a mathematician could love,
Poincaré, the author of the citation, cites Hilbert's works on the foundations of geometry:

There are in the history of the philosophy of geometry, three principal
epochs: the first is that in which the thinkers, at the head of whom we must cite J.
Bolyai, developed non-Euclidean geometry; the second is that in which
Helmholtz and Lie revealed the role of ideas of motion and the group in geometry;
the third has been opened up by M. Hilbert.6
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That should be a bit puzzling--"ideas of motion" in geometry? Whatever did he mean by that?
Poincaré and Hilbert (and all of Göttingen) had a good idea of what he meant. Unfortunately, the
notion connects in a very controversial way with the neo-Kantian and neo-idealist battles going
on in technical mathematics at the time (and later). Though it is politic to suggest only that this
idea, whatever it was, further connected Helmholtz and Hilbert, it is safe to assume that these
geometrical investigations had forced a reconsideration of the original "pure" Kantian doctrine.
Before moving to Hilbert's take on the back-to-Kant bandwagon, we might then look at this
detail, this association of "motion" and Geometry.
Kant had annoyed future generations by arguing that mathematical statements, like his famous
5 + 7 = 12, were synthetic, that is, there was something attained by 12 that was not originally in 5
and 7, but was gained by the fact that 12 had been "synthesized" by a process of addition. This
process involved a sequence of logical steps, and represented what the moderns call a
“narrative,” a story-telling construct of the form “12 arose out of the synthesis of 5 and seven.”
In as sense, then, this 12 was not quite the same as other 12s that had been attained by other
processes. The "missing ingredient" in the bald statement of the sentence 5 + 5 = 12 was time,
the framework of the "process" that began with 5 and 7 and ended with 12. To Kant, time, or its
passage, was the a priori condition for the existence of the "inner senses," like mathematical
reasoning. In order to make this kind of logical narrative relevant "scientific" experience, Kant
also made "space," or the relative locations of representations of experience, an a priori
condition on the "outer senses," that is, "outer perception" as opposed to "inner mentation."
Thus "descriptive" geometry requires space, and arithmetic requires time. "Mechanics," matter
in motion, required some combination of space and time, something like Helmholtz' "motion in
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geometry." As Kant himself put it:

Geometry is based upon the pure intuition of space. Arithmetic achieves
its concept of number by the successive addition of units in time, and pure
mechanics cannot attain its concepts of motion without employing the
representation of time.7

Obviously Helmholtz and Hilbert, as interpreted by Poincaré, were carrying into the new
geometry the old agenda of Kant.
They weren’t the only ones. Recall Maxwell’s fascination with the new “quaternion”
mathematics of the Irish phenomenon, Sir William Rowan Hamilton. Hamilton, despite his
suspicion of the Scots philosopher of the same name, turned out to be another of our alleged
back-to-Kant troops. See what he said about mathematics and time in an 1846 letter to his uncle,
the Reverend James Hamilton:

It may also be accounted a presumption in favor of a system which
introduces from the outset, without reservation or fear, the thought of time into the
study of Algebra...In the speech respecting Quaternions which I made last winter,
to the Academy, the occasion warmed me into saying it was time to have done
with the pedantry which censured Newton for the introduction of a foreign
element [time]...by introducing it into the lower or earlier parts of the science [of
Algebra]...Indeed I am profoundly impressed with the conviction that if the
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intuition or conception of time be put out of view, as foreign to Algebra, then
Algebra itself must cease to be regarded as a science. It must either descend into
the rank of an art, which has for its province to supply convenient rules of
calculation; or pass, by what some minds may seem an ascent, into the category
of a language, having no independent truth, but only at most a certain coherency
or elegance. The symbols will then become what many now account them to be,
the all-in-all of algebra: the analogy to geometry will disappear: the signs will
have no longer a reference to things or thoughts signified by them.8

We have already quoted Goethe, Schelling, and Maxwell on the same philosophical mix of
mathematics, language, logic, and analogy. Now hearing Poincaré linking Hilbert to that agenda
will be subversive to the positivists' plan to make Göttingen's formalists the guarantors of formal,
timeless, mathematical truth. The technical revision in Kantian doctrine is spelled out in
Hilbert's 1930 address on the subject of innate (a priori) knowledge:

I admit that even for the construction of special theoretical subjects certain
a priori insights are necessary...I even believe that mathematical knowledge
depends ultimately on some kind of such intuitive insight...Thus the most general
basis of Kant's theory of knowledge retains its importance...The a priori is
nothing more or less than...the expression for certain indispensable preliminary
conditions of and experiences. But the line between that which we possess a
priori and that for which experience is necessary must be drawn differently by us
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than by Kant...
We see now: Kant's a priori theory contains anthropomorphic dross
from which it must be freed. After we remove that, only that a priori will remain
which is also the foundations of mathematics."9

That was, in Hilbert's "last address," the point that Helmholtz had been trying to make fifty
years before. Kant was not wrong about ideas, he was wrong only about the ideas of geometry.
Geometry was, as Helmholtz and Hilbert argued, learned by experience, not known in intuition.
"Pure" mathematics, however, could be indeed discovered by introspection, or so said Hilbert.
That meant (in a Kantian way) that there must be principles from which geometry itself can be
derived. Way back in 1869, Hilbert’s mentor Klein thought he had such an idea, a kind of
picture-geometry ("projective geometry") that had its own rules--from which one might derive
the secondary rules of Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometry 10.
Helmholtz, Klein, and Hilbert had changed considerably the way mathematics was to be
regarded by philosophers. Whether neo-Kantian notions were adequate for these new geometric
entities and their new meanings was an open question--a question that fed into the revolution
against Kant finally staged by the Vienna circle. It was, indicated the late Alberto Coffa, Klein's
fault.
In 1872, Klein felt he was getting nowhere in finding the Kantian foundations of discovered
geometries, and turned to start a new agenda, the famous "Erlangen Program." The idea was
almost "experimental"--to find as many uniquely distinct geometries as possible and look to see
if there was some hidden structure in their classification. He and his successor Hilbert had not
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necessarily abandoned their neo-Kantianism, but they were moving in another direction.
This idea of exploration and geometric "discovery" was picked up by a young, neo-idealistic
English philosophy student, Bertrand Russell. His rather garbled interpretations of Klein in his
Ph.D. dissertation led to a reputation as a philosopher of mathematics, to a book, and to an
unwise attack on Poincaré. From there on, the fight gets almost too dense to follow. The main
outlines of this geometry-war seem to be this:

The issue at stake was the notion of "definition." Lines, points,
surfaces, and such in geometry need to be "defined." Defined in terms of what?
Some (the "empiricists") thought the basis for definition was experience ("call a
point a point"). Some (the Kantians) said the basis was some intuitive, necessary
abstract principle. Still others ("conventionalists") said that the basis was other
definitions--it was all a made-up game (hence there were as many geometries as
you wanted). Yet others ("skeptics") denied there were necessary definitions;
mathematics was an (impressionistic) metaphorical description of "something
else."

Russell and Frege, the philosophers, took one position, Hilbert and Poincaré, the
mathematicians, another. It is still arguable as to who took what position. Coffa suggested that
the mathematicians took the position that there were certain necessary undefinables at the base of
mathematics, and the philosophers demanded the undefinables be defined.
Somehow, this battle, swirling around Göttingen, gets explained to the Viennese.
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Certainly not by Boltzmann (or his Graz colleague Meinong), for the Vienna circle came out on
the side of a well-defined language as a prerequisite for positive philosophy. Russell then wrote
(with Whitehead) his "dictionary" of logic, and the Circle set out to reform science--to clean up
its logical act. Thus the new role for the philosophers of science would be as logic-police for the
scientists. The first chance to try out their new authority was in the new ideas of Boltzmann,
which didn't turn out well at all. The next chance was the work of Einstein, which was shown to
be a triumph of logical precision over the sloppy impressionism of the prior (Maxwellian) aether
theories.
Ernst Mach was the other source of inspiration to the Circle. His role was to read very
carefully the definitions in physics--not those in controversial heat or electromagnetics,but those
in fundamental Newtonian mechanics. He had pointed out that the physicists were too
sloppy--mechanics was not founded on clean, clear definitions at all--Newton was much too
vague. The success of Einstein at showing precisely that in his first relativity theory thus
vindicated the Vienna Circle's admiration of their heroes: Russell, Frege, Mach, and Einstein.
Like our previous legends of the chemical and electrical industries, this story of the
logic-industry, the Vienna Circle, is both accurate and misleading. We have already quoted
Friedman and Coffa to the effect that the Neo-Kantians had some role, suggesting that their
scientific counterparts, Helmholtz, Maxwell, and Gibbs--and their mathematical counterparts,
Klein, Hilbert, and Poincaré--should be included. But that would create chaos, for the factions
were at each other's throats. Russell attacked Poincaré, Frege attacked Hilbert, Mach attacked
Einstein, and so on.
No wonder that the Göttingen crowd viewed the Viennese with suspicion, and, as
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anti-metaphysical positivism came to be identified as the only philosophy relevant to science,
stayed away from philosophy. Our later example, Max Born, was one of Hilbert's assistants at
Göttingen. We earlier mentioned his studies with philosophers Husserl and Heidegger. These
studies were unsuccessful, and Born joined the rush away from non-positivistic philosophies
(particularly "phenomenology"):

Now at the time I was still under the spell of Kant, and my mathematical
studies had so far strengthened the conviction that there are fundamental facts
(like the axioms of Euclidean Geometry) which are beyond empirical proof but
nevertheless evident, by a kind of introspection...
[Husserl] was the center of another rather exclusive circle...Near the
end of my study I attended a course of Husserl's lectures..., but found them so dull
that I gave them up. Then we tried Husserl's seminar, which was dealing at that
time with philosophical problems of mathematics...The subject of our discussions
was the epistemological validity of the mathematical axioms, and Husserl tried to
lead us to his phenomenological solutions. This consisted of the conviction that
by a proper kind of contemplation and reflection on the meaning of a notion you
can approach the `phenomenon' itself...Under the spell of Husserl's dialectics we
were for some time impressed by this idea. It is a kind of `a-priorism', not a
rational one, like that of Kant, but a mystical one. I can quite well grasp Kant's
idea that there are principles or categories of thinking which are the conditions of
actual knowledge and which you can discover by investigating the structure of this
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knowledge. That is what we theoretical physicists are really doing...If science
stands for anything it has certainly no use for Husserl's philosophy.
As a matter of fact, the phenomenologists in Göttingen were a little
group of conceited fellows who did not appeal to me. On of them, Heidecker
[Heidegger], tried for some time to convert me to their creed, but in vain. I
disliked not only his philosophy but also his personality. He became later
Husserl's successor in Freiburg and wrote a book which appears to me the summit
of senseless accumulation of words.11

Again the important scientists abandoned academic philosophy. Born's student Werner
Heisenberg gave up his undergraduate study of Plato for the more clear-cut world of physics.
The Vienna Circle rewrote their history (Russell, Frege, Mach were in, Helmholtz, Boltzmann,
and Poincaré were out), and adopted an "anti-Kantian rhetoric" (Friedman's term) that dominated
the first half of the twentieth century.

THE MICHELSON-HELMHOLTZ EXPERIMENT

Meanwhile, back in Berlin (1888), Helmholtz's career was to take another turn. He was
appointed to head the new state laboratory, the "Imperial Physico-Technical Institute" (PTR).
As early as the 1870-1871 war, industrialists had been complaining about the backwardness of
Prussia in precision mechanics. The VDI and other leaders pressured the parliaments for some
state investment in research. Significant among these lobbyists were the great industrial
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successes--Duisberg in chemicals, Siemens in electricity and steel, and Carl Zeiss in optical
instruments.12 Opposed to such unpromising uses of public funds were the "Mandarins" (Fritz
Ringer's term13), the university professors and the Prussian Academy of Sciences.14 As we have
seen, the new Kaiser was strongly behind the industrialists, and the Reichstag finally approved
the new national laboratory in 1887--provided the funds came from private industry. Siemens,
Duisberg, Zeiss, and others gathered the money and land (in Charlottenberg) and sought a
director. Who else but Helmholtz would do?
But, we have argued, Helmholtz was a mandarin of the first order. What possible agenda
could he set for the PTR to bring the new industrial wealth to bear on the modernization of
manufacturing? He outlined his plan for the scientific (as opposed to the mechanical) section of
the new laboratory:

1. The exact determination of the intensity of gravity, and the
comparison of this force at different parts of the earth's surface.
2. The absolute measurement of gravitation, or the determination of the
mean density of the earth.
[We might call these "Cavendish's agenda," as it was this subject of Maxwell’s
biography who had first measured “the density of the Earth, thus establishing the
legitimacy of Newton’s gravitational recipe.]
3. The continuation of the exact determination of the velocity of light
at terrestrial distances, with the object of reducing cosmic distances to terrestrial
measures of length."
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[For future purposes, we could call this the "Fizeau-Michelson agenda," as these
experiments were already underway by those savants.]
4. In theory of the magnetic actions of electrical currents a velocity,
which appears to be exactly equal to that of light, and which W. Weber
characterizes as `critical',...seems to play a fundamental part. Its identity with the
velocity of light appears to me to indicate an essential and intimate relation with
optical and electric processes. We seem hereby to acquire a clue to the mysterious
aspect of electromagnetic phenomena, which probably may lead us to their
deepest foundation.
[Call this the "Maxwell-Helmholtz agenda," well underway by 1888]
5. Determination of the electrical units of measurements
[The "Weber-Helmholtz agenda," ancient history.]
6. Measurement of pressure and density of gases and vapours at
different temperatures, and the measurement of the different amount of heat
consumed in these processes.15
[The "Maxwell-Boltzmann-Helmholtz agenda," again rather settled.]

One doubts that this is what the industrialists were so excited about. We have seen that plan
was already in place in the universities--in fact, most of it had been completed (Hertz's
experiment had just recently been done).
Helmholtz's PTR was to be just like Maxwell's Cavendish--an extension of the
model-building enterprise. David Cahan has recently studied the PTR for some clue to the
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peculiar mismatch between the "pure science" agenda of Helmholtz and the "practical science"
agenda of its financiers.16 His solution to the puzzle is in the person of Helmholtz’ son-in-law
Werner Siemens, the chief donor. Quoting a reviewer of Cahan's work, R.S. Turner:

Siemens insisted, and the dominating presence of Helmholtz ensured, that
pure research would take a commanding place in the mandate of the PTR. Much
of the early opposition to the institution resulted from fear that industrial and
technical interests, especially those of relatively `low tech' fields, such as
construction and mechanical engineering, would be ignored in a scientifically
oriented PTR. This issue continued as a leitmotif of the PTR's internal politics.17

While similar reliance on private capital prevailed in England, the Americans wouldn't put up
with such a diversion of investment funds. In their country, the government had been persuaded
by people like Rowland to foot some of the bill for "useful" research (via the Coast Survey, the
Weather Bureau, and similar agencies). In 1885, a few years before the PTR, the U.S. congress,
monitoring the public purse, became alarmed and opened an investigation into alleged "pure"
scientific infiltration of government research. Congressman Hilary Herbert (Dem.-Alabama) of
the "Allison Commission" quoted our phrenologist friend, Henry Buckle, on the government's
role in intellectual affairs:

They, who dispense the patronage, will, of course, receive the homage;
and if on the one hand government is always ready to reward literature, so on the
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other hand will literature be always ready to succumb to government.18

In Kevles' telling of this story, there was actually little "pure science" going on at government
expense, and many in science and Congress thought that was as it should be--so the hearings
were inconclusive.19 This another clue as to why the agenda of Edison was so much different
than that of Maxwell and Helmholtz.
In Imperial Germany, of course, the government (and the Kaiser) didn't investigate Helmholtz,
they decorated him. He was then in his sixties, but again the list of his published work while
head of the PTR (until his death in 1894) shows ambition.20 There were four or five papers on
his original subject, physiological optics--something he had put aside for years. There were two
papers "On Atmospheric Movements" following up on his mathematical "hydrodynamics."
Then there were some mathematically related papers on electrodynamics, employing the same
field analogies he had used in fluids and atmospheres.
The latter papers seemed to signal a re-entry into field theory just after his seventieth birthday.
There was, in sequence from 1892-1894:

"The Principle of Least Action in Electrodynamics"
"The Electromagnetic Theory of Color Dispersion"
"Conclusions from Maxwell's Theory as to the Movements of Pure Ether"
"How one may imagine the Movement of the Ether in Maxwell's Theory of
Electrodynamics to take place."
"Further Researches on the Completeness of the unknown Electrodynamic
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Forces"

The eye-catching piece of that agenda is the work on "moving ether," for it was taking place in
the aftermath of Hertz's experiment, about which Hertz and Helmholtz corresponded
considerably. More intriguingly, it was taking place in the aftermath of a peculiar series of
French and American experiments which set about to detect the movement of the ether--from
studies by Fizeau in 1851 to Michelson in 1888. This failed search for the aether too well-known
(and controversial) to justify details here, but Helmholtz' role should be told.
Back at Berlin in 1880 the Prussian-American Michelson, celebrated for his unusually precise
measurements of the speed of light in Annapolis, came to study with Helmholtz. They had
hatched up an idea to revive an old experiment by Armand-Hippolyte-Louis Fizeau in trying to
detect the effect of a fast-moving stream of water on the speed of light.21 Michelson's motive for
the experiment was evidently to display the virtuosity in experimental physics he had gained (and
for which he would win one of the early Nobel Prizes). It was a deviously tricky business to
measure the speed of light at all, let alone measure a change wrought by flowing water.
Helmholtz's motive, whetted by his experiments with Boltzmann in electrodynamics, was more
mathematical (as indicated by his subsequent papers on the matter). It seemed that Maxwell's
theory had some ambiguous features when applied to a model which was moving. This
stemmed, of course, from the origins of the theory--the problems Ampère, Weber, and Neumann
had confronted in ascribing the origin of magnetism to moving charges.
If a system of moving charges created "fields" in their neighborhood, what happened when the
neighborhood (say a puddle of water) itself "moved"? This problem had been around even
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before Maxwell's mathematics. Fizeau had long been interested in moving aether (embedded in
the water), as had been England's the Royal Astronomer, Sir George Airy (predictor of the
collapse of the Crystal Palace). The latter had filled one of his telescopes with water, to see if the
water, moving along with the speed of the earth in flight, would affect the light from the stars (it
didn't).22 The aether analogies had their own non-mathematical paradoxes, and Maxwell's
mathematical fields only exacerbated the matter.
Helmholtz, exploring the possibilities of a laboratory model that might clarify the application
of Maxwell's formulas to these extant questions, immediately set the young American on the
problem. For experiments of this delicacy there was too much traffic vibration in Berlin, so
Michelson set up his apparatus at the partially completed observatory in Potsdam.23 Dispensing
with the flowing water, Michelson set out to measure the effect of the flowing aether itself (made
"flowing" through his laboratory by the motion of the earth). He employed his now famous
arrangement of mirrors, the "Michelson interferometer," to detect a "shift" in the speed of light
when he turned his apparatus from pointing parallel to the earth's motion to pointing
perpendicular to it. The observations of resulting "fringes" indeed justified the move from
Berlin. Michelson wrote:

Here, the fringes under ordinary circumstances were sufficiently quiet to
measure, but so extraordinarily sensitive was the instrument that the stamping on
the pavement about 100 meters from the observatory, made the fringes disappear
entirely.24
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The experiment was a flop. There turned out to be no effect--no "displacement." Either the
apparatus didn't work, or the ether didn't move through the lab (proving, one might have thought,
that the earth didn't move through the aether after all). Michelson concluded:

The interpretation of these results is that there is no displacement of the
interference bands. The result of the hypothesis of a stationary ether [through
which the earth moves] is thus shown to be incorrect, and the necessary
conclusion follows that the hypothesis is erroneous.
This conclusion directly contradicts the explanation of the phenomenon
of aberration [of starlight] which has been hitherto generally accepted, and which
presupposes that the earth moves through the ether, the latter remaining at rest.25

This was in 1880 (published in 1881), and doubtless Helmholtz thought it a bit silly that a
failed demonstration should challenge the motion of the earth. In 1888, however, with
Helmholtz at the PTR and Michelson in Cleveland, his student did it again, performing the
famous "Michelson-Morley" Experiment.d This refined version of the experiment failed again.
--------------(d) Actually Michelson was in Chicago when the experiments were completed. His chemist
friend Morley carried on after Michelson had been chased from Cleveland by an embarrassing
scandal.
--------------And this time the failure needed explaining, for Michelson had injected his work into the fringes
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of the atom-wars, enlisting his Potsdam experiment on the side of those British electricians
building their atoms out of aether, notably Kelvin, Stokes, and, in memoriam, Maxwell and Airy.
Was this some kind of defection from the embattled Helmholtz-Boltzmann agenda?
Stokes, the expert in mathematical fluid flow, had collaborated with Kelvin on the vortex
atom, the aether whirlpool model of Maxwell's equations. He had picked up some of his ideas
from Helmholtz's mathematical models of atmospheric flow, and, in particular, a theorem that a
whirlpool (or smoke-ring) once created would not dissipate (in an ideal fluid). The
electromagnetic properties of this lumpy aether could also be borrowed from Helmholtz, for in
1870 he had constructed a version of Maxwell's electrodynamic theory that fit the equations to a
somewhat novel model. These equations proved amenable to describing "local" clusters of
electricity in an aether, like Kelvin's vortices or the later "electrons." Eventually, Helmholtz's and
Maxwell's "theories" collided, at the expense of the British whirlpool-atoms. But back in the
1880's Stokes' vortices were still the most promising physical analogy to link the occurrence of
"atomic structure" with the continuous fields of Maxwell and Helmholtz. But what had the
problem of the material atom have to do with the optical flop of Michelson?
Well, Stokes, in order to get his whirlpools to hang together, had to employ Maxwell's theory
of viscosity (from Maxwell's "other" theory, heat). This implied that any stuff (matter) caught in
the whirlpools would be "dragged" along. The French had used this idea all along to explain how
the water "dragged" the aether in Fizeau's experiment (which Michelson, we recall, was trying to
duplicate). Michelson could then argue, and did, that the ether trapped in the observatory in
Potsdam (or in Airy's telescope) was being dragged along with the earth, hence was stationary in
the lab--so the orientation of the experiment would have no effect. This neatly explains the
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"failure" of the fringe-shift experiments.
This state of affairs, and its extension in 1888, was not a paradox. It was a puzzle--a puzzle
concerning the consistency of Maxwell's equations as applied to questions of relative motion. It
was as well a puzzle of just how should the experimental demonstrations of Fizeau, Airy,
Michelson and others be interpreted in light of the theory. FitzGerald and Lorentz, who we met
earlier in other venues, had several suggestions--the "right formulas for the wrong reasons"
mentioned in regard to Einstein. Helmholtz had his, and such was the subject of those last few
papers.
How did it all turn out? Such a question may be appropriate for military history, where the
complex battles and politics eventually "come out" to a victory or a loss. But in the history of
ideas, somehow nothing ever seems to "come out"--the "ideas of Plato" are still very much
around, and the mathematical arguments of Helmholtz are still available. However, materialist
and positivist historians do not quite recognize ideas as having histories, hence they would
require an outcome for this story: Einstein, in 1905, mathematically "proved" that the ether
hypothesis was unnecessary to account for the Maxwell-FitzGerald-Lorentz formulas. In the
laboratory, Michelson had "proved" that the ether had no effect on physical apparatus either.
Hence the ether did not exist at all. It was a fiction, a mistake. Like the other wrong turns of
immature science--phlogiston, caloric, and other "subtle spirits" (Newton's phrase)--the
Luminiferous Ether goes into the museum of lost causes, and modern physics has been liberated
from it (and, incidentally, the Psychic and Theosophical British Atomists). Or maybe not.
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FROM HERTZ'S WAVES TO J.J.'S ELECTRONS

In hindsight it almost looks like Maxwell and Helmholtz were failures. Michelson's missing
aether wind led Lorentz and J.J. to replace aether vortices by discrete atoms studded with
"electrons," and Einstein to employ weird mathematical to "save" Maxwell's equations. But this
was "progress,"and these "revolutionary" changes were performed by mixed mathematicians, not
experimental materialists. Our philosopher-physicists were "merely" trying to clarify in models
some detailed distinctions between various versions of systems of electromagnetic analogies.
One of the older generation, Hertz, tried to explain such distinctions--between method and model
and between equation and theory:

...what is it that we call the Faraday Maxwell model? Maxwell has left us
as the result of his mature thought a great treatise on Electricity and Magnetism, it
might therefore be said that Maxwell's theory is the one which is propounded in
that work. But such an answer will scarcely be regarded as satisfactory...Many a
man has thrown himself with zeal into the study of Maxwell's work, and, even
when he has not stumbled upon unwonted mathematical difficulties, has
nevertheless been compelled to abandon the hope of forming for himself an
altogether consistent conception of Maxwell's work. I have fared no better
myself...I have not always felt quite certain of having grasped the physical
significance of his statements. Hence it was not possible for me to be guided in
my experiments by Maxwell's book. I have rather been guided by Helmholtz's
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work...But unfortunately, in the special limiting case of Helmholtz's theory which
leads to Maxwell's equations, the physical basis of Helmholtz's theory
disappears...I therefore [modified parts of Maxwell's theory]...Thus the [three
versions of theory: ] the representation of the theory in Maxwell's own work, its
representation as a limiting case of Helmholtz's theory, and its representation in
the present dissertation--however different in form--have substantially the same
inner significance...To the question `what is Maxwell's theory?' I know of no
shorter or more definite answer than the following:--Maxwell's theory is
Maxwell's system of equations...26

But did this mean that Hertz too was a "neo-Kantian"--that despite his celebrated
experimental "discovery" of radio he held to a priori truths speakable only in analogies of
equations to theories? Indeed Hertz, a true student of Helmholtz, thought so.
Hertz' connection to Helmholtz' philosophy is far from coincidental. Joseph Mulligan makes
that emphatically clear:

After five years of close association with Helmholtz, Hertz left Berlin for
Kiel in 1883, but remained in close contact with his mentor throughout the
remaining 10 years of his life. Helmholtz had a physicist son of his own, Robert,
who died in 1889 at the beginning of what promised to be a productive research
career. Helmholtz seems to have transferred some of his feelings and hopes from
his son to Hertz. It was therefore a crushing blow for Helmholtz to lose this
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"second son" so prematurely in 1894.27

Like Helmholtz, Hertz sometimes seemed publicly equivocal on the subject of literal
interpretations of "models," "analogies," and "heuristics," and he often squeezed in some solace
for the materialists. Consider some excerpts from his famous text, The Principles of Mechanics:

If we try to understand the motions of bodies around us, and to refer them
to simple and clear rules, paying attention only to what can be directly observed,
our attempt will in general fail...We become convinced that the manifold of the
actual universe must be greater than the manifold of the universe which is directly
revealed to us by our senses...[We] have to presuppose, behind the things which
we see, other, invisible things--to imagine confederates concealed beyond the
limits of our senses. These deep-lying influences [have]...two representations;
[one in which], in order to represent them in our image, we created the ideas of
force and energy...[In the other representation] we may admit there is a hidden
something at work, and yet deny that this something belongs to a special category.
We are free to assume that this hidden something is nothing else than motion and
mass again--motion and mass which differs from the visible ones not in
themselves but in relation to us and to our usual means of perception.28

The last part of that oft-quoted passage gave rise to a whole industry of commentators who
thought Hertz was abandoning idealism for materialism. After all, "hidden" masses in motions
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underlying visible phenomena were just what the materialists (especially the English
Maxwellians) were advocating. Yet in the tradition of Kant (and Vaihinger, of whom Hertz
seems to have known little), Hertz refers to these hidden masses as representations, images
alternative to other "ideas" that would do the job.
Old Helmholtz too was making equivocal philosophical statements, interpretable as
anti-idealist (as we noted earlier). He seemed especially materialistic in his preface to Hertz's
book itself, writing (just after Hertz' death and before his own in 1894):

There can no longer be any doubt that light-waves consist of electric vibrations in
the all-pervading ether... [Hertz' radio-frequency] electric waves only lack the
power of affecting the eye as do also the dark heat-rays, whose frequency of
oscillation is not high enough...
Here we have two great natural agencies--on the one hand light...and
on the other hand electricity...: to have furnished a complete demonstration that
these two are most closely connected together is to have achieved a great feat...29

Yet in his final remarks of the preface, Helmholtz left possibly his last thoughts on materialism:

English physicists--e.g. Lord Kelvin in his theory of vortex atoms and
Maxwell in his hypothesis of systems of cells with rotating contents...--have
evidently derived a fuller satisfaction from such explanations than from the simple
representation of physical facts and laws in the most general form as given in
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systems of differential equations. For my own part I must admit that I have
adhered to the latter mode of representation and have felt safest in so doing.30

Helmholtz went on to remark that an analogous phenomenon, gravity, seems also to mimic
"action-at-a-distance" but "still remains an unsolved puzzle" (a puzzle we have seen frustrating
both Faraday and Maxwell).
This sounds even less like a theory of "representations," "images," and "models" than Hertz's
arguments. And what is more odd, this was written at a time when Helmholtz's electromagnetic
theory had taken a turn toward the abstract--through Hamilton's advowedly Neo-Kantian (in fact,
neo-Idealist) mathematical methods. This provides an overt metaphysical link between
Helmholtz and Hertz, supported by Koenigsberger's note that Helmholtz's new fascination with
Hamilton's principle of least action "gave Hertz the idea and starting point for his `Principles of
Mechanics'..."31 e
--------------(e) Boltzmann too recognized a fellow theorist, for he is reported to have urged that the Prussian
Reichstag vote a "national gift" to Hertz' heirs upon his death in 1894.32 Helmholtz himself is
said to have vetoed the suggestion as "impractical", but clearly was not doing so for ideological
reasons.
--------------Hertz did make remarks on the metaphysical foundations of the principles of mechanics. He
gave much comfort to the opponents of “metaphysics,” particularly those, like Maxwell, who saw
in Hamilton’s methods some clue to the metaphorical nature of reality:
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In order that an image of certain external things may be in our sense be
permissible not only must its characteristics be consistent amongst themselves but
they must not contradict the characteristics of other images already established in
our knowledge On the strength of this it may be said to be inconceivable that
Hamilton's principle...should really play the part of a fundamental law of
mechanics...For the first thing that is to be expected of a fundamental law is
simplicity and plainness whereas Hamilton's principle...[is] exceedingly
complicated...Not only does it make the present motion dependent upon
consequences...in the future; but what is much worse it attributes to nature
intentions which are void of meaning...The usual answer which physics nowadays
keeps ready for such attacks is that these considerations are based upon
metaphysical assumptions; that physics has renounced these and no longer
recognises it as its duty to meet the demands of metaphysics...If we had to decide
upon such a matter we should not think it unfair to place ourselves on the side of
the attack than of the defence. A doubt which makes an impression on our mind
cannot be removed by calling it metaphysical...Hence our requirement of
simplicity does not apply to nature but to the images thereof we fashion.33

It took several readings of this paragraph by such as Helmholtz to realize that Hertz is siding
with, not criticizing, the Maxwell-metaphor agenda. Hamilton has a faulty (un-simple) principle,
not a faulty method. The “images” (analogies) are not in nature
Later, in the twentieth century, the status of Hertz's philosophical leanings became a more
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sinister question. Hertz's dual image as a hero to materialists and experimenters and as a hero to
idealists and theorists was taken to extreme degrees by the racist "Aryan Physicists" of the Hitler
era. Philip Lenard, a former student of Hertz's at Bonn, argued that Hertz's magnificent early
experiments in radio reflected a heritage from his Aryan mother, while his later "unfortunate"
tendency to theory was cause by having had a Jewish father.34 The theorist Einstein, of course,
came in for considerably more abuse, while Helmholtz's theorizing was excised from Lenard's
history. This was a remarkable collapse in civilized physics, as it was Lenard himself who had
edited Hertz’ Mechanics, and had treasured an 1894 note from Helmholtz declaring:

I can only say that I am just beginning to see what his [Hertz'] aim is, and
this merely since I received the last set of proof-sheets a few days ago. Till then I
had not the slightest inkling of what he was driving at.35

Ideology notwithstanding, Helmholtz had obviously turned from an experimental
physiologist to a theoretical physicist. Jed Buchwald has written in detail about the consequences
of that turn, emphasizing that the differences between Maxwell's and Helmholtz's
electromagnetic theories were formally more serious than Hertz recognized.36 The issue was
whether or not the British "atom builders" (constructing atoms out of aether) could remain
consistent with Maxwell's theory. It seemed that Joseph Larmor articulated an incompatibility,
and Buchwald demonstrated how Helmholtz' and Hertz' use of Hamilton's Principle sealed the
divorce of discrete particles from continuous fields and aethers. Larmor, in fact, was one of the
first to "abandon" Maxwell's theory (though not his equations) in favor of "electrified atoms
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(electrons)," and "paved the way" for J.J.'s "demonstration" of the numerical ratio of
electrification to matter ("charge to mass") required to account for streams of matter in a Crookes
tube. Positivists like to call this calculation the "discovery of the electron."
J.J.'s "discovery" of the electron, Becquerel's "discovery" of radiation and Röntgen's
"discovery" of x-rays, all in the late 1890's, have been heralded as the "birth" of the new physics
(and the beginning of the end of aether). Moreover, their work been sometimes portrayed as
major victories for experimental over theoretical investigations. When Alfred Nobel left his
money for a prize in "useful" physics, the first ten were given for "discoveries" in the new world
of atoms and sub-atoms. Röntgen got the first in 1901, Becquerel the fourth in 1903, J.J. the
ninth in 1906. Yet the crucial presence of theorists in this ten is remarkable. For instance, J.J.
was principally an electromagnetic theorist (Arthur Schuster, a student of Helmholtz, recalls
teaching Maxwell-Helmholtz theory to J.J. in 1875-187637). And there were other mixed
mathematicians in the list: Lorentz (who shared the prize with an experimenter, Pieter Zeeman),
and Rayleigh (though his fame was for the "discovery" of Argon, not his ripple-mathematics).
Anti-theorists were there too: Lenard (for work in a Crooke's' tube), Pierre and Marie Curie (she
had a second Ph.D. in mathematics, but was always portrayed as a lab drudge), and that famous
doubter of both Helmholtz and Einstein, Michelson.
Whether theoretical or experimental demonstration, nearly all of this celebrated work
revolved around the Maxwell-Helmholtz-Boltzmann agenda, which, as you recall, made no
specific commitment to the "real" nature of its subject (e.g. atoms or aether). That seminal role
for mathematical electrodynamics has already been described in the cases of Rayleigh, J.J.,
Lorentz, Lenard, and Michelson. One could make a case for the others. For instance, Becquerel's
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radioactivity arose from a long family tradition of investigation of fluoresecent minerals.
Perhaps one of these laureates who best represents the interaction of many of our analogies is the
"discoverer of x-rays, another term in Maxwell's equations," Wilhelm Röntgen.
Röntgen was an E.T.H. Ph.D., so it was natural to consider him a member of the Hochschule
brand of experimenters. His fame rests, however, on two demonstrations. The first was a direct
demonstration of a Maxwell "prediction" involving a magnetic effect in matter moved between
electrically charged plates.38 The second was the "accidental" discovery of x-rays in 1895. This,
in legend, came about because a barium platino-cyanide screen that "accidentally" happened to
be near his Crookes tube unexpectedly glowed, tipping off the presence of invisible light.
Those suspecting that Röntgen might have been less surprised than legend has it should
wonder about that accident--just what was he doing with a Crooke's' tube anyway, and for what
reason did he own such an exotic device as a smear of barium, platinum, and cyanide? The
answer is that he was studying light--following his earlier successes at demonstrating the
analogies between Maxwell's and Helmholtz's equations and his lab models. Specifically,
Crookes tubes (recall that they are just glass tubes with low pressure gas and electrodes) gave off
light, somewhat as indeed a modern "neon" light does. It turned out that there were unusual dark
places in the tubes They had been originally noted in the mid 19th century by Faraday and friends,
and called “Groves’ bands. They became known again as "Crookes' dark spaces." These bright
and dark bands piqued the curiosity of all of our late-century investigators. Recall that Crookes
himself thought the glowing light was a "fourth state of matter". Since there was no
corresponding formula for the dark spaces or tube-glow in Maxwell's "theory," Crookes' was not
counted as a Maxwellian, but as an experimental "discoverer."
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The dark spaces in the tubes seemed to emit radiation, dubbed "Kathode Rays,"

f

that caused

--------------(f) Like much of modern terminology, the term Kathode was coined by Whewell, at the request
of Faraday. Whewell sought "natural" terms from the Greek that would actually describe the
phenomena. There is a wonderful legend that Kathode was derived from "Hode"--the "way" and
"Kata"--"down", thus indicating the "lower" end of Faraday's apparatus. Naturally the other end
would be the "ana"-"hode," or "anode," the "upper way," or top. Goethe, naturally, preferred
"negative" and "positive." Alas the legend falls, for, while Faraday was trying terms like eisode,
exode, zetode, east-ode, and west-ode, Whewell responded with anode and cathode, noting: "I
may mention that anodos and cathodos are genuine Greek words, and not coined for the
purpose."39
--------------fluorescence in the glass walls and in various other substances familiar to the mineralogist,
particularly barium-platino-cyanide. Thus we understand why Röntgen (or for that matter,
Becquerel, the son of a mineralogist and fluorescence researcher) would be playing with these
materials. So chasing Röntgen's concern with a Crookes tube, we stumble on a whole
"paradigm" of such investigations, all surrounding the lights from those tubes. Indeed, Lenard's
Nobel Prize was for getting the Kathode Rays to leak outside the tube and light up an external
screen. J.J.'s prize was to deflect these Kathode rays to show that they were "material"--that they
had a mass and electrical charge, hence were the "electrons" that Larmor, Lorentz, and the other
theorists sought as alternatives to aether-blobs.g
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(g) Lorentz wasn't altogether convinced about this "material." In 1909 he lectured: "Of late the
question has been much discussed as to whether the idea that there is no material but only
electromagnetic mass...may not be extended to positive electrons and to matter in general...This
remains I believe an open question, about which we shall do well to speak with some reserve."40
--------------But what then did Röntgen expect to find from the lights and darks of his Crookes tube?
Unlike the English post-Maxwellian investigators, Röntgen learned his electromagnetic theory in
German, in the Hertz-Helmholtz formulation, and in that argument there was still some hope that
the field oscillation theory of light had a place for Kathode rays themselves. Helmholtz and
Hertz had suggested as much. In a letter (1893) from Helmholtz to Hertz, the outlines for
Röntgen's investigation are suggested:

I have read your investigation on the Glow Discharge [in Crookes' tubes] with the
greatest interest, and cannot refrain from writing to say Bravo!...I have been
considering for some time whether the cathode [Kathode] rays may not be a mode
of propagation of a sudden impact upon the Maxwellian electromagnetic ether.
...Deviation of the rays through magnetization of the medium would accordingly
also be possible [J.J.'s experiment]; longitudinal waves could be more easily
conceived, and might exist if the constant k in my electromagnetic researches
were not zero. But in that case, transversal waves could also be produced...41

That looks a little ominous, perhaps more to the mathematician than to the layperson. The
466

issue here is that in the normal Maxwell-Helmholtz models of light, the waves are "transverse"
("transversal" in Koenigsberger's translation). That is, the varying fields that make up the light
are directed perpendicular to the direction of motion of the light. One allegedly could prove from

footnote g? On monopole

Maxwell's equations that there would be no component of "field" directed "longitudinally" (in
the direction of motion). All of this had been confirmed in the models by experiments with
"polarization," for instance in Röntgen's earlier experiments. Helmholtz, however, was here
suggesting a modification (or perhaps a slightly altered model) of the theory where longitudinal
"vibrations" would be allowed, and perhaps such a new "term in his equations" could be
represented in the lab by a new kind of light--maybe even in the lights ("glow discharge") in
Crookes' tubes.
Hertz was a little skeptical. He replied:

I had, as a matter of fact, considered the ideas you express, but was
inclined to think that the cathode rays are produced by the longitudinal waves,
which correspond to the transverse vibrations of light...The question no doubt is
whether these simple considerations will hold good for the more exact
applications of the theory. I have not attempted this, because I had imagined,
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perhaps erroneously, that the theory was not yet sufficiently perfect.
The following seems to also point to a correspondence between the two
phenomena [Kathode rays and light]. The more the tube is exhausted, the less
does the magnet act upon the rays, and the more rigid they become, as Dr.
Goldstein expresses it. This may show [although there is another possible
interpretation] that the magnet can only act indirectly upon the cathode rays, as it
does upon light...
Generally speaking, the cathode rays excite the same fluorescence in
solid bodies as does light. But I do not therefore hold it necessary to assume that
they are directly converted into optical rays...42

Longitudinal waves, Kathode rays, fluorescence, Crookes' tubes--it all seems a bit bewildering
(and Helmholtz and Hertz weren't altogether clear themselves on the subjects), but it should be
reasonably clear that there was an agenda here. The theory, or rather in Hertz's case a model of a
part of the theory that hadn't been "perfected" yet, showed some analogies to experimental
findings. Röntgen went after these experiments, to "perfect" the models. He found what he
thought were longitudinal oscillations all right, hanging around the place where the Kathode rays
struck a plate (the "anode"). What surprised him was not in finding these predicted oscillations,
but that he found them outside the tube. There was some precedent for these results. Hertz had
set Lenard to work on such a project, and he indeed got the Kathode rays out of the tube (through
a "Lenard window"), hence his prize. But Röntgen (unaware of Lenard's work) got something
else streaming out of the tube--he called them "x-rays" (the Germans now call them "Röntgen
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rays"), and began to investigate just how "penetrating" these oscillations were. He found that
they could go through glass (to light up his fluorescent screen), and they could also go through
his hand to expose a photographic plate. This also was no "accident." The use of photographic
plates along with fluorescent screens was familiar to mineralogists, and a reasonable experiment
for Röntgen to try. In fact in France, Henri Becquerel was exploring just that--mineral
fluorescence in Uranium ores and its detection by photographic plates. He found, as the story
goes, that the fluorescence that exposed his plates was not caused in the mineral by sunlight (or
other kinds of light in the lab), but came "from within" the material itself--hence "radioactivity"
and another prize. Ironically, The New Zealander Ernst Rutherford (later J.J.'s successor at the
Cavendish), began his famous Canadian researches looking for a Kathode ray--radioactivity
connection (after abandoning early research in radio detectors). Yet more Nobel prizes for the
light and matter demonstrators. Throw in heat and we get Max Planck and the line of physics
that finally precipitated the "quantum revolution." The appearance here is that of theory-driven
investigations, not "discovery" research but "demonstration" experiments. Even the "accidents"
are processed through terms proscribed by the theories that generated them. But to the
anti-intellectuals the theoretical base of this work was quickly forgotten. For one thing, the
phenomena themselves were appealing beyond their mathematical significance. Röntgen's hand
photos were sent all over the world, and caused instant sensation wherever they were seen. The
public imagined all sorts of uses for the new discovery--for instance a scheme to transmit
knowledge by x-raying the pages of textbooks directly onto the brain. Kevles notes that a New
Jersey assemblyman proposed a bill prohibiting the use of x-rays in opera glasses.43 Similar
examples of the public fascination of the "uses" of x-rays, radioactivity, and electronics are now
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the staple of stories of the public consequence of "pure" research.
The story of Röntgen’s x-rays ilustrate the uniqueness of the mathematical analogies invented
by Maxwell. Few turn-of-the century physicists had enough expertise to fully utilise Maxwell’s
model and, like Röntgen, employed “optico-centric” visual pictures of a vibratin aether to
describe electromagnetic wave-like phenomenae. Acording to Graham Farmelo

Some 20 years would pass [after the 1895 discovery ]before scientists
determined the true nature of x-rays...
Within a few months of Röntgen’s discovery, there emerged several theories
about te nature -rays. Wave theories wereespecially popular. In one, the rays
were described as impulses (short bursts) of electromagnetic energy energy,
emitted when when cathode rays struck matter and stopped [called
Bremsstrahlung (“braking radiation”) in modern nuclear physics texts]. In the
other, x-rays were envisioned simply as another type ov electromagnetic wave,
like visible light but with a much shorter wavelength.. It as not until 1912 that
important evidence for the latter theory emerged from an experiment done in
Munich [by walter Friedrich and Paul Knipping]....
Contrary to popular belief, Friedrich and Knipping’s result did not deal a
mortal blow to the rival theory. A few months after the results were announced,
Hendrik A. Lorentz of the University of Leiden showed, using a virtuoso
theoretical argument [employing the full force of Maxwell’s equations], that they
could also be explained by the impulse theory, and the consensus in favor of the
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wave theory emerged only gradually.

43a

The theoretical crisis (the ambiguity in application of Maxwell's equations) in which these
"discoveries" took place was, of course, invisible to the public that had fallen in love with
"science." But the philosophical crisis of the same time, the battles of the idealists and realists,
was a bit more accessible to the amateur, as they did not require the dreaded "calculus" to follow.
The materialists and positivists used such publicity to demand that the schools be reformed to
include the "science" that had bred such progress. Or rather, they used their celebrity to attach the
new discoveries to their side of a battle (the Schulkrieg) that had been going on for a decade.
Helmholtz, of course, was in the middle of that battle too.

SCHOOL-WARS

The breakup of the Maxwell-Helmholtz agenda in the 1890's seems now a reflection of wider
cultural turmoil. The atom-wars, the scientific battle-front of materialists and the idealists, did
not end--they got worse. The decision to classify Kathode rays as material flow (electrons) and
x-rays (produced in the same experiments) as Maxwell-Helmholtz oscillations reflected yet
another round of the struggle between the moderns and the ancients--progress vs. tradition. By
this time Helmholtz's idealist-rooted continuum methods were the tradition, and Larmor's grainy
electric molecules (acting on each other "at-a-distance") were avant garde. Combatants forgot
that earlier versions of this same issue were fought at mid-century, or at the end of the eighteenth
century (or, for that matter, in Galileo's day, as Redondi has recently pointed out44). So it was
that the new generation had to re-invent their fundamental principles to justify the "invention" of
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fundamental phenomena, like radio, x-rays, electrons, etc. The analogies were passed on to the
new generation, while their motives (in most cases) were not-- J.J.'s electrons did not become
clumps of electrified aether, and Röntgen's x-rays did not become longitudinal oscillations. But,
if Brentano and Meinong (and their "successor" Edmund Husserl) were to be believed,
constructed artifacts carry with them the intentions of their authors (we earlier quoted Heisenberg
to this effect). Thus the consequence of this "fall of the Kantian Empire" was to bequeath to the
twentieth century artifacts that didn't make sense (without the lost equipment for
sense-making)--and still don't. Lately, the struggle to reconcile matter and fields has been
spectacular in both its expanding progress and expanding internal contradiction. How was it that
the new century forgot why the founders had made these inventions? One part of the answer is in
the disaster of the school-wars--decisions to keep the terms of the argument away from the youth
who would inherit the dilemmas.
Not only universities, but public schools became ideological battle-grounds for the promotion
or suppression of new agendas--civil, scientific, philosophical, and economic. By the 1880's,
academic squabbles had become public spectacles all over Europe and North America. In
England, for instance, Cambridge was undergoing a "revolution of the dons" (Rothblatt's term45),
trying, among other things, to force science and math tutors onto the faculty. This was only a
small part of the revolution. On another front, J.J. recounted the battle to admit women to
research:

A subject which excited even more interest [than the combining of teaching and
research], and which the undergraduates seized upon as an opportunity for indulging in very
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elaborate `rags', was the proposal to admit [women] students from Newnham and Girton to
University Examinations, that they should have the right to sit for the various Honours
Examinations, and the place they took in the examination should be published...This would not,
however, entitle them to a degree...
There was a long and very animated discussion on the proposal in the Senate
house...The undergraduates took it up with great gusto: they paraded the streets, carrying banners
inscribed with various sentiments, all, or nearly all, against the proposal...The proposal was
carried by 398 to 366...The undergraduates thoroughly enjoyed the fight: they could not vote, but
everything they did to defeat the proposal they did, and celebrated the result with a stupendous
`rag.' There is still (1936) in the windows of a well-known shop in the Market Place a
photograph inscribed `the historic rag of 1897.' 46

In America, there were yet other fronts; other battles. A most influential anti-metaphysical
attack on the "mechanisms" of the materialists was mounted by a lawyer (and later Ambassador
to Italy), Johann Stallo, in The Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics in 1882. Echoing
Mach, Stallo took aim at the atomic ideas of heat (insofar as they were not derived from
experience, but from pure mathematics):

A scientific hypothesis may be defined...as a provisional or tentative
explanation of physical phenomena. But what is an explanation in the true
scientific sense?...Science is knowledge, and all knowledge, in the language of Sir
William Hamilton [the Scot] is a `unification of the multiple'...Similarly Jevons:
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...`Every act of explanation consists in detecting and pointing out resemblance
between facts...'
...all hypotheses are futile which merely substitute an assumption for a
fact...Some of the uses made of the atomic hypothesis, both in physics and
chemistry,...afford conspicuous examples of this class of bootless assumptions;
and similar instances abound among mathematical formulae that are not
infrequently paraded as physical theories...
This finds illustration again in the undulatory theory of light. The
multitude of fictitious assumptions embodied by this hypothesis...can hardly be
looked on otherwise than as a standing impeachment of its validity...
...the kinetic hypothesis [is also]...the very reverse of a scientific procedure...It
is utterly vain, or rather, inasmuch as it complicates the phenomenon which it
professes to explicate, it is worse than vain--a complete inversion of the order of
intelligence, a resolution of identity into difference, a dispersion of the One into
the Many, an unraveling of the Simple into the Complex, an interpretation of the
Known in terms of the Unknown, an elucidation of the Evident by the Mysterious,
a reduction of an ostensible and real fact to a baseless and shadowy phantom...
It may seem strange that so many of the leaders of scientific research,
who have been trained in the severe schools of exact thought and rigorous
analysis, should have wasted their efforts upon a theory so manifestly repugnant to
all scientific sobriety...Faith in spooks (with due respect be it said for Maxwell's
theoretical dynamical `demons' and for the population of the `Unseen Universe') is
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unwisdom in physics no less than in pneumatology.47

This invocation of Maxwell's teacher, Hamilton, to attack the Maxwell-Boltzmann method
was the kind of attack that another school-warrior, James McCosh of Princeton, saw as a crime
of the "progressives" (positivists). In his Scottish philosophy, he saw that Maxwell's methods
were not only Kantian (Hamiltonian) blessed, but academically urgent. Kevles mentions
McCosh's "conservative" response to such polemics as Stallo's:

But as an enlightened conservative, McCosh believed firmly in the college
as a source of public leadership...McCosh issued no paeans to laboratory work,
and he was no great enthusiast of practical scientific training. Whatever the
caveats, he did favor a limited elective system and a school of science, which
would include a school of engineering [and the Crookes pump that Edison
needed]. Of course, scientific students at Princeton would have to study Latin. In
McCosh's defense of the requirement, `we seek to make [them]...educated
gentlemen, not mere scientists.'48

Stallo was no stranger to education or the history of philosophy. He was Gymnasium trained
in Germany, and taught languages in Cincinnati before gaining a post in physics, chemistry, and
mathematics at Fordham University in New York in the 1840's. His first book, a commercial
failure, was a detailed defense of Naturphilosophie. The failure of the book in 1848 led him to
quit teaching, to renounce Hegel and Schelling, and to "convert" to the progressive critical
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philosophy of the Machists--rooting out the "Spirits" of Hegel in the "spooks" of Maxwell. As a
language teacher, Stallo believed, as did McCosh, that the mentality of good or bad thinking was
embedded in the language in which one thought. This accounts for the fact that the principle
issue in the school wars was the legitimacy of collegiate and Gymnasium required courses in
Latin and Greek. Roughly the "conservative" supported the classics, and were accused of
harboring Romantic, Hegelian notions. The "progressives" advocated Mathematics (as a
"language"), and were suspected of anti-metaphysical sympathies.
Other Americans and other colleges were in the fray, and new colleges arose to represent new
positions--notably the Rockefeller-endowed University of Chicago. Rockefeller was persuaded
to divert his money to the defense of his Baptist principles he feared imperiled by the
school-wars. Since one of his first warriors was physicist A. A. Michelson, and one of his 1893
inaugural guests was Helmholtz, we can see that the symbols of the school-wars became a
confusion of intentions in artifacts.
Back in Germany, the academic turmoil was muddied by the rise of "psycho-physics," a
doctrine basing psychology on physiological research (like Helmholtz's) rather than classical
philosophy (Like Meinong's). The progressives pressed for academic license, the Idealists and
neo-Kantians fought back. As late as 1912, when Hermann Cohen retired from Marburg, the
proposal to appoint a psycho-physicist, rather than Cassirer, to his place drew opposition
petitions uniting such usually battling philosophers as Natorp of Vienna Circle fame and Husserl
of phenomenological persuasion.49 A revolution in the name of Helmholtz was being opposed by
his most sympathetic colleagues.
While he was alive, Helmholtz himself was, of course, in the middle of such academic
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struggles as Rector at Heidelberg, Professor at Berlin, and head of the "industrial" P.T.R. The
younger, more progressive troops were from the Technische Hochschulen, and their specific
reform aim was to promote school requirements in practical scientific and mathematical studies
to parity with traditional, Romantic classical studies, particularly Greek and Latin. Ernst Mach
of Vienna, then a legislator, was a most prominent advocate of reform, and had at his disposal
German and Austrian pamphleteers agitating for major changes in schooling. As we have seen,
Kaiser Wilhelm himself was a supporter of the new pragmatism (that was why Helmholtz got the
P.T.R. job). So were Helmholtz's friends (like Siemens) and his family (son Richard, of course,
and brother Otto, the metallurgist). Despite his rather conservative philosophy, Helmholtz's brand
of public progressivism aligned him with the Kaiser and the new winds of change. This
propelled him directly to the front lines of the new Schulkrieg.
In 1888, the Kaiser appointed Helmholtz to a Commission on higher education, convened by
the most influential school administrator of the period (and perhaps history), Friedrich Althoff.
When Koenigsberger, Helmholtz's later biographer, approached him on behalf of the
"conservatives" to sign a petition in defense of the Gymnasium (the classical status quo).
Helmholtz wrote:

I do not propose to sign the memorial. In the first place I do not approve
of these public manifestoes by private individuals...and in the second place I hold
that our Gymnasia have been conducted on false lines, even if I do not want to see
Greek struck out of our first-class schools.50
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Helmholtz's Rectorial Address at Heidelberg contained an elaboration of his (and later the
Commission's) opinions on this matter:

The education of civilized nations has till now centered on the study of
languages. Language is a great instrument, the possession of which essentially
distinguishes man from the lower animals...
Historically, the culture of the modern nations of Europe is especially
connected with the study of classical literature, and thereby immediately with
linguistics...Logic and grammar...have thus hitherto formed the natural
corner-stones of intellectual culture.
Granted, however, that language is the means of transmitting and
preserving the truth when it is once known, we must not forget that its study is no
guide to the discovery of new truths...
All these studies, accordingly, fail to lead us to the true source of
knowledge, nor do they bring us face to face with the reality which we week to
know. They even contain an undeniable danger, inasmuch as that knowledge is
transmitted by preference to the individual, of the origin of which he has no right
conception...
Thus...we must...insist that this exclusively literary and logical method
of education fails in one essential point. This is the methodological training of the
faculties, by which we subject the unorganized material, governed apparently
more by chance than by reason, which we encounter in the real world, to the
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organizing concept, after which it is capable of linguistic expression...
I only refer to these facts in this connexion in order to point out in what
sense the natural sciences have become a new and essential element in human
civilization...so that the complete education of the individual, as of the nation, is
no longer possible without a combination of the former literary and logical
tendencies with those of modern science.
The majority of educated people at the present time were instructed on
the old lines, or at most with a little mathematics. It is men of this school who are
directing our State, educating our children, maintaining the standard of morality,
publishing the wisdom and knowledge of our forefathers. It is they who must
organize the changes in the mode of education of the rising generation...51

Thus, as noted, Helmholtz's position (and that of Mach) was for parity of science and
mathematics with languages. The more extreme proposals to eliminate Greek and Latin were
both ideologically and politically too radical for our elder statesman. The applicable political
significance in question concerned the training of Germany's future leaders. We recall that in the
old Humboldt system, the Gymnasium certificate (Arbitur) was required for both university and
civil service, and the progressives wanted this "mandarinism" halted. One proposed reform was
to enfranchise the Realschule at the secondary level and Technische Hochschule at the college
level. In particular, Althoff's commission wanted more Realschule graduates in the government,
and more Hochschule graduates teaching in Gymnasia. For this to happen, Greek and Latin
requirements had to go. Thus Mach and Helmholtz's program of substituting mathematics and
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science added overwhelming academic support to the reform movement, despite considerable
counter-petitioning from the other faculties.
One particular progressive educator concerns us here--an Aldolph Sickenberger of Bavaria.
His significance to us is that he became young Albert Einstein's mathematics teacher, and may
represent the connecting link that transferred the mixed mathematics agenda to the next and last
generation of physicists. Or he may not, for Einstein claimed that his Gymnasium education in
Munich was a disaster of Prussian authoritarianism and backward teaching (he flunked out or
dropped out of the Gymnasium at fifteen). Historian Lewis Peyenson has studied Einstein's
education, and it is through his work52 that we will try to view the connections, missed or made,
to the Maxwell-Helmholtz agenda.
It happened that Sickenberger was a leader of the reformers, the head of a Verein known as
the Realschule Movement. He was also tutor to the Wittelsbachs, the Bavarian Royal family.
That could not have been an easy job, since the King of Bavaria (they still retained royal titles
after the Empire was formed) was mad King Ludwig II, of fairy-castle and Wagner-worship
fame--followed by his equally mad brother Otto after a mysterious suicide in 1886. Neither of
these unfortunate monarchs had children, but there must have been a family Crown Prince
somewhere, for Peyenson reports his name (Ruprecht) and his tutor, Sickenberger. One presumes
the royal scholar Ruprecht was better known by the name of "Luitpold," for this name is still
remembered in Munich. The tutor became widely known to the reformists for both his
Realschule movement and his textbooks in mathematics in the new "user-friendly" style, and he
was deemed by the Commission to be a model of the kind of teacher they wanted in the state
schools. The Bavarian minister of education, not Althoff, had control over the system in Munich,
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but the influence of the mighty Prussian seemed evident in the appointment of Sickenberger as
rector of a revised secondary school, the Luitpold-Kreis Realschule in 1891. Munich, as the
home of the most influential Technische Hochschule, was an ideal place for a progressive
"experimental" school.
But reform took time, and Sickenberger was first moved to the "classical" school, the Luitpold
Gymnasium. It was there, from 1888-1891 that Einstein, son of a Munich electrical engineer,
attended his renowned classes. And young Einstein got more than a celebrated teacher, he got a
peek at the most up-to-date scientific equipment around. This happened because Berlin was
anxious to make Luitpold a demonstration school. Through Siemens and others, an industrial
machine, the "unipolar inductor," was sent to Luitpold for the students to study first-hand--a rare
"laboratory" piece for a Hochschule, let alone a Gymnasium. The particular use of this
demonstration apparatus was to illustrate the production of electricity by magnetic motion. h
--------------(h) More to the point, this apparatus originated with Arago in 1820's, the very time that Oersted's
magnetism-motion-electricity analogy was puzzling Faraday. This so-called "Arago's wheel"
offered a crucial puzzle to the English electromagnetic speculators, Herschel and Babbage, and
Faraday triumphed in his subsequent account of the operation of "fields" in this apparatus. Thus,
in Einstein's day the gadget illuminated more the theoretical agenda of fields than the technical
agenda of power-production.
------------It is rather too easy to make too much or too little of the effect of education on the mature
work of an individual, but Einstein was so hostile to his Munich Gymnasium that it is only fair to
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point out that it was, in fact, part of the reform movement. Peyenson tentatively noted Einstein's
own "dismissal" of this part of his life this way:

Einstein's appeal [to the virtues of Swiss "democratic" education]--if
indeed, that is what he intended--is an unequivocal rejection of his years at the
progressive Luitpold Gymnasium. We can only speculate on what irreparable
damage might have been inflicted on the young genius had Einstein attended a
more traditionally inclined secondary school.53

There were other chances for Einstein to become indoctrinated into the one of the competing
agendas, all similarly controversial. There was his re-entrance to a prep-school in Aarau in order
to qualify for E.T.H. in Zurich. He was able to escape Greek and Latin after all, and developed a
fondness for his "Swiss" education there. He boarded with a kindly history professor (whose son
married Einstein's sister, Maja, and whose daughter married his best friend, Michelangelo
Besso54) and passed (on second try) the exams for E.T.H. The significance of this in the later
school-wars was that the Aarau school was to be celebrated as a victory for the progressives over
conservative Luitpold. This was a bit of an illusion, arising because Aarau happened to be in the
canton Aargau, the "home" of the demonstration school (for orphans of the Napoleonic wars) of
the reformer Johann Pestalozzi. Historian Gerald Holton found that Einstein's school had been
founded by partisans of Pestalozzi, and suspected that the spirit of that movement (particularly its
emphasis on "visual understanding") was an influence:
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So it may not be an accident that Einstein became aware of the strength of
his genial scientific imagination at this particular school; here, at last, he was in a
place that did not squash, and may well have fostered, the particular style of
thinking that was so congenial to him.55

Peyenson, however, suggests that the school had developed a bad local reputation, and, in
order to make it qualify as a "feeder" school for E.T.H., the townspeople had collected funds to
revive it along the lines of the proposals of Helmholtz's commission. It became called
Reformschule (combination Gymnasium and Realschule),56 and it is not clear whether the
success of its students, including Einstein, came from its old or new agendas.
Having stumbled across Einstein as a casualty of the Schulkrieg, we might wonder about that
description of "that particular style of thinking that was so congenial to" him. In part, Holton
used the phrase to point to Einstein's infamous use of Gedankenexperimenten and to the peculiar
non-mathematical, analogical character of the kind of "proofs" he adduced. Holton and others
refer to this as a "visual imagination," while we here assert that it was precisely the method of
analogy that Maxwell had spoken of years before. If this was the case, then where did Einstein
learn of the agenda? Luitpold? Aarau? Maybe both or neither. Or, perhaps he had to wait until
college, where he would have come into direct contact with the styles of Maxwell, Boltzmann,
and Helmholtz.
Of course at the E.T.H. Einstein studied physics, but apparently not very diligently. He was
distracted from classes, as he was then in love with a fellow physics student, Mileva. And, some
say, the physics taught at E.T.H. was not of the university calibre of, say, Berlin or Vienna, so the
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details of the atom-wars were not standard undergraduate fare. If so, how did it come to be that
Einstein became qualified to be an inheritor of both the Maxwell-Boltzmann heat agenda, and the
Maxwell-Helmholtz light dilemma?

ENTER EINSTEIN

Gerald Holton's dramatic 1968 study of "Influences on Einstein's Early Work"57 looked
elsewhere than college for the sources of Einstein's agenda. In addition to Einstein’s dismissal of
his college education, Holton cites a passage from classmate Louis Kollros on Einstein’s selfeducation:

There was not very much theoretical physics done at the Poly [E.T.H.],
which was strong in mathematics...[Weber's] lectures concerning classical physics
were lively, but we waited in vain for an exposition of Maxwell's theory...Above
all, it was Einstein who was disappointed...In order to fill the gap, he undertook to
study on his own the works of Helmholtz, Maxwell, Hertz, Boltzmann, and
Lorentz.58

The recently published love-letters from Einstein to his schoolmate and later wife Mileva Maric
confirms his debt to the founders. Young Einstein often mentions tomes by Helmholtz, Hertz,
Boltzmann, and others. Perhaps overestimating the romantic spirit of Helmholtz, he wrote:
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[1899] I can already imagine the fun we'll have. And then we'll start in on
Helmholtz's electromagnetic theory of light, which I still haven't read--(1) because
I'm afraid to, and (2) because I didn't have it.59

More seriously, he was then struggling with the obscure key to mixed mathematics, Hamilton's
principles:

[1899] I returned the Helmholtz volume and am now rereading Hertz's
propagation of electric force with great care because I didn't understand
Helmholtz's treatise on [Hamilton's] principle of least action in electrodynamics.60

Of Boltzmann, young Einstein approved his taking the metaphor of "atoms" literally:
[1900] The Boltzmann is absolutely magnificent...He's a masterful writer.
I am firmly convinced of the correctness of the principles of his theory,. i.e., I am
convinced that in the case of gases, we are really dealing with discrete mass points
of definite finite size which move according to certain conditions. Boltzmann
quite correctly emphasizes that the hypothetical forces between molecules are not
an essential component of the theory, as the whole energy is essentially kinetic in
character.61

But perhaps not literal enough:
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[1901] I'm presently studying Boltzmann's gas theory again. It is all very
good, but not enough emphasis is placed on a comparison with reality.62
[1902] [Habicht is] very enthusiastic about my good ideas and is pestering
me to send to Boltzmann the part of the paper which relates to his book. I'm
going to do it.63

Einstein apparently did correspond with Boltzmann until the latter's suicide in 1906.64
Later, Einstein, in his famous Autobiographical notes, repeated his debt to the writings of
Kirchoff, Helmholtz, and Hertz. Most helpfully, Holton's research turned up another author, one
August Föppl. This discovery spawned an industry of Föppl comments among historians, for
Holton showed that it was likely that Einstein had relied directly on him for the framework of
his 1905 paper on "Electrodynamics of Moving Objects," otherwise known as the "Relativity
paper."
Föppl came to the center of the Munich educational reform movement with his text,
"Introduction to Maxwell's Theory of Electricity" (1894), and his appointment to the
strength-of-materials laboratory at the Munich Technische Hochschule in the same year.65 He
was no mandarin (though his Ph. D. was from Leipzig), but a professorial engineer. He helped
design the Markthalle in Leipzig, and in 1892, "was called to the University of Leipzig to teach,
of all things, agricultural machinery."66
In keeping with the progressive spirit, Föppl addressed his text to the engineer, not to the
philosophic combatants in the atom wars. He does declare his opinion in a later work, "Lectures
on Technical Mechanics" of 1898, where he reveals his "antimetaphysical and self-conscious
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empiricism" (Holton's phrase) by complaining of philosophy:

[the meaning of `experience' in Mechanics] is now, of course, no longer a
question of mechanics, but a philosophical and epistemological question. Its
discussion can, however, not be circumvented in an introduction to mechanics, no
matter how, on the basis of earlier unfavorable experiences, one may shy away
from teaching on philosophical questions.67

Föppl also names his models for clear physics--Kirchoff, Hertz, and Mach, and this
advertisement for "antimetaphysicalism" was a big hit--selling nearly 100,000 copies
world-wide.68 The earlier (and nearly as successful) text on Maxwell's theory, however, was not
as clear on its metaphysics--or, more accurately, it was not so clear what the material and
metaphysical implications of Maxwell's equations were in that time of the aether wars.
Buchwald notes:

Föppl's work (which was recommended to all by Heaviside [1897] in his
review condemning Boltzmann [1891] as non-Maxwellian) is the only one of
these six texts [Poincaré, Boltzmann, Föppl, Helmholtz, Drude, and Volkmann]
which does not rely on Helmholtzian theory but concentrates instead on fluxes
and intensities. Nevertheless, it continues to regard electricity as substantial...Of
all the texts, though, Föppl's comes closest to proper Maxwellian concepts. This
was one of the texts from which Einstein learned electromagnetism.69
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Now we have a muddle. Was it, after all, the philosophy of Maxwell--neo-Kantianism--rather
than that of Mach--anti-idealist--whose intentions lay buried in this artifact of Föppl?
Further digging has just complicated the confusion. On the metaphysical side we find that
Einstein took an unusual number of courses from a very abstract mathematics professor,
Hermann Minkowski. Like Helmholtz, Minkowski was a Königsberg Ph.D. He had studied
physics with Hertz, and advocated Kronecker's "whole-number" program in class.70 Much as
Helmholtz had tried to apply Riemann's geometry to physics, Minkowski became famous for
incorporating Einstein's 1905 Electrodymanics ("Relativity") into a geometric format (arguably
non-Euclidean), and authored the term "space-time" for which Einstein was henceforth
celebrated. Predictably, he did all this from Klein and Hilbert's Göttingen, where he went after
the E.T.H. He died young, in 1909, and the legend he has accumulated makes it almost
impossible to gauge the extent (or philosophical thrust) of his influence on Einstein, or of
Einstein on him. Some see Minkowski's translation of "Relativity" into Geometry as taking it
away from Einstein's intentions; some see it as formalizing (Göttingen-style) Einstein's
intentions. Einstein saw it both ways (he was notorious for his contradictory philosophical
reminiscences). Thus the question of whether those intentions were idealistic or positivistic
becomes further muddled.
Yet more muddle. In addition to his extra-curricular readings, Einstein chose some elective
studies at E.T.H. These included Swiss-banking and, at extra cost (a severe hardship for
Einstein), Goethe!71 On the other (positivistic) hand, he was much taken by his friend Besso's
life-long allegiance to Machism, and was himself a close reader of Mach at E.T.H. When he
took to tutoring, his first pupil, Maurice Solovine, a philosophy student who wanted to know
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some physics, Einstein started him on Karl Pearson's The Grammar of Science, and then Mach!72
Next to Mach, Pearson was probably the best known advocate of the proto-positivist principle of
"the economy of thought"--that is, that mathematical ideas were merely convenient summaries of
observations of the senses. He is perhaps better known to life-scientists as the powerful
proponent of the use of statistical measurements in biology--the inventor of "Biometrics" and the
founder of the journal of that name.
So there were idealist, materialist and positivist forces working on young Einstein. Which
predominated in his professional agenda? We argue that the balance is on the side of the Scottish
philosophy. Note his penchant for thought-experiments (Gedankenexperimenten)--again
Holton's phrase "that particular style of thinking that was so congenial to him." Note his specific
mixed-mathematical treatment of the equations of Lorentz, FitzGerald, and Maxwell. Note the
widely reported influence of Kant, whom Einstein, like Maxwell and Helmholtz, read in his
teens--the impressionable years. Note the "other papers" of 1905--one of them on "classical"
thermodynamics in the style of Helmholtz. In fact, this had evolved from an attempted Ph.D.
thesis (from the University at Zurich, not the E.T.H.) in fluid viscosity. This work in turn grew
from his first paper on the subject ("capillarity"), which he sent to, of all people,
Naturphilosopher Ostwald, in hopes of a job.i This study of viscosity and diffusion was in the
line of work that led
--------------(i) He also applied to Leiden, where the laboratory of Kammerlingh-Onnes was developing the
subject of very-low temperatures--this would become a specialty of Nernst at Berlin.
--------------535

Einstein's name to be linked with Perrin as the final vindicator of the atomic theory.
Note finally Einstein's other "other paper" of 1905, the famous "photoelectric theory"--the one
cited in his Nobel citation (relativity was a dubious business in the 1920's). In this paper he took
up the explosive problem of the interaction of radiation with (heated) matter--Maxwell vs.
Maxwell. He hadn't invented the problem (or its equations), Max Planck had done that in 1900.
What Einstein did was to show that certain of Planck's equations, and those of a predecessor,
Wilhelm Wien, could be produced by use of another analogy than Planck's equilibrium
thermodynamics. The proposed alternate analogy was taken from Boltzmann's statistical
thermodynamics! Since wasn't then aware of Gibbs's progress he had to reinvent for himself
some of Gibbs' methods.
This analogy has become legendary. The studies that followed it are now known as the
("old") quantum theory, for Niels Bohr later used the Planck-Einstein method to describe the
behavior of J.J.'s electrons in Rutherford's atoms. The description "Photoelectric Theory" came
not from the main subject of the paper, but from one of Einstein's examples of the application of
his and Boltzmann's methods. This afterthought involved an analogy to the experiments by Hertz
and Lenard in which an ultraviolet light bath changed the strength of Kathode rays in a Crookes'
tube. The enhancement of the Kathode rays by the light was known as "the photoelectric effect."
In Einstein's analogy it happened that there need be no commitment to whether the light, or
Kathode rays were aethereal or material. We expected that from a descendent of Fourier.
There was another example in this paper, an analogy that might "explain" the production of
mineral light called "fluorescence." These obvious connections to Becquerel, Lenard, Röntgen,
et. al., are reminders that Einstein was by that time reasonably conversant with the research
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puzzles around him. And he addressed them with analogies. What then was this method called
by Einstein? He titled the paper "On a Heuristic Point of View about the Creation and
Conversion of Light"! Shades of Vaihinger! The meat of the paper held that the Wien-Planck
formulas could be viewed `as if' light were composed of countable "rays" rather than aether
vibrations. If this analogy were chosen, we could then assign statistical thermodynamic quantities
to the light, be it Becquerel's fluorescent light, Lenard's ultraviolet, or, in the central analogy, The
Planck-Wien "radiation" given off by heated objects. Once having a countable number of
"energy carriers," (rays or "lichtstrahlen”), we could distribute energy and entropy among them
via Boltzmann factors, and quantitively predict the distribution of colors, the spectrum, of heated
objects (Kirchoff's concern), or the enhanced energy of Lenard's Kathode rays, or any other
situation involving a mixture of heated mater and electromagnetic radiation.
Later this "heuristic" use of rays would evolve into the notion that optical formulas could be
derived `as if' light were microscopic "particles" called "photons." These would be unusual
particles indeed--of zero size and having a penchant for disappearing on contact with matter. This
notion was so peculiar that historians still debate whether Einstein (or anybody else) really
"believed" in such an idea. In similar cases Maxwell, it seems, and Helmholtz too, "believed" in
their aethers, but were quick to always point out that such a belief was not part of the agenda.
Their light acted `as if' it were oscillations of an ether, which acted `as if' it filled space. It should
be no problem that in other analogies light acted `as if' there were "photons" and no aether.
Heuristics are fictions. Vaihinger thought they were necessary, Einstein thought they were at
least useful. Mach thought so too, though the "use" to which Maxwell's and Einstein's fictions
were to be put is obviously more Kant's than Mach's.
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What did Einstein himself say? Many contradictory things, but we might best leave him
arguing the philosophy of science at a coffee house in Prague in 1911. Most recall that he was
then hatching his General Relativity--astrophysical ideas by using non-Euclidean geometry in
gravity theory. He was treating gravitational relationships of stars and light beams `as if' they
were merely consequences of peculiar natural geometries of the cosmos. But we might reflect on
how he got to Prague--he was chosen by the education commissioners of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire because he was thought to be a Machist, hence the best choice to sit in Mach's former
chair at Prague.73 He had qualified for professorial status by his Ph.D. from Zurich, and then a
teaching job there, from which his reputation as a Machist entered academic circles. Actually, not
everybody thought him so, as we can see in a letter from a competing candidate for the Zurich
job, Friedrich ("Fritz") Adler (later to gain Socialist hero status by assassinating the Austrian
prime minister) wrote a famous description of young Albert:

[the other candidate] is a man named Einstein, who studied at the same
time I did. We even heard a few lectures together. Our development is seemingly
parallel: He married a student at about the same [time] as I, and has children. But
no one supported him, and for a time he half starved. As a student he was treated
contemptuously by the professors, the library was often closed to him, etc. He had
no understanding of how to get on with important people...
Finally he found a position in the patent office in Bern and throughout
the period he has been continuing his theoretical work in spite of all distractions.74
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That much is often quoted. What is less cited is the next sentence of that letter:

Today he is in the school of Boltzmann, and one of the most distinguished
and recognized. And this school, not that of Mach, is the mode today.

This distinct separation between the "school of Boltzmann," here taken to be a kind of
conservative Naturphilosophie, or at least Helmholtzian Kantianism, and the "school of Mach"
(proto-positivism) says volumes about the turn-of-the century "school-wars."
Even later, in the time of the "second scientific revolution," the new "Quantum Mechanics"
of 1925, this distinction between the empirically literal Machists and the heuristic
Maxwell-Boltzmannists was evident. Of one of the revolutionaries, Erwin Schrödinger,
biographer Walter Moore writes:

At this time, his philosophy of science (as distinct from his philosophy in
general) was derived in part from Mach and in part from Boltzmann, and any
synthesis of these conflicting elements must have seemed impossible. Moreover,
both physics and its philosophy were on the verge of revolutionary changes.75

So we had Einstein in Prague under somewhat mixed flags. A Boltzmannite in Mach's chair.
But we are trying to picture him in the coffee-house, specifically the "Cafe Louvre," not at the
university. There Einstein occasionally joined celebrated company of Prague intellectuals and
visitors. Hungarian academician Jozesf Illy recently described this salon:
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Apart from scientific and musical circles Einstein got into touch with a
group of German-speaking Jewish intellectuals consisting of professors, writers,
and librarians. This group...was often called the `Louvre Circle.' Some of its
members, under the leadership of Hugo Bergman, gathered under the hospitable
roof of Berta Fanta, wife of the owner of the pharmacy `Unicorn'...These
gatherings were called `Kant-Abende' [Kant Evenings] by the writer Max Brod,
since the main subject of discussion was Kant's Philosophy. Two years were
bestowed upon [Kant's] Prolegomena and the Critique of Pure Reason, then a
year was devoted to Fichte's Theory of Science and another year to Hegel.
The hard core of the `Kant-Abende' consisted of Bergman, Brod, Felix
Weltsch, a librarian and private philosopher, and Baron Ehrenfels, philosopher.
These four were surrounded by a variety of others...[including] Einstein and his
colleagues Hopf, Freundlich, and later Philipp Frank [later the Positivist's
representative at Harvard]. On rare occasions Franz Kafka made an
appearance...Bergman remembers that Einstein visited the circle when it was
discussing Hegel; Brod recalls how Einstein took parts in the debates on
Kant...Einstein's openness, objectivity, and intellectual audacity received literary
expression in Brod's novel Tycho Brahe's Way to God, in the form of some of
Kepler's attributes.76

So, far from being a spear-carrier in the new Viennese positivism, Einstein was apparently
immersed, as were his predecessors, in trying to reconcile the new physics of ethers and gas
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molecules with the old philosophy of innate categories of Kant and his Jena heirs.
Einstein himself tried to describe his own mode of mixed mathematics in a letter to the
mathematician Jacques Hadamard (who was writing a book on the psychology of creativity). He
said:

The words or the language, as they are written or spoken, do not seem to
play any role in my mechanism of thought. The psychical entities which seem to
serve as elements in thought are certain signs and more or less clear images...
There is, of course, a certain connection between those elements and
relevant logical concept...[resulting in a] rather vague play with the above
mentioned elements...This combinatory play seems to be the essential feature in
productive thought...
The above mentioned elements are, in my case, of visual and some of
muscular type...the play...is aimed to be be analogous to certain logical
connections one is searching for.77

Lest it be thought that Einstein was evolving too far from the Maxwell-Helmholtz agenda, we
consider his one famous foray into experimental demonstration: the "Einstein-de Haas"
experiment of 1915. The project was to try and demonstrate that the electric currents that
generated Maxwell's fields were themselves material--the actual flow of massive "electrons."
This was the great anomaly, the paradoxical junction between atomic matter, or here sub-atomic
matter, and immaterial fields, electric, magnetic, and optical. Following Maxwell and
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Helmholtz, theorist H.A. Lorentz (among many) conjured with material electronics and, in 1915,
his son-in-law Wander de Haas proposed to Einstein that they pursue this analogy in a laboratory.
As it was wartime and his own laboratory, the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physics, had delayed
construction, Einstein got a temporary laboratory at (where else?) the P.T.R. The experiment
involved jiggling a metal cylinder tethered to a glass fiber, hopefully inducing electron motion by
exposing it to varying magnetic fields. If the electrons had mass, their shifting should affect the
motions of the cylinder, and so they did. De Haas's results matched Einstein's calculations to
within ten percent (oddly, since the theory was off by a factor of two, as the later quantum theory
demonstrated).78 So, after-all, wasn't electric current "really" a material flow? But what about
Maxwell's famous "displacement currents" where empty space could behave "as if" there were a
current without mass? Clearly the material analogy was appropriate "play" for the one effect and
not the other. Paraphrasing Maxwell (who anticipated the Einstein-de Haas experiment), the
analogy is not in nature. It is a "free construction of a free mind," Einstein declared in his
oft-quoted Spencer Lecture of 1933. The experiment was for demonstration, not discovery. As
Einstein put it:

I am convinced that we can discover by means of purely mathematical
constructions the concepts and the laws...which furnish the key to the
understanding of natural phenomena. Experience may suggest the appropriate
mathematical concepts, but they certainly cannot be deduced from it. Experience
remains. of course the sole criterion of the physical utility of a mathematical
construction.79
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We remember Einstein, then, as a deliberate and worthy successor to the giant
scientist-philosophers: Maxwell, Helmholtz, Boltzmann, and Kant.
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EPILOGUE

The old Hermann von Helmholtz, recently arrived at the University of Chicago on a
ceremonial visit, could not fail to be impressed by 1893's major public spectacle in America, the
"Columbian Exposition." There were other cultural distractions to be sure. Dvorak, the director
of the New York Conservatory, had introduced his "New World" Symphony (No. 5). Poetry was
mourning the death of Walt Whitman (and Tennyson in England). It was surely the end of some
kind of era--Hippolyte Taine, the French positivist, had died, and Henry Ford had made his first
automobile. George Seurat of France had died too--perhaps the last hope of Helmholtz's early
color-theory to provide a basis for working artists, for Seurat was a fan of Charles Henry's
lectures at the Sorbonne. Henry had concocted a fantastically technical mathematico-physico
theory of vision--a Goethian study of the influences of color-mixes and line shapes on emotions.
Seurat's silly-smiled dancers were to express joy (according to Henry), but seemed to others to
represent decadence. Decadence was all the rage in Europe when Helmholtz left, but in
America, progress, Ford cars, electric gadgets, and industrial progress were the new agenda.
The Columbian Exhibition was staged to commemorate Columbus' invention of America in
1892 (the exposition slopped over until the next year, as such extravaganzas had done since the
"Great Exposition" of 1851). One big attraction was the forty-story engineering marvel by
George Washington Ferris--a wheel carrying boxes of 36 viewers each--built explicitly to outdo
the Eiffel Tower. Another attraction was the exotic dancing of "Little Egypt," whose antics
survived in memory much longer than the Ferris wheel. The similarities between Helmholtz'
exhibition and Maxwell's goes beyond the engineering competition between the crystal palace
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and the giant wheel. Instead of a greek nude, the 25 million visitors were titillated by a giant
chocolate Venus de Milo. For new age marvels the American fair showed zippers, Edison's
movies (the "Kinetiscope"), and music transmitted over telephone wires from New York. As
The 1851 Exhibition heralded the age of steel, the 1893 show boasted the age of electricity. It
was opened by President Cleveland's touching an ivory-and-gold key that lit a thousand-bulb
tower of light. Elevated electric trains carried visitors past electrically lit copies of Venetian
canals, and Mrs. Potter Palmer held forth at the Woman's building about the liberation of the
housewife through electric stoves, fans, and dishwashers. The exposition was supposed to uplift
the sagging American morale, beset as it was by the bread-lines of an economic crash, and the
company that won the electrical contract to stage the show was to be the nation's flagship of
technology; Westinghouse, with its newly perfect alternating current systems clearly outshining
Edison's dying dream of D.C. electrification. Westinghouse's master of ceremonies was a former
partner, an engineer whose inventive fame rivaled Edison's, Nikola Tesla. Tesla staged his
world-famous electrical light show, with Crookes tubes in his hands flashing colored lights
electrified by high voltage A.C. current running through his body (thus confounding Edison's
propaganda, including his sing-sing electric chair, that A.C. current was unsafe). Above the
Westinghouse exhibition hall glowed colored electrical discharge lamps in glass tubes handblown by Tesla himself--spelling out the names of his famous predecessors: Franklin, Faraday,
Maxwell, Hertz, and Helmholtz.1
But Helmholtz hadn't come to see all that. He had been invited to participate in ceremonies
marking the formal opening of the science laboratories of the new University of Chicago. This
was an opportunity for Helmholtz to meet his former students now in America. Passing by the
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East coast, he greeted the many American physicists who had visited him in Berlin to get ideas
for their new laboratories at Harvard, Yale, Columbia, and so on. Of course he saw his old
Heidelberg student, J. Willard Gibbs.
On to the "wild west" (as he satirically wrote about it), he was honored by (or honored) two
other American ex-students then at Chicago, Albert Michelson and Robert Millikan. We haven't
met this Millikan fellow, for he belongs to the twentieth century revolution in science leadership
(Caltech's version of Cambridge's Rutherford). Einstein would be lured to America by this man,
so an Einstein-Michelson meeting could take place, but Millikan's physics were skeptically
skewed from Einstein--he was no theorist, and didn't exactly trust them. Rather, Millikan was a
follower of the experimentalist doctrines of his eminent Chicago colleague, Michelson.
So Helmholtz met with Michelson for the first time since their joint experiments of 1880. He
had met with Vaihinger too, but nothing came of it. And nothing came of the last Michelson
meeting either, for the two were from different schools by then. Michelson was no
mathematician, and didn't understand the furor over Helmholtz's equations that, in part, his own
experiments (originally in collaboration with Helmholtz at Potsdam) had kicked up. He would
be even less enchanted with Einstein's 1905 furor, and the American meeting of those two would
be anti-climactic as well. As late as 1927, Michelson couldn't give up:

The existence of an ether appears to be inconsistent with the theory [of
relativity]...It is to be hoped that the theory may be reconciled with the existence
of a medium, either by modifying the theory, or, more probably, by attributing the
requisite properties to the ether.2
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The ceremonies over, Helmholtz returned to Germany, was hurt in an accident, and died the
next year. The agenda, however, was alive and well in the next generation. Not in Michelson,
Millikan or Rutherford, but in Einstein and a friend of his from Zurich, Erwin Schrödinger.
The detailed biography by Mehra and Rechenberg made it clear that Schrödinger's life and
work was, in effect, a reprise of Helhmoltz's in a twentieth century version.3 The parallels are
uncanny--artistic and philosophical intentions, early research in physiology and color theory,
schooling at Vienna, university chairs at Zurich and Berlin, rediscovery of Hamilton's methods
for an "undulatory" theory (of matter, not light), ambiguous help from the Göttingen
mathematicians, and so on. Ultimately, Schrödinger's "wave mechanics" of matter, a field
theory, suffered the same Cheshire-cat fate of the Maxwell-Helmholtz electromagnetic theory-the equations survived, but the intentions (and the analogies) faded away.
As in the case of Einstein, there was not a direct transmission of the oral tradition of neoKantianism to Schrödinger. Though he is considered Boltzmann's true pupil at Vienna,
Boltzmann had gone by the time Schrödinger got there, and he learned the method from
Boltzmann's ill-fated successor, Fritz Hasenhörl (Germany's tragic loss in the Great War).
Schrödinger was a Gymnasium product (only after most of his early schooling was at home), and
mastered Greek philosophy in the original language. Like Maxwell, he had no musical interests
to speak of, but a bent for many languages, and interests in theater and poetry (he published a
book of poems in 1949). His graduate work was marked by his Boltzmannian thermodynamics
and his absorption of the philosophical ("erkenninistheoretisch") outlook of Boltzmann, Mach,
and Kant. Atmospheric electricity, atomic physics, Einstein theory, and radiation were all
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research topics for Schrödinger when he succeeded Einstein at Zurich. Like Helmholtz, he
served in wartime (as an artillery officer), and like Helmholtz he pondered the epistemological
foundations of his work. He even took up Helmholtz and Maxwell's three-color theory, then
discredited, and tried to revive it by constructing non-Euclidian "hills and dales" over which
straight lines would connect colored patches and pass through other colors harmonious to them.
Schrödinger's long forgotten "color metric" was perhaps the last gasp of the Goethe-Helmholtz
connection between perception, emotion, and abstract mathematics.
Finally, Schrödinger is famous (he shared the 1933 Nobel Prize with Dirac) for his "wave
mechanics"--an abstract series of equations intended to evoke "analogies" (his term) between
light and undulations of "material field equations" (`as if' there was a material as well as a
luminiferous aether). The new guys from Göttingen--Born, Heisenberg, and Jordan--had a
different idea. In their “matrix mechanics” they explicitly rejected both analogies and Kant, and
though their formulas were shown to be equivalent to Schrödinger’s, their philosophy of the
“meaning” of theory was quite opposed. Thus the Einstein-Schrödinger "interpretation" of the
formalism fell to the Göttingen-Copenhagen "interpretation" (Bohr the Dane was involved too)
of what is called "Quantum theory."
But in the artifact, the equations of Schrödinger and Heisenberg, and their synthesis with
Einstein's by Dirac, there seems to remain a serious dilemma--their philosophical breeding may
not have disappeared. The infamous wave-particle duality, the pesky “measurement problem,
and various renormalizations and gravitational conflicts are ubiquitous. Recall Hertz: It is not a
problem with the world, but a problem with the nature of ideas–do such paradoxes in notions
have analogies in experience? To rephrase Maxwell's question: Are there analogies in nature?
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Are there paradoxes in analogies? Our heroes have expressed different combinations of
opinions: no-maybe (Maxwell), no-no (Hemholtz and Kant), yes-no (Kelvin), yes-yes
(Heisenberg), and no comment (Gibbs). But with the logical empiricist divorce of science and
philosophy, today's students view these issues with bemusement, if not disdain. Einstein
shuffled off to Princeton and Schrödinger to Dublin after World War II, to become famous, but
sort of comic, antiques. Their insistence that physics was a philosophical enterprise (and a neoKantian one at that) "proved" that they were not of new world of the "second scientific
revolution," although they made that revolution. Like the long line of predecessors, from
Lorentz and his equations to Helmholtz and his "Kraft," they had done the right things for the
wrong reasons. Or maybe not, for agendas, unlike battles, never "come out," they are only
abandoned--sometimes temporarily.
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